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THE   SERVICE 


OP 


Security  and  Information 


BY 

ARTHUR  L.   WAGNER,  Q.  Q^ 

Colonel  and  Assistant   Adjutant-General   U.  S.   Army;    Formerly 
Instructor  in  the  Art  of  War  at  the  U.  S.  Infantry  and  Cav- 
alry School;  Gold  Medalist  of  the  Military  Service 
Institution  of  the  United  States;  Author  of 
"Organization   and  Tactics,"  "The 
Campaign  of  Koniggratz, "  etc. 


ELEVENTH  EDITION, 

Revised  in  the  Light  of  Recent  American  Campaigns. 


Officially  Adopted  by  the  War  Department  as  a 
Manual  of  Instruction. 


HUDSON-KIMBERLY  PUBLISHING  CO., 

1014-1016  Wyandotte  Street, 

Kansas  City,  U.  S.  A. 


BOSTOl^  COLLEGE  LIBRARY 

CHESTiNUTHILL,MAJSS. 


Copyright  by 
ARTHUR  h.  WAGNER, 

1893. 


Copyright  by 

ARTHUR  Iv.  WAGNER, 

1896. 


Copyright  by 

ARTHUR  L.  WAGNER, 

1903. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  NINTH  EDITION. 


Since  this  work  was  first  presented  to  military  readers,  eleven  years  ago, 
it  has  gone  through  various  editions,  and  has  received  the  official  approval 
of  the  War  Department,  having  been  adopted  as  a  text-book  at  West  Point 
and  the  several  officers'  schools,  and  as  a  standard  in  the  examination  of 
officers  for  promotion.  The  author  is  encouraged  to  hope  that  this  revised 
edition  of  The  Service  oe  Security  and  Information  may  receive  the 
same  welcome  from  the  officers  of  the  Army  that  was  so  cordially  given  to 
previous  editions,  and  that  the  additional  matter  contained  herein  may 
meet  with  their  approval.  Since  the  book  was  first  issued  from  the  press, 
the  armies  of  the  United  States  have  been  engaged  in  active  campaigns  in 
Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  the  Philippine  Islands,  and  China,  and  the  principles, 
herein  set  forth  have  had  practical  application  in  war.  It  is  belived  that 
they  have  satisfactorily  stood  the  test. 

While  the  recent  campaigns  of  our  armies  in  the  West  Indies  and  the 
Orient  have  evolved  nothing  radically  new  on  the  subject  herein  treated, 
they  have  aft'orded  some  valuable  illustrations  of  the  application  of  old 
principles  to  new  conditions,  and  have  lent  additional  emphasis  to  many  of 
the  matters  set  forth  in  former  editions  of  this  work.  It  has  been  the  good 
fortune  of  the  author  to  participate  in  campaigns  in  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  and 
Luzon,  and  he  has  endeavored  to  verify  and  reinforce  his  own  observations 
by  consulting  many  officers  who  served  in  those  theaters  and  in  China. 
Among  the  officers  who  have  favored  him  with  their  views  he  would  espe- 
cially mention  General  J.  Franklin  Bell,  U.  S.  A.,  and  Major  C.  J.  Crane, 
Assistant  Adjutant -General,  formerly  Lieutenant-Colonel,  38th  Infantry, 
U.  S.  V. 

Headquarters,  Department  of  the  Lakes, 

Chicago,  Ilhnois,  May  8,  1903. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  THIRD  EDITION. 


The  gratifying  reception  accorded  to  the  first  and  second  editions  of 
The  Service  of  Security  and  Information  encourages  the  author  to  hope 
that  the  revised  edition  of  the  book  now  presented  may  not  be  unwelcome 
to  the  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  and  the  National  Guard. 

Profiting  by  the  kind  criticism  of  his  brother  officers,  and  by  his  own 
experience  in  using  the  work  for  more  than  two  years  as  a  text-book  at  the 
U.  S.  Infantry  and  Cavalry  School,  the  author  has  made  a  few  changes  in 
the  text,  which,  it  is  beUeved,  will  meet  with  approval ;  but  these  changes 
are  neither  so  many  nor  so  great  as  to  effect  any  radical  alteration  in  the 
work. 

The  author  desires  here  to  express  his  thanks  to  Captain  Eben  Swift, 
Fifth  Cavalry,  First  Lieutenant  A.  L.Mills,  First  Cavalry,  and  First  Lieu- 
tenant J.  T.  Dickman,  Third  Cavalry,  assistant  instructors  in  the  Art  of 
War  at  the  U.  S.  Infantry  and  Cavalry  School,  for  valued  suggestions  in 
the  revision  of  the  book. 

U.  S.  Infantry  and  Cavalry  School, 

Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas, 

February  i,  1896. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION. 


This  book  lays  claim  to  no  other  merit  than  that  of  being  an  earnest 
attempt  to  meet  the  demand,  often  expressed,  for  an  American  text-book 
on  the  subjects  herein  discussed.  Many  of  the  features  of  the  service  of 
security  and  information  are  common  to  both  hemispheres  and  to  all  armed 
forces,  whether  savage  hordes  or  highly  organized  armies.  Other  details 
of  the  same  science  vary  with  the  topography,  the  organization  of  the  army, 
national  characteristics,  and  the  nature  of  the  enemy  encountered.  It 
follows,  therefore,  that  a  text-book  on  this  subject  might  be  admirably 
adapted  to  the  requirements  of  European  officers  and  at  the  same  time  be 
in  some  respects  quite  unsuited  to  our  needs. 

Enghsh,  French,  and  German  military  writers  have  written  so  volumi- 
nously on  all  tactical  subjects,  that  the  author  has  found  a  wealth  of  val- 
uable books  at  hand  for  consultation;  and  he  has  discovered,  on  most  of 
the  important  points,  a  gratifying  unanimity  of  opinion  on  the  part  of 
writers  of  different  nations.  The  aim  of  the  author  has  been  to  select  the 
best  established  theories  of  European  tactical  authorities,  to  illustrate 
them  by  a  reference  to  events  in  otu-  own  miUtary  history,  and  to  apply  to 
them  the  touchstone  of  American  practice  in  war.  To  this  end  he  has  sub- 
mitted his  manuscript  to  several  officers  of  high  rank  and  distinguished 
ability,  who  have  criticised  it  in  the  light  of  their  own  extensive  military 
study  and  great  experience  in  actual  warfare. 

The  author  is  at  a  loss  for  an  adequate  expression  of  thanks  to  Briga- 
dier-General Thomas  H.  Ruger  and  Brigadier-General  Wesley  Merritt, 
U.  S.  A.,  for  the  valuable  criticism,  comments,  and  notes  with  which  they 
have  favored  him,  and  by  means  of  which  he  has  been  enabled  to  place 
upon  his  work  the  best  stamp,  as  it  were,  of  American  experience  in  war. 
He  desires  also  to  express  his  obligations  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  H.  S. 
Hawkins,  23d  Infantry,  lieutenant-Colonel  Guy  V.  Henry,  7th  Cavalry, 
Major  H.  C.  Hasbrouck,  4th  Artillery,  Major  C.  C.  C.  Carr,  8th  Cavalry, 
and  Major  J.  B.  Babcock,  A.  A.  G.,  for  valuable  information  and  com- 
ments. To  Lieutenant-Colonel  Henry,  Captain  E.  S.  Godfrey,  7th  Cav- 
alry, and  First  Lieutenant  Thomas  Cruse,  6th  Cavalry,  the  author  is  in- 
debted for  most  of  the  information  on  which  the  chapter  on  "Indian 
Scouting"  is  based.  To  Colonel  E.  F.  Townsend,  12th  Infantry,  Com- 
mandant of  the  U.  S.  Infantry  and  Cavalry  School,  in  compUance  with 
whose  order  this  work  has  been  written,  and  whose  steady  and  consistent 


6  PREFACE. 

encouragement  has  accompanied  it  from  its  inception  to  its  appearance  in 
these  pages,  the  author's  thanks  are  especially  due  and  gratefully  tendered. 

A  word  in  regard  to  the  form  in  which  this  book  makes  its  appearance 
may  not  be  out  of  place.  There  is  a  fashion  in  books,  as  in  all  other  human 
products ;  and  the  shape  in  which  some  of  our  most  valuable  military  man- 
uals have  appeared  would  seem  to  indicate  a  tendency  to  sacrifice  every- 
thing to  the  fancied  benefits  of  portabiUty;  military  books  being  printed 
in  small  type  to  reduce  them  to  a  proper  compass  to  fit  the  pocket — in 
which,  by  the  bye,  they  are  never  carried.  It  is  not  clear  that  this  fashion 
has  anything  to  recommend  it ;  while  anyone  who  has  noticed  the  impaired 
eyesight  of  many  of  the  graduates  of  our  officers'  schools  must  find  much  to 
condemn  in  a  typographical  style  which  seems  designed  mainly  for  the 
benefit  of  the  oculist.  It  is  hoped,  therefore,  that  the  typographical  dress 
of  this  volume  will  prove  a  welcome  innovation. 

The  plates  with  which  this  work  is  illustrated  are,  with  a  single  excep- 
tion, from  drawings  made  by  Lieutenant  C.  B.  Hagadorn,  23d  Infantry, 
whose  skill  and  accuracy  in  such  work  are  well  known,  and  to  whom  the 
author  desires  to  express  his  obhgations. 

A  list  of  books  consulted  in  the  preparation  of  this  work  is  given  below. 
Where  the  author  has  felt  under  special  obligations  to  any  particular  work, 
acknowledgment  has  been  made  in  the  text  or  in  a  foot-note.  In  many 
cases,  however,  the  words  of  several  authorities  on  the  same  subject  are  so 
similar  that  it  seemed  impossible  to  render  tribute  to  any  particular  one. 
The  author  accordingly  takes  pleasure  in  expressing  his  obhgations  gen- 
erally to  all  the  works  mentioned  in  the  following  list ;  more  especially 
to  De  Brack,  Riistow,  Von  Mir  us,  Clery,  Shaw,  Wolseley,  and  the  "  Guide 
Manuel  du  Chef  de  Patrouille." 

Cumberland,  Md.,  March  i,  1893. 


LIST  OF  BOOKS  CONSULTED  IN  THE  PREPARATION 
OF  THIS  WORK. 


Aperfus  sur  Quelques  Details  de  la  Guerre,  Bugeaud. 

Artillery  Drill  Regulations  (U.  S.). 

Art  of  War,  Jomini. 

Avant  Postes  de  Cavalerie  Legere,  De  Brack. 

Battles  and  Leaders  of  tlie  Civil  War. 

Campaigns  of  Stuart's  Cavalry,  H.  B.  McClellan. 

Catechism  of  Military  Training,  Marryatt. 

Cavalry  Field  Duty,  Von  Mirus  (tr.  by  Russell) . 

Cavalry  Drill  Regulations  (U.  S.). 

Cavalry,  Regulations  for  the  Movements  and  Instruction  of  (British) . 

Cavalry  in  Modern  War,  Trench. 

Conduct  of  a  Contact  Squadron,  De  Biensan  (tr.  by  Bowdler-Bell) . 

Duties  of  the  General  Staff,  Bronsart  von  Schellendorf . 

Dienstunterricht  des  Infanteristen,  Von  Waldersee. 

Elements  of  Modern  Tactics,  Shaw. 

Esprit  des  Institutions  MiUtaires,  Marmont. 

Extracts  from  an  Infantry  Captain's  Journal,  Von  Arnim  (tr.  by  East) . 

Guide  Manuel  du  Chef  de  Patrouille. 

History  of  the  Crimean  War,  Hamley. 

History  of  the  Peninsula  War,  Napier. 

History  of  the  War  with  Mexico,  Ripley. 

Infantry  Drill  Regulations  (U.  S.). 

Infantry  Fire  Tactics,  Mayne. 

Instruction  for  Cavalry,  Von  Schmidt. 

Johnston's  Narrative. 

JotuTial  of  the  Military  Service  Institution  of  the  U.  S.,  various  volumes* 

La  Petite  Guerre,  Riistow  (tr.  by  Savin  de  Larclause) . 

Letters  on  Cavalry,  Prince  Kraft  zu  Hohenlohe  Ingelfingen. 

Life  of  Andrew  Jackson,  Parton. 

Methodes  de  Guerre  Actuelles,  Pierron. 

Minor  Tactics,  Clery. 

Maximes  de  Guerre,  Napoleon. 

Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grant. 

Memoirs  of  W.  T.  Sherman. 

Memoirs  of  P.  H.  Sheridan. 

Napoleon's  Expedition  to  Russia,  Segur. 


8  LIST  OF   BOOKS  CONSULTED. 

Official  Records  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion. 

Operations  of  War,  Hamley. 

Precis  of  Modern  Tactics,  Home. 

R^glement  sur  le  Service  des  Arm6es  en  Campagne,  De  Savoye 

Service  d' Exploration  et  de  Sur6t6,  Bonie, 

Soldiers'  Pocket  Book,  Wolseley. 

Strategic  Service  of  Cavalry,  Bowdler-BeU. 

Strategischer  Kavalleriedienst,  Von  Widdern. 

Strategy  and  Grand  Tactics,  Dufoiur. 

Studies  in  Troop  Leading,  Verdy  du  Vemois. 

Tactical  Deductions  from  the  War  of  1870-71,  Boguslawski. 

Tactique  de  Pdrizonius. 

Tactique  des  Renseignements,  Lewal. 

The  Army  in  the  Civil  War  ("  Scribner  Series  ") . 

The  Franco-German  War,  Borbstaedt  (tr.  by  Dwyer). 

The  Franco-German  War,  Von  Moltke  (tr.  by  Bell  and  Fischei ). 

The  Nation  in  Arms,  Von  der  Goltz. 

War,  Clausewitz. 

War,  Maurice. 


CONTENTS. 


Preliminary  Definitions Page  13 

CHAPTER  I. 

INTRODUCTION. 

The  punctilio  of  private  combat  not  applicable  to  the  operations  of 
war. — Condition  of  an  army  taken  by  surprise. — Security  and  information 
inseparably  connected. — Information  necessary  for  a  commander. — How 
obtained. — Exceptions  in  former  wars. — Kind  of  information  considered 
in  the  subject  of  tactics Page  15 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE   ADVANCE   GUARD. 

Division  of  a  column  of  troops  on  the  march. — The  duty  of  the  advance 
guard. — Its  objects. — Its  strength. — The  several  parts  of  the  advance 
guard. — The  formation  of  the  advance  guard. — Distance  from  the  main 
body. — The  commander  of  the  vanguard. — Staff  oflScer  with  vanguard. — 
The  commander  of  the  advance  guard. — Halts. — Signals. — Compliments. — 
Cavalry  advance  guard. — Its  formation. — Advance  guard  of  all  arms. — 
Formation  modified  by  terrain. — Encountering  the  enemy. — Advance 
guard  of  a  division. — Advance  guard  of  an  army  corps. — Flank  guards. — 
Advance  guard  in  a  retreat Page  20 

CHAPTER  III. 

OUTPOSTS. 

Definition  of  outposts. — Historical  instances  of  evil  results  of  neglect 
of  outpost  duty. — Duties  of  outposts. — Subdivisions  of  the  outposts. — 
Two  systems  of  outposts. — Position. — Strength. — Composition. — Distance 
ol  outposts  from  the  main  body. — The  commander  of  the  outpost. — Sen- 
tinels and  vedettes. — Connecting  sentinels. — The  picket  sentinel. — Exam- 
ining posts. —  Detached  posts. —  Pickets. —  Supports.  —  Cossack  posts. — 
The  reserve. — The  outpost  at  night. — Outpost  patrols. — Visiting  patrols. — 
Reconnoitering  patrols. — Patrolling  posts. — Strong  patrols. — Posting  the 
outpost. — Defense  of  the  outpost. — Relieving  the  outpost Page  43 


lO  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

RECONNAISSANCE. 

Importance  of  reconnaissance. — Kinds  of  reconnaissance. — Recon- 
naissance in  force. — How  conducted. — Objections. — Historical  instances. — 
Special  reconnaissance.  —  Historical  instances.  —  Patrolling. —  Exploring 
patrols. — Small  infantry  patrols. — Composition. — Preparation  and  inspec- 
tion.— Signals. — Formation  of  the  patrol. — Conduct  of  the  patrol. — En- 
countering the  enemy. — Inhabitants. — Guides. — Reconnaissance  of  differ- 
ent kinds  of  ground. — Cross-roads. — Heights. — Defiles. — Bridges  or  fords 
— Woods. — Inclostures. — Houses.— Villages. — Cities  and  towns. — Recon- 
naissance of  the  enemy  in  position. — Reconnaissance  of  the  enemy  on  the 
march  — Signs  and  trails. — Reports. — Strong  infantry  patrols. — Expedi- 
tionary patrols. — Prisoners. — Harassing  patrols. — Flank  patrols. — The 
advance  guard  passing  through  a  town. — Cavalry  patrols. — Historical 
instances. — Connecting  patrols. — Pursuing  patrols. — Cychst  patrols. — 
Balloon  reconnaissance Page  82 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE    CAVALRY   SCREEN. 

Screening  and  reconnoitering  duty  in  the  Napoleonic  wars. — Revival 
of  the  duty  in  the  War  of  Secession. — The  cavalry  screen  in  recent  Euro- 
pean wars. — By  whom  the  duty  may  be  performed. — Distance  of  the  screen 
from  the  army. — Frontage  of  the  screen. — Formation  of  the  screen. — 
Typical  formation  of  a  cavalry  screen  consisting  of  a  brigade. — Horse  artil- 
lery with  the  brigade. — Patrols. — Bonie's  points. — Duties  of  the  scouts. — 
The  Uhlans  in  1870. — Officers'  patrols. — German  patrols  after  Spicheren. — 
Battle  of  Tom's  Brook. — Separation  of  the  duties  of  security  and  informa- 
tion.— Transmission  of  intelligence. — Contact  and  fighting. — Buford  at 
Gettysburg. — Protecting  the  infantry. — Seizing  important  points. — Bat- 
tle of  Hoover's  Gap. — Foraging. — Connecting  posts. — A  regiment  as  a 
screening  force. — Conclusions Page  134 

CHAPTER  VI. 

REAR   GUARDS. 

Effect  if  a  defeated  army  be  vigorously  pursued. — Vigorous  pursuits 
not  often  made. — Duty  of  the  rear  guard. — Ney's  method. — Strength  of 
the  rear  guard. — Morale. — Offensive  returns. — De  Fezensac  at  Smolensk. — 
Lee  at  Boonsboro. — Commander  of  the  rear  guard. — Distance  from  the 
main  body. — Formation  and  composition  of  the  rear  guard.— Typical  form- 
ations.— Withdrawal  from  action. — Communication  between  the  several 
parts  of  the  rear  guard  and  with  the  main  body. — Protection  of  the  flanks. 
— Conduct  of  the   rear   guard. — Riistow's  intermediate  body. — Contact 


CONTENTS.  1 1 

with  the  enemy  ^o  be  preserved. — Defiles. — Negative  measures. — John- 
ston's retreat  in  1863. — Sick  and  wounded. — Halts. — Retreating  by  par- 
allel roads. — When  line  of  retreat  is  changed. — Rear  guard  in  a  retrograde 
movement  which  is  not  a  retreat. — Rear  guard  as  delaying  force  when 
main  body  is  awaiting  battle  in  position. — Rear  guard  in  a  friendly  country, 
— In  a  hostile  country. — The  rear  guard  in  a  forward  march Page  1 59 

CHAPTER  VII. 

SPIES. 

MiUtary  and  civilian  spies. — When  the  services  of  spies  are  most  valu- 
able.— Persons  who  should  be  selected  as  spies. — Qualities  requisite  in  a  spy. 
— Compulsory  espionage. — Double  spies. — Conduct  of  the  service  of  espi- 
onage.— Concealment  of  messages. — Spies  as  a  check  upon  each  other. — 
How  spies  should  leave  and  return. — What  a  spy  should  report. — Means 
of  identification. — Stationary  spies. — Use  of  the  telegraph. — Guarding 
against  hostile  spies. — The  detection  of  spies. — Their  search. — The  man- 
agement of  the  secret  service Page  1 80 

NEWSPAPERS. 

Their  importance  in  war. — Newspaper  correspondents  "the  plague  of 
modem  armies." — Control  of  correspondents. — The  press  censor. — Not 
merely  the  great  newspapers  that  betray  information. — Means  of  utilizing 
reporters. — Punishment  for  indiscreet  or  mischievous  publication.  .Page  190 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

ORIENTATION   AND   MAP-READING. 

Definition  of  orientation. — Orientation  by  compass. — By  observing 
the  sun. — Use  of  a  watch  as  a  compass. — Orientation  by  observing  the 
moon. — By  observing  the  North  Star. — By  maps. — By  indications. — Prac- 
tice in  map-reading. — Measuring  distances  on  the  map Page  194 

CHAPTER  IX. 

INDIAN  SCOUTING. 

Apaches  as  small  infantry  patrols. — Scouting  methods  in  Arizona. — 
Skill  in  selection  of  positions  and  in  defensive  dispositions. — The  Sioux 
scout. — Crook's  march  from  Fort  Fetterman. — Scouting  methods  of  the 
Sioux. — Long-distance  reconnoitering. — The  Sioux  camps. — ^The  tactics  of 
the  Sioux. — Knowledge  of  geography  and  topography. — Observations- 
Page  199 
APPENDIX  I. 
Advance  guard  drill  (Infantry). — Advance  guard  drill  (Cavalry) .. Page  205 

APPENDIX  II. 

Questions  for  General  Review Page  213 

Index Page  237 


IIvLUSTRATIVE  PLATES. 


Outpost  Line,  Showing  Changes  Made  at  Night Frontispiece. 

Facing  Page 
I.     Company  of  Infantry  as  Advance  Guard 23 

II.     Battahon  as  Advance  Guard 24 

III.  Troop  of  Cavalry  as  Advance  Guard 29 

IV.  Illustrative  Variation  from  the  Normal  Formation  of  an  Ad- 

vance Guard 35 

V.     Order  of  March  of  a  Division  Acting  Independently 40 

VI.     Regiment  of  Infantry  as  Outpost  for  a  Division 48 

VII.     Squadron  of  Cavalry  as  Outpost  for  a  Cavalry  Brigade 49 

VIII.     Comparison  of  Cossack  Posts  with  the  Picket  System 67 

IX.     Patrol  System  of  Outposts 70 

X.     Patrols 115 

XI.     Advance  Guard  Entering  Franklin,  Tenn 122 

XII.     Cavalry  Screen  Consisting  of  One  Brigade 140 

XIII.  Cavalry  Screen  Consisting  of  a  Brigade  on  Two  Roads 142 

XIV.  Company  of  Infantry  as  Rear  Guard 1 66 

XV.     Troop  of  Cavalry  as  Rear  Guard 167 

XVI.     Orientation 198 


13 


PRELIMINARY  DEFINITIONS. 


Abatis — Rows  of  felled  trees,  with  the  smaller  branches  lopped  off,  and  the 
others  sharpened  and  turned  towards  the  enemy. 

Base — "A  base  of  operations  is  the  portion  of  country  from  which  the 
army  obtains  its  reinforcements  and  resources,  from  which  it  starts 
when  it  takes  the  offensive,  to  which  it  retreats  when  necessary, 
and  by  which  it  is  supported  when  it  takes  position  to  cover  the 
country  defensively.  The  base  of  operations  is  most  generally 
that  of  supply — though  not  necessarily  so,  at  least  as  far  as  food  is 
concerned." — Jomini. 

Billet — Quarters  provided  for  troops  in  private  houses,  barns,  etc.  Sol- 
diers billeted  generally  obtain  from  the  inhabitants  food  and  drink 
for  themselves  and  forage  for  their  horses;  payment  for  these 
suppUes  being  usually  made  at  the  rates  and  in  the  manner  pre- 
scribed in  regulations  and  orders. 

Bivouac — A  temporary  place  of  repose  for  troops,  in  which  they  are 
sheltered  by  shelter-tents,  bowers,  or  improvised  shelter  of  any 
kind,  or  sleep  in  the  open  air.  A  camp  differs  from  a  bivouac,  in 
that  the  men  are  sheltered  with  regular  tents.  Troops  are  can- 
toned when  sheltered  in  huts  or  billeted  in  villages. 

Communications — The  routes  (roads,  railroads,  etc.)  by  which  an  army 
communicates  with  its  base,  or  by  which  the  several  parts  of  an 
army  communicate  with  each  other. 

Com,pliments — Ceremonious  marks  of  respect  paid  by  officers  and  soldiers 
to  their  miUtary  superiors ;  such  as  saluting,  standing  at  attention, 
etc. 

Containing  Force — A  body  of  troops  charged  with  the  duty  of  holding  in 
check  a  body  (generally  numerically  superior)  of  the  enemy,  while 
the  main  efforts  of  the  army  are  directed  against  another  portion 
of  the  hostile  force. 

Cuartel — The  Spanish  word  for  barracks.  Habitually  used  in  the  Phil- 
ippines to  designate  also  ^a  rendezvous  or  a  store-house^of  the 
insurgents. 

Depth — The  space  occupied  by  a  body  of  troops  from  front  to  rear. 

Distance — The  space  between  bodies  of  troops,  or  individual  soldiers,  from 
front  to  rear. 

Escort  Wagon. — A  four-horse  wagon,  lighter  than  the  "army  wagon." 

Front — The  extent  of  ground  occupied  by  the  front  rank  of  a  body  of 
troops  in  any  formation. 

13 


14  PRELIMINARY  DEFINITIONS. 

Glacis — A  mound  of  earth,  with  a  gentle  slope  to  the  front,  thrown  up  a 
few  yards  in  front  of  the  ditch  of  a  fortification. 

Hike — An  expedition  in  search  of  an  enemy  whose  location  is  not  defini  ely 
known ;  the  operation  partaking  of  the  nature  of  a  reconnaissance 
in  force,  with  the  object,  however,  of  attacking  the  enemy  vigor- 
ously if  encountered,  and  incidentally  of  capturing  or  destroying 
any  supplies  of  the  hostile  force  that  may  be  found.  This  term, 
which  came  into  general  use  in  the  Philippine  campaigns,  is  pecu- 
liarly applicable  to  operations  against  guerrillas 

Impedimenta — Baggage,  and,  in  general,  anything  accompanying  troops, 
which  tends  to  impede  the  celerity  of  their  movement. 

Interval — The  lateral  space  between  bodies  of  troops  or  individual  soldiers. 

Morale — The  condition  of  troops  as  to  discipline,  bravery,  confidence,  or 
discouragement,  etc. 

Provost-Guard — A  guard  under  the  orders  of  a  provost-marshal. 

Provost-Marshal — An  officer  attached  to  the  headquarters  of  the  command- 
ing general  to  superintend  the  police  of  the  army;  to  provide  for 
the  protection  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  from  pillage  and 
violence ;  to  preserve  order  among  camp-followers ;  to  take  charge 
of  stragglers,  prisoners,  and  deserters;  and  to  superintend  the 
secret  service. 

Shrapnel — Called  the  "man-killing  projectile."  A  shell  filled  with  bullets, 
and  having  a  bursting  charge  only  sufficient  to  break  the  case  and 
release  the  bullets,  which  then  move  forward  with  the  velocity 
which  the  projectile  had  at  the  moment  of  bursting. 

Strategy — The  art  of  moving  an  army  in  the  theater  of  operations  with  a 
view  to  placing  it  in  such  a  position  relative  to  the  enemy  as  to 
increase  the  probability  of  victory,  increase  the  consequences  of 
victory,  or  lessen  the  consequences  of  defeat. 

Tactics — The  art  of  handling  troops  on  the  field  of  battle. 

Terrain — The  topography  of  a  field,  considered  especially  in  its  relation  to 
tactical  operations. 

Theater  of  War — "The  theater  of  war  comprises  all  the  territory  upon 
which  the  parties  may  assail  each  other,  whether  it  belong  to  them- 
selves, their  allies,  or  to  weaker  states  who  may  be  drawn  into  the 
war  through  fear  or  interest.  When  the  war  is  also  maritime,  the 
theater  may  embrace  both  hemispheres.  *  *  *  The  theater 
of  war  may  thus  be  undefined,  and  must  not  be  confounded  with 
the  theater  of  operations  of  one  or  the  other  army." — Jomini. 

Theater  of  Operations — "The  theater  of  operations  of  an  army  embraces  all 
the  territory  it  may  desire  to  invade,  and  all  that  it  may  be  nec- 
essary to  defend." — Ibid. 

Vedette — A  mounted  sentinel. 


CHAPTER  I. 


Introduction. 


It  is  pardonable  to  be  defeated,  but  never  to  be  taken  by  surprise. — 
Frederick  the  Great. 

If  Opposing  armies  could  march  unmolested  to  a  designated 
battle-field,  as  the  knights  of  old  repaired  to  their  tournaments, 
the  military  problem  would  consist  simply  in  drawing  up  the 
forces  in  order  of  battle,  and  nine-tenths  of  the  difficulties  of 
the  art  of  war  would  be  eliminated.  But  just  as  the  code  of 
ethics  which  governs  the  actions  of  individuals  is  varied  greatly 
when  applied  to  the  diplomacy  of  nations,  so  the  chivalry  and 
punctilio  of  private  combat  are  necessarily  lacking  in  the  opera- 
tions of  war.  It  is  the  duty  of  a  commander  to  assail  the 
enemy  imder  circumstances  most  unfavorable  to  the  latter  and 
most  advantageous  to  himself ;  to  catch  the  hostile  army  astride 
of  an  unfordable  stream,  or  divided  by  an  impassable  obstacle 
of  any  sort ;  to  assail  the  communications  of  his  opponent  while 
covering  his  own ;  to  surprise  him,  and,  in  brief,  to  take  advan- 
tage of  the  unfortunate  position  or  unskillful  dispositions  of  the 
foe,  and  to  guard  against  being  similarly  assailed  himself. 

An  army  taken  by  surprise  may  be  compared  to  a  sleeping 
man  attacked  by  a  well-prepared  enemy.  Astonishment,  con- 
fusion, and  alarm  are  opposed  to  coolness,  preparation,  and 
confidence;  and  severe  blows  are  received  before  any  can  be 
given  in  return.  The  surprised  army  must  possess  many  ele- 
ments of  superiority  over  its  assailant  to  be  able  to  overcome 
the  enormous  disadvantage  at  which  it  is  taken;  and  a  sur- 
prise generally  means  a  defeat. 

If  the  entire  army  were  constantly  on  the  alert,  its  surprise 
would  be  impossible :  so,  too,  if  the  plans  and  movements  of  the 

15 


1 6  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

enemy  were  accurately  known  by  the  commander,  siu-prise 
could  easily  be  avoided.  But  to  keep  the  entire  force  contin- 
ually on  the  watch  would  be  to  ruin  it  by  physical  hardship; 
and  a  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  movements  and  objects  is  gen- 
erally incomplete  and  usually  inferential.  To  guard  against 
surprise  without  making  undue  demands  upon  the  endurance 
of  the  soldiers,  use  is  made  of  covering  detachments,  which 
should  be  strong  enough  to  hold  the  enemy  while  the  main  body 
is  preparing  for  action.  On  the  march  the  security  of  the  army 
is  thus  provided  for  by  advance  guards,  rear  guards,  and  flank- 
ing detachments :  at  a  halt  a  chain  of  outposts  protects  it  from 
surprise. 

Information  in  regard  to  the  enemy  is  the  indispensable 
basis  of  all  military  plans,  and  nothing  but  faulty  dispositions 
for  the  sectuity  of  an  army  can  be  expected  if  such  information 
is  lacking.  Moreover,  the  covering  detachments,  being  nearer 
the  enemy  than  the  main  body  is,  are  charged  either  with  gain- 
ing this  information,  or  with  the  support  of  patrols  or  detach- 
ments engaged  in  scouting  and  observation.  In  military  science 
the  two  elements  of  security  and  information  are,  therefore, 
inseparable. 

The  information  necessary  for  a  commander  is  of  two  kinds : 

1.  That  relating  to  the  geography,  topography,  and  re- 
sources of  the  theater  of  operations. 

2.  That  which  relates  to  the  strength  and  composition  of 
the  enemy's  forces,  and  their  position,  movements,  and  morale. 

Among  military  nations,  the  first  kind  of  information  is  now 
generally  obtained  in  time  of  peace,  and  compiled  by  a  bureau 
of  military  intelligence  at  the  headquarters  of  the  army.  This 
has  not,  however,  always  been  the  case.  When  the  Crimea  was 
selected  by  the  Allies,  in  1854,  ^.s  a  theater  of  operations,  it  was 
practically  a  terra  incognita.     Hamley  says : 

"It  was  as  completely  an  unknown  country  to  the  chiefs 
of  the  allied  armies  as  it  had  been  to  Jason  and  his  argonauts 
when  they  journeyed  thither  in  search  of  the  Golden  Fleece. 


INTRODUCTION.  1 7 

It  was  known  to  contain  a  great  harbor,  and  a  city  with  docks, 
fortifications,  and  arsenal;  but  the  strength  and  resources  of 
the  enemy  who  would  oppose  us,  the  nature  of  the  fortifica- 
tions, and  even  the  topography,  except  what  the  map  could 
imperfectly  show,  lay  much  in  the  region  of  speculation."* 

Our  own  military  history  offers,  if  possible,  still  more  strik- 
ing instances.  Such  was  the  lack  of  information  concerning 
Mexico,  that  our  war  with  that  country  lasted  a  year  before 
definite  plans  of  campaign  were  adopted.  Taylor's  movement 
upon  Monterey  was  avowedly  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
information  respecting  the  capacity  of  the  country  to  sustain 
a  force  of  6,000  men  or  more;  and  Wool's  expedition  against 
Chihuahua,  undertaken  ttpon  insufficient  information,  termi- 
nated fruitlessly  at  Monclova,  more  than  three  hundred  miles 
from  its  objective. 

In  the  War  of  Secession  much  of  the  theater  of  war  had 
never  been  accurately  mapped,  and  in  many  instances  the 
topography  of  the  immediate  theater  could  be  learned  only 
by  reconnaissances  conducted  during  the  military  operations. 
In  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War,  General  McClellan  said :  ' '  Our  maps  proved  entirely 
inaccurate,  and  did  us  more  harm  than  good,  for  we  were 
constantly  misled  by  them."  In  his  report  he  states:  "The 
coimtry,  though  known  in  its  general  features,  we  found  to  be 
inacciu^ately  described  in  essential  particulars  in  the  only  maps 
and  geographical  memoirs  or  papers  to  which  access  could  be 
had.  Erroneous  courses  of  streams  and  roads  were  frequently 
given,  and  no  dependence  could  be  placed  on  the  information 
thus  derived.  Reconnaissances,  frequently  under  fire,  proved 
the  only  trustworthy  sources  of  information."  Delays  and 
embarrassments  were  caused  by  incorrect  maps  and  faulty 
topographical  information  in  Grant's  Virginia  campaign  also.f 

*"The  War  in  the  Crimea,"  page  24. 

tSee  Humphrey's  "The  Virginia  Campaign  of  '64  and  '65,"  pages  128 
and  211 ;  also  "Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grant,"  Vol.  II.,  page  243. 


1 8  SECURITY  AND   INFORMATION. 

Similar  dijBiculties  were  encountered  iu  Cuba  and  the  Phil- 
ippines. In  the  Santiago  campaign  the  only  detailed  maps 
of  the  theater  of  operations  were  those  prepared  daily  by  col- 
lating the  notes  and  sketches  made  by  ofl&cers  engaged  in  top- 
ographical reconnaissance.  In  the  Philippines,  map-making 
went  hand-in-hand  with  the  operations  of  the  American  troops 
and  many  parts  of  the  Archipelago  are  now  well  mapped ;  but, 
unfortunately,  these  maps  were  the  result  of  campaigns  in 
which  they  would  have  been  most  useful  at  the  beginning ;  and 
their  value  diminished  in  the  course  of  their  creation. 

A  great  nation  contemplating  the  possible  invasion  of  an- 
other highly  civilized  country  will  generally  possess  beforehand 
an  accurate  knowledge*  of  the  geography,  topograph}'-,  and 
resources  of  the  latter;  but  in  conducting  military  operations 
in  any  Central  American,  South  American,  or  Oriental  country, 
we!  should,  probably,  labor  under  the  same  disadvantages,  in 
this  respect,  that  we  have  encountered  in  our  former  wars ;  and 
topographical  reconnaissance  becomes  thus  a  matter  of  much 
importance  to  American  ofi&cers.  This  subject  belongs,  how- 
ever, to  military  topography  rather  than  to  tactics,  and  is  ex- 
haustively treated  in  several  well-known  works.* 

The  second  class  of  information-  is  gained  in  two  ways : 

1.  From  spies,  deserters,  prisoners,  newspapers,  etc. 

2.  By  reconnaissance. 

The  first  method  does  not  pertain  to  the  subject  of  tactics. 
All  the  information  gained  in  this  manner  is  collated  at  the 
headquarters  of  the  army,  to  which  all  information  in  regard 
to  the  enemy  should  be  sent  without  delay. f 

In  the  subject  of  tactics  we  have,  then,  to  deal  solely  with 
military  reconnaissance,  in  contradistinction  to  topograph- 
ical reconnaissance.  A  reconnaissance  may  be  effected  by 
forces  varying  in  size  from  a  single  scout  to  an  entire  division; 

*The  student  is  referred  to  Root's  "Military  Topography,"  and  to 
Chapter  VII.,  Vol.  I.,  and  Chapter  VIII.,  Vol.  II.,  of  Bronsart  von  Schel- 
lendorf's  "The  Duties  of  the  General  Staff"  (Hare's  translation), 

fFurther  on  this  subject,  see  Chapter  VII. 


INTRODUCTION.  I9 

and  the  reconnoitering  force  may  consist  of  infantry  or  cavalry, 
or  both,  of  all  three  arms,  or  of  cavalry  and  horse  artillery. 

To  gain  reliable  information  of  the  enemy,  contact  with 
him  should  be  quickly  gained  and  never  lost.  On  the  march 
bodies  of  cavalry,  pushed  out  in  advance,  come  in  touch  with 
the  advanced  parties  of  the  enemy,  which  they  endeavor  to 
drive  in  or  brush  aside,  at  the  same  time  covering  their  own 
army  with  a  veil  which  the  enemy  must  be  prevented  from 
penetrating.  If  the  army  is  at  a  halt,  and  the  enemy  is  ad- 
vancing, similar  reconnoitering  bodies  are  pushed  out  to  meet 
him  while  he  is  still  at  a  distance. 

Reconnaissance  is  thus  primarily  performed  by  a  screen  of 
cavalry  extended  well  to  the  front  of  the  main  body.  It  is  also 
conducted  by  bodies  of  troops  sent  out  from  the  main  body  or 
its  advanced  detachments  or  posts.  The  question  of  recon- 
naissance is  inseparable  from  each  of  the  subjects  considered 
in  the  following  chapters. 


CHAPTER  II. 


Thk  Advance  Guard. 


Marches  in  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy  can  not  be  made  with  too  much 
precaution  and  prudence. — Marmont. 

Troops  moving  in  one  body  would,  if  they  came  suddenly 
upon  the  enemy,  certainly  be  thrown  into  confusion,  and  per- 
haps defeated,  before  deployment  for  action  could  be  effected. 
Moreover,  insignificant  bodies  of  the  enemy  could  seriously 
delay  the  march  of  the  column  by  causing  it  to  halt  and  deploy 
for  action. 

A  column  of  troops  on  the  march  is,  therefore,  divided  into 
a  main  body,  an  advance  guard,  a  rear  guard,  and  such  flanking 
parties  as  may  be  necessary. 

The  objects  of  the  advance  guard  are,  in  general  terms,  to 
observe  and  to  resist ;  specifically,  they  are : 

1.  To  provide  for  the  sectuity  of  the  main  body  by  giving 
it  time  for  deployment  when  the  enemy  is  encountered. 

2.  To  clear  the  way  for  the  main  body  and  prevent  its 
march  from  being  delayed. 

3.  To  seize  and  hold  important  points  until  the  arrival  of 
the  main  body. 

4.  To  support  the  reconnoitering  cavalry,  and  afford  a 
rallying  point  for  it  in  case  it  is  driven  in  by  the  enemy.  Even 
when  a  cavalry  screen  is  operating  in  front  of  the  advance  guard, 
the  latter  should  not  relax  its  vigilance.  The  cavalry  may  be 
driven  in,  and  the  advance  guard  must  then  check  the  enemy. 
On  advance  the  security  of  the  column  must,  therefore,  depend 
essentially  upon  the  advance  guard. 

Strength. — The  proportionate  strength  of  the  advance 
guard  varies  with  the  size  of  the  main  body,  the  object  of  the 


STREINGTH   OF   THE   ADVANCE   GUARD.  21 

march,  the  topography  of  the  country,  and  the  nature  of  the 
enem3^  In  a  close,  rugged  country,  and  against  an  enemy 
inferior  in  numbers  and  morale,  it  should  be  less  than  in  an 
open  country,  against  a  strong,  aggressive  enemy,  or  when  the 
intention  is  to  bring  on  a  decisive  engagement.  With  a  large 
force  the  proportionate  strength  of  the  advance  guard  is  larger 
than  in  the  case  of  a  small  column.  No  absolute  rule  for  the 
strength  of  the  advance  guard  can  be  given.  If  too  weak,  it 
can  not  fulfill  its  proper  functions ;  if  too  strong,  there  will  be 
a  hurtful  waste  of  energy,  for  service  with  the  advance  guard  is 
much  more  fatiguing  and  exhausting  than  marching  with  the 
main  column.  Moreover,  a  strong  advance  guard  has  a  tend- 
ency to  engage  an  enemy  seriously,  even  when  its  duty  requires 
that  it  should  merely  fight  a  delaying  action  to  gain  time  for 
'the  main  body. 

As  a  general  rule  (subject,  however,  to  a  multitude  of  excep- 
tions), we  may  assume  the  strength  of  the  advance  guard  to  be 
one-sixth  of  the  whole  force,  and  the  rear  guard  to  be  half  as 
strong  as  the  advance  guard.  On  a  retrograde  movement  the 
relative  strength  of  the  advance  and  rear  guards  must  be  re- 
versed. The  flanking  parties  are  taken  from  the  advance  and 
rear  guards,  except  in  the  case  of  very  large  forces,  when  they 
would  be  separate  bodies  of  a  strength  according  to  circum- 
stances. Thus  we  have  about  a  fourth  of  the  whole  force  on 
duty  with  the  covering  detachments  on  the  march. 

With  a  small  force  the  advance  guard  m-ight  be  reduced 
to  one-eighth,  or  even  one-tenth,  of  the  whole.  The  time  re- 
quired for  the  deployment  of  a  large  column  (such,  for  in- 
stance, as  an  army  corps)  being  much  greater  than  in  the  case 
of  a  small  force,  the  delaying  action  of  the  advance  guard  must 
be  much  longer,  and  its  strength  much  greater.  In  the  Franco- 
German  War  the  German  columns  sometimes  pushed  forward 
half  of  their  force  as  advance  guard,  and  never  less  than  one- 
fourth.  But  this  proportion  can  not  be  recommended ;  for  no 
advantage  worth  considering  seems  to  have  been  gained  by 
these  great  advance  guards,  while  they  frequently  brought  on 


22  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

battles,  as  at  Spicheren,  Worth,  and  Colombey,  contrary  to  the 
wishes  and  plans  of  the  commanding  general.  In  view  of  this 
tendency  of  large  advance  guards  to  commit  themselves  to 
serious  engagement.  Von  der  Goltz  says :  "The  advance  guard 
must  be  only  small.  It  was  formerty  the  rule  to  employ  a 
third  or  fourth  part  of  aU  the  troops  on  this  duty.  The  justifi- 
cation of  this  proportion  appears  very  doubtful.  The  com- 
mander-in-chief parts  with  a  considerable  portion  of  his  own 
troops,  and  creates  an  independent  will  beside  his  own."  A 
large  advance  guard,  by  engaging  seriously,  is  likely  to  defeat 
the  object  for  which  it  is  created;  for  instead  of  gaining  time 
for  the  main  body  to  deplo}',  it  hurries  it  into  action.  Von  der 
Goltz  adds:  "The  experience  of  the  late  wars  has  taught  us 
that  the  main  body  never,  as  a  rule,  deplo3^ed,  because  the  urg- 
entl}"  needed  assistance  required  by  the  advance  guard  when 
struggling  with  a  superior  enemy  demanded  that  the  troops 
should  be  led  by  driblets  straight  into  the  battle."  It  seems, 
therefore,  that,  even  in  the  case  of  large  forces,  the  advance 
guard  should  not  have  so  great  a  proportionate  strength  as  the 
Germans  gave  it,  and  that  it  should  be  so  composed  as  to  admit 
of  its  withdrawal  from  action,  if  desirable,  without  precipi- 
tating a  battle. 

Formation. — An  advance  guard  consists  of  a  series  of  de- 
tachments increasing  progressively  in  size  from  front  to  rear, 
each  being  charged  with  the  duty  of  protecting  from  surprise 
the  body  immediately  following  it  and  gaining  time  for  the 
latter  to  prepare  for  action. 

The  advance  guard  is  divided  into  two  parts:  the  reserve 
and  the  vanguard.  The  reser\^e  consists  of  from  one-third  to 
one-half  of  the  entire  advance  guard.  The  remainder  consti- 
tutes the  vanguard,  which  is  divided  into  the  advance  party 
and  the  support,  the  latter  being  generally  twice  as  strong  as 
the  former.  In  large  advance  guards  this  proportion  is  often 
different;  the  support,  relatively  to  the  advance  party,  and 
the  reserve,  relatively  to  the  vanguard,  being  considerably 
greater.     These  proportions  are,  moreover,  varied  according 


PLATE     I. 


COMPANY    OF    INFANTRY  AS    ADVANCE  GUARD. 

i     4         150YDS     j,        ISO  YDS      ** 
flankers     4^  >  ,•     Flanl<ers 

4   '■---  g        .--'"  * 


/  Section  SfB  Advance  Party 


4  4 

F/anlrers    4  .  .  _ 

4 


4?« 


44 

,--4      Flankers 

4 


1  Section      BV    -Support' 


*"4 


/  RJatoon 


4  '4 


Reserve 


This  normal  formation  is  not  to  be 
taken  as  an  invar/able  guide,  but  merely 
ai  a  model  requiring  more  or  less  variation 
according  to  circumstances .    It  is  very  rarely 
that  a  normal  formation  Can  be  used 
without  considerable  change 


4  14 


MA/N  BODY 


FORMATION  OF  THE)  ADVANCE  GUARD.  23 

to  the  most  convenient  subdivisions  of  the  organizations  com- 
posing the  advance  guard.  They  may  be  regarded  as  suitable 
inmost  cases. 

The  following  is  given  as  a  typical  (but  by  no  means  in- 
variable) formation  of  a  company  forming  the  advance  guard 
of  the  battalion.     (See  Plate  I.) 

The  advance  party  (one  section)  throws  forward  a  "point" 
consisting  of  three  or  four  men  under  a  non-commissioned  offi- 
cer. On  each  side  a  flanking  group  of  four  men  marches  about 
150  yards  from  the  main  route  to  the  right  and  left  rear  respect- 
ively of  the  point.  Each  flanking  group  should  be  under  a  cor- 
poral or  old  soldier,  and  would  habituall}'-  march  with  two  men 
in  front  and  one  in  rear  of  the  group  leader,  though  the  forma- 
tion adopted  would  depend  upon  circumstances.*  The  rest  of 
the  advance  party  follows  loo  yards  in  rear  of  the  point. 

The  support  (one  section)  follows  the  advance  party  at  a 
distance  of  200  3^ards,  throwing  out  two  flanking  groups  of  four 
men  each  to  its  right  and  left  front,  and  somewhat  farther  out 
than  the  flankers  of  the  advance  party.  These  groups  can 
safely  move  farther  out  than  those  of  the  advance  party,  thus 
extending  the  field  of  view;  while  each  can,  if  necessary, 
protect  by  its  fire  the  outer  flank  of  the  group  in  front.  All 
flanking  groups  should  be  relieved  every  hour,  if  practicable, 
as  their  duty  is  much  more  fatiguing  than  that  of  the  men 
marching  on  the  main  route.  A  connecting  file,  detached  from 
the  advance  party,  marches  between  the  advance  party  and 
the  support  to  aid  in  the  transmission  of  intelligence  from  one 
to  the  other.  On  many  roads  bicycles  can  be  advantageously 
used  by  the  connecting  files. 

The  reserve  marches  about  500  yards  in  rear  of  the  sup- 
port, a  connecting  file  marching  between  them.  The  reserve 
may  throw  flanking  groups  to  the  front  or  to  the  front  and  rear, 
the  groups  being  slightly  farther  out  than  those  of  the  support. 
The  flankers  from  the  reserve  can  generally  be  dispensed  with, 


^See  chapter  on  "Reconnaissance." 


24  SECURITY   AND  INFORMATION. 

and  should  be  thrown  out  only  when  reasonable  prudence  re- 
quires them ;  for,  as  a  rule,  the  reserve  should  be  kept  entire 
and  well  in  hand. 

The  main  body  follows  the  reserve  ac  500  yards,  one  or  two 
connecting  files  marching  between  the  two  bodies. 

The  distances  given  above  are  all  variable;  but  those  from 
the  support  to  the  reserve,  and  from  the  reserve  to  the  main 
body,  can  not  prudently  be  made  more  than  600  or  800  yards, 
respectively,  in  the  case  of  so  small  a  force  as  the  one  consid- 
ered. In  the  case  of  a  single  company  acting  as  an  advance  guard, 
the  rule  for  the  proportionate  strength  of  the  advance  party 
and  the  support  is  necessarily  modified  to  accord  with  the  most 
convenient  subdivisions  of  the  company.  Moreover,  the  nattue 
of  the  terrain  will  often  render  necessary  very  considerable 
modifications  of  the  normal  formation  of  the  advance  guard.* 

When  the  advance  guard  consists  of  a  battalion,  the  first 
and  second  companies  constitute  the  vanguard,  and  the  third 
and  fourth  the  reserve.  In  this  case,  the  first  platoon  of  the 
first  company  constitutes  the  advance  party,  the  support  con- 
sisting of  a  company  and  a  half.  The  distances  may  be  as  fol- 
lows :  from  point  to  advance  party,  1 50  yards ;  from  advance 
party  to  support,  200  yards;  from  support  to  reserve,  600 
yards;  from  reserve  to  main  body,  800  5'ards.  (See  Plate  II.) 
In  the  case  of  two  battalions  acting  as  the  advance  guard  of  a 
brigade,  the  vanguard  and  reserve  would  each  consist  of  a  bat- 
talion, the  advance  party  consisting  of  a  company,  and  the  sup- 
port of  three  companies.  The  distances  would  be  about  the 
same  as  in  the  case  of  a  single  battalion. 

Distance  from  the  Main  Body. — The  distance  frota  the  ad- 
vance guard  to  the  main  body  depends  so  entirely  upon  cir- 
cumstances that  it  can  not  be  made  subject  to  any  rigid  rule. 
If  the  distance  were  too  great,  the  advance  guard  might  be 
forced  into  a  heavy  engagement  while  beyond  the  assistance 
of  the  main  body,  and  might  even  be  entirely  cut  off  by  an 

*See  "Formation  Modified  by  Terrain,"  page  34. 


PLATE  II. 


BATTALION  AS  ADVANCE  GUARD. 

•*  2  ♦  • 

4j-  /SOYBS-i-ISOYOS—jt 

1  Platoon      "^    j^dvance  Party 


3  Platoons 


§♦ 


* 


Support 


<»* 


S  Companies 


I 


Reserve 


S 
^ 


7^/5  normal  fbrmartionjs  not  to  tie  taken 
as  an  Invariable  §uide',bui  rnersly  as  a  modei 
requiring  more  or  less  variation  according  to 
circumstances.     It  is  vary  rarely  tfiat  a  normal 
formation  can  be  used  without  consideratie  change. 


MAIN  BODY 


distance;  from  the;  main  body.  25 

attack  upon  its  flank  and  rear.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  dis- 
tance were  not  great  enough,  time  could  not  be  afforded  for 
the  preparation  of  the  main  body  for  action. 

The  advance  guard  should  be  far  enough  ahead  to  enable 
the  commander  of  the  column  to  make  his  plan  of  action  with- 
out extreme  haste  while  the  advance  guard  is  still  successfully 
resisting  the  enemy ;  but  it  should  not  be  so  far  in  advance  that 
the  commander  of  the  main  body  should  be  obliged  to  abandon 
every  other  consideration  to  the  one  object  of  hurrying  to  the 
succor  of  the  advance  guard. 

A  rough  rule,  which  will  answer  in  many  cases,  is  that  the 
minimum  distance  should  be  equal  to  the  depth  of  the  main 
body ;  as  the  time  required  for  the  rear  troops  to  deploy  on  the 
head  of  the  column  would  not  be  geater  than  that  taken  by  the 
advance  guard  in  falling  back. 

It  is  evident  that  this  rule  will  not  answer  when  a  large 
force  is  acting  with  energy  and  aggressiveness  for  the  purpose 
of  bringing  on  a  battle,  as  the  advance  guard  must  then  be 
promptly  supported.  At  Mars -la-Tour,  when  the  German 
army  was  moving  forward  with  the  object  of  stopping  Ba- 
zaine's  retreat  and  bringing  him  to  battle,  the  advance  guard 
of  Stiilpnagel's  division,  being  separted  by  a  considerable  dis- 
tance from  the  main  body,  was  so  roughly  handled  by  the  enemy 
that  the  leading  battalion  of  the  main  body  had  to  be  hurried 
into  action  without  deploym.ent,  and  the  escape  of  the  division 
from  disastrous  defeat  was  due  only  to  the  failure  on  the  part  of 
the  French  to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity  presented. 

The  distance  will  also  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  country 
and  the  state  of  the  weather.  If  the  country  is  full  of  defens- 
ive positions,  such  as  to  admit  of  a  sturdy  delaying  action  on 
the  part  of  the  advance  guard,  the  distance  may  be  decreased. 
In  foggy  weather,  or  at  night,  or  during  a  storm  of  rain  or  snow, 
the  distance  should  be  decreased,  as  well  as  the  front  covered 
by  the  scouting  groups  or  flanking  parties.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  country  is  open,  the  weather  clear,  and  there  is  danger 


26  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

of  the  advance  guard  being  driven  back,  the  distance  must  be 
increased. 

It  will  be  observed  that  in  the  typical  formations  given 
above,  the  main  body  is  from  1,300  to  1,750  yards  from  the 
point,  while  the  reserve  is  from  800  to  950  yards  from  the  point. 
Even  if  the  enemy  were  so  well  concealed,  and  the  advance 
guard  so  careless,  that  the  point  should  be  in  actual  contact 
with  the  enemy  before  opening  fire,  the  reserve  would  be  at  least 
800  yards  from  the  hostile  force.  In  almost  every  conceivable 
case,  the  first  shots  fired  by  the  point  or  flankers  of  the  advance 
party  would  be  at  such  a  range  that  (with  the  distances  given 
above)  the  reserve  could  prepare  for  action  before  coming 
under  destructive  fire.  The  reserve  is  the  first  body  that  really 
demands  time  for  deployment.  It  is  essentially  the  fighting 
part  of  the  advance  guard;  the  vanguard  is  the  reconnoitering 
part. 

The  Commander  of  the  Vanguard. — The  vanguard  should 
always  be  commanded  by  an  officer,  who  should  be  mounted, 
if  possible,  and  furnished  with  a  detailed  map  of  the  region 
through  which  the  force  is  marching.  He  habitually  marches 
with  the  support,  but  goes  to  any  part  of  the  vanguard  where 
his  presence  may  be  necessary.  He  may  take  immediate  com- 
mand of  the  advance  party,  if  it  seems  advisable  to  do  so,  leav- 
ing the  support  under  the  immediate  command  of  the  ofl&cer  or 
non-commissioned  officer  next  in  rank.  If  guides  are  present, 
they  should  accompany  the  support  and  be  under  the  orders  of 
the  commander  of  the  vanguard. 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  commander  of  the  vanguard: 

1 .  To  see  that  the  proper  road  is  taken  by  the  point. 

2.  When  cross-roads  are  passed,  to  see  that  a  man  is  left 
to  guide  the  main  column. 

3.  To  send  out  special  patrols  to  examine  all  ground  that 
might  afford  shelter  to  the  enemy,  such  as  woods,  farm-houses, 
hamlets,  etc. 


STAFF  OFFICER.  27 

4.  To  send  out  special  patrols  to  watch  and  oppose  any- 
hostile  patrols  that  may  be  seen,  or  whose  presence  may  be 
suspected. 

5.  To  cause  necessary  repairs  to  be  made  in  roads,  bridges, 
approaches  to  fords,  etc. 

6.  To  transmit  promptly  to  the  commanding  officer  of 
the  advance  guard  all  information  that  he  may  gain  about  the 
enem)'-,  fiirst  testing  its  accuracy  as  far  as  possible  without  de- 
laying the  transmission  of  important  news  to  the  commander. 

7.  To  see  that  the  march  of  the  column  is  not,  under  any 
circumstances,  unnecessarily  delayed. 

The  support  replaces  any  men  of  the  advance  party  who 
may  be  relieved  or  placed  hors  de  combat.  When  a  scout  of  the 
advance  party  brings  in  important  information,  he  should,  if 
practicable,  be  sent  to  the  commander  of  the  advance  guard. 
His  place  with  the  advance  party  is  at  once  supplied  from  the 
support.  He  is  retained  with  the  reserve,  from  which  another 
man  is  sent  forward  to  the  support.  The  number  of  men  with 
the  point  and  flankers  should,  if  possible,  remain  unchanged. 
When  there  are  particular  reasons  for  sending  the  man  back  to 
his  former  post,  the  man  who  replaced  him  should  be  returned. 

Staff  Officer. — In  a  command  of  considerable  size  a  staff 
officer  usually  accompanies  the  vanguard,  and  is  charged  with 
the  duty  of  selecting  a  camp  or  bivouac  for  the  main  body. 
When  he  has  selected  the  place,  he  remains  there  with  such  a 
detail  as  may  be  necessary,  until  the  arrival  of  the  main  body, 
the  advance  guard  marching  on  and  forming  the  outpost,  at  least 
temporarily. 

The  Commandef  of  the  Advance  Guard. — The  commander  of 
the  advance  guard  is  generally  with  the  reserve;  but,  on  ap- 
proaching the  enemy,  should  go  wherever  his  presence  is  most 
needed.  He  should  always  be  mounted,  if  practicable,  even  in 
the  case  of  a  small  advance  guard.  With  the  exception,  per- 
haps, of  the  commander  of  the  rear  guard  in  retreat,  no  officer 
needs  a  more  perfect  combination  of  courage,  self-reliance,  and 
good  judgment. 


28  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

A  timid  officer  in  command  of  an  advance  guard  would 
suffer  the  column  to  be  delayed  by  small  parties  of  the  enemy ; 
a  rash  one  would  plunge  into  combat,  and  might  thus  impose 
upon  his  superior  a  cotu"se  of  action  at  total  variance  with  his 
plans.  Small  parties  of  the  enemy  should  always  be  quickly 
driven  back.  On  the  other  hand,  an  engagement  should  gen- 
erally be  avoided,  unless  the  commander  of  the  advance  guard 
has  orders  to  touch  upon  the  enemy  and  bring  him  to  a  stand 
at  all  hazards. 

The  comm.ander  of  the  advance  guard  should  continually 
consider  the  measures  necessary  for  the  security  of  the  march, 
and  for  rapidly  gaining  reliable  information  of  the  enem}'.  He 
should  carefully  observe  the  groimd,  and  consider  the  tactical 
use  that  might  be  made  of  it,  and  should  have  a  clear  idea  as  to 
what  he  intends  to  do  in  case  the  enemy  is  encountered.  His 
orders  will  be  either  to  march  in  a  certain  direction  and  arrive 
promptly  at  a  certain  point,  to  pursue  the  enemy  vigorously, 
or  to  follow  him  with  prudence,  and  profit  by  his  faults  and  by 
all  advantages  that  offer  themselves.  In  the  first  two  cases  he 
should  execute  his  orders  promptly  and  exactly.  In  the  last 
case  he  should  move  cautiously,  venturing  upon  any  particular 
route  only  after  having  well  weighed  the  probable  results  of 
his  decision. 

Halts. — Whenever  the  advance  guard  halts,  all  approaches 
should  be  reconnoitered  and  guarded,  and  an  officer  should  be 
sent  to  get  an  extended  view  from  the  highest  available  point. 
During  a  short  halt  each  part  of  the  advance  guard  remains  in 
the  place  where  it  is  halted.  The  reserve  may  usually  be  allowed 
to  fall  out ;  but  the  support  and  the  advance  party  rest  or  stand 
at  ease,  according  to  the  proximity  of  the  enemy  and  the  con- 
sequent necessity  of  alertness.  If  a  prolonged  halt  is  contem- 
plated, the  advance  guard  endeavors  first  to  occupy  ground 
that  will  furnish  a  good  defensive  position,  behind  which  the 
main  body  is  assembled  in  the  best  formation  for  prompt  de- 
ployment. 


PLATE     III. 


TROOP  OF  CAVALRY  AS  ADVANCE  GUARD. 

1 

Hi 

4 zoo  YDS i-f-* 30QYDS f 

*                Advance  Party                 * 

1 

5 

> 

• 

,^ 

X 

Support, 

N 

• 
• 

X 

X 

X 

X 

N 
^X 

X 

N 

i 

X^ ._-_ ......  ^    Ai/i  ^  ... .. .- 

...  ......  ^2    MI L£  —  —  —  —  — 

Li 

d 

li 

1 

Reserve 

< 

< 

! 

1 

777/5  norma/  fbrmation  is  not  to  be  taken 
as  an  invarJadle  guide,  butmerety  as  a  model 
requiring  more  or  less  variation  according  to 
circumstances,  n  is  very  rsiely  t/>at  a  normal 
formation  can  be  usedmithout  considerable  change. 

1 — i 

s 

^ 

MAIN  BODY 

THE    COMMANDER    OF    THE   ADVANCE   GUARD.  29 

Signals. — Information  from  one  part  of  the  advance  guard 
to  another  should  be  conveyed  by  some  code  of  signals,  and 
shouting  and  imnecessary  firing  should  be  carefully  avoided. 
The  point  and  flankers  fire  only  when  they  are  certain  that  they 
have  been  seen  by  the  enemy  and  that  he  is  not  retiring. 

Compliments. — Advance  guards,  as  a  body,  pay  no  compli- 
ments whatever ;  but  individual  soldiers  on  this  duty,  as  on  all 
other,  salute  when  addressing  or  addressed  by  a  superior  ofl&cer. 

Cavalry  Advance  Guards. 

The  formation  of  a  cavalry  advance  guard  is  similar  to  that 
of  one  composed  of  infantry.  An  advance  guard  composed  of 
a  single  troop  will  be  first  considered.     (See  Plate  III.) 

If  the  troop  consists  of  but  two  platoons,  the  first  consti- 
tutes the  vanguard  and  the  second  the  reserve.  If  there  are 
three  platoons,  the  first  and  second  compose  the  vanguard,  and 
the  third  the  reserve.  When  there  are  four  platoons,  the  first 
and  second  form  the  vanguard,  and  the  third  and  fourth  the 
reserve.  The  point  consists  of  four  troopers.  The  flanking 
groups,  each  consisting  of  four  troopers,  march  about  loo  yards 
in  rear  of  the  point,  and  from  300  to  500  yards  from  the  line  of 
march.  The  advance  party  consists  of  che  point  and  flankers, 
and  is  under  the  command  of  a  sergeant,  who  is  generally  with 
the  point.  In  some  cases  the  commander  of  the  advance  party 
may  reduce  the  point  to  two  troopers,  holding  the  other  two  in 
rear  of  the  point  and  abreast  of  the  flankers,  or  he  may  march 
in  this  position  himself  without  reducing  the  point.  He  should 
be  where  he  can  best  command  and  control  the  reconnaissance 
of  the  advance  party.  The  flanking  groups  are  each  commanded 
by  a  corporal  or  an  old  soldier.  Generally  two  troopers  ride  in 
front  and  one  in  rear  of  the  group  commander.  The  groups 
may,  however,  be  kept  together  in  any  suitable  formation,  or 
distributed  along  the  front  so  as  to  make  an  arc  of  scouts  from 
one  extreme  flanker,  through  the  point,  to  the  other  extreme 
flanker. 


30  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

The  support  follows  the  point  at  a  distance  of  500  yards,  a 
flanking  group  of  from  four  to  eight  men  being  sent  out  on  each 
flank  about  half  a  mile  from  the  column  and  slightly  in  advance 
of  the  reserve.  In  an  enclosed  country  these  groups  would 
march  on  the  nearest  roads  parallel  to  th^  one  taken  by  the 
main  column,  and  should  keep  up  communication  with  the 
advance  guard. 

The  reserve  follows  the  support  at  a  distance  of  700  yards. 
As  a  rule,  it  is  kept  entire;  but,  if  necessary,  flanking  parties 
may  be  thrown  out  in  such  a  manner  and  to  such  distances  as 
circumstances  may  require.  The  main  body  follows  the  re- 
serve at  a  distance  of  700  to  1,000  yards. 

Communication  between  the  parts  of  a  cavalry  advance 
guard  being  much  easier  than  in  the  case  of  a  corresponding 
body  of  infantry,  connecting  files  are  not  so  necessary,  and  may 
often  be  dispensed  with.  No  part  of  the  advance  guard  should, 
however,  lose  sight  of  the  body  immediately  preceditig  it ;  and 
whenever  it  becomes  necessary,  one  or  more  troopers  should  be 
detached  and  sent  ahead,  so  as  to  keep  in  view  both  the  body 
in  advance  and  the  one  from  which  detached.  On  a  winding 
road  and  in  a  rough  country  connecting  files  are  indispensable, 
but  they  should  be  called  in  as  soon  as  the  nature  of  the  ter- 
rain renders  their  services  unnecessar)^ 

If  two  troops  compose  the  advance  guard,  the  first  troop 
constitutes  the  vanguard  and  the  second  the  reserve.  In  this 
case  the  advance  party  consists  of  a  half-platoon,  if  there  are 
but  two  platoons  in  the  troop;  or  a  platoon,  if  the  troop  con- 
tains three  or  four.  The  members  of  the  advance  party  not 
employed  as  point  and  flankers  form  a  center  group,  which 
marches  in  rear  of  the  point  and  abreast  of  the  flankers.  Any 
increase  in  the  strength  of  the  advance  party  generally  in- 
creases the  center  group,  the  point  and  flanking  groups  rarely 
exceeding  four  men  each. 


CAVAI^RY   ADVANCE   GUARDS.  31 

In  the  case  of  a  very  large  advance  guard  the  advance  paity 
should  consist  of  an  entire  troop,  in  which  case  it,  instead  of  the 
support,  would  furnish  the  flanking  patrols. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  distances  and  intervals  are  con- 
siderably greater  in  a  cavalry  advance  guard  than  in  one  com- 
posed of  infantry.  Cavalry  possessing  much  greater  mobility 
than  infantry,  the  different  covering  troops  can  safely  be  sep- 
arated from  each  other  by  greater  distances  in  the  former  than 
in  the  latter  arm.  Moreover,  the  resisting  power  of  cavalry  is 
less  than  that  of  infantry,  and  when  a  cavalry  advance  guard  is 
driven  in  by  the  enemy,  the  ground  is  passed  over  more  rapidly 
in  retreat  than  in  the  case  of  a  corresponding  infantry  force. 
Hence,  in  order  to  give  each  successive  body  in  rear  time  to 
prepare  for  action,  the  distances  must  necessarily  be  greater 
for  cavalry.  It  would  seem,  however,  that  in  our  service  these 
distances  might  safely  be  reduced ;  for  American  cavalry,  which 
can  make  effective  use  of  dismounted  fire-action,  has  greater 
resisting  power  than  European  cavalry,  and  it  is  not  limited,  as 
the  latter  seems  generally  to  be,  to  a  charge  to  the  front  or  a 
flight  to  the  rear.        '    WSMiPMM MMW  I'  6  liL  li SUBl 

M  -y.  l&f&Wi  T'AdVANCeT^GuARDS  ~OF|ALljARMS.''^r?'*''  ^'   -  ^H'S 

To  perform  its  functions  thoroughly,  an  advance  guard 
should  be  composed  of  all  arms.  Reconnoitering  duty  can  be 
performed  more  efficiently  and  more  easily  by  cavalry  than  by 
infantry — more  efficiently,  because  a  cavalry  group  can  safely 
push  much  farther  away  from  the  column  than  an  infantry 
group  can,  and  the  field  of  observation  is  thus  extended ;  more 
easily,  because  a  trooper  can,  with  comparative  ease,  recon- 
noiter  to  a  degree  that  would  exhaust  a  foot  soldier. 

All  European  authorities  recommend  the  use  of  cavalry  as 
reconnoiterers,  but  prescribe  that  the  support  should  consist 
in  part  of  infantry  to  supply  the  necessary  resisting  power. 
In  our  service  this  is  not  in  general  necessary,  as  our  cavalry 
has  enough  resisting  power  to  carry  out  the  delaying  action  of 


32  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

the  support;  and  nothing  but  the  lack  of  sufficient  cavalry- 
should  necessitate  the  adoption  of  a  composite  support.  In- 
deed it  is,  in  most  cases,  a  great  mistake  so  to  combine  cav- 
alry with  infantry  as  to  tie  the  former  down  to  the  pace  of  the 
latter.  The  cavalry  should  ordinarily  be  given  great  latitude 
in  pushing  forward,  for  its  great  object  is  to  gain  information ; 
and  even  when  it  constitutes  the  entire  vanguard  of  a  com- 
posite advance  guard,  no  attempt  should  be  made  to  fix  the 
distance  between  the  support  and  the  reserve.  If  the  cavalry 
push  far  ahead,  the  reserve  should  throw  out  an  advance  party 
with  a  point  and  flankers.  If  pressing  closely  upon  the  enemy, 
the  cavalry  will  probably  be  delayed  enough  by  exploration  and 
skirmishing  to  reduce  its  progress  to  the  pace  of  the  infantry- 
reserve. 

Artillery  is  of  great  value  to  the  advance  guard  in  preparing 
the  way  for  the  infantry  attack,  and  in  compelling  the  enemy 
to  deploy  at  a  distance.  Light  field  batteries  only  should  be 
used  with  the  advance  guard,  mobility  being  essential.  When 
the  advance  guard  is  specially  strong  in  cavalry,  a  battery  of 
horse  artillery  should  be  attached  to  it.  The  gims  of  a  battery 
attached  to  the  advance  guard  should  be  kept  together,  any 
subdivision  being  generally  a  mistake.  Under  exceptional  cir- 
cumstances, part  of  the  guns  may  be  with  the  vanguard  (march- 
ing with  the  support) ;  but  in  such  an  advanced  position  the 
artillery  would  be  liable  to  suffer  from  the  enemy's  infantry 
fire  at  short  range,  and  would  be  exposed  to  capture  by  sudden 
assault.  When  the  front  is  restricted  and  the  country  is  hilly, 
part  of  the  guns  may  be  with  the  vanguard;  for  the  enemy 
could  find  advantageous  positions  from  which  to  bring  guns  to 
bear  upon  the  advance  guard,  and  would  have  to  be  opposed  by 
artillery;  and  in  such  a  country  the  gims  would  not  be  greatly 
endangered  by  their  forward  position,  as  the  enemy  could  ad- 
vance only  on  a  narrow  front.  In  a  large  advance  guard  (such 
as  that  of  an  army  corps)  a  battery  might  safely  march  at  the 
rear  of  the  support.  But,  as  a  rule,  all  the  artillery  of  the  ad- 
vance guard  should  generally  be  with  the  reserve,  and  should 


advance;  guards  of  all  arms.  33 

be  preceded  by  a  small  force  of  infantry  to  prevent  it  from 
being  taken  at  a  disadvantage  by  sudden  attack.  In  any  case, 
the  delay  in  bringing  artillery  into  action  from  the  reserve  would 
be  so  slight  that  but  little  would  be  gained  by  having  guns  with 
the  vanguard.  As  the  guns  should  come  into  action  within  ar- 
tillery range,  but  beyond  infantry  range,  of  the  enemy's  position, 
the)^  would  generally  be  nearer  to  their  proper  position  if  with 
the  reserve  than  they  would  be  with  the  support.  The  battery 
commander  accompanies  the  commander  of  the  advance  guard 
on  the  march  and  in  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy,  and  receives 
his  orders  as  to  bringing  the  battery  into  action. 

A  few  engineers  should  march  with  the  support,  to  repair 
bridges,  remove  obstacles,  etc.  If  the  rest  of  the  support  con- 
sists entirely  of  cavalry,  the  engineers  should  be  mounted. 
Owing  to  the  small  number  of  engineer  sbldiers  in  oiur  army, 
this  duty  would  generally  be  performed  by  pioneer  detachments 
from  the  infantry. 

The  proportion  of  each  arm  in  the  advance  guard  depends 
upon  the  nature  of  the  country,  the  object  of  the  march,  and 
the  strength,  composition,  and  proximity  of  the  opposing  force. 
In  a  close  or  mountainous  country  the  proportion  of  infantry 
should  be  increased.  In  an  open  country  the  cavalry  should  be 
strengthened.  If  the  enemy  is  strong  and  near,  and  a  battle 
seems  imminent,  the  advance  guard  should  be  specially  strong 
in  infantry  and  guns.  If,  however,  it  is  desired  merely  to  de- 
velop the  enemy  without  seriously  engaging,  the  advance  guard 
should  consist  of  cavalry  and  light  artillery  (horse  artillery  if 
possible),  as  these  troops  can  be  more  readily  withdrawn  than 
infantry.  In  the  pursuit  of  a  beaten  foe,  or  whenever  the  ob- 
ject is  to  follow  and  keep  touch  with  the  enemy,  the  proportion 
of  cavalry  should  be  as  great  as  possible.  In  any  case  all  three 
arms  are  needed. 

As  a  rule,  the  different  organizations  of  the  command  per- 
form in  turn  the  duty  of  advance  guard;  but  in  operations  of 
special  importance  it  may  be  desirable  to  have  the  advance 
guard  composed  of  select  troops.     Napoleon  says :     "It  is  nee- 


34  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

essary  that  the  advance  guard  should  consist  of  elite  troops, 
and  that  the  generals,  officers,  and  soldiers  should  thoroughly 
understand  their  tactics,  each  according  to  the  needs  of  his 
grade.  An  uninstructed  body  of  troops  would  be  only  an  em- 
barrassment to  the  advance  guard.  "* 

Formation  Modified  by  Terrain. — In  the  formation  of  an 
advance  guard  considerations  of  terrain  take  precedence  over 
all  prescribed  rules.  If,  for  instance,  a  ridge  from  which  a  good 
view  can  be  obtained  lies  near  one  of  the  flanks,  the  flankers 
must  be  pushed  out  to  the  ridge,  whether  it  be  nearer  or  farther 
from  the  flank  than  the  normal  distance.  When  the  nature  of 
the  country  is  such  that  flankers  are  unnecessary  or  cannot 
keep  up  with  the  command,  dispositions  must  be  made  accord- 
ingly. In  such  a  case,  the  advance  party  and  the  support  move 
forward  entire,  the  former  being  preceded  by  a  point.f  This 
formation  was  very  properly  taken  by  the  advance  guard  of  the 
"Rough  Riders,"  under  Captain  Capron,  in  marching  upon 
Las  Guasimas.J 

When  marching  in  an  open  country,  the  entire  advance 
party  may  bef  deployed  as  skirmishers,  with  considerable  inter- 
vals, the  support  following  in  line  of  squads.  Both  lines  may 
be  straight  or  echeloned  back  slightly  from  the  center  towards 
the  flanks.  The  reserve  should  ordinarily  be  kept  in  column. 
Circumstances  may  render  it  practicable  and  desirable  to  in- 
clude the  support,  or  even  the  entire  advance  guard,  in  this 
formation.  Thus,  in  Bates'  advance  from  Imus  to  Dasmarinas, 
January  8,  1900,  Wheaton's  brigade,  marching  on  two  parallel 

*"Maximes  de  Guerre  et  Pensees  de  Napoleon  ler." 

fSee  page  28  of  the  former  editions  of  this  work,  from  the  third  to  the 
eighth,  inclusive. 

f'Owing  to  the  difficulties  of  the  trail,  the  column  had,  in  many  places, 
to  march  in  single  file,  and  in  no  place  could  it  march  on  a  broad  front. 
So  dense  was  the  undergrowth  that  it  was  impossible  to  use  flankers  with- 
out retarding  the  advance  of  the  column  to  a  ruinous  degree.  The  ad- 
vance party  and  support  of  the  advance  guard  each  moved  forward  'entire' 
with  suitable  distances  and  preceded  by  a  point  of  four  men.  This  was 
good  tactics,  and  the  only  disposition  suited  to  the  circumstances." — Offi- 
cial Report  by  the  A  uthor  on  the  Military  Operations  in  Cuba. 


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FORMATION   MODIFIED   BY   TERRAIN.  35 

roads,  was  preceded  by  a  line  of  skirmishers  covering  and  con- 
necting the  two  columns;  a  formation  admirably  adapted  to 
the  theater,  which  was  exceptionally  open  for  Filipino  terrain. 

In  many  tropical  regions,  where  the  vegetation  is  so  dense  as 
to  make  it  out  of  the  question  for  flankers  to  operate,  and  where 
it  is  accordingly  almost  impossible  to  discover  a  concealed 
enemy,  the  entire  advance  party  should  habitually  march  in 
column  of  files,  with  suitable  distances  between  the  men.  In- 
deed, it  was  frequently  found  necessary  in  the  Philippines  to 
dispose  the  entire  advance  guard  in  this  formation ;  so  that,  by 
facing  either  to  the  right  or  left,  a  concealed  enemy  opening  fire 
on  either  flank  could  be  at  once  opposed  by  a  skirmish-line. 

In  some  of  the  minor  operations  of  the  Island  of  vSamar,  in 
1 90 1,  the  conditions  were  so  unfavorable  as  to  render  the  use  of 
an  advance  guard  altogether  impracticable.  Owing  to  the  dense 
and  high  grass,  it  was  impossible  to  send  a  detachment  even  a 
few  yards  away  without  losing  sight  of  it  altogether.  The  use 
of  flankers,  or  even  of  a  point,  was  not  admissible;  and,  as  a 
result,  the  entire  command  was  compelled  to  be  continually 
alert  and  ready  for  action. 

An  ingenious  disposition  of  the  advance  guard  made  by 
General  Cox,  in  West  Virginia,  in  1861,  is  worthy  of  rem-ark. 
The  main  body  of  the  command,  embarked  on  steamers,  moved 
up  the  Kanawha  River,  on  either  side  of  which  the  enemy  might 
be  expected.  An  advance  guard  accordingly  marched  along 
each  bank,  the  main  body  being  held  in  readiness  to  land  and 
reinforce  whichever  one  should  encounter  the  enemy. 

Whether  on  active  service  or  rnerely  at  drill,  the  commander  of 
an  advance  guard,  outpost,  or  rear  guard  must  exercise  judgm^ent, 
and  7)iake  his  dispositions  in  accordance  with  the  nature  of  the 
ground  and  the  real  or  supposed  circumstances  of  warfare  under 
which  he  is  acting. 

Encountering  the  Enemy. — As  soon  as  the  enemy  is  seen,  the 
advance  guard  must  endeavor  to  ascertain  promptly  whether 
it  has  to  deal  with  an  outpost  of  a  stationary  force,  an  advance 
guard  of  a  marching  body,  or  a  flanking  detachment  of  a  col- 


36  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION, 

umn.  It  should  lose  no  time  in  discovering  where  the  enemy's 
main  position  is,  or  how  far  away  is  the  marching  column.  The 
relative  numbers  and  position  and  the  orders  under  which  the 
advance  guard  is  acting  will  decide  the  question  of  attacking  or 
taking  up  a  defensive  position.  The  offensive  is  generally  the 
best,  if  an  attack  seems  at  all  likeh^  to  succeed.  If  between 
the  advance  guard  and  the  enemy  there  is  an  exceptionally 
good  position,  the  enemy  should  be  attacked  vigorously,  in 
order  that  the  position  may  be  occupied  and  held  for  the  de- 
ployment of  the  main  body.  If  the  defensive  has  been  decided 
upon,  and  a  good  defensive  position  has  been  passed  a  short 
time  before  the  enemy  is  encountered,  or  if  the  latter  is  in  such 
force  that  the  advance  guard  can  not  hold  its  own  against  him, 
it  will  be  necessary  to  fall  back  slowly  and  stubbornly  to  the 
position  or  upon  the  main  body ;  the  commander  of  the  advance 
guard  sending  to  the  commander  of  the  main  body  prompt 
warning  of  the  threatened  or  actual  attack. 

It  is  not  always  necessary  for  the  advance  guard  to  take  up 
a  position  on  the  road  by  which  the  main  body  is  advancing. 
If  the  latter  is  compelled  in  its  advance  to  adhere  to  the  route, 
it  is  often  better  for  the  advance  guard  to  make  a  stand  at  one 
side,  holding  the  road  with  only  some  detached  troops.  The 
main  body  advancing  along  the  road  is  thus  sometimes  enabled 
to  make  its  attack  in  the  most  effective  direction.  Moreover, 
in  case  the  advance  guard  is  driven  back,  it  will  not  be  pushed 
directly  upon  the  main  body,  to  which  it  might  communicate 
its  disorder.  In  case  of  a  sudden  encounter  with  the  enemy, 
the  advance  guard  will  probably  be  compelled  to  take  up  a  posi- 
tion as  best  it  may,  which  will  probably  be  on  the  road.  In 
this  case  the  main  body  may  sometimes  be  able  to  advance  by 
a  lateral  road,  to  avoid  the  danger  of  being  compromised  in  a 
reverse  of  the  advance  guard,  and  at  the  same  time  gain  the 
advantage  of  a  flank  attack  upon  the  enemy.  When  the  ad- 
vance guard  is  strong  and  able  to  hold  its  own  against  the 
enemy  for  some  time,  and  when  the  main  body  does  not  follow 


ENCOUNTERING   THE   ENEMY.  37 

the  advance   guard  too   closely,  such  a  movement  may  be 
decisive. 

Advance  Guard  of  a  Division. 

A  division  consists  of  three  brigades  of  infantry  and  two  or 
more  batteries  of  artillery.  As  no  divisional  cavalry  is  provided, 
a  portion  of  the  corps  cavalry  must  be  detached  and  assigned 
to  the  division  whenever  the  latter  is  acting  independently,  or 
when  the  front  is  not  covered  by  a  general  screen  of  cavalry. 
The  corps  cavalry  will  not  comprise  more  than  two  regiments, 
and  may  consist  of  only  one.* 

It  cannot,  therefore,  be  safely  assumed  that  more  than  one 
squadron  will  be  assigned  to  each  division.  The  experience 
of  recent  wars  would  seem  to  indicate  four  as  the  proper  num- 
ber of  batteries ;  and  it  may  be  assumed,  then,  that  the  divi- 
sion consists  of  three  brigades  (composed  of  nine  regiments,  or 
twenty-seven  battalions)  of  infantry,  four  batteries  of  light  ar- 
tillery, four  troops  of  cavalry,  one  company  of  engineers,  three 
companies  of  hospital  troops, f  and  a  section  of  signal  soldiers. 

The  advance  guard  of  the  division  might  be  formed  as  fol- 
lows (see  Plate  V.) :  The  advance  party  consists  of  one  troop  of 
cavalry,  its  point  being  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  advance, 
and  the  flankers  at  the  same  distance  from  the  line  of  march. 
A  flanking  patrol  would  march  on  each  flank,  abreast  of  the 
advance  party,  and  from  two  to  four  miles  from  it.  Each  of 
these  flanking  patrols  should  be  not  less  than  a  platoon,  and 
should  be  commanded  by  a  lieutenant  or  an  experienced 
sergeant. 

The  support  follows  one  mile  in  rear  of  the  advance  party. 
It  consists  of  two  and  one-half  troops  of  cavalry,  two  battal- 
ions of  infantry,  one  section  of  engineers,  with  a  tool  wagon; 
one  machine-gun  detachment,  and  infantry  ammunition  carts. 

*Infantry  Drill  Regulations,  paragraphs  479  and  484. 

tNamely,  a  bearer  company,  an  ambulance  company,  and  a  field  hos- 
pital. Most  of  the  ambulances  and  the  field  hospital  would  be  with  the 
train.  For  the  details  of  the  organization  of  a  division,  see  "  Organization 
and  Tactics,"  page  34. 


38  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

The  number  of  carts  is  regulated  by  the  fact  that  as  the  advance 
guard  may  have  to  fight  during  many  consecutive  hours  after 
touching  upon  the  enemy,  it  should  have,  including  ammuni- 
tion carried  by  the  soldiers,  at  least  200  rounds  per  man. 

A  flanking  detachment  varying  in  strength  from  one-half 
to  one-fourth  of  a  troop  is  sent  out  to  each  flank  from  the  cav- 
alry of  the  support.  It  marches  slightly  farther  out  from  the 
line  of  march  than  the  corresponding  detachment  from  the 
advance  party,  and  nearly  abreast  of  the  reserve. 

The  reserve  follows  at  a  distance  of  a  mile  and  a  quarter. 
At  its  head  marches  the  commanding  officer  of  the  advance 
guard,  followed  by  a  platoon  of  cavalry.  The  rest  of  the  reserve 
is  arranged  in  the  following  order :  A  battalion  of  infantry,  a 
battery,  a  regiment  of  infantry,  a  section  of  engineers,  infantry 
ammunition  carts,  and  a  platoon  of  hospital  troops  with 
ambulances. 

Members  of  a  mounted  signal  detachment  should  be  with 
the  advance  party,  the  support  and  the  reserve,  and  at  the  head 
of  the  main  body.  One  or  two  machine  guns  might  be  advan- 
tageously used  with  the  support.  Connecting  files,  preferably 
cyclists,  march  between  the  advance  party  and  the  support, 
and  between  the  support  and  the  reserve. 

Two  or  three  escort  wagons  conve5dng  picks,  shovels,  and 
axes,  in  addition  to  those  required  for  the  use  of  the  engineers, 
should  accompany  the  reserve,  following  immediately  in  rear  of 
the  infantry.  The  War  of  Secession  demonstrated  the  neces- 
sity of  having  at  hand  every  facility  for  intrenching  rapidly  and 
strongly;  and  these  implements  would  be  a  valuable  addition 
to  the  intrenching  tools  carried  by  the  soldiers.  The  number 
and  kind  of  tools  would  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  country 
and  the  object  of  the  march.  If  the  advance  guard  were 
charged  with  the  duty  of  seizing  and  holding  an  important  point, 
the  necessity  of  intrenching  would  be  imperative.  On  the  other 
hand,  in  the  pursuit  of  a  beaten  foe  intrenching  tools  might  be 
neglected.     In  a  wooded  country  axes  would  be  a  prime  neces- 


ORDER     OF     MARCH    OF     A    DIVISION     ACTING     INDEPENDENTLY. 


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■  -a-a-cj-n  -n  ctio-n-ttn-im'  -  -  ■ 


These  flanking  detachments  are  always 
slightly  farther  out  from  the  line  of  march 
than  those  sent  out  from  the  advance  parly. 


6th  Infantry  \ 

tath  Infantry  \    , 

t5th  Infantry  \ 

Zhl  Infantry  \ 

4th  Infantry  f   3rd  Bn^ade 

14-th  Infantry  I 

9th  Field  Battery  \ 
lOth  Field  Battery  (    -,. 
3rd  Field  Battery  {   O'^^sionat 
Ath  Field  Battery  ) 
Co  A,  Battalion  of  Fngineers. 
2  Companies  of  Hospital  Corps 
/  Section  Signal  Corps. 
2  Machine  Cuns  manned  by  details  from  the 

Divisional  Artillery. 
I  Squadron,  fst  Cavalry,  attached  to  Division . 


Artillery. 


Note: 
The  distances  given  are  variable. 

The  organizations  represented  are  all  assumed  to  be  at  full  v\far strength . 
The  number  of  platoons  in  each  cavalry  troop  is  assumed  to  be  four. 
The  flanking  patrols  abreast  of  the  advance  party  are  taken  from  the  same. 
There  is  no  attempt  to  indicate  ti'e  exact  number  of  ammunition  carts, as  no 

special  cart  has  yet  been  adopted  by  the  United  States. 
In  the  rear  guard    two  battalions  of  the  regiment  are  in  ordinary  <.olumn 

of  route,  the  third  battalion  constituting  the  rear  guard  for  the  same    in 

case  of  considerable  danger  the  entire  regiment  composing  the  rearguard 

would  be  in  regular  rear- guard  formation . 
The  rear  point  and  flankers  fr.iy  or  may  not  be  thrown  out  by  the  rearguard, 

according  to  crcumstances. 

In  considering  the  distance  from  the  mam  body  to  the  rear  guard,  note  the 
division  tram   consists  of  136  ivogons. 
The  troops  are  not  drawn  to  a  ;,cale.    For  the  length  of  the  column  and  its 

component  parts   see 'Space  and  Time  Reguired  in  Formations  and  Marches! 

in  'Organization  and  Tactics.' 

It  to  be  taken  as  an  invar/able  guide,  but  merely 
or  less  variation  according  to  circumstances. 
rial  formation  can  be  used  without  considerable 


Th 


normal  formation  i 
as  a  model  requiring  n 
'i  IS  very  rarely    that  a  i 


ADVANCE   GUARD   OF   A   DIVISION.  39 

sity;  in  a  prairie  country  picks  and  shovels  would  be  most 
important.* 

The  main  body  follows  the  reserve  at  a  variable  distance. 
In  the  case  of  a  di\asion  the  distance  would  vary  from  half  a 
mile  to  three  miles,  but  should  not  ordinarily  exceed  a  m-ile  and 
a  half.f  In  the  case  of  large  forces  the  distance  may  be  as 
great  as  five  miles ;  or  even  gre'ater  if  it  be  desired  to  seize  some 
important  point  even  at  the  risk  of  incurring  the  defeat  of  the 
advance  guard  before  it  can  be  succored  by  the  m^ain  body. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  advance  guard  is  strong  and  has 
orders  to  bring  on  a  battle,  the  distance  may  be  not  more  than 
half  a  mile.  At  the  head  of  thd  main  column  marches  the 
major-general  with  his  staff  and  a  platoon  of  cavalry.  The 
main  body  is  formed  in  accordance  with  the  maxim  that  the 
troops  likely  to  be  first  needed  should  be  in  advance.  This 
would  place  the  artillery  at  the  head  of  the  column,  but  a  ^mall 
force  of  infantry  must  precede  it  for  its  protection.  We  have, 
consequently,  the  following  arrangement  of  the  main  body 
from  front  to  rear :  One  regiment  of  infantry,  followed  by  its 
ammunition  carts;  three  batteries;  one  brigade  of  infantry, 
followed  by  its  ammunition  carts;  two  regiments  of  infantry 

*Immediately  after  the  battle  of  The-  Wilderness,  Lee,  learning  that 
Grant  was  extending  his  left  toward  Spottsylvania,  began  to  push  forward 
his  own  right  toward  the  same  point,  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry  division  in 
advance.  The  two  armies  marched  on  parallel  roads  at  a  short  distance 
from  each  other.  Pushing  forward  rapidly,  Fitzhugh  Lee  placed  his  divis- 
ion across  the  Federal  line  of  advance  on  the  Brock  Road,  and  quickly 
intrenched  so  strongly  as  to  thwart  all  attempts  to  dislodge  him.  The 
important  point  of  Spottsylvania  was  thus  secured  by  Lee. 

Later  in  the  same  campaign,  the  First  Cavalry  Division  (General  Tor- 
bert)  seized  and  held  the  important  position  of  Cold  Harbor.  By  some 
mistake  it  was  withdrawn  in  the  night,  but,  under  orders,  retook  the  posi- 
tion, strengthened  it  with  shght  intrenchments,  and  held  it  against  a  deter- 
mined assault  by  the  Confederate  infantry,  until  the  arrival  of  General 
Wright  with  the  Sixth  Corps  placed  the  position  definitely  in  the  possession 
of  the  Union  forces. 

Similar  results  might  often  be  gained  by  the  advance  guard  by  seizing 
and  intrenching  important  points. 

tit  should  be  remembered  that  all  the  distances  here  given  are  based 
on  the  asstunption  that  the  division  is  operating  in  an  open  country.  In 
a  close  country  they  would  be  much  less,  and  in  any  case  they  should  be 
regulated  by  the  object  of  the  march  and  the  nature  of  the  terrain. 


40  SECURITY  AND   INFORMATION. 

with  ammunition  carts;  the  remainder  of  the  hospital  troops 
with  ambulances ;  a  platoon  of  engineers  with  a  bridge  train ; 
the  ammimition  column,  and  the  baggage  and  supply  train. 
The  position  of  the  bridge  train  depeinds  upon  circumstances. 
Ordinarily  it  would  be  with  the  main  body,  as  stated  above, 
but  under  certain  circumstances,  especially  in  the  pursuit  of  a 
defeated  enemy,  it  might  be  with  the  reserve  of  the  advance 
guard. 

The  commander  of  the  first  brigade  commands  the  advance 
guard,  all  the  infantry  of  which  is  taken  from  his  brigade.  The 
infantry  at  the  head  of  the  main  column  also  belongs  to  the 
first  brigade.  The  infantry  of  the  rear  guard  (one  regiment)  is 
taken  from  the  third  brigade.  The  brigades  alternate  from  day 
to  day  in  their  positions  in  column. 

If  the  country  is  close  and  the  enemy's  guerrillas  are  act- 
ive, detachments  must  flank  the  train.  These  detachments 
are  generally  taken  from  the  rear  guard. 

Advance  Guard  of  an  Army  Corps. 

If  the  entire  corps  were  opera  cing  together,  the  corps  cavalry 
would  screen  its  front,  and  the  advance  guards  of  the  divisions 
would  be  composed  of  infantry  and  artillery.  In  view  of  the 
protection  afforded  by  the  advance  screen  of  cavalry,  two  regi- 
ments of  infantry  and  a  battery  would  probably  be  sufficient 
for  the  advance  guard  of  each  division,  if  the  corps  were  march- 
ing on  three  parallel  roads.  If,  however,  the  corps  were  march- 
ing on  two  parallel  roads,  the  column  composed  of  two  divisions 
should  be  preceded  by  at  least  a  brigade  of  infantry  and  two 
batteries. 

The  above  dispositions  may  be  taken  as  a  guide,  but  must 
not  be  blindly  followed.  In  nothing  does  the  adage,  "Circum- 
stances alter  cases,"  find  a  more  complete  verification  than  in 
the  details  of  the  security  and  information  of  an  army.  No 
fixed  rule  for  distances  and  formation  can  possibly  be  given.  In 
very  few  cases,  indeed,  can  the  normal  distances  and  formations 


ADVANCB   GUARD   OF  AN   ARMY   CORPS.  4I 

be  used  without  some  modification.  The  object  of  the  advance 
guard  must  be  continually  borne  in  m,ind,  and  any  disposition  or 
formation  that  will  enable  it  best  to  perform  its  functions  is  right. 

Flank  Guards. 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  in  the  case  of  large  forces 
the  flanking  parties  are  taken  from  the  main  body.  These  par- 
ties are  not  mere  flanking  groups,  but  are  bodies  varying  in 
strength  and  composition  from  a  small  patrol  of  infantry  or 
cavahy*  to  a  large  force  of  all  arms. 

In  the  case  of  a  flank  march  near  the  enemy,  the  flank  guard 
becomes  a  body  of  the  greatest  importance,  and  its  composi- 
tion and  formation  resemble  those  of  an  advance  guard.  A 
flank  march  near  the  enemy  being  an  especially  hazardous 
operation,  and  one  never  made  to  a  great  distance,  a  force 
undertaking  it  is  generally  in  light  marching  order  and  ready  to 
form  promptly  for  action.  For  this  reason,  the  distance  from 
the  flank  guard  to  the  flank  of  the  column  is  not  so  great  as  the 
distance  from  an  advance  guard  to  the  head  of  the  main  body. 
Moreover,  the  formation  from  column  to  a  flank  can  be  made 
more  quickly  than  a  formation  on  the  head  of  the  column. 

In  a  flank  march  it  may  be  necessary  to  have  an  advance 
guard,  flank  guard,  and  rear  guard,  each  of  very  considerable 
strength. 

The;  Advance  Guard  in  a  Retreat. 

When  a  force  is  retreating,  the  fimctions  of  security  and 
information  devolve  upon  the  rear  guard,  which  is,  of  course, 
the  force  nearest  the  enemy,  f  Nevertheless,  it  is  important 
that  there  should  be  a  small  advance  guard,  to  clear  the  way 
for  the  main  body  by  removing  obstacles,  repairing  roads  and 
bridges,  selecting  the  most  practicable  routes  of  march,  driving 

*The  movements  of  flank  patrols  and  the  minor  details  of  the  conduct 
of  an  advance  guard  are  considered  in  the  chapter  on  "Reconnaissance." 

tSee  Chapter  VI. 


42  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

away  small  parties  of  hostile  cavalry  which  may  have  passed 
entirely  around  the  flanks  of  the  retreating  force,  and  (if  in  the 
enemy's  country)  dispersing  bodies  of  partisans  or  hostile  in- 
habitants who  may  be  endeavoring  to  block  the  way.  As 
already  stated,  the  strength  of  the  advance  guard  on  a  retro- 
grade movement  would  be  the  same  as  that  of  the  rear  guard 
on  a  forward  march.* 


*See  page  21,  ante. 


CHAPTER  III. 


Outposts. 


To  exercise  ceaseless  vigilance,  to  be  in  constant  readiness  for  action, 
and  to  preserve  the  most  profound  silence,  are  the  cardinal  principles  of 
outpost  duty. — Van  Mulken. 

Outposts  are  detachments  thrown  out  from  a  force  when 
halted,  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  it  from  surprise.  Like 
advance  guards  on  the  march,  outposts  are  charged  with  the 
duties  of  observation  and  resistance.  They  prevent  the  recon- 
naissance of  the  position  by  the  enemy's  scouts  and  patrols, 
give  warning  of  the  approach  of  hostile  bodies,  and  offer  sufl&- 
cient  resistance  to  the  enemy's  attacks  to  enable  the  main  body 
to  prepare  tor  action. 

The  proper  performance  of  outpost  duty  is  of  vital  import- 
ance to  an  army,  and  history  presents  many  examples  of  disas- 
ters resulting  from  its  neglect.  At  Laon,  in  1814,  Marmont's 
neglect  to  exercise  proper  vigilance  caused  him  to  be  over- 
whelmed by  Bliicher's  night  attack.  At  Shiloh  the  careless- 
ness with  which  outpost  duty  was  performed  by  the  United 
States  army  enabled  the  Confederates  to  form  their  line  of  bat- 
tle deliberately  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  the  camp  of  their 
unsuspecting  opponents,  and  to  take  the  Union  forces  at  a  ter- 
rible disadvantage.  At  Vionville,  in  1870,  Forton's  cavalry 
division  was  so  negligently  guarded  by  its  outposts  that  it  was 
surprised  by  the  German  horse  artillery,  and  forced  to  fly  in 
confusion  through  the  camp  of  its  own  infantry.  Scores  of 
similar  examples  might  be  mentioned. 

When  a  strong  cavalry  screen  is  in  front  of  the  army,  the 
duty  of  observation  becomes  much  less  important  to  the  out- 
posts than  would  otherwise  be  the  case.  In  1870  the  effective- 
ness of  the  cavalry  screen  was  such  that  Boguslawski  says: 

43 


44  SECURITY   AND  INFORMATION. 

"As  an  additional  result  of  the  use  to  which  our  cavalry  was 
put,  we  may  mention  the  perfect  security  and  tranquillity 
enjoyed  by  our  army  corps  on  the  march  and  in  camp,  in  rear  of 
the  cavalry  divisions  pushed  forward  half  or  a  whole  day's  march 
to  the  front.  The  army  corps  had  not,  as  a  rule,  to  trouble 
themselves  with  outpost  duty,  but  only  to  provide  for  the  imme- 
diate security  of  the  bivouac  or  cantonment."  This  was,  how- 
ever, an  exceptional  condition  of  affairs,  for  the  German  cav- 
alry was  strong  and  enterprising,  and  the  opposing  cavalry  was 
weak  and  dispirited.  While  a  good  cavalry  screen  greatly  in- 
creases the  security  of  an  army,  and  thus  materially  lightens 
the  duty  of  the  outposts,  it  furnishes  no  excuse  for  the  latter  to 
be  careless,  or  to  forget  that  the  duty  of  observation  is  insep- 
arably connected  with  that  of  resistance. 

Unbroke'n  rest  at  night  being  necessary  for  the  preservation 
of  the  health  and  efficiency  of  troops  undergoing  the  hardships 
and  fatigues  of  a  campaign,  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that 
the  repose  of  the  arm)^  in  camp  or  bivouac  should  not  be  dis- 
turbed by  needless  alarms.  The  army  must  feel  that  the  vigil- 
ance of  its  outposts  enables  it  to  sleep  in  security. 

The  duties  of  the  outposts  may  be  classified  as  follows : 

1.  To  observe  constantly  all  approaches  by 

Observation :       ^  ^^^^^  ^^^  ^^^^^  °^^g^^  advance. 

2.  To  watch,  and  immediately  report,  the 
movements  of  the  enemy. 

f   I .  To  prevent  reconnaissance  by  the  enemy. 
2.  Above  all,  to  check  the  advance  of  the 


X^esistance  * 

enemy  long  enough  to  enable  the  main 

I  body  to  prepare  for  action. 

Subdivisions  of  the  Outpost. — The  outpost  is  divided  into 
four  parts,  namely:  i.  Sentinels  or  vedettes;  2.  Pickets; 
3.  Supports;  4.  Reserve.  The  sentinels  or  vedettes  occupy 
the  line  of  observation.  They  are  sent  out  from  the  pickets, 
and  supported  by  them.  The  supports  usually  occupy  the  line 
of  resistance,  and  are  supported  by  the  reserve. 


SUBDIVISIONS   OF  THE)   OUTPOST,  45 

In  an  infantry  outpost  the  pickets  are  from  100  to  400  yards 
in  rear  of  the  sentinels ;  the  supports,  from  400  to  800  yards  in 
rear  of  the  pickets ;  and  the  reserve,  from  400  to  800  yards  in 
rear  of  the  supports.  In  a  cavah-y  outpost  the  distance  from 
the  vedettes  to  the  picket  is  about  600  yards,  and  the  other 
distances  vary  between  the  limits  of  1,200  and  2,000  yards. 
These  distances  cannot  be  definitely  fixed,  as  they  depend  upon 
many  circmnstances  of  ground,  weather,  and  the  natm-e  and 
proximityof  the  enemy.  When  the  outpost  occupies  a  strong  de- 
fensive position  and  the  approaches  from  the  rear  are  open  and 
unobstructed,  the  distances  may  be  much  greater.  The  only 
essential  requirement  is  that  the  supporting  bodies  should  be 
able  to  reinforce  in  time.  Thus,  in  an  infantry  outpost,  if  the 
support  can  be  depended  upon  to  hold  its  position  for  half  an 
hour  against  a  heavy  attack,  and  the  reserve  can  be  kept  in 
instant  readiness,  the  latter  may  be  held  back  at  any  distance 
not  exceeding  that  over  which  it  can  march  in  twenty  minutes, 
or,  in  other  words,  a  mile.  Such  a  great  distance  would,  how- 
ever, be  quite  exceptional,  and  would  be  justified  only  by  the 
conditions  supposed.  The  distances  given  above  may  be  re- 
garded as  approximations  to  those  that  might  be  adopted  in 
most  cases. 

The  general  plan  of  an  outpost  may  be  likened  to  an  open 
fan,  the  sentinels  being  along  the  outer  edge ;  or,  better  yet,  to 
a  hand  with  the  fingers  extended  and  widely  opened.  A  line 
along  the  tips  of  the  fingers  would  represent  the  chain  of  senti- 
nels ;  the  first  joints,  the  line  of  pickets ;  the  second  joints,  the 
line  of  supports;  and  the  knuckles,  the  line  of  the  reserve; 
while  the  wrist  would  represent  the  position  of  the  main  body, 
(See  Plate  VI.) 

The  reserve  generally  consists  of  iiot  less  than  one-third 
nor  more  than  one-half  of  the  entire  outpost.  The  strength  of 
the  supports  and  pickets  would  consequently  vary  from  two- 
thirds  to  one-half  of  the  outpost.  The  strength  of  each  picket 
depends  upon  the  number  of  sentinels  and  patrols  that  it  has 
to  ftunish,  and  the  size  of  each  support  is  regulated  by  the  prin- 


46  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

ciple  that  it  should  be  equal  to  the  aggregate  strength  of  all  the 
pickets  supported  by  it.  As  a  general  rule,  one-third  of  the  out- 
posts would  be  assigned  to  the  reserve,  one-third  to  the  supports, 
and  one-third  to  the  pickets  and  sentinels. 

Two  Systems  of  Outposts. — Outposts  are  of  two  kinds:  the 
cordon  system,  in  which  the  entire  front  is  covered  with  a  chain 
of  sentinels;  and  the  patrol  system,  in  which  only  the  roads 
and  other  avenues  of  approach  are  guarded  by  sentinels,  closely 
backed  up  by  pickets,  while  the  intervening  country  is  con- 
stantly patrolled.  The  best  results  are  generally  obtained  by 
a  combination  of  the  two  systems. 

Position. — The  outpost  must  cover  the  front  of  the  army, 
and  overlap  its  flanks,  unless  the  latter  are  secured  by  impassa- 
ble obstacles.  A  prominent  natural  feature  should  be  selected 
to  mark  the  general  line,  such  as  a  ridge,  a  river,  or  the  farther 
edge  of  a  wood.  The  most  favorable  position  will  be  one  which 
furnishes  a  good  view  and  field  of  fire  to  the  front,  while  afford- 
ing concealment  from  the  enemy  and  shelter  from  his  fire. 
One  of  the  best  positions  is,  therefore,  a  wood  held  at  the  edge 
toward  the  enemy,  and  one  of  the  worst  is  a  wood  held  at  the 
nearer  edge.* 

If  the  farther  edge  is  too  distant  to  be  occupied,  and  no 
broad  roads  or  continuous  clearings  exist  in  the  wood,  the 
measures  to  be  taken  will  depend  upon  the  length  of  time  the 
position  is  to  be  occupied.  If  the  outpost  is  to  hold  the  po- 
sition for  some  time,  as,  for  instance,  in  the  case  of  the  invest- 
ment of  a  fortified  place,  a  belt  at  least  twenty  yards  wide 

*When  Banks,  falling  back  after  his  defeat  at  Sabine  Cross  Roads  the 
day  before,  took  up  his  position  at  Pleasant  Hill  (April  g,  1864),  Benedict's 
brigade  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps  was  in  line  in  an  open  field  within  effective 
infantry  range  of  the  southern  edge  of  a  forest.  The  outpost  covering  the 
brigade  was  established  in  the  wood,  the  pickets  being  only  a  short  distance 
from  the  southern  edge.  The  Confederates,  advancing  from  the  north, 
through  the  wood,  drove  in  the  outpost,  and,  with  little  or  no  loss,  took  up 
a  position  at  the  edge  of  the  wood,  where  they  were  sheltered  by  the  trees, 
while  the  Union  troops  were  not  only  in  the  open,  but  had  their  fire  masked 
for  a  time  by  the  outpost  troops  retreating  across  the  unsheltered  space. 
The  Federal  brigade  was  soon  thrown  into  confusion,  and  suffered  heavy 
loss,  its  commander  being  among  the  killed. 


POSITION.  47 

should  be  cleared,  an  entanglement  made  of  the  felled  trees, 
and  the  sentinels  posted  along  the  near  edge  of  the  belt.  If 
the  entanglement  consists  of  obstacles  of  such  a  nattue  that 
they  might  furnish  shelter  to  the  enemy,  it  should  be  placed  on 
the  near  side  of  the  clearing;  otherwise  on  the  far  side.  Thus 
felled  trees,  trous-de-loup,  etc.,  would  be  at  the  near  edge, 
while  wire  entanglements,  etc.,  would  be  at  the  far  edge.  If, 
as  is  usually  the  case,  time  and  opportunity  do  not  admit  of 
making  such  a  clearing,  and  the  outpost  line  must  traverse  the 
wood,  the  line  of  sentinels  should  be  along  a  stream,  ordinary 
road,  or  ridge  overlooking  a  valley,  so  as  to  get  the  best  view 
practicable  under  the  circumstances.  In  holding  the  outpost 
line  in  a  heavy  forest,  it  would  be  well  to  make  use  of  Cossack 
posts  closely  backed  up  by  the  supports,  the  posts  sheltered  by 
barricades  of  timber,  patrolling  in  front  being  constant.  In- 
stead of  carrying  the  outpost  line  through  the  wood  when  the 
farther  edge  can  not  be  occupied,  it  is  generally  advisable  to 
place  the  sentinels  under  cover  of  some  kind,  facing  the  wood, 
and  at  least  200  yards  from  the  near  edge,  the  wood  being  pa- 
trolled. Where  a  stream,  canal,  or  other  obstacle  having  but 
few  passages,  lies  parallel  to  the  outpost  line,  the  sentinels,  or 
even  the  pickets,  may  sometimes  be  posted  beyond  it;  but  the 
supports  should  be  kept  on  the  near  side  for  fear  of  so  large  a 
body  being  cut  off  before  it  could  make  good  its  retreat.  It 
would  generally  be  best  to  keep  even  the  line  of  sentinels  on 
the  near  side,  and  merely  patrol  beyond  the  obstacle.  The  sen- 
tinels msLj  be  withdrawn  some  distance  from  the  obstacle, 
especially  during  the  day,  if  they  can  thus  get  a  more  extended 
view  or  find  better  cover. 

The  outpost  line  is  convex  towards  the  enemy,  or  straight 
with  its  extremities  thrown  back.  Unless  the  nature  of  the 
ground  compels,  it  should  never  be  concave,  even  when  that  is 
the  shape  of  the  position  which  it  covers.  It  does  not  neces- 
sarily conform  to  the  line  of  the  position  in  any  case. 

Strength. — To  avoid  overtaxing  the  troops,  the  strength  of 
the  outpost  should  be  the  least  that  is  compatible  with  the 


48  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

proper  performance  of  its  functions.  It  depends  upon  vari- 
ous considerations,  such  as  the  natm-e  of  the  country  and  the 
strength,  proximity,  and  character  of  the  enemy.  In  a  coun- 
try well  adapted  to  defense,  smaller  numbers  sufifice  than  in 
an  open  countr5^  When  the  enemy  is  near  and  aggressive, 
the  outposts  must  be  strong  and  vigilant.  The  strength  of 
the  outpost  will  also  depend  upon  the  plan  of  action  deter- 
mined upon  in  case  of  attack.  If  the  line  chosen  for  the  de- 
ployment of  the  main  body  coincides  with  the  line  of  resist- 
ance of  the  outpost,  Xhe  latter  force  must  be  strong  enough 
to  hold  the  chosen  position  to  the  utmost.  If  it  is  decided  to 
fall  back  upon  the  main  body,  the  outpost  not  only  may  be, 
but  should  be,  weaker  than  in  the  former  case,  as  a  strong 
force  would  b^  more  likely  to  become  compromised  in  a  serious 
engagement  than  a  weaker  one. 

The  strength  of  the  outpost  thus  depends  upon  so  many 
different  considerations  that  no  definite  rule  on  the  subject 
can  be  prescribed.  Clery  gives  six  different  examples  of  out- 
posts in  the  European  wars  of  1866  and  1870-71,  in  which  the 
strength  varies  from  250  to  i,odo  men  to  a  mile.  As  a  rule, 
the  maximum  strength  of  an  outpost  is  one-sixth  of  the  entire 
force.  This  proportion  should  not  be  exceeded,  except  in 
case  of  absolute  necessity,  and  it  should  be  less  whenever  a 
reduction  is  consistent  with  prudence. 

Composition. — When  an  army  is  on  the  march  from  day 
to  day,  the  advance  guard  constitutes  the  outpost  at  each 
halt;  but  if  its  duties  during  the  day's  march  have  been  ardu- 
ous, it  must  be  relieved,  as  soon  as  practicable,  by  fresh  troops. 
If  outposts  are  required  on  the  flanks  and  rear,  they  will  be 
composed  of  the  flank  and  rear  guards,  when  such  guards 
exist  in  sufficient  strength;  otherwise  such  outposts  are  taken 
from  the  main  body,  which  will  also  furnish  them  when  the 
duties  of  the  flank  and  rear  guards  during  the  day  have  been 
especially  trying.  In  the  disposition  of  an  outpost  the  differ- 
ent tactical  units  should  as  far  as  practicable  be  kept  intact. 
Thus,  supposing  the  outpost  of  a  division  to  consist  of  a  regi- 


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COMPOSITION.  49 

ment  of  infantr}^,  the  reserve  might  be  composed  of  the  first 
battalion;  the  supports,  of  two  companies  of  the  second  bat- 
taUon  and  two  of  the  third,  each  supporting  the  remaining 
companies  of  its  own  battalion,  which  would  constitute  the 
pickets  and  sentinels.  (See  Plate  VI.)  Similarly  the  outpost 
of  a  cavalry  brigade  (three  regiments)  might  consist  of  a 
squadron  arranged  as  shown  in  Plate  VII. 

Each  division  will  generally  furnish  the  outpost  for  its 
own  front.  In  a  large  force  especially  this  principle  may  be 
advantageously  applied  to  brigades.  In  this  case  the  outpost 
of  the  division  might  consist  of  a  battalion  (four  companies) 
from  each  of  the  three  brigades.  The  brigade  outpost  would 
then  have  two  companies  in  reserve,  one  in  the  support,  and 
the  other  furnishing  the  pickets  and  sentinels.  As  alternative 
formations,  one  company  might  furnish  the  reserve;  two,  the 
supports;  and  one,  the  pickets  and  sentinels:  or  the  reserve 
and  support  might  each  consist  of  one  company,  the  pickets 
and  sentinels  consisting  of  the  other  two.  The  outpost  of 
each  brigade  would  be  under  the  command  of  the  officer  com- 
manding the  battalion  composing  it,  and  would  constitute  a 
section  of  the  general  outpost.  An  officer  should  be  detailed 
to  command  the  entire  outpost. 

If  two  brigades  encamp  in  the  first  line,  with  the  third  in 
reserve,  the  outpost  for  the  division  is  taken  from  the  first  two. 
If  outposts  for  the  flank  and  rear  should  be  necessary,  they 
should  be  taken  from  the  reserve  brigade. 

All  the  baggage  of  the  troops  on  outpost  duty  remains  in 
rear  with  the  main  body,  the  only  vehicles  brought  up  being 
those  containing  intrenching  tools  and  a  part  of  the  reserve 
ammunition. 

An  outpost  may  consist  of  infantry,  of  cavalry,  of  both,  of 
cavalry  and  artillery,  or  of  all  three  arms.  The  proportion  of 
the  different  arms  depends  upon  circumstances.  In  an  open 
country,  in  daytime,  the  duty  can  be  best  performed  by  cav- 
alry. In  a  close  country,  at  night,  and  when  the  enemy  is 
near,  infantry  is  preferable.     The  best  performance  of  outpost 


50  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

duty  requires  a  combination  of  the  two  arms.  Cavalry  is  of 
the  greatest  value  when  pushed  well  to  the  front  as  a  screen, 
but  it  may  often  be  advantageously  combined  with  infantry  in 
the  outpost  proper.  It  may  thus  occupy  look-out  stations  too 
distant  to  be  held  by  infantry,  or  to  patrol  to  a  distance  beyond 
the  outpost  that  would  be  impracticable  for  the  latter  arm. 
When  a  considerable  portion  of  the  outpost  line  is  in  wooded  or 
enclosed  country  and  the  space  adjoining  it  is  open,  it  may 
sometimes  be  advisable  to  hold  the  former  portion  with  infantry 
and  the  latter  with  cavalry ;  but  such  a  formation  cannot  gen- 
erally be  recommended.  As  a  rule,  when  it  is  impracticable 
to  use  the  cavalry  as  an  advanced  screen,  its  use  with  the  out- 
posts should  be  limited  to  patrolling  and  to  furnishing  order- 
lies, when  necessary,  to  the  pickets,  supports,  and  reserve. 
The  experiment  was  made  at  Metz  of  employing  cavalry  on 
picket  duty,  but  it  was  soon  given  up,  and  the  use  of  cavalry 
with  the  outposts  confined  to  attaching  mounted  orderlies  to 
the  infantry  pickets.  True,  the  German  cavalry  was  not  as, 
well  suited  as  American  cavalry  to  this  duty ;  but  it  may  safely 
be  laid  down  as  a  general  rule  that  cavalry  ought  never  to  be 
used  on  any  duty  that  can  be  performed  as  well,  or  better,  by 
infantry. 

When  cavalry  is  used  with  an  outpost,  it  should  be  employed 
in  constant  and  vigilant  patrolling  as  far  to  the  front  as  may  be 
consistent  with  reasonable  precautions  for  safety ;  but  a  squad- 
ron should  not  be  used  where  a  troop,  or  perhaps  a  few  small 
patrols,  could  perform  the  duty  equally  well.  Moreover,  the 
use  of  mounted  orderlies  with  the  pickets,  supports,  and  reserve 
should  be  limited  to  the  requirements  of  actual  necessity.  If 
the  duty  of  patrolling  and  furnishing  mounted  orderlies  does 
not  employ  all  the  cavalry  of  the  outpost,  the  rest  should  be 
held  in  hand  b)^  the  outpost  commander  with,  or  near,  the 
reserve,  at  a  point  on  one  of  the  main  roads  leading  towards 
the  enemy,  whence  it  can  be  quickly  sent  forward  in  any 
emergency  requiring  its  action.  It  would  generally  be  a 
mistake  to  employ  cavalry  as  pickets  with  infantry  supports, 


COMPOSITION.  51 

as  in  the  case  of  an  atttack  upon  the  outpost  such  pickets 
would  be  thrust  back  upon  the  infantry,  with  which  they 
would  be  intermingled  in  such  a  manner  as  to  hamper  the 
correct  tactical  handling  of  the  two  arms. 

Too  much  stress  cannot  be  placed  upon  the  fact  that  the 
best  use  of  cavalry  in  the  service  of  security  and  information 
is  as  a  body  constituting  a  screen  so  far  in  advance  of  the  gen- 
eral outpost  line  as  to  be  quite  independent  of  it.*  When 
such  use  is  impracticable,  and  its  service  as  a  part  of  the  out- 
post proper  is,  for  any  reason,  necessary,  its  employment  should 
he  strictly  limited  to  those  duties  for  which  it  is  especially 
suited.  Cavalry  is  an  expensive  arm;  its  efficiency  is  more 
easily  impaired  than  that  of  infantry;  and  its  peculiar  uses 
are  of  such  vital  importance  to  an  army  that  its  strength 
should  not  be  needlessly  frittered  away.f 

Commanders  inexperienced  in  the  mounted  service  are  too 
apt  to  impose  heavy  outpost  duty  on  the  cavalry  as  a  matter 
of  convenience.  The  superb  cavalry  force  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  was  badly  treated  in  this  respect.  In  describing  the 
condition  of  the  cavalry  corps  when  he  assumed  command  of  it. 
General  Sheridan  says :  '  'The  horses  were  thin  and  very  much 
worn  down  by  excessive  and,  it  seemed  to  me,  unnecessary 
picket  duty ;  for  the  cavalry  picket  line  almost  completely  en- 
circled the  infantry  and  artillery  camps  of  the  army,  covering 
a  distance,  on  a  continuous  line,  of  nearly  60  miles,  with 
hardly  a  mounted  Confederate  confronting  it  at  any  point. 
From  the  very  beginning  of  the  war  the  enemy  had  shown 
more  wisdom  respecting  his  cavalry  than  we. "J 

Artillers^  is  of  great  value  to  an  outpost  when  it  can  be  so 
posted  as  to  command  an  important  road  or  defile,  and  be  at 
the  same  time  beyond  the  effective  range  of  the  enemy's  rifle 

*vSee  Chapter  V. 

fit  would  be  well  to  furnish  each  regiment  of  infantry  with  a  sufficient 
niunber  of  horses  to  provide  for  mounted  orderlies  with  the  outpost  and 
the  mounting  of  the  commanders  of  the  advance  guard  and  vanguard. 

J:"Personal  Memoirs  of  P.  H.  Sheridan,"  Vol.  ±.,  page  355. 


52  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

fire.  It  may  aid  materially,  with  shrapnel  fire,  in  supporting 
the  advanced  portions  of  the  outpost  and  in  covering  their 
retreat.  It  should  be  in  constant  readiness  to  move  from  one 
point  to  another,  the  horses  being  kept  harnessed,  and  only  a 
portion  fed  or  watered  at  a  time.  Only  the  limbers  should  be 
with  the  battery,  the  caissons  and  other  carriages  being  at  the 
rear.  If  possible,  the  guns  of  a  battery  should  be  kept  to- 
gether. Emergencies  may,  it  is  true,  demand  the  detachment 
of  guns;  but,  as  a  rule,  it  is  a  mistake  to  divide  a  battery, 
especially  if  the  pieces  are  so  separated  as  to  deprive  the  battery 
commander  of  the  power  to  use  them  in  concert.  All  cover 
afforded  by  the  ground  should  be  utilized  for  the  concealment 
of  the  guns  from  the  enemy;  and  the  pieces  should  not  be 
exposed,  except  when  some  definite  object  is  to  be  gained.  As 
a  rule,  they  should  not  take  position  within  artillery  range  of 
ground  on  which  the  enemy's  batteries  could  take  post  unper- 
ceived ;  should  it  be  necessary  to  do  so,  they  must  be  carefully 
concealed  and  their  prompt  withdrawal  provided  for.  The 
artillery,  when  not  posted  to  command  bridges  or  roads,  should 
be  with  the  reserve,  preferably  near  a  road.  Machine  guns 
may  be  used  with  the  outpost  to  command  approaches  with 
long-range  fire.  Horse  artillery  is  best  suited  to  the  require- 
ments of  outpost  duty. 

Distance  of  Outposts  from  Main  Body. — ^The  outpost  must 
be  far  enough  from  the  main  body  to  give  the  latter  time  to 
form  for  action  before  the  outlying  troops  are  driven  in.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  must  not  be  so  far  distant  as  to  be  in  dan- 
ger of  being  cut  off  by  the  enemy.  The  distance  will  also  de- 
pend upon  the  strength  that  can  be  spared  for  the  outpost 
line,  the  length  of  the  line  increasing  almost  in  direct  propor- 
tion with  the  distance.  When  the  country  is  open,  the  dis- 
tance will  generally  be  greater  than  in  an  enclosed  country 
which  offers  good  positions  for  defense.  When  the  main  body 
is  under  the  enemy's  artillery  fire,  it  can  not  form  for  action  in 
the  security  which  it  needs;  but  if  the  line  of  resistance  is  at 
a  distance  from  the  camp  or  bivouac  equal  to  the  limit  of  the 


DISTANCE    FROM    MAIN    BODY.  53 

effective  range  of  artillery,  the  outpost  must  be  driven  from 
that  line  before  the  main  body  can  be  subjected  to  the  fire  of 
the  hostile  guns.  The  supports  (occupying  the  line  of  resist- 
ance) should,  therefore,  in  a  large  force,  be  at  a  distance  of 
about  3,000  yards  from  the  main  body.  This  fixes  the  line  of 
supports,  at  proper  distances  from  which  the  other  parts  of  the 
outpost  are  established.  The  maximum  distance  from  an 
infantry  outpost  to  the  body  which  it  covers  is  about  three 
miles,  supposing  the  outpost  to  be  of  considerable  strength 
and  strongly  posted ;  in  a  small  force  the  distance  must  neces- 
sarily be  less. 

The  Commander  of  the  Outpost. 

The  officer  detailed  to  command  the  outpost  makes  his 
headquarters  with  the  reserve,  and  establishes  there  his  field 
telegraph  or  signal  station.  If  the  front  of  the  outpost  is  con- 
siderable, it  is  divided  into  sections  of  about  a  mile  or  a  mile 
and  a  half  for  infantry  and  three  miles  for  cavalry,  and  an  officer 
assigned  to  the  command  of  each  section.  Each  section  com- 
mander makes  his  headquarters  with  one  of  his  supports,  and  is 
under  the  orders  of  the  commander  of  the  outpost.  When 
each  brigade  guards  its  own  front,  the  sections  of  the  outpost 
coincide  with  the  brigade  fronts. 

The  outpost  commander  receives  from  the  commander  of 
the  forces  instructions  as  to  the  general  front  to  be  occupied  by 
the  outposts,  their  object,  and  the  amount  of  resistance  they 
are  expected  to  make.  He  is  also  informed  about  the  avenues 
of  approach  from  the  direction  of  the  opposing  force,  and  is 
made  acquainted  with  everything  known  in  regard  to  the  posi- 
tion and  probable  intentions  of  the  enemy.  He  then  deter- 
mines the  strength  of  the  reserve,  supports,  and  pickets;  de- 
cides upon  the  distance  of  the  line  of  resistance  from  the  main 
body,  and  selects  a  line  of  observation  farther  in  advance.  A 
good  topographical  map  of  the  position  selected  for  the  camp 
and  the  surrounding  country  would  enable  him  to  choose  these 
positions  at  once.     In  the  absence  of  such  a  map  they  must  be 


54  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

determined  by  reconnaissance,  and  in  any  case  the  ground  must 
be  carefully  examined  before  the  detachments  move  out.  The 
station  of  the  reserve  is  next  fixed,  the  positions  of  the  supports 
pointed  out,  places  for  the  pickets  approximately  designated, 
and  the  general  line  of  the  sentinels  roughly  indicated. 

The  outpost  commander  then  gives  instructions  to  his 
subordinates  as  to : 

1.  The  general  front  of  the  outpost  line. 

2.  The  ground  to  be  occupied  by  each. 

3.  The  positions  of  neighboring  supports  and  pickets. 

4.  The  night  positions  of  the  pickets  and  supports. 

5.  What   is   known  of   the   enemy   and   his   probable 

movements. 

6.  The  approaches  by  which  the  enemy  might  advance. 

7.  The  direction  and  method  of  patrolling. 

8.  What  is  to  be  done  in  case  of  attack. 

9.  How  flags  of  truce  and  deserters  are  to  be  received. 

10.  The  kind  of  reports  required. 

1 1 .  Where  he  himself  is  to  be  found. 

12.  The  countersign  and  parole. 

When  the  outpost  has  been  posted,  its  commander  makes 
his  inspection ;  orders  such  changes  in  the  positions  of  supports, 
pickets,  or  sentinels  as  may  seem  advisable ;  sees  that  the  roads 
and  paths  leading  from  the  enemy  are  properly  guarded ;  gives 
directions  for  the  fortification  of  such  parts  of  the  position  as 
need  strengthening;  and  is  especially  careful  that  the  flanks 
are  secured  by  resting  them  on  impassable  obstacles,  or  by 
refusing  them  and  protecting  them  by  detachments.  As  a 
rule,  the  outpost  should  strengthen  its  position  by  intrenching. 
A  continuous  line  of  intrenchments  is  out  of  the  question,  as  it 
would  require  too  much  labor  to  make  it  and  too  many  men  to 
hold  it;  but  each  picket  and,  above  all,  each  support,  should 
intrench  when  practicable.  Whether  the  reserve  should  in- 
trench or  not  will  depend  on  circumstances.  If  the  outpost 
remains  in  the  position  for  some  time,  the  sentinels  should 
shelter  themselves  in  pits  about  two  and  a  half  feet  in  depth. 


THE   COMMANDER   OF   THE    OUTPOST.  55 

the  earth  being  thrown  up  toward  the  enemy  and  covered  with 
sod  or  twigs,  in  order  that  it  may  not  attract  attention. 

The  outpost  commander  sends  to  the  commander  of  the 
main  body  all  information  received,  first  testing  its  accuracy  as 
far  as  he  can  without  delay  in  its  transmission.  If  time  is  lack- 
ing for  such  test,  he  sends  back  the  information  with  a  clear 
statement  of  the  source  from  which  it  came,  and  afterwards 
sends  back  any  corroborative  or  contradictory  news  he  may 
receive  in  regard  to  the  matter  reported. 

Sentinels  and  Vedettes. 

Sentinels  must  be  so  posted  as  to  have  a  good  view  to  the 
front  and  flanks,  and  be  concealed  as  much  as  possible.  They 
do  not  walk  their  posts,  but  remain  stationary,  being  generally 
posted  double,  so  that  one  man  may  go  to  examine  any  suspi- 
cious point  while  the  other  remains  on  post.  They  may  also  be 
posted  in  groups.  In  the  former  case  the  reliefs  not  on  post 
remain  with  the  picket;  in  the  latter  case  the  group  accom- 
panies the  sentinel  to  his  post  and  remains  in  concealment  a 
short  distance  behind  him.  When  the  group  system  is  used,  a 
single  sentinel  for  each  will  suffice  by  day,  but  double  sentinels 
should  be  used  at  night.  As  the  group  furnishes  the  reliefs,  it 
should  consist  of  3  or  6  men,  and  every  two  or  three  groups 
should  be  under  charge  of  a  non-commissioned  officer. 

There  should  be  easy  communication  with  neighboring  sen- 
tinels and  with  the  picket,  and  a  clear  view  of  all  approaches; 
and  the  post  (especially  at  night)  should  not,  if  it  can  be  avoided, 
be  so  situated  that  the  noise  of  falling  water  or  the  soughing  of 
the  wind  through  the  trees  would  deaden  the  noise  of  approach- 
ing footsteps.  Sentinels  are  generally  not  less  than  100  nor 
more  than  400  yards  apart — the  lesser  limit  being  usually  the 
minimum  for  single  sentinels,  and  the  greater  limit  the  maxi- 
mum for  double  ones.  Vedettes  may  be  as  far  as  600  yards 
apart.  But  no  definite  rule  can  be  laid  down  in  this  matter, 
except  that  the  number  of  posts  should  be  as  small  as  may  be 


56  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

compatible  with  a  vigilant  watch  on  all  points  at  which  the 
enemy  might  approach.  The  posts  furnished  by  each  picket 
are  numbered  from  right  to  left;  thus,  "Post  No.  4,  Picket  No. 
I,"  "Post  No.  I,  Picket  No.  2,"  and  so  on. 

Sentinels  should  watch  and  listen  without  betraying  their 
own  presence;  but  observation  is  the  first  consideration,  and 
concealment  is  of  secondary  importance.  A  sentinel  must 
expose  himself  to  see,  rather  than  limit  his  observation  for  the 
purpose  of  remaining  concealed. 

Sentinels  must  not  smoke,  and  such  conversation  as  may  be 
necessary  between  them  must  be  conducted  in  a  whisper.  The 
sentinel  must  not  have  about  him  any  glittering  accouterments ; 
and,  except  in  foggy  weather  or  on  a  dark  night,  must  keep  his 
bayonet  in  its  scabbard. 

Each  sentinel  should  clearly  understand  the  following : 

1.  The  countersign. 

2.  The  number  of  his  own  post. 

3.  The  number  and  position  of    his   own  picket  and 

the  name  of  its  commander. 

4.  The  position  of   the   neighboring   sentinels  and  of 

the  examining  post,  when  there  is  one. 

5.  The  direction  of  the  enemy  and  the  probable  line  of 

his  advance. 

6.  The  points  to  which  all'  roads,  paths,  and  railroads 

in  sight  lead. 

7.  The  names  of  all  villages  and  rivers  in  view. 

8.  The  signals  by  which  he  should  communicate  with 

the  pickets  or  detached  posts. 

The  mistake  of  giving  sentinels  too  many  instructions  and 
orders  should  be  avoided.  If  his  mind  is  burdened  with  many 
details,  the  sentinel  is  likely  to  become  hesitating,  timid,  and 
confused.  The  principal  thing  is  that  he  should  know  where  to 
look  for  the  enemy  and  what  to  do  if  he  sees  him. 

Only  persons  in  the  performance  of  duty  with  the  outpost, 
or  having  authority  over  it,  are  allowed  to  cross  the  line  of  sen- 
tinels.    All  other  people,  with  the  exceptions  below,  are  halted, 


SENTINELS  AND   VEDETTES.  57 

not  more  than  one  being  advanced  at  a  time,  and  then  con- 
ducted to  the  examining  post.  If  there  is  no  examining  post, 
they  are  conducted  by  one  of  the  sentinels  back  to  the  picket, 
or  detained  until  the  arrival  of  the  visiting  patrol.  If  they 
refuse  to  halt,  or  attempt  to  escape,  they  must  be  shot  down. 

Deserters  from  the  enemy  are  halted  at  some  distance  from 
the  post,  and  required  to  lay  down  their  arms.  The  command- 
er of  the  picket  is  at  once  notified,  and  he  sends  out  a  patrol  to 
bring  them  in.  If  the  deserters  are  pursued  by  the  enemy, 
they  are  ordered  to  throw  down  their  arms,  the  picket  being  at 
the  same  time  alarmed.  If  they  refuse  to  obey  the  order,  the 
picket  opens  fire  on  them  as  a  necessary  precaution  against  a  pos- 
sible ruse  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  As  a  rule,  inhabitants  and 
deserters  are  not  allowed  to  cross  the  line  of  sentinels  at  night. 
An  exception  to  this  rule,  in  the  case  of  deserters,  is  when  the 
demoralization  of  the  enemy  is  known  to  be  such  that  whole- 
sale desertions  are  to  be  expected.  Under  any  circumstances 
too  much  care  can  not  be  exercised  in  receiving  deserters.  In 
the  spring  of  1865  there  were  many  desertions  from  Lee's  army, 
and  the  Federal  sentinels  in  front  of  Petersburg  had  fallen  into 
the  habit  of  allowing  the  deserters  to  bring  their  arms  in  with 
them.  Taking  advantage  of  this  carelessness,  the  Confeder- 
ates, on  the  morning  of  the  25th  of  March,  quietly  gained  posses- 
sion of  several  picket  posts  by  means  of  sham  deserters,  and, 
immediately  thrusting  in  a  storming  party,  overwhelmed  the 
trench  guard,  broke  the  main  line  between  Batteries  9  and  10, 
turned  to  the  right  and  left,  captured  Battery  10,  and  overpow- 
ered the  garrison  of  Fort  Stedman. 

When  a  flag  of  truce  approaches,  the  bearer  and  his  escort 
(if  he  have  one)  are  halted  in  front  of  the  line  of  sentinels  and 
ordered  to  face  in  the  direction  from  which  they  came.  Word 
is  then  sent  back  to  the  commander  of  the  picket.  While  the 
bearer  and  his  escort  are  halted,  the  sentinel  must  not  converse 
with  them  nor  allow  them  to  reconnoiter. 

^;  The  vigilance  of  the  sentinel  in  watching  the  enemy  must 
not  be  disturbed  by  any  requirements  of  military  etiquette. 


58  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

He  pays  no  compliments  and  takes  no  notice  of  any  of  his 
officers  who  come  upon  his  post,  unless  addressed  by  them, 
except  so  far  as  may  be  necessary  to  challenge  and  identify 
them. 

Everything  observed  by  the  sentinel  in  regard  to  the  enemy 
should  be  communicated  at  once  to  the  picket,  especial  care 
being  taken  to  report  promptly  all  indications  of  the  enemy's 
approach.  If  the  sentinel  is  satisfied  that  the  enemy  is  advanc- 
ing to  attack,  he  gives  the  alarm  by  firing ;  but  when  immediate 
alarm  is  not  necessary,  firing  should  be  avoided ;  it  disturbs  the 
repose  of  the  troops,  and  if  groundless  alarms  are  frequently 
given,  the  troops  grow  careless  and  fail  to  heed  the  warning 
when  real  danger  comes.  The  so-called  "picket  firing,"  so 
common  in  the  early  days  of  the  War  of  Secession,  deserves 
even  more  serious  condemnation  than  it  has  generally  received. 
It  seems  to  have  been  the  custom  of  the  sentinels  to  fire  when- 
ever a  sentinel  of  the  opposing  force  was  seen.  This  slaughter 
of  sentinels  doubtless  added  considerably  to  the  aggregate  loss 
of  life,  but  it  probably  never  benefited  either  army,  while  cer- 
tainly acting  to  the  detriment  of  each.  The  sentinel,  by  firing, 
often  needlessly  alarmed  his  own  outpost,  and  gave  a  certain 
amount  of  information  to  the  enemy  by  betraying  his  own  posi- 
tion; while  by  remaining  hidden  and  watching  carefully  he 
might  have  been  able  to  give  a  valuable  report  of  the  disposition 
of  the  opposing  outpost.  As  the  armies  grew  in  their  knowl- 
edge of  "the  trade  of  war,"  this  pernicious  custom  disappeared; 
quite  as  much,  it  seems,  from  the  good  sense  of  the  soldiers 
themselves  as  from  orders  from  higher  authority.* 

It  is  advisable  to  keep  the  same  men  on  the  same  posts 
instead  of  changing  then  to  new  ones  each  time  they  are  posted. 
For  very  important  posts  the  most  intelligent  men  should  be 
selected.  If  the  army  is  stationary,  the  sentinels  should  be 
divided  into  regular  reliefs,  which  should  be  on  post  two  hours 


*Sentinel  firing  might  be  employed  for  the  purpose  of  annoying  the 
enemy  when  it  is  practicable  for  a  sentinel  to  play  the  part  of  a  harassing 
patrol  (see  next  chapter),  but  such  exceptional  cases  serve  only  to  mark 
the  general  rule. 


SENTINELS  AND   VEDETTES.  59 

at  a  time  during  the  day,  and  an  hour  at  a  time  during  the  night. 
If,  however,  the  army  is  to  march  the  next  day,  it  would  gen- 
erally be  better  to  post  the  sentinels  after  the  manner  of  a 
"running  guard,"  as  the  men  should  not  be  unduly  fatigued 
before  begining  the  day's  march.  In  a  running  guard  all  the 
privates  of  a  company  are  detailed  as  sentinels  an  hour  at  a 
time,  thus  giving  each  man  only  a  short  period  of  sentinel  duty 
during  the  night.  In  very  inclement  weather,  sentinels  should 
be  relieved  every  hour  during  the  day  as  well  as  at  night. 

The  foregoing  principles  are  applicable  to  vedettes  as  well  as 
sentinels.  Vedettes,  like  sentinels,  are  posted  in  pairs,  and  for 
similar  reasons.  One  is  habitually  6  or  8  yards  to  the  right 
or  left  rear  of  the  other;  a  greater  distance  would  make  the 
horses  uneasy,  and  thus  distract  the  attention  of  the  riders, 
while  a  less  distance  would  encourage  conversation  between  the 
vedettess  When  cavalry  is  operating  in  a  close  or  wooded 
country,  the  vedettes  may  dismount,  one  holding  the  horses 
while  the  other  keeps  watch.  Whenever  the  vedette  can  per- 
form his  duty  dismounted,  he  should  do  so  as  a  means  of  sparing 
his  horse.  The  horse  may  sometimes  be  held,  with  the  lariat, 
behind  the  brow  of  a  hill,  while  the  vedette,  lying  down,  peers 
over  the  crest.  In  any  case,  the  mode  of  action  must  be  deter- 
mined by  the  two  considerations  of  observation  and  conceal- 
ment, it  being  always  remembered  that  it  is  more  important  to 
see  than  to  avoid  being  seen. 

Connecting  Sentinels. — When  the  sentinel  post  is  not  in 
plain  view  of  the  picket,  a  connecting  sentinel  is  posted  at  a 
point  where  he  can  see  the  post  and  be  seen  by  the  picket.  It 
is  his  duty  to  transmit  signals  from  one  to  the  other.  Connect- 
ing sentinels  are  always  single.  A  connecting  vedette  is  gen- 
erally mounted  by  day,  and  alwa5^s  at  night.  If  dismounted, 
his  horse  is  with  the  picket. 

The  Picket  Sentinel. — A  single  sentinel  is  posted  at  the  picket 
to  keep  a  lookout  on  the  sentinels  or  connecting  sentinels,  and 
report  all  signals  made  b}^  them  or  any  unusual  occurrence.  In 
a  cavalry  picket  the  sentinel  is  dismounted. 


6o  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

Examining  Posts. — It  is  recommended  by  many  military 
writers  that  no  persons,  except  in  the  performance  of  duty 
with  the  outpost,  be  allowed  to  pass  the  line  of  sentinels  except 
at  certain  designated  points  on  the  main  roads,  where  exam- 
ining posts  are  established,  each  consisting  of  an  officer  or  non- 
commissioned officer  and  6  men — three  reliefs  for  one  double 
sentinel  post.  On  the  approach  of  any  person  to  the  examining 
post,  one  of  the  sentinels  advances  and  halts  him  at  some  dis- 
tance from  the  line,  while  the  other  notifies  the  commander  of 
the  post,  who  examines  the  stranger,  and  either  allows  him  to 
pass  or  conducts  him  to  the  commander  of  the  picket.  Any 
person  approaching  the  line  of  sentinels  at  any  other  than  a  des- 
ignated point  is  passed  along  from  post  to  post  until  he  is  brought 
to  the  examining  party;  care  being  taken  that  he  is  not  given 
an  opportunity  to  observe  the  location  of  the  pickets  and  sup- 
ports. The  bearer  of  a  flag  of  truce,  or  a  suspected  spy,  should 
be  blindfolded  before  being  conducted  to  the  examining  post, 
if  he  be  conducted  thither.  As  a  rule,  the  bearer  of  a  flag  of 
truce  is  not  allowed  to  cross  the  line  of  observation,  all  commu- 
nication with  him  being  held  beyond  the  chain  of  sentinels.  If 
brought  within  the  lines,  he  should  invariably  be  blindfolded 
before  entering. 

Examining  posts  have  not  been  used  to  any  extent  in  the 
armies  of  the  United  States.  'Though  they  are  in  use  in  the 
German,  Austrian,  and  Dutch  armies,  and  have  the  sanction 
of  such  authorities  as  Von  Waldersee,  Van  Mulken,  and  Shaw, 
their  use  is  doubtful.  If  the  sentinels  are  intelligent  and  well 
instructed,  and  the  non-commissioned  officers  on  duty  with  the 
outpost  understand  their  business,  examining  posts  are  gener- 
ally unnecessary.  In  the  close  investment  of  a  place,  or  when 
preparations  are  being  made  for  the  secret  execution  of  an 
important  movement,  orders  will  probably  be  given  to  allow  no 
persons  to  pass  the  chain  of  sentinels  without  the  most  rigid 
scrutiny;  and  in  such  cases  examining  posts  may  be  of  use,  if 
care  is  exercised  to  see  that  the  people  conducted  to  them  do  not 


DETACHED  POSTS.  6 1 

thus  gain  an  opportunity  of  spying  out  the  dispositions  of 
the  outposts. 

Detached  Posts. — Small  parties  are  often  detached  from  a 
picket  to  protect  exposed  points  or  support  isolated  sentinels. 
These  detached  posts  consist  generally  of  from  3  to  12  men, 
and  are  under  an  officer  or  non-commissioned  officer,  ac- 
cording to  their  strength  and  the  importance  of  their  posi- 
tion. They  are,  in  fact,  small  pickets,  and  must  act  in  concert 
with  the  pickets  from  which  they  are  taken. 

A  bridge  on  a  flank  might  be  held  by  a  detached  post.  An 
isolated  hill,  affording  a  good  outlook,  too  far  to  the  front  to  be 
included  in  the  general  line,  but  near  enough  to  be  occupied 
without  extreme  risk,  should  be  held  by  such  a  post,  communi- 
cating with  the  outpost  by  signal.  If  there  is  reason  to  expect 
the  enemy  to  attempt  to  occupy  the  hill,  a  support  may  be 
pushed  forward  to  assist  in  holding  it  against  an  isolated  attack, 
but  not  against  a  general  advance. 

If  practicable,  detached  posts  should  be  relieved  every  six 
hours.  They  are  not  allowed  to  light  fires,  and  the  men  are 
required  to  keep  on  their  equipments  and  have  their  arms  con- 
stantly at  hand.  In  a  detached  post  composed  of  cavalry  the 
horses  are  kept  constantly  saddled  and  bridled  and  held  by 
horse-holders,  three-fourths  of  the  men  being  ready  to  fight  on 
foot.  The  sentinels  or  dismounted  vedettes  are  posted  close  in 
front  of  the  party.     Vedettes  may  be  pushed  farther  forward. 

Pickets. 

An  infantry  picket  generally  consists  of  from  25  to  50  men, 
and  a  cavalry  picket  usually  varies  between  20  and  30.  A 
picket  furnishes  from  two  to  four  double  sentinels  or  vedettes, 
there  being  three  reliefs  for  each  post.  If  detached  posts  are  to 
be  sent  out  from  the  picket,  corresponding  additional  strength 
must  be  given  it,  and  an  allowance  must  be  made  for  patrolling. 
The  requirements  for  patrolling  vary  so  much  that  the  propor- 


62  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION, 

tion  of  the  picket  to  be  used  for  that  purpose  can  not  be  fixed. 
Generall}'',  about  a  third  of  the  picket  should  be  used  in  patrol- 
ling. In  a  close  country,  the  patrols,  rather  than  the  sentinels, 
should  be  increased ;  and  at  night  the  patrols  are  the  principal 
reliance  for  observation.  There  should  be  enough  men  for 
three  patrols,  so  as  to  admit  of  one  patrol  being  out,  one 
ready  to  go  out,  and  one  resting.  This  is  especially  the  case 
with  a  cavalry  picket.  The  strength  of  the  picket  will  thus 
vary;  but  its  minimum  strength  must  allow  6  men  for  every 
double-sentinel  post,  3  for  each  connecting  sentinel,  3  for  the 
picket  sentinel,  and  at  least  3  non-commissioned  officers.  These 
are  the  barest  requirements,  without  considering  patrols.  The 
picket  commander  should  always,  if  possible,  be  a  commis- 
sioned officer. 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  the  distance  between  sen- 
tinels will  vary  from  100  to  400  yards,  the  smaller  limit  being 
in  the  case  of  single  sentinels,  four  of  whom  could  easily  be  sup- 
plied by  a  small  picket.  The  minimum  front  covered  by  the 
sentinels  of  a  single  picket  may,  therefore,  be  placed  at  400 
yards.  The  maximum  front,  even  when  the  picket  furnishes 
four  double  sentinels,  may  be  placed  at  800  yards:  for,  as  we 
have  already  seen  that  the  distance  from  the  sentinels  to  the 
picket  may  be  as  great  as  400  yards,  it  is  evident  that  with  a 
front  of  800  yards  the  commander  of  the  picket  or  the  reliefs, 
in  visiting  or  relieving  the  sentinels,  would  have  to  go  about  a 
mile.  The  front  covered  by  the  vedettes  of  a  cavalry  picket 
varies  from  1,000  to  2,000  yards.  Infantry  pickets  are  gen- 
erally from  600  to  800  yards  apart,  and  cavalry  pickets  from 
1,000  to  1,500  yards.  All  these  distances  vary  with  different 
circumstances  of  ground  and  weather:  the  distances  given  above 
have  been  found  by  experience  to  answer  in  many  cases,  but  they 
must  often  be  Tuaterially  changed. 

The  line  of  resistance  should  be  made  the  first  considera- 
tion in  selecting  the  ground  for  the  outpost;  then  the  line  of 
obser\^ation  should  be  fixed,  the  position  of  the  sentinels  regu- 


PICKETS.  63 

lating  that  of  the  pickets,  and  not  the  reverse.     The  following 
points  should  be  considered  in  posting  a  picket : 

1.  It  should  be  near  enough  to  the  sentinels  to  give  them 
prompt  support,  but  not  so  close  as  to  be  involved  in  their 
disaster  if  they  should  be  surprised  and  suddenly  driven  in. 

2.  It  should  be  posted  on,  and  command,  some  route 
leading  from  the  enemy ;  the  largest  pickets  on  the  most  import- 
ant routes. 

3.  It  should  be  in  a  good  defensive  position,  should  have  a 
good  field  of  fire  to  the  front,  and  should  be  so  far  concealed 
that  the  enemy  could  not  discover  it  without  attacking. 

4.  It  should,  as  far  as  consistent  with  the  foregoing  re- 
quirements, be  in  rear  of  the  center  of  its  line  of  sentinels. 

5.  It  should  have  free  approaches  to  its  sentinels,  neigh- 
boring pickets,  supports,  and  reserves,  and  should  have  a  good 
line  of  retreat. 

6.  It  should  be  close  enough  to  the  neighboring  pickets 
for  mutual  support,  and  a  mutual  flanking  fire  should  be  pro- 
vided for. 

A  position  fulfilling  all  these  requirements  can  scarcely  be 
hoped  for;  the  best  position  will  be  the  one  which  fulfills  the 
greatest  part  of  them. 

If  the  picket  is  posted  in  a  defile,  its  front  should  be  covered 
with  obstacles,  in  order  that  it  may  not  be  overpowered  by  a 
sudden  rush  of  the  enemy. 

A  picket  should  not  be  posted  in  a  house  nor  in  an  enclosure. 
An  exception  to  this  rule  is  found  in  the  case  of  a  besieging  force, 
whose  front  is  covered  with  formidable  obstacles.  Thus,  at 
the  siege  of  Paris,  the  German  pickets  were  frequently  sheltered 
in  houses  or  in  underground  posts,  security  from  surprise  being 
afforded  by  constant  patrolhng  well  to  the  front,  and  by  formid- 
able abatis  in  front  of  the  line  of  sentinels. 

Any  jimction  of  roads  leading  from  the  enemy's  position 
should  be  in  front  of  the  picket,  and  roads  passing  the  flank 
should  be  carefully  guarded. 


64  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

When  an  impassable  obstacle,  such  as  a  swamp,  lake,  or 
stream,  lies  along  a  portion  of  the  front  of  the  outposts,  the 
strength  at  that  part  of  the  line  may  be  limited  to  the  require- 
ments of  observation,  the  sentinels  being  few,  and  the  chief 
reliance  being  placed  upon  patrolling. 

Other  considerations  affecting  the  position  of  the  picket 
have  already  been  noticed  in  connection  with  the  general  sub- 
ject of  the  position  of  the  outpost. 

Fires  should  not  be  lighted  by  a  picket  unless  they  can  be 
well  concealed  from  the  enemy.  If  a  fire  is  allowed  at  night, 
the  rallying-point  should  be  some  distance  in  its  rear.  If  the 
enemy  attacks,  he  will  almost  invariably  march  upon  the  fires, 
and  will  thus  be  clearly  visible,  while  the  picket  will  have  the 
advantage  of  the  darkness. 

The  men  composing  the  picket  stack  arms  and  may  remove 
their  equipments,  with  the  exception  of  the  cartridge-belt. 
They  must  not  leave  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  picket,  and 
must  be  ready  to  fall  in  at  a  moment's  notice.  Part  of  the  men 
must  be  constantly  under  arms  at  night,  and  separated  from  the 
rest,  who  keep  their  arms  close  at  hand  while  sleeping.  If  dan- 
ger seems  imminent,  the  entire  picket  must  be  awake  and  un- 
der arms.  The  commander  of  the  picket  will  cause  it  to  stand 
to  arms  at  once  if  a  noise  is  heard  from  a  neighboring  picket; 
and  if  that  picket  is  attacked,  he  will  endeavor  to  relieve  it  by 
an  attack  upon  the  enemy's  flank.  If  an  attack  is  not  evi- 
dent, but  the  noise  seems  suspicious,  a  patrol  must  be  sent  to 
investigate. 

In  a  cavalry  picket,  or  in  the  case  of  mounted  orderlies 
attached  to  an  infantry  picket,  the  horses  should  be  kept 
constantly  saddled,  and  the  bridles  should  be  taken  off  only 
for  feeding  and  watering.  Not  more  than  one-third,  or  at  most 
one-half,  of  the  horses  should  be  fed  at  a  time.  When  there  is 
no  water  close  to  the  picket,  only  a  few  horses  should  be  taken 
to  the  water  at  a  time,  the  men  in  charge  of  them  being  under 
arms  and  fully  equipped.      Saddles  should  be  adjusted  once 


SUPPORTS,  65 

every  twelve  hours,  or  as  much  oftener  as  necessary,  under  the 
direction  of  an  officer  or  non-commissioned  officer. 

Supports. 

The  supports  constitute  a  force  upon  which  the  pickets  fall 
back  if  driven  in  by  the  enemy,  or  with  which  (in  exceptional 
cases)  the  pickets  may  be  reinforced.  The  ground  regulates 
their  position,  as  they  should  occupy  the  line  of  resistance.  The 
position  selected  should  afford  a  good  general  line  of  defense, 
ground  uniformly  moderately  good  being  preferable  to  that 
which  is  very  strong  in  some  parts  and  weak  in  others.  The 
supports  should  not  be  too  far  away  from  the  pickets  to  render 
timely  aid,  nor  so  close  as  to  be  involved  in  their  defeat  if  sud- 
denly driven  in.  They  should  be  located  as  centrally  as  prac- 
ticable in  reference  to  the  pickets  in  their  front,  and  should 
preferably  be  upon,  or  near,  the  main  routes  by  which  the  en- 
emy might  advance.  A  defile  on  the  road  leading  from  the 
enemy's  position  to  the  camp  is  generally  a  good  position  for  a 
support.  Often  the  best  line  of  resistance  lies  close  to  the  line 
of  observation,  or  even  coincides  with  it.  In  such  cases  the 
supports  may  be  close  to  the  pickets  or  merged  with  them.  One 
support  is  generally  sufficient  for  two  or  three  pickets. 

The  commander  of  the  support  should  make  arrangements 
with  the  commanders  of  the  pickets  in  his  front  for  concerted 
action  in  case  of  attack,  and  should  maintain  communication 
with  them,  with  the  neighboring  supports,  and  with  the  re- 
serve. This  communication  is  generally  kept  up  by  means  of 
patrols. 

The  support  must  provide  for  its  own  immediate  safety  by 
sentinels  or  vedettes,  but  may  relax  to  some  extent  the  watch- 
fulness exacted  from  the  pickets.  The  men  stack  arms  and  are 
allowed  to  remove  their  accouterments  (excepting  always  the 
cartridge-belt),  but  they  are  not  permitted  to  wander  away 
from  the  post  of  the  support,  and  must  be  ready  at  all  times  to 
fall  in.  They  are  usually  allowed  to  light  fires,  and  may  be 
required  to  do  the  cooking  for  the  pickets  as  well  as  for  them- 


66  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

selves.  The  horses  with  the  support  are  kept  in  the  same 
degree  of  readiness  as  those  with  the  pickets.  No  shouting  or 
unnecessary  noise  of  any  kind  should  be  permitted  in  any  part 
of  the  outpost. 

Cossack  Posts. 

In  most  cases  it  will  be  better  to  replace  the  pickets  and 
sentinels  with  a  line  of  Cossack  posts,  sent  out  directly  from  the 
supports.  Each  of  these  posts  consists  of  4  men;  namely, 
three  reliefs  of  a  single  sentinel,  and  a  non-commissioned  officer 
or  old  soldier  for  the  command  of  the  post.  Bach  support 
furnishes  from  four  to  twelve  Cossack  posts,  which  are  placed 
from  300  to  400  yards  in  advance  of  it,  and  from  100  to 
300  yards  apart ;  the  smaller  limits  of  distance  in  the  case  of 
very  close  and  rugged  ground,  and  the  latter  in  the  case  of 
very  open  ground.  The  sentinel  is  stationed  from  10  to  30 
yards  in  advance  of  the  post,  the  other  members  of  which  re- 
main concealed  and  keep  him  constantly  in  view.  The  senti- 
nels are  relieved  every  hour  and  the  post  ever  three  hours, 
One  or  two  men  may  be  sent  from  the  post,  from  time  to  time, 
to  patrol  to  the  post  on  either  side ;  but,  as  a  rule,  all  the  patrol- 
ling is  done  from  the  support. 

It  would  seem  at  first  thought  that  a  line  of  Cossack  posts 
must  lack  the  resisting  power  of  the  two  lines  of  sentinels  and 
pickets,  and  that  it  should,  therefore,  be  used  only  when  the 
ground  affords  strong  defensive  positions.  It  has,  however, 
many  positive  elements  of  strength.  The  sentinels  are  more 
likely  to  be  free  from  the  timidity  of  loneliness,  and  to  be  more 
resolute  in  the  performance  of  their  duty,  when  they  are  closely 
backed  up  by  a  friendly  post,  than  when  they  are  at  a  consid- 
erable distance  from  a  picket.  The  posts  should  be  so  sta- 
tioned as  to  enable  each  to  cross  its  fire  with  that  of  its  neigh- 
bors. If  the  posts  are  then  intrenched,  there  is  no  reason  why 
they  should  not  hold  their  own  long  enough  to  enable  the  sup- 
ports to  prepare  fully  for  action.  In  the  Spanish  war,  and  later 
in  the  campaigns  in  the  Philippines,  Cossack  posts  were  almost 


PLATE    VIII. 


COMPARISON  OF  PICKET  SYSTEM   AND  COSSACK  POSTS. 


PigureJ 


Line  of  observaUon  -    e^OOy^^ 

->«'      \  \  /  '« /        I      -v. 

Mf  -«  '.  .1^        Pickets  -Ml  ■>'  ^-- 


Pickets         ^ 


\       0 
Supports         ^' 

Reserve 


!,r 


Figure  2. 


Cossack  Posts 


Supports 
I 

?! 


777/5  normal  ■fbrmatior^  is  not  to  be  taken        Rg^ 
as  an  invariable  guide,  but  merely  as  a  model 
requiring  more  or  less  variation  according  to         Reserve 
circumstances    It  is  very  rarely  that  a  normal 
formation  can  tx  used  without  considerable  change. 


^2 


C^^JDursnd  ^^ 


COSSACK   POSTS.  67 

invariably  used  instead  of  pickets.  The  system  is  in  thorough 
keeping  with  the  nature  of  American  warfare,  and  its  adoption 
in  every  case  is  recommended,  except  when  circumstances  ren- 
der it  necessary  to  provide  an  exceptionally  strong  resistance  in 
advance  of  the  line  of  supports.* 

A  comparison  of  the  diagrams  on  Plate  VIII.  will  show  the 
economy  of  men  for  outpost  duty  effected  by  the  use  of  Cos- 
sack posts.  In  each  case  the  line  of  observation  is  2,400  yards 
in  length.  In  the  first  case  we  have  four  pickets,  each  supply- 
ing three  reliefs  for  two  double-sentinel  posts  and  the  post  at 
the  picket.  Add  three  reliefs  of  (say)  four  connecting  sentinels 
for  the  entire  line,  and  we  have  72  men;  but  one-third  of  the 
picket  consists  of  patrols,  which  makes  the  total  for  the  pickets 
108  men.  In  the  second  case  we  will  take  the  same  number  of 
connecting  sentinels  and  allow  the  same  number  of  men  for 
patrols,  assigning  them,  however,  to  the  supports. 

We  have,  then,  the  following: 

Fig  I.  Fig.  2. 

Pickets 108  men.     Cossack  posts 48  men. 

Supports 108  men.     Supports 96  .nen. 

Reserve 108  men.     Reserve 96  men. 

Total 324  men.         Total 240  men. 

Adding  non-commissioned  officers,  we  should  have  in  the 
first  case  about  360  men  for  the  strength  of  the  outpost,  and 
in  the  second  case  about  260.  In  round  numbers,  we  should 
require  four  companies  (war  strength)  in  the  first  case  and 
three  in  the  second.  This  estimate  may  be  regarded  as  a 
minimum  rather  than  a  maximum. 


*Notwithstanding  the  name,  Cossack  posts  are  of  American  origin, 
and  are  the  outgrowth  of  our  own  experience.  General  Pierron  (quoting 
Baron  von  Valentini)  says:  "In  the  American  war  (1776-17 83),  as  the 
terrain  was  extremely  wooded  and  rough,  instead  of  forming  the  first  line 
of  a  thin  chain  of  sentinels  separated  from  each  other  (who  could  not  have 
been  relieved  during  the  night,  as  the  relief  would  have  lost  its  way  in  the 
underbrush),  a  cordon  of  small  groups  was  employed,  in  which  one  man 
watched  while  those  who  were  in  turn  to  relieve  him  slept.  These  groups 
were  placed  at  the  edge  of  the  wood  and  on  the  roads." — "Me'thodes  de 
Guerre,"  Tome  III.,  lere  partie,  page  52. 


68  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION, 

The  Reserve. 

The  reserve  forms  the  general  support  and  pivot  of  resist- 
ance of  the  whole  outpost,  and  usually  consists  of  all  three 
arms.  It  should  be  concealed  from  the  enemy,  and  should  be 
posted  as  centrally  as  practicable,  so  as  to  enable  it  to  move 
quickly  to  any  endangered  point.  It  may  sometimes  be  di- 
vided into  two  parts,  to  facilitate  supporting  the  more  ad- 
vanced bodies;  and  it  should  be  upon  their  principal  line  or 
lines  of  retreat  to  the  main  body.  Its  position  may  be  in- 
trenched and  strengthened  with  obstacles;  but,  as  a  rule,  it 
will  'advance  to  reinforce  the  supports  or  pickets,  and  the 
intrenchments  should  be  on  the  line  of  resistance. 

The  same  rules  obtain,  in  regard  to  the  men  and  horses, 
with  the  reserve  as  in  the  case  of  the  supports.  The  reserve 
is  allowed  to  light  fires;  and  in  the  exceptional  cases  where 
fires  are  prohibited  to  the  more  advanced  parties,  it  must  do 
the  cooking  for  them. 

In  the  case  of  a  small  force  which  can  prepare  quickly  for 
action,  or  when  the  main  body  bivouacs  in  order  of  battle,  the 
reserve  may  sometimes  be  dispensed  with.  When  the  reserve 
is  not  needed,  its  omission  greatly  relieves  the  troops  from  the 
pressure  of  outpost  dut}^;  but  it  can  rarely  be  safely  omitted 
from  the  composition  of  the  outpost.  The  line  of  resistance 
being  3,000  yards  from  the  main  body,  it  is  evident  that,  un- 
less the  latter  were  in  a  state  of  instant  readiness,  the  supports 
might  be  overwhelmed  before  they  could  receive  assistance,  if 
there  were  no  reserve.  To  keep  the  main  body  in  such  a 
state  of  readiness  would,  to  a  great  extent,  defeat  the  prime 
object  of  the  outpost.  In  rare  cases,  where  the  supports  oc- 
cupy a  very  strong  defensive  position,  and  the  main  body  can 
be  held  close  at  hand  sheltered  from  the  enemy's  artillery 
fire,  the  reserve  may  be  omitted. 

No  compliments  are  paid  by  the  outpost;  but  when  a  re- 
serve, support,  or  picket  is  approached  by  a  general  officer, 
the  commander  of  the  outpost,  or  an  armed  party,  the  men  fall 


THE   RESERVE.  69 

in  in  rear  of  the  stacks,  ready  to  take  arms.  Individual  mem- 
bers of  the  outpost,  with  the  exception  of  sentinels  on  post, 
salute  when  addressing,  or  addressed  by,  a  superior  officer. 

The  Outpost  at  Night. 

The  foregoing  description  of  the  outpost  duties  relates 
principally  to  the  cordon  system.  If  this  system  were  retained 
at  night,  it  would  be  necessary  either  to  increase  the  number  of 
sentinels  greatly,  thus  adding  to  the  burden  of  outpost  duty,  or 
else  to  draw  in  the  outpost  line  closer  to  the  main  body,  thus 
contracting  the  front.  The  greatest  objection  to  the  latter 
alternative  is,  that  valuable  ground  would  thus  be  abandoned, 
which,  if  the  enemy  were  enterprising,  might  be  regained  only 
at  the  cost  of  an  engagement.  If  it  can  be  avoided,  the  outpost 
line  must  must  never  be  drawn  in  at  night;  but  should  such  a 
measure  become  necessary,  the  position  should  be  resumed 
again  at  early  dawn,  and  the  outpost  should  occupy  it  with  as 
much  caution  and  vigilance  as  when  it  was  first  taken  up. 

The  outpost  system  of  Marshal  Bugeaud  is  generally 
adopted  in  its  essential  features  for  night.  This  is  based  on 
the  idea  that  in  making  a  night  attack,  in  any  but  an  excep- 
tionally open  country,  the  enemy's  movements  must  neces- 
sarily be  confined  to  roads  and  clearly  defined  paths.  In  a 
close  country,  movements  off  the  roads  can  not,  in  fact,  be 
made  by  any  force  larger  than  a  patrol ;  while  in  an  open  coun- 
try, roads  and  paths  must  be  followed  for  guidance,  unless  the 
ground  is  thoroughly  known  and  there  is  a  bright  moon.  The 
uncertainty  of  effecting  the  necessary  combinations  at  night, 
and  the  danger  of  columns  losing  their  way  and  not  arriving  at 
appointed  destinations  at  the  proper  time,  render  night  attacks 
in  force  very  infrequent.  They  must,  however,  be  carefully 
guarded  against ;  and  partial  attacks  for  the  purpose  of  alarm- 
ing the  outpost,  capturing  sentinels  or  pickets,  or  reconnoiter- 
ing  the  position,  must  be  expected. 

If,  then,  double  sentinels  are  placed  on  the  roads  and  paths, 
and  closely  backed  up  by  their  reliefs,  the  advanced  posts  thus 


70  3ECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

formed  will  give  timely  warning  of  the  enemy's  approach  in 
force.  But  the  intervening  ground  must  not  be  neglected,  or 
hostile  patrols  might  push  through  and  reconnoiter  the  posi- 
tion. The  ground  between  the  sentinels  is,  therefore,  thor- 
oughly patrolled,  the  number  of  men  available  for  this  purpose 
being  increased  by  the  diminution  of  the  number  of  sentinel 
posts.  Nothing  more  than  careful  observation  and  warning 
should  be  expected  of  the  advanced  posts,  the  duty  of  resist- 
ance falling  first  upon  the  pickets,  which  should  be  nearer  the 
sentinels  at  night  than  during  the  day,  and  should  be  in  strong 
defensive  positions  on  the  roads,  in  rear  of  the  advanced  posts 
furnished  by  them. 

In  cavalry  outposts  the  pickets  are  placed  on  the  roads, 
double  vedettes  being  pushed  out  in  front.  Each  picket  must 
be  on  the  alert  and  prepared  to  fight  on  foot.  Its  position  may 
be  strengthened  by  barricading  the  road;  but  care  must  be 
taken  to  leave  a  passage  by  which  the  vedettes  may  retire, 
and  the  barricade  must  not  be  so  constructed  as  to  prove  an 
obstacle  to  the  advance  of  the  troops  in  rear. 

When  the  enemy  is  close  at  hand  and  aggressive,  it  may 
sometimes  be  advisable,  in  addition  to  bafring  his  advance  on 
the  main  roads,  to  post  a  cordon  of  sentinels  near  the  camp  or 
bivouac,  to  check  small  patrols  of  the  enemy,  which  might 
otherwise  annoy  and  alarm  the  main  body  and  destroy  its 
repose.  As  a  rule,  however,  patrolling  between  the  advanced 
posts  will  be  sufficient  to  check  such  hostile  parties. 

All  changes  in  the  position  of  the  outpost  must  be  ar- 
ranged during  daylight,  and  made  at  late  dusk.  Even  if  the 
cordon  system  is  retained  and  the  line  is  not  drawn  in,  the 
positions  of  the  sentinels  and  pickets  should  be  changed,  in 
order  to  prevent  their  possible  capture  by  the  enemy,  who 
may  have  noted  their  positions  during  the  day.  The  senti- 
nels, who  are  habitually  posted  on  high  ground  during  the 
day,  should  be  moved  to  lower  ground  at  night,  so  as  to  bring 
an  approaching  enemy  in  view  on  the  sky-line.  As  a  rule,  the 
the  sentinels  should  be  pushed  forward  from  the  high  ground 


PLATE    IX. 


PATROL    SYSTEM    OF  OUTPOSTS. 


Jfote: 

On/y  the  /atera/ patrols  are 
shown  in  the  sketch.      Patrols, 
would  also  be  sent  to  the  front 
on  each  road. 


THE   OUTPOST  AT   NIGHT.  7 1 

rather  than  drawn  back,  in  order  to  retain  possession  of  the 
ridge. 

The  plate  given  as  a  frontispiece  illustrates  the  changes 
made  in  the  position  of  the  outpost  at  night,  and  the  manner 
in  which  the  normal  formation  may  be  modified  to  suit  the 
topography.  In  this  case  the  lines  of  observation  and  resist- 
ance are  coincident,  and  in  case  of  attack  the  supports  would 
advance  to  the  line  of  the  pickets.  Support  C  is  on  the  coinci- 
dent lines,  its  front  covered  with  Cossack  posts.  The  reserve 
is  necessarily  divided,  the  right  portion  being  in  readiness  to 
reinforce  supports  C  and  D,  and  the  left  portion  to  reinforce 
support  E.  Picket  K  sends  out  a  detached  post  N  to  watch 
the  bridge,  and  establishes  one  double  sentinel,  whose  functions 
are  mainly  those  of  a  connecting  sentinel  between  the  picket 
and  the  detached  post. 

At  night,  picket  K  moves  close  to  the  detached  post  at 
the  bridge.  Pickets  H  and  I  are  united  and  posted  at  L,  send- 
ing out  a  single  double  sentinel  closely  backed  up  by  the  re- 
lief. In  a  similar  way  picket  G  moves  to  G'  and  picket  F  to 
F'.  There  are  no  changes  in  support  C  and  its  Cossack  posts. 
Support  D  is  divided  and  moves  to  D'  D'.  Similarly,  sup- 
port E  is  divided  and  stationed  at  E'  E^  It  is  not  usual 
either  to  divide  or  advance  the  supports,  but  in  this  case 
topographical  conditions  make  it  necessary.  The  same  con- 
ditions render  it  advisable  to  advance  the  reserve  B  B  to 
B'  B'.  It  will  be  observed,  however,  that  the  line  of  resist- 
ance is  the  same  as  by  day,  and  that  the  distance  from  this 
line  to  the  main  body  remains  the  same. 

The  artillery  of  the  outpost  is  stationed  on  the  hill  P, 
where  it  commands  every  avenue  of  approach,  and  is  sup- 
ported by  the  reserve.  The  range  and  direction  of  the  bridges 
and  other  important  approaches  are'  obtained  during  the  day, 
and  the  guns  remain  in  the  same  position  at  night. 

The  extent  and  direction  of  the  patrolling  are  indicated  in 
the  diagram. 


72  SECURITY   AND    INFORMATION. 

Sandy  Creek  is  fordable  with  difficulty,  atid  is  passable  for 
all  arms  at  the  bridges.  Swamp  Run  is  everywhere  fordable, 
but  the  swamp  is  impassable. 

Outpost  Patrols. 

The  outpost  patrols  are  of  two  kinds:  visiting  patrols  and 
reconnoitering  patrols. 

Visiting  Patrols. — Visiting  patrols  usually  consist  of  a  non- 
commissioned officer  and  two  or  three  men.  They  are  sent 
out  from  the  picket,  and  keep  up  communication  between 
it  and  its  sentinels  and  detached  posts,  the  neighboring 
pickets,  and  the  support.  In  making  its  rounds  the  patrol  first 
touches  upon  the  nearest  sentinel  of  the  picket  on  its  right  (or 
left),  and  then  passes  along  the  front  of  its  own  sentinels  to 
the  nearest  sentinel  of  the  picket  on  its  left  (or  right),  return- 
ing by  the  rear  to  its  own  picket.  The  patrol  (especially  if 
composed  of  cavalry)  may  often  find  it  expedient,  as  a  means 
of  concealment,  to  pass  in  rear  of  the  sentinels.  The  patrol 
must  see  that  the  sentinels  of  its  picket  understand,  and  faith- 
fully perform,  their  duties.  They  examine  any  suspicious 
points  which  the  sentinel  can  not  inspect  without  going  too 
far  away  from  his  post ;  take  charge  of  persons  detained  by  the 
sentinels,  and  relieve  any  sentinel  who  may  be  sick  or  wounded. 

Visiting  patrols  are  mainly  used  at  night.  When  the 
sentinels  can  be  seen  from  the  picket,  the  patrol  would  not 
ordinarily  make  the  rounds,  during  the  day,  oftener  than  once 
each  relief.  At  night  the  patrol  should  not  cover  a  front  of 
more  than  500  yards  in  its  operations.  When  the  distance 
between  two  advanced  posts  exceeds  this,  they  should  be  vis- 
ited by  separate  patrols,  which  would  generally  be  from  differ- 
ent pickets,  as  posts  at  so  great  an  interval  would  rarely  be 
furnished  by  the  same  picket.  It  is  seldom  necessary  for  a 
visiting  patrol  to  examine  beyond  the  line  of  observation 
during  the  day.  When  it  does  so,  it  should  not  go  beyond 
sight  of  the  sentinels;  and  at  night  it  should  not  advance 


VISITING   PATROIvS.  73 

beyond  short  rifle  range.  When  the  picket  is  weak,  the  reliefs 
must  be  used  as  visiting  patrols. 

Reconnoitering  Patrols. — The  sentinels  guard  against  sur- 
prise, but  the  information  they  can  gain  in  regard  to  the  enemy 
is  generally  very  slight.  This  information  must  be  sought  by 
reconnoitering  patrols  sent  out  towards  the  enemy,  to  watch 
his  movements,  and,  if  possible,  examine  his  position. 

Reconnoitering  patrols  are  either  small  or  strong.  A  small 
patrol  varies  in  size  from  three  men  to  a  squad.  If  composed 
of  infantry,  it  should  not,  as  a  rule,  advance  more  than  half  a 
mile  beyond  the  line  of  sentinels  at  night:  in  daytime  it  may 
often  prudently  advance  farther.  Cavalry  is  generally  used 
for  this  duty  by  day,  and  may  push  out  five  or  ten  miles,  or 
even  farther,  according  to  the  discretion  of  the  patrol  com- 
mander. The  patrol  should  go  far  enough  to  see  the  enemy's 
sentinels,  if  not  too  distant,  and  may  even  penetrate  his  line 
of  observation. 

It  is  a  good  rule  to  use  at  night  the  patrols  that  have 
scouted  the  same  region  by  day.  The  time,  direction,  and 
manner  of  sending  out  patrols  must  be  constantly  varied,  in 
order  that  the  enemy  may  not  be  prepared  to  cut  them  off.  A 
small  patrol  must  constantly  bear  in  mind  that  its  business  is 
not  to  fight,  but  to  observe.  It  should  accordingly  be  careful 
to  avoid  engagements,  unless  ordered  to  take  prisoners.  Its 
duty  is  most  efficiently  performed  when  it  comes  back  with 
valuable  information  without  having  been  seen  by  the  enemy. 

Patrolling  Posts. — ^At  night  the  advanced  posts  in  front 
of  the  pickets  may  be  replaced  by  patrolling  posts  of  four  men 
each.  The  patrolling  posts  are  small  patrols  sent  out  at  dusk, 
along  all  the  avenues  by  which  the  enemy  might  approach. 
The  commanders  of  these  patrols  should  be  selected  with  care, 
and  should  be  hampered  with  as  few  restrictions  as  possible; 
usually  receiving  general  instructions  to  patrol  a  certain  road 
to  a  certain  distance.  The  distance  will  depend  upon  circum- 
stances; but  it  should  always  be  such  that  information  of  the 
enemy's  approach  may  be  sent  back  in  time  to  enable  the 


74  SECURITY   AND    INFORMATION. 

picket  and  support  to  be  ready  to  receive  him.  When  the  dis- 
tance is  greater  than  i,ooo  yards,  the  patrolling  post  might 
better  be  composed  of  cavalry.  If  composed  of  infantry,  a 
mounted  orderly  should  accompany  it. 

The  patrolling  post  must  not  leave  the  road  or  path  as- 
signed to  it;  but  it  may  either  keep  moving  or  remain  sta- 
tionary at  the  limit  of  the  distance  to  which  it  is  ordered  to 
patrol.  In  the  latter  case  a  sentinel  or  vedette  is  posted,  and 
the  rest  of  the  patrol  remains  near  at  hand  and  well  concealed. 
The  sentinel  should  be  relieved  every  half -hour,  and  the  patrol- 
ling post  every  three  hours.  The  relief  moves  out  from  the 
picket,  along  the  designated  road  or  path,  until  it  comes  upon 
the  patrolling  post.  As  the  picket  itself  must  generally  be 
constantly  on  the  alert  at  night,  the  only  object  in  relieving 
the  patrolling  posts  is  to  make  an  equitable  division  of  a  haz- 
ardous duty.  If  the  number  of  patrolling  posts  is  such  as  to 
weaken  the  picket  materially,  the  support  must  be  moved  up 
close  enough  to  it  to  render  prompt  assistance;  or,  if  this  can 
not  be  done  without  abandoning  a  strong  position  for  a  weaker 
one,  the  support  must  send  reinforcements  to  the  picket,  and 
draw  corresponding  reinforcements  from  the  reserve.  The 
members  of  the  patrolling  post  must  preserve  the  strictest 
silence,  and  must  not  under  any  circumstances  smoke  or  light 
fires;  for  the  safety  of  the  post  depends  upon  the  darkness, 
silence,  absence  of  fires,  and  the  enemy's  ignorance  of  its 
location. 

Strong  Patrols. — When  strong  patrols  are  sent  out  from 
the  outpost,  they  are  generally  taken  from  the  support  or 
reserve.  They  vary  in  size  from  9  men  to  a  company  or 
troop ;  and  if  composed  of  less  than  two  squads,  may  be  taken 
from  a  picket.  As  a  rule,  the  movements  of  a  strong  patrol 
are  not  so  cautious  as  those  of  a  small  one.  Its  object  is  to 
gain  information  that  can  not  be  acquired  by  sentinels  or 
small  patrols.  If  composed  of  infantry,  it  rarely  goes  more 
than  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  line  of  sentinels,  and  it  should 
have  one  or  two  mounted  men  with  it  to  insure  the  rapid 


STRONG  PATROLS.      »  75 

transmission  of  intelligence  back  to  the  outpost.  If  a  post  of 
the  enemy  is  discovered,  the  patrol  will  generally  endeavor 
to  remain  concealed  in  observation  of  it,  sending  back  infor- 
mation of  anything  important  that  may  be  noted ;  but  a  strong 
patrol  may  sometimes  be  used  offensively  to  discover  the  ene- 
my's position  or  intentions  by  attacking  a  post.  Patrols  of 
the  enemy  must  be  kept  back,  and  may  be  attacked,  especially 
for  the  purpose  of  capturing  prisoners ;  but,  as  a  rule,  the  patrol 
avoids  firing,  and  endeavors,  as  far  as  possible,  to  see  without 
being  seen.* 

If  the  patrols  return  witnout  reportmg  anything,  vigil- 
ance must  not  be  relaxed;  for  it  is  possible  for  patrols  to 
take  a  wrong  direction,  or  to  pass  close  to  the  enemy  without 
discovering  him.  On  the  afternoon  before  the  battle  of 
Shiloh,  General  Prentiss  sent  a  force,  consisting  of  three  com- 
panies of  the  2ist  Missouri  Infantry  (Col.  Moore),  to  recon- 
noiter  in  his  front.  They  followed  a  line  oblique  to  the  front 
of  the  camp,  which  led  them  to  the  right,  in  front  of  Sher- 
man's line.  After  marching  three  miles,  they  returned  to 
camp,  and  reported  that  they  had  seen  nothing.  Had  they 
moved  direct  to  the  front,  they  would  have  struck  Hardee's 
Confederate  corps. 

As  a  rule,  patrols  are  frequent;  and  when  the  enemy  is  in 
force  and  close  at  hand,  they  are  constant. 

Posting  and  Relieving  the  Outpost. 

The  men  detailed  for  outpost  duty  should  have  a  prop- 
er supply  of  ammunition,  and  (when  practicable)  one  day's 
cooked  rations.  Their  canteens  should  be  filled  with  coffee, 
or,  if  cooking  is  to  be  allowed,  with  water.  Each  officer  should 
have  a  watch,  compass,  field-glass,  memorandum  pad,  and  lead 
pencil;  and,  if  possible,  he  should  be  provided  with  a  topo- 
graphical map  of  the  ground  to  be  occupied  by  the  outpost. 

*For  the  conduct  of  patrols,  see  the  next  chapter. 


76  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

Every   non-commissioned   officer   should   have   a   lead-pencil 
and  a  small  memorandum  pad. 

The  troops  detailed  having  been  inspected,  and  the  sub- 
ordinate officers  having  taken  down  in  writing  the  instruc- 
tions of  the  outpost  commander  (if  time  admits),  the  force 
moves  out,  with  an  advance  guard,  to  take  up  designated 
positions.  The  reserve  and  supports  may  each  march  inde- 
pendently from  camp  directly  to  its  position;  or  they  may 
march  together  and  be  detached  from  the  column  at  suitable 
points.  Bach  body  moves  to  its  position  covered  by  a  point 
and  flanking  groups,  and  the  pickets  especially  move  with 
extreme  vigilance.  When  the  picket  is  halted,  slightly  in 
rear  of  the  selected  line  of  observation,  several  squads  are 
deployed  as  skirmishers,  with  sufficient  intervals  to  enable 
their  front  to  cover  approximately  the  front  of  the  sentinels 
of  the  picket,  and  are  pushed  forward  cautiously  to  recon- 
noiter,  being  followed  by  the  first  relief  of  sentinels.  If  it 
should  be  impracticable  to  use  a  sufficient  number  of  skir- 
mishers to  cover  the  front  of  the  sentinels  without  too  great 
an  extension  of  intervals,  several  small  patrols  should  recon- 
noiter  the  ground  in  front.  The  picket  commander  halts  on 
the  line  of  observation,  and  the  skirmishers  move  on  to  re- 
connoiter  in  its  front,  not  going  farther  than  loo  yards  if  the 
country  is  close  or  wooded.  When  the  relief  comes  up,  the 
picket  commander  posts  the  sentinels  quickly,  the  posts 
afterwards  being  changed  as  may  be  required.  Any  tree, 
building,  haystack,  or  other  object  affording  a  good  view 
should  be  occupied  at  once  as  a  lookout  by  tw^o  men,  one  of 
whom  should,  if  practicable,  be  provided  with  a  field-glass. 
As  soon  as  the  sentinels  have  been  tentatively  posted,  the 
skirmishers  or  patrols  are  recalled  and  sent  back  to  the  picket ; 
after  which  the  picket  commander  touches  upon  the  nearest 
sentinel  of  the  picket  on  his  right  (or  left),  and  passes  along 
his  own  line  of  observation  to  the  nearest  sentinel  of  the  picket 
on  his  left  (or  right) .  He  assures  himself  that  his  sentinels  are 
in  positions  best  suited  for  observation  and  concealment,  sees 


POSTING   AND   RELIEVING   THE   OUTPOST.  77 

that  the  number  of  posts  does  not  exceed  the  requirements 
of  efficient  observation,  and  then  returns  to  his  picket.  He 
next  posts  the  picket  sentinel  and  such  connecting  sentinels 
as  may  be  necessary,  sends  out  such  detached  posts  as  may 
be  requisite,  details  a  portion  of  the  picket  for  patrolling 
(dividing  the  men  thus  detailed  into  patrols  numbered  con- 
secutively), orders  the  picket  to  stack  arms  and  fall  out,  and 
sends  to  his  immediate  commander  a  report  of  his  position 
and  dispositions,  accompanied,  if  practicable,  with  a  rough 
sketch  of  the  same. 

If  Cossack  posts  are  established  instead  of  pickets  and 
sentinels,  the  force  on  leaving  the  supports  deploys  first  into 
line  of  squads,  and  then  into  line  of  skirmishers,  taking  such 
interv^als  as  to  cover  the  front  to  be  occupied.  On  halting  on 
the  line  of  observation,  such  reconnaissance  to  the  front  as 
may  be  necessary  is  effected,  and  the  skirmishers  are  then 
assembled  by  squads.  Numbers  3  and  4,  front  and  rear  rank, 
of  each  squad  are  then  marched  half  way  to  the  next  squad  on 
their  left,  and  halted.  Each  group  of  four  men  then  consti- 
tutes a  Cossack  post. 

A  cavalry  picket  is  posted  in  a  manner  similar  to  the 
method  of  posting  one  composed  of  infantry.  If  the  country 
is  open,  the  picket  remains  mounted  during  the  posting  of  the 
vedettes;  if  the  country  is  wooded  and  close,  it  is  prepared 
to  fight  on  foot.  When  the  picket  commander  returns  to  the 
picket,  the  men  are  allowed  to  dismount;  or,  if  prepared  for 
fighting  on  foot,  they  are  assembled  and  stand  to  horse.  The 
horses  are  then  placed  under  a  proper  guard,  and  the  men 
fall  out. 

After  the  picket  commander  has  sent  in  his  first  report, 
he  visits  his  detached  posts,  and  makes  such  inspection  of 
the  ground  as  may  be  necessary  to  familiarize  him  with  the 
roads,  paths,  and  other  topographical  featm-es  of  his  position, 
but  should  not  go  be3^ond  reach  of  his  picket.  If  streams  or 
other  obstacles  exist  in  front  of  his  position,  he  ascertains  at 
what  points  they  are  passable;  and  he  must  satisfy  himself 


78  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

that  the  picket  occupies  a  post  fulfilling,  as  far  as  possible, 
the  requirements  already  set  forth.  He  takes  such  measures 
in  regard  to  strengthening  his  position  as  may  be  required 
by  circumstances  and  be  in  consonance  with  orders  received 
by  him;  but  while  He  should  make  all  prudent  preparations 
to  defend  the  main  avenues  of  approach,  bridges,  fords,  etc., 
he  should  not  obstruct  a  main  road  with  obstacles  whose  re- 
moval might  delay  the  advance  of  the  main  body,  nor  destroy 
bridges,  without  orders  from  higher  authority.  He  must  be 
especially  careful  to  see  that  the  picket  post  at  night  is  pre- 
pared for  a  stubborn  defense ;  and  he  must,  at  all  times,  con- 
sider what  he  would  do  in  case  of  attack.  "Though  by  nature 
he  be  slow  of  thought,  he  has  nothing  to  fear,  provided  he  has 
made  up  his  mind  beforehand  as  to  what  he  will  do  when 
attacked."* 

When,  at  the  close  of  a  day's  march,  the  advance  guard 
forms  the  outpost,  the  advance  party  furnishes  the  pickets 
and  sentinels  (being  reinforced,  if  necessary,  from  the  sup- 
port until  the  two  bodies  are  equal  in  strength) ;  the  support 
furnishes  the  supports;  and  the  reserve  constitutes  the  re- 
serve of  the  outpost.  When  the  place  for  camp  or  bivouac  is 
selected,  the  advance  guard  marches  to  its  post  as  an  outpost 
in  the  same  general  manner  as  though  detailed  from  camp. 

Whenever  practicable,  the  outpost  should  be  divided  into 
three  equal  parts,  which  should  so  relieve  each  other  as  to 
make  an  equitable  division  of  the  duty  on  the  line  of  observa- 
tion. At  the  end  of  each  eight  hours  the  reserve  should  take 
the  place  of  the  support,  the  support  should  relieve  the  pick- 
ets, and  the  latter  should  march  back  and  unite  at  the  posi- 
tion of  the  reserve.  This  arrangement  would  give  each  senti- 
nel two  hours  and  forty  minutes  on  post  (which  might  be  di- 
vided into  two  periods  of  an  hour  and  twenty  minutes  each) 
during  his  tour  of  outpost  duty.  If,  for  any  reason,  this 
method  of  equalizing  the  duty  should  be  impracticable,  a 
careful  roster  of  sentinel  duty,  and  especially  of  night  duty, 

*Wolseley. 


POSTING  AND  RELIEVING   THE   OUTPOST.  79 

should  be  kept,  and  the  burden  should  be  equalized  in  the 
course  of  several  tours.  To  equalize  the  burden  of  sentinel 
duty  as  advised  above,  it  might  sometimes  be  expedient  to 
change  the  typical  formation  as  given  in  Plate  VI.,  so  as  to 
have  one  entire  battalion  in  each  line;  though  such  a  change 
is  open  to  the  objection  that,  in  case  of  attack,  it  would  be 
difficult  to  avoid  an  intermingling  of  the  different  battalions. 

The  Defense  of  the  Outpost. 

^  if  The  outpost  should,  as  a  rule,  avoid  unnecessary  move- 
ments tending  to  bring  on  an  engagement;  but  if  attacked, 
it  should  resist  stubbornly,  in  order  to  give  the  main  body 
time  to  prepare  for  action.  The  chief  resistance  is  generally 
made  on  the  line  of  supports,  though  in  some  cases  it  may  be 
best  for  the  supports  to  advance  to  the  line  of  pickets.  In 
the  former  case,  the  picket  usually  deploys  as  skirmishers 
and  advances  to  reinforce  the  line  of  sentinels;  the  whole 
line  then  falling  back  slowly  upon  the  supports,  taking  ad- 
vantage of  every  defensive  feature  of  the  ground,  and  fight- 
ing resolutely.  In  order  that  the  fire  of  the  support  may 
not  be  masked,  the  pickets  will  direct  their  retreat  upon  its 
flanks  instead  of  falling  directly  back  upon  it.  The  skir- 
mishers then  form  on  a  line  with  the  skirmishers  of  the  sup- 
port. In  the  latter  case,  the  pickets  should  be  intrenched. 
The  sentinels  fall  back  upon  them,  moving  towards  their 
flanks  to  unmask  their  fire;  and  the  supports  are  brought  up 
and  deployed  in  the  intervals  between  the  pickets.  In  either 
case,  the  reserve  is  brought  up  to  reinforce  the  troops  in  front 
as  soon  as  the  nature  and  direction  of  the  attack  become 
apparent. 

In  case  the  enemy  is  repulsed,  the  infantry  should  re- 
sume its  former  positions,  but  should  not  ordinarily  pursue. 
The  cavalry  should  send  out  patrols  to  discover  where  the 
enemy  halted.  These  patrols  should  beware  of  ambuscade, 
and  must  not  push  beyond  an  indicated  distance.     When  the 


8o  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

outpost  is  composed  of  infantry  alone,  small  detachments  de- 
ployed as  skirmishers  ma}^  sometimes  be  sent  in  pursuit,  but 
the  outpost  must  not  be  much  weakened  for  this  purpose. 
Soon  after  the  repulse  of  the  attack,  the  pickets  and  supports 
should  shift  their  positions  (unless  by  so  doing  it  would  be 
necessary  to  abandon  strong  points),  in  order  to  deprive  the 
enemy  of  profiting  by  the  knowledge  of  the  position  gained 
by  attacking. 

When  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  approach  is  gained  in 
time  to  admit  of  full  preparation,  he  should  be  received  with 
volleys.  This  would  enable  the  officer  to  keep  the  troops 
better  in  hand,  and  would  have  a  desirable  moral  effect  on  the 
enemy,  as  volleys  may  be  regarded  as  an  indication  of  coolness 
and  readiness  on  the  part  of  the  troops  delivering  them. 

The  pickets  should  be  under  arms  an  hour  before  daybreak, 
as  an  attack  is  most  likely  to  occur  at  dawn. 

Rkueving  the  Outpost. 

The  outpost  is  relieved  at  daybreak,  in  order  that  there 
may  be  double  strength  on  the  outpost  line  at  the  time  when 
an  attack  is  most  to  be  feared. 

The  new  reserve  maches  to  the  post  of  the  old  one,  where 
both  rest  with  arms  stacked,  and  "the  new  commander  re- 
ceives from  the  old  all  information  possessed  b}^  the  latter  in 
regard  to  the  enemy,  and  the  standing  orders  for  the  reserve. 
Bach  support  marches  to  the  post  of  the  support  which  it  is 
to  relieve,  and  both  supports  rest,  while  information  and 
orders  are  turned  over  as  in  the  case  of  the  reserves.  When 
a  new  picket  arrives  to  relieve  an  old  one,  each  stands  at 
ease  while  the  new  and  old  commanders  visit  the  sentinels' 
posts  together,  followed  by  the  first  relief  from  the  new  picket. 
The  old  commander  points  out  to  the  new  the  important  topo- 
graphical features  of  the  vicinity,  and  the  known  or  suspected 


RBLIEVING  THE   OUTPOST.  8 1 

positions  of  the  hostile  posts ;  and  gives  him  all  the  information 
that  has  been  gained  in  regard  to  the  enemy.* 

When  the  old  sentinels  and  detached  posts  have  been  re- 
lieved, the  commander  of  the  old  picket  (unless  there  appears 
to  be  danger  of  an  attack)  sends  in  a  written  report  to  the 
commander  of  the  outpost  or  section,  and  marches  his  picket 
back  to  its  support.  As  soon  as  the  support  has  been  joined 
by  its  pickets,  it  marches  back  to  its  reserve,  and  the  entire 
old  outpost  returns  to  camp;  or  each  support  may  march 
directly  back  to  camp  as  soon  as  it  is  joined  by  its  pickets.  If, 
while  the  old  outpost  or  any  part  of  it  is  returning,  the  enemy 
should  attack,  it  must  be  at  once  marched  back  to  the  assist- 
ance of  the  new  outpost. 

As  a  rule,  outposts  should  be  relieved  every  twenty-four 
hours.  With  cavalry  this  is  necessar}^;  but  in  the  case  of 
infantry,  if  the  enemy  is  not  near  and  enterprising,  it  may 
sometimes  be  advisable  to  keep  the  same  troops  on  outpost 
duty  for  forty-eight  hours,  if  the  command  remains  in  camp. 

If  the  army  is  on  the  march,  the  outpost  will  be  relieved 
as  soon  as  the  advance  guard  has  passed  the  chain  of  sentinels. 
The  pickets  will  not,  as  a  rule,  fall  back  to  the  supports,  but 
will  join  them  at  some  desigated  point  on  the  line  of  march, 
in  order  to  save  the  fatigued  men  from  unnecessary  marching. 
The  reserve  follows  the  rear  of  the  column,  and  the  supports 
and  pickets,  united  at  designated  rendezvous,  form  the  rear 
guard  of  the  column. 

■.;^If  the  army  is  retreating,  the  outpost  each  day  (when 
practicable)  forms  the  rear  guard.  The  manner  of  relieving 
the  outpost  in  this  case  is  considered  in  the  chapter  on  "Rear 
Guards." 


*There  is  a  complete  absence  of  ceremony  in  relieving  an  outpost. 
There  is  no  position  prescribed  for  tbe  new  reserve,  supports,  or  pickets. 
They  rest  solely  to  avoid  fatigue,  and  the  pickets  stand  at  ease  merely  to 
insure  silence. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


Reconnaissance. 


How  can  any  man  decide  what  he  should  do  himself,  if  he  is  ignorant 
of  what  his  enemy  is  about  ? — Jomini. 

It  is  an  easy  matter  to  criticise  military  operations  after 
the  event ;  but  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  conditions 
and  relative  positions  of  the  opposing  forces,  alwa3^s  set  forth 
with  clearness  by  a  good  historian,  are  matters  of  doubt  to 
the  commanders  while  the  operations  are  in  progress.  The 
curtain  that  separates  the  players  in  the  game  of  kriegsspiel 
is  an  apt  symbol  of  the  veil  of  uncertainty  which  hangs  be- 
tween two  opposing  armies.  To  screen  his  own  movements 
and  positions,  and  to  gain  a  knowledge  of  those  of  his  oppo- 
nent, a  commander  must  depend  mainly  upon  reconnoitering 
bodies;  and  upon  the  zeal,  daring,  prudence,  and  skill  of 
these  bodies,  the  intelligence  and  promptness  with  which 
their  reports  are  collated,  and  his  own  power  of  making 
correct  deductions  or  synthetical  conclusions  from  separate 
facts  reported,  must  in  a  great  rneasure  depend  his  chances 
of  success. 

Reconnaissance  may  be  considered  under  the  following 
heads : 

1.  Reconnaissance  in  force. 

2.  Special  reconnaissance. 

3.  Patrolling. 

Reconnaissance  in  Force. — Reconnaissances  in  force  are 
made  only  by  the  orders  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  the 
force  employed  generally  consists  of  all  three  arms.  They 
are  often  made  just  before  an  action,  for  the  purpose  of  dis- 
covering the  enemy's  strength  and  dispositions,  and  frequently 

82 


RECONNAISSANCE   IN   EORCE.  83 

lead  to  a  battle.  The  reconnaissance  is  conducted  in  the 
same  general  manner  as  a  regular  attack.  Artillery  is  brought 
into  action  for  the  purpose  of  drawing  the  fire  of  the  enemy's 
guns  and  thus  discovering  their  position.  The  outposts  are 
attacked,  and,  if  possible,  driven  in,  and  different  parts  of  the 
enemy's  line  are  threatened,  or  actually  attacked,  by  skirmish- 
ers in  strength  according  to  the  result  desired.  Efforts  are 
made  while  driving  in  the  enemy's  pickets  to  capture  prisoners. 
Staff  officers,  advancing  with  the  skirmishers,  rapidly  sketch 
the  different  features  of  the  enemy's  position,  and  note  his 
apparent  strength  at  different  points. 

Prisoners  captured  in  a  reconnaissance  in  force  should  be 
questioned  as  to  the  regiments,  brigades,  divisions,  etc.,  to 
which  they  belong.  If  prisoners  have  been  captured  all  along 
the  line,  their  answers  will  discover  the  enemy's  positions  and 
strength.  Even  if  the  prisoners  should  be  uniformly  stubborn 
and  untruthful,  their  regimental  badges  would  convey  valuable 
information. 

Cavalry  and  horse  artillery  are  especially  valuable  in  a  re- 
connaissance in  force,  as  they  can  be  withdrawn  from  action 
more  easily  than  infantry;  and  it  would  be  well  to  limit  the, 
reconnaissance  to  these  two  arms  when  they  are  in  ample  force 
and  circumstances  render  their  action  sufficient.  To  be  suc- 
cessful, however,  a  reconnaissance  in  force  should  impose 
upon  the  enemy  the  belief  that  he  is  encountering  a  real 
attack;  and  this  consideration  will  determine  the  kind  of 
troops  to  employ  and  the  hour  at  which  the  attack  should  be 
made.  If  infantry  be  employed  in  the  attack,  it  will  be  hard 
to  break  off  the  action ;  but  if  it  be  not  employed,  it  will  gen- 
erally be  manifest  that  the  attack  is  not  serious.  As  to  the 
time  of  making  the  reconnaissance,  if  it  be  made  late  in  the 
afternoon,  the  troops  may  be  withdrawn  under  cover  of  the 
darkness ;  but  if  made  at  that  hour,  the  enemy  will  probably 
suspect  the  true  nature  of  the  operation.  If  made  in  the 
morning,  the  enemy  will  doubtless  believe  it  to  be  a  serious 
attack;  but  it  may  very  easily  precipitate  a  battle. 


84  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  a  reconnaissance  in  force  is  a 
difficult  operation.  Indeed,  it  should  never  be  made  except 
when  other  means  of  getting  necessary  information  about  the 
enemy  fail.     It  is  open  to  three  serious  objections : 

1.  It  often  results  in  committing  the  troops  so  com- 
pletel}^  to  action  as  to  bring  on  a  battle  through  the  necessity 
of  bringing  up  other  troops  to  their  assistance. 

At  Worth  a  reconnaissance  by  the  20th  Prussian  Brigade 
developed  the  enemy;  and  the  other  German  troops,  "moving 
to  the  sound  of  the  cannon,"  precipitated  a  battle  a  day  earlier 
than  the  Crown  Prince  had  intended. 

2.  The  withdrawal  of  the  troops  in  pursuance  of  the 
general  plan  of  the  reconnaissance  may  often  present  the 
appearance  of  defeat. 

In  1859  Guilay  caused  a  reconnaissance  in  force  to  be 
made  by  Stadion's  Corps.  It  developed  Forey's  Division 
near  Montebello;  and  although  the  Austrians  withdrew  in 
accordance  with  the  plan  of  reconnaissance,  the  moral  effect 
of  the  action  on  both  sides  was  that  of  a  victory  of  a  French 
division  over  an  Austrian  army  corps. 

On  July  18,  1 86 1,  McDowell  ordered  Tyler  to  observe  with 
his  division  the  roads  leading  from  Centerville  to  Bull  Run, 
but  not  to  bring  on  an  engagement.  Tyler  exceeded  his  in- 
structions by  making  a  reconnaissance  in  force;  and,  though 
he  succeeded  in  developing  the  enemy's  front  in  the  vicinity 
of  Blackburn's  Ford,  his  left  flank  was  turned  by  the  Confed- 
erates, he  was  forced  to  fall  back,  and  the  apparent  defeat 
had  a  depressing  effect  upon  the  raw  troops  composing  the 
Union  army. 

3.  It  is  always  a  costly  means  of  gaining  information. 
The  Atlanta  campaign,  conducted  mainly  in  a  heavily  wooded 
country,  where  the  opposing  forces,  though  always  near,  were 
often  completely  concealed  from  each  other,  furnishes  nu- 
merous examples  of  reconnaissances  in  force,  which  were  gen- 
erally very  costly  ones.  These  reconnaissances  were  termed 
demonstrations,  and  were  usually  made  by  a  continuous! line 


reconnaissance;  in  i^orce.  85 

of  considerable  extent.  In  advancing  the  army  was  always 
covered  by  a  line  of  skirmishers,  which  on  halting  became  a 
line  of  sentinels.  When  a  demonstration  was  ordered,  the 
sentinels  advanced,  thus  becoming  again  a  line  of  skirmish- 
ers, and  were  supported  more  or  less  by  the  troops  in  rear 
according  to  the  earnestness  of  the  demonstration. 

On  June  22,  1864,  in  ordel"  to  ascertain  the  presence  and 
position  of  Johnston's  army  at  the  base  of  Kenesaw  Moun- 
tain, a  demonstration  was  made  in  front  of  the  2d  Division  of 
the  IV.  Corps.  The  97th  Ohio  Infantry  (Lieutenant-Colonel 
Barnes),  operating  in  front  of  the  2d  Brigade  of  that  division, 
encountered  the  enemy  in  a  strong  position,  and  suffered  the 
severe  loss  of  98  killed  and  wounded  (including  7  officers)  out 
of  a  total  strength  of  369 — a  heavier  loss  than  it  incurred  in 
any  of  the  great  battles  in  which  it  was  engaged  during  the 
war. 

The  reconnaissance  in  front  of  the  ist  Brigade,  made,  at 
the  same  time,  by  the  24th  Wisconsin  Infantry  (Major  Mac- 
Arthur),*  furnishes  an  exception  to  the  general  rule  of  severe 
losses  on  special  reconnaissance.  The  men  of  this  regiment 
were  instructed  each  to  select  a  tree  about  50  yards  in  front 
of  the  line,  and,  at  command,  to  run  forward  and  halt  behind 
the  tree  selected.  The  regiment,  thus  pushing  forward  by  a 
series  of  rushes,  advanced  three-fourths  of  the  distance  sep- 
arating it  from  the  enemy,  developed  his  position,  and  com- 
pletely gained  the  object  of  the  reconnaissance,  with  the  loss 
of  only  2  men  killed  and  1 1  wounded.  This  happy  adapta- 
tion of  tactics  to  the  terrain  enabled  the  reconnaissance  on 
this  part  of  the  line  to  be  made  with  an  exceptionally  small 
loss. 

Special  Reconnaissances. — Reconnaissances  of  this  class 
have  some  limited  and  definite  object  in  view:  to  discover 
whether  a  certain  point  is  occupied  in  force  by  the  enemy; 
whether  a  bridge  is  broken,  or  a  defile  is  fortified;  to  capture 
a  picket,  with  a  view  to  gaining  information;  or  to  attack  a 

*Novr  (1903)  Major-General  MacArthur 


86  SECURITY   AND   INI^ORMATION. 

post  for  the  purpose  of  discovering  the  intentions  or  morale 
of  the  enemy.  In  the  latter  case  the  inference  to  be  drawn  is 
that  the  post  is  of  much  or  little  importance,  or  that  the  enemy 
is  confident  or  dispirited,  according  to  its  stubborn  defense 
or  quick  abandonment.  The  post  might,  however,  be  aban- 
doned solely  because  of  its  lack  of  support  by  other  parts  of 
the  line.  Thus  the  abandonment  of  the  Turkish  posts  at  Bal- 
aklava  at  the  first  attack  was  evidence  neither  of  the  unim- 
portance of  the  posts  nor  of  the  impaired  morale  of  the  defend- 
ers, but  it  was  an  indication  that  the  dispositions  of  the  Allies 
were  extremely  faulty.  Though  this  was  not  a  case  of  recon- 
naissance, but  of  a  real  attack,  the  same  result  might  occur 
in  a  special  reconnaissance. 

The  manner  of  conducting  a  special  reconnaissance  de- 
pends upon  its  object  and  the  circumstances  under  which  it 
is  conducted.  A  good  rule  in  one  case  might  be  a  fatal  guide 
in  another.  The  following  instance  of  a  brilliant  and  suc- 
cessful special  reconnaissance  shows  how  the  alert  intelligence 
and  personal  daring  of  a  commander  of  a  reconnoitering  party 
may  solve  a  problem  for  which  no  rule  can  be  prescribed : 

In  the  spring  of  1863,  the  First  Cavalry  Division,  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  was  ordered  to  make  a  reconnaissance  to- 
wards Orange  Court-House,  to  develop  the  position  and 
strength  of  the  enemy  on  the  Rapidan ;  other  troops,  infantry 
and  cavalry,  being  detached  on  similar  duty  towards  other 
points  of  the  enemy's  line.  When  the  cavalry  division  ar- 
rived at  the  Rapidan,  it  discovered  a  weak  line  of  Confeder- 
ate outposts  and  a  long  line  of  earthworks;  but  was  unable 
to  ascertain  whether  the  latter  was  occupied,  especially  as 
orders  discouraged  any  considerable  engagement  or  "the  sac- 
rifice of  men."  To  induce  the  enemy  to  show  his  force,  vari- 
ous expedients  were  resorted  to,  but  without  result.  It  was 
finally  determined  to  cross  the  stream  at  the  ford  in  front, 
and  the  advance  squadron  (5th  U.  S.  Cavalry)  moved  towards 
the  crossing.  The  line  of  advance  gave,  at  points,  a  view  of 
the  interior  of  the  enemy's  line,  which  seemed  to  indicate  that 


SPECIAI^   RECONNAISSANCES.  87 

it  was  held  b}^  a  strong  force.  Acting  with  prompt  resolu- 
tion, the  squadron  commander  (Captain  Ash)  quickly  placed 
his  men  behind  cover  near  by,  and  rode  alone  along  the  bank 
of  the  river  at  a  rapid  gallop,  looking  into  the  enemy's  works. 
A  furious  fusillade  from  the  earthworks  followed  his  move- 
ment; but  he  succeeded  in  making  a  complete  inspection, 
and,  waving  his  hat  triumphantly  over  his  head,  rode  back 
to  his  command,  loudly  cheered  by  the  forces  on  both  sides  of 
the  river,  the  Confederates  mounting  their  breastworks  and 
waving  their  hats  in  admiration  of  the  gallant  exploit.  Thus 
the  object  of  the  reconnaissance  was  gained  without  the  loss 
of  a  man. 

In  an  attempt  upon  a  picket  of  the  enemy,  the  most  fa- 
vorable place  for  crossing  his  line  of  sentinels  is  sought  out, 
and  the  necessary  dispositions  are  made,  before  dark;  the 
attack  being  made  at  night  or  at  late  dusk.  The  force  should 
ordinarily  be  divided  into  two  detachments,  one  of  which 
should  remain  concealed  and  ready  to  rush  forward  to  the 
assistance  of  the  other  if  necessary.  The  latter  endeavors  to 
cross  the  line  of  sentinels  unperceived,  advancing  silently, 
in  close  order,  without  flankers,  and  with  only  one  or  two 
scouts  in  advance.  As  soon  as  the  line  of  sentinels  is  passed, 
the  greatest  difficulty  is  overcome.  The  detachment  moves 
quickly  upon  the  picket  so  as  to  attack  it  on  the  flank  and 
rear.  It  is  imperative  that  the  attack  should  be  prompt  and 
impetuous,  and  made  simultaneously  from  two  or  more  di- 
rections. The  great  object  of  the  attack  is,  of  course,  to  cap- 
ture prisoners,  with  a  view  to  obtaining  information  from 
them.  The  prisoners  are  hurried  away,  and  the  reconnoitering 
force  makes  its  retreat  without  delay. 

The  force  employed  in  a  special  reconnaissance  varies  in- 
size  from  a  company  or  troop  to  a  division.  The  dividing 
line  between  a  special  reconnaissance  and  a  reconnaissance 
in  force  is  often  very  dim,  and  in  many  cases  the  same  opera- 
tion could  be  designated  by  either  term.  On  the  4th  of  July, 
1864,  Sherman  being  in  doubt  as  to  the  presence  of  Johnston's 


88  SECURITY   AND    INFORMATION. 

army  at  Smyrna  Camp-Ground,  Howard  ordered  a  demon- 
stration, which  he  describes  as  follows : 

"I  called  Stanley,  whose  division  held  the  front.  'Gen- 
eral, double  your  skirmishers  and  press  them.'  At  once  it 
was  done.  The  lines  sped  forward,  capturing  the  outlying 
pits  of  the  enemy,  and  took  many  prisoners;  but  a  sheet  of 
lead  instantly  came  from  the  hidden  works  in  the  edge  of 
the  wood  beyond  us,  and  several  batteries  hurled  their  shot 
across  our  lines,  some  of  them  reaching  our  grove  and  forc- 
ing us  [Sherman  and  Howard]  to  retire."* 

This  demonstration  may  with  equal  correctness  be  termed 
either  a  reconnaissance  in  force  or  a  special  reconnaissance. 
The  force  employed  would  justify  the  former  term,  and  the 
limited  and  special  object  would  render  the  latter  proper. 

Patrolling. — Patrols  are  divided  into  small  patrols  and 
strong  patrols.  A  strong  patrol  varies  in  strength  from  nine 
men  to  a  troop  of  cavalry  or  a  company  of  infantry.  A  small 
patrol  varies  from  three  men  to  a  squad.  A  patrol  should 
never  consist  of  less  than  three  men;  for  if  it  were  composed 
of  only  two,  it  would  be  impossible  to  send  back  a  report  of 
anything  seen  or  heard,  without  leaving  one  man  alone,  with- 
out support,  in  the  proximity  of  the  enemy. 

In  our  service  patrols  are  also  classified  as  officers' ,  recon- 
noitering,  visiting,  covering  (flanking),  and  connecting  patrols. f 
To  these  may  be  added  exploring,  harassing,  expeditionary,  and 
pursuing  patrols.  The  classification  into  small  and  strong 
patrols  is  the  important  one;  for  without  changing  its  size, 
and  without  material  modification  of  its  methods,  the  patrol, 
may  combine  the  functions  of  several  of  the  different  kinds  of 
patrols  contained  in  the  second  classification.  In  fact,  the 
latter  classification  is  mainly  for  convenience  of  description. 

Officers'  patrols  are  extensively^  used  in  connection  with 
the  cavalry  screen,   and  will  therefore  be  considered  in  the 

*"  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,"  Vol.  IV.,  p.  313. 
fCavalry  Drill  Regulations,  par.  978. 


PATROLLING.  89 

next  chapter.  Visiting  patrols  have  already  been  considered ; 
they  belong  exclusively  to  outposts. 

Exploring  patrols  have  for  their  object  to  explore  the  coun- 
try in  front  of  the  army.  The  nature  of  this  exploration 
and  the  manner  of  conducting  it  belong  rather  to  "Military 
Topography"  than  to  the  subject  here  considered;  but  the 
following  observ^ations  of  different  natural  features  should 
alwa3^s  be  made,  and  it  may  not  be  out  of  place  to  mention 
them  here : 

Roads. — Their  direction;  their  nature  (macadamized,  cor- 
duroy, plank,  "dirt,"  etc.);  their  condition  of  repair;  their 
grade;  the  nature  of  lateral  roads,  and  the  points  where  they 
leave  the  main  road;  their  borders  (woods,  hedges,  fences,  or 
ditches) ;  the  places  at  which  they  pass  through  defiles,  across 
heights  or  rivers,  and  where  they  intersect  railroads;  their 
breadth  (whether  suitable  to  column  of  fours  or  of  platoons, 
etc.). 

Railroads. — Their  direction;  the  number  of  tracks,  sta- 
tions, and  junctions;  their  grade;  the  nature  of  the  cuts, 
embankments,  and  tunnels. 

Bridges. — Their  position;  their  width  and  length;  their 
construction  (wood,  brick,  stone,  or  iron) ;  the  roads  and  ap- 
proaches on  each  bank. 

Rivers  {and  Other  Streams). — Their  direction,  width,  and 
depth;  the  rapidity  of  the  current;  liability  to  sudden  rises 
and  extreme  fluctuations  in  depth,  as  indicated  by  drift- 
wood, etc. ;  fords ;  the  nature  of  the  banks ;  kind,  position, 
and  number  of  islands  at  suitable  points  of  passage;  heights 
in  the  vicinity,  and  their  command  over  the  banks. 

Woods — Their  situation,  extent,  and  shape;  whether  clear 
or  containing  underbrush;  the  number  and  extent  of  "clear- 
ings"; whether  cut  up  by  ravines,  or  containing  marshes, 
etc. ;  nature  of  roads  penetrating  them. 

Canals. — Their  direction,  width,  and  depth;  condition  of 
towpath;  locks,  and  means  for  protecting  or  destroying  them. 


90  SECURITY  AND   INI^ORMATION. 

Telegraphs. — Whether  they  follow  railroads  or  common 
roads;  stations;  number  of  wires. 

Villages. — Their  situation  (on  a  height,  in  a  valley,  or  on 
a  plain) ;  nature  of  the  surrounding  country ;  construction  of 
the  houses ;  nature  and  width  of  the  streets ;  means  of  defense. 

Defiles. — Their  direction;  whether  straight  or  crooked; 
whether  heights  on  either  side  are  accessible  or  inaccessible; 
nature  of  ground  at  each  extremity;  width  (frontage  of  col- 
umn that  can  pass  through). 

Ponds  and  Marshes. — Means  of  crossing ;  defensive  use  that 
might  be  made  of  them  as  obstacles  against  the  enemy ;  wheth- 
er the  marshy  grounds  are  practicable  for  any  or  all  arms. 

Springs  and  Rivulets. — Nature  of  approaches;  whether  wa- 
ter is  drinkable  and  abundant. 

Valleys. — Extent  and  nature;  towns,  villages,  hamlets, 
streams,  roads,  and  paths  therein ;  obstacles  offered  by,  or  in, 
the  valley  to  the  movements  of  troops. 

Heights. — Whether  slopes  are  easy  or  steep;  whether  good 
defensive  positions  are  offered;  whether  plateau  is  wide  or 
narrow;  whether  passages  are  easy  or  difficult;  whether  the 
ground  is  broken  or  smooth,  wooded  or  clear. 

Cultivated  Ground. — Nature  of  cultivation  and  kind  of  crops. 

Good  camping-places  should  always  be  noted. 

The  report  should  be  rendered  as  quickly  as  possible  after 
the  return  of  the  patrol,  accompanied,  when  practicable,  with 
a  map.* 

A  patrol  of  any  nature  should  endeavor  to  note  carefully 
the  different  features  of  the  ground  over  which  it  passes, 
whether  required  to  make  a  report  or  not.  In  every  case  a 
railroad  embankment,  a  ditch,  or  any  other  object  that  would  fur- 
nish a  good  defensive  position,  should  be  noted. 

*For  a  complete  and  excellent  description  of  the  requirements  of  the 
kind  of  reconnaissance  here  considered,  see  "The  Duties  of  the  General 
Staff,"  by  Bronsart  von  Schellendorf,  Vol.  II.,  p.  249,  et  seq.  For  technical 
information  in  regard  to  sketching  and  map-making  in  connection  with 
such  reconnaissance,  consult  Root's  "Military  Topography." 


PATROLS.  91 

Reconnoitering  patrols  are  used  to  reconnoiter  the  position 
and  watch  the  movements  of  the  enemy. 

Harassing  patrols  are  for  the  purpose  of  disturbing  and 

annoying  the  enemy,  and  thus  depriving  him  of  sleep  and  rest. 

Expeditionary  patrols  have  for  their  mission  the  capture 

of  sentinels  or  patrols,  or  the  destruction  of  roads,  railroads, 

or  telegraphs. 

Connecting  patrols  are  used  to  preserve  communication 
between  columns  of  troops  on  the  march  or  between  different 
bodies  in  battle. 

Pursuing  patrols  hang  upon  a  retreating  enemy,  and  ren- 
der prompt  information  as  to  his  movements,  location,  and 
morale. 

Exploring,  reconnoitering,  harassing,  expeditionary,  and 
pursuing  patrols  may  be  either  strong  or  small;  connecting 
patrols  are  always  strong. 

Cavalry  is  the  arm  par  excellence  for  patrolling,  especially 
when  (as  is  the  case  with  American  cavalry)  it  unites  mobility 
and  defensiA'^e  power,  and  does  not  need  to  be  hampered  with 
a  supporting  force  of  infantry.  The  composition  of  the  patrol 
will,  however,  depend  upon  the  ground  to  be  reconnoitered, 
the  distance  to  which  the  reconnaissance  is  to  be  extended, 
and  the  hour  at  which  the  patrol  is  sent  out.  The  union  of 
infantry  and  cavalry  is  recommended  by  some  military  writ- 
ers; but  such  a  measure  seems  of  doubtful  value  in  any  case 
and  worse  than  useless  when  the  cavalry  can  take  care  of 
itself  with  its  own  fire  action.  Infantry  is  preferable  to  cav- 
alry for  patrolling  only  at  night,  or  in  a  very  close  and  broken 
country.  It  is  often  advisable  to  attach  a  few  troopers  to  an 
infantry  patrol  merely  as  mounted  orderlies,  but  no  further 
imion  of  the  two  arms  on  this  service  should  ordinarily  be 
contemplated. 


92  security  and  information. 

SmaIvL  Infantry  Patrols. 

The  conditions  under  which  small  infantry  patrols  are 
sent  out  differ  very  much.  If  possible,  the  following  rules 
should  be  observed : 

Composition. — Experienced  soldiers  should  be  detailed, 
and  if  no  non-commissioned  officer  is  available,  an  intelligent 
private  should  be  selected  to  command  the  patrol,  and  the 
others  ordered  to  obe}^  him.  It  is  desirable  that  at  least  one 
member  of  the  patrol  should  be  able  to  speak  the  language 
of  the  country  in  which  the  army  is  operating. 

Preparation  and  Inspection. — The  patrol  commander  should 
be  given  clear  and  definite  instructions  in  regard  to  the  duty 
to  be  performed,  and  he  should  be  required  to  repeat  them  to 
the  members  of  the  patrol  in  the  presence  of  the  officer  giving 
them.  These  instructions  should  inform  him  of  the  object 
of  the  reconnaissance,  what  is  known  about  the  enemy,  the 
nature  of  the  ground  to  be  reconnoitered,  whether  he  is  to 
reconnoiter  in  one  direction  or  in  several,  how  long  he  is  to 
remain  out,  where  his  reports  are  to  be  sent,  and,  if  other 
patrols  are  sent  out  at  the  same  time,  the  particular  route 
which  he  is  to  follow.     For  instance — 

Captain  (to  sergeant  of  patrol) :  Do  you  know  the  country 
in  front? 

Sergeant:     No,  sir. 

Captain:  Well,  you  see  that  hill  half  a  mile  out — the 
road  forks  there.  Small  parties  of  the  enemy  are  suspected 
in  that  vicinity.  Move  out  and  observe  the  fork  and  the  open 
fields  to  the  left.  Don't  reconnoiter  the  ground  at  the  right 
of  the  fork;  another  patrol  will  take  care  of  that.  If  you  see 
this  patrol,  don't  mistake  it  for  the  enemy.  Remain  out  until 
dark.  Report  to  me  at  No.  2  Picket.  Don't  fire  unless  you 
have  to. 

The  patrol  commander  must  be  sure  that  he  understands 
his  instructions.  If  he  has  the  slightest  doubt  about  it,  he 
must  ask  for  a  repetition. 


PREPARATION  AND   INSPECTION.  93 

He  then  inspects  the  patrol,  being  careful  that  each  man 
has  the  proper  amount  of  ammunition,  and  that  none  are  sick, 
intoxicated,  or  foot-sore.  If  any  man  has  a  cold  which  causes 
him  to  cough,  he  must  be  replaced  by  another  man,  even 
though  he  be  not  on  sick-report.  The  patrol  commander  also 
sees  that  the  arms  and  accouterments  of  his  men  are  so  ar- 
ranged as  neither  to  rattle  nor  to  glisten  in  the  sunlight.  He 
also  points  out  to  the  members  of  the  patrol  the  positions  of 
troops  of  their  own  army,  and  a  place  of  assembly  for  men 
who  may  be  detached  or  become  separated  from  the  patrol, 
choosing,  if  practicable,  some  prominent  landmark.  He  next 
gives  the  men  their  general  instructions,  cautioning  them  es- 
pecially that  they  must  neither  talk  nor  smoke,  and  explains, 
if  they  be  not  already  familiar  with  them,  the  signals  by  which 
they  are  to  communicate. 

Signals. — In  addition  to  the  signals  described  in  the  Drill 
Regulations,  the  following  should  be  used : 

Attention,  or,  Do  you  see  anything?  Wave  the  hand 
across  the  face,  or  whistle  once. 

Affirmative  signal:  Raise  and  lower  the  arm  vertically 
twice,  or  whistle  twice. 

Negative  signal:  Extend  the  arm  horizontally  thrice,  or 
whistle  thrice. 

Enemy  in  sight  or  hearing:  Hold  the  rifle  horizontally 
above  the  head  with  both  hands,  holding  it  steadily  if  the 
enemy  is  in  small  bodies,  and  raising  and  lowering  it  repeat- 
edly if  he  is  in  force.     To  signal  by  whistle,  whistle  four  times. 

To  ask  for  reinforcements:  Extend  the  arm  horizontally 
and  wave  it  rapidly  with  a  circular  motion,  or  give  a  long, 
continuous  whistle. 

In  a  very  close  country,  in  foggy  weather,  or  at  night,  the 
whistle  must  be  relied  upon,  but  at  all  other  tim.es  its  use 
should  be  avoided.  In  giving  the  signals,  the  whistle  must 
be  used  softly,  as  a  loud  noise  might  be  heard  by  the  enemy. 
In  every  case,  except  when  asking  for  reinforcements,  the 
note  should  be  short.     If  the  men  are  not  provided  with  whis- 


94  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

ties,  they  should  give  the  whistle  signals  by  mouth.  Many 
different  signals  may  be  devised,  such  as  waving  the  hat  or 
handkerchief,  striking  the  butt  of  the  piece  with  the  knuckles, 
etc.  No  signals  should  be  made  unnecessarily,  and  when 
near  the  enemy  the  greatest  care  should  be  exercised  that  the 
signals  be  not  detected  by  him. 

Formation. — ^The  disposition  of  the  patrol  while  on  the 
march  can  not  be  definitely  prescribed.  The  patrols  should 
have  the  general  formation  of  main  body,  advance  guard, 
rear  guard,  and  flankers,  even  when  each  can  be  represented 
by  only  one  man.  If  the  patrol  consists  of  less  than  five  men, 
the  rear  guard  or  one  or  both  flankers  may  be  dispensed  with ; 
but  the  advance  guard  should  always  be  retained.  It  is  gen- 
erally better  to  do  without  one,  or  even  both,  of  the  flankers 
than  without  the  rear-guard  man,  whose  vigilance  prevents 
the  patrol  from  being  attacked  in  the  rear  and  cut  off.  On 
nearing  the  enemy,  the  patrol  should  generally  extend  in  line 
to  facilitate  observation.  Figures  i  to  6,  Plate  X.,  give  typical 
formations  of  a  small  patrol. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  typical  formations 
are  merely  hints,  the  formation  of  the  patrol  always  depend- 
ing upon  its  object,  the  nature  of  the  ground,  and  the  charac- 
ter and  position  of  the  enemy.  The  only  definite  rule  that 
can  be  laid  down  is  the  following":  The  patrol  must  always  he 
so  formed  as  to  facilitate  the  gaining  of  information,  and  to  in- 
sure, if  possible,  the  escape  of  at  least  one  man,  if  the  patrol  should 
be  cut  off.     Any  disposition  that  coftiplies  with  this  rule  is  right. 

The  distances  and  intervals  between  the  members  of  the 
patrol  depend  upon  circumstances.  They  are  rarely  less 
than  25  or  more  than  100  yards.  The  men  should  be  close 
enough  to  see  and  hear  each  other's  signals,  and  for  mutual 
support.  On  the  other  hand,  they  should  not  so  crowd 
together  that  the  patrol  could  not  see  more  than  a  single 
man  could — a  fault  to  which  men  are  prone  through  anxiety 
about  being  cut  off.  The  commander  should  not  lose  sight 
of  the  point,  and  the  other  members  should  keep  the  same 


FORMATION.  95 

man  in  view;  or,  in  the  case  of  a  large  patrol,  or  one  on 
an  extended  front,  each  man  should  endeavor  to  keep  in  sight 
the  man  next  him  towards  the  point.  The  point  should,  when 
practicable,  consist  of  two  men,  in  order  that  one  may  scout 
vigilantly  towards  the  enemy  while  the  other  watches  for 
signals  from  the  men  on  the  right  and  left  and  from  the  com- 
mander. The  signals  from  the  other  members  of  the  patrol 
are  generally  transmitted  to  the  commander  through  the 
point.  To  assemble  the  patrol,  the  comander  signals  to  the 
point  to  halt,  and  moves  up  to  it,  followed  by  the  rear-guard 
man.  The  other  men  at  once  close  in  on  the  point,  conforming 
their  pace  to  that  of  the  commander. 

Condtict  of  Patrol. — The  patrol  moves  cautiously,  hut  not 
timidly,  along  hedges,  walls,  ditches,  ravines,  etc.,  seeking  in 
every  way  to  see  without  being  seen.  It  halts  frequently  to 
listen,  and  to  make  careful  observation  of  the  ground.  At 
each  halt  the  men  should  note  their  bearings  relative  to  cer- 
tain landmarks,  and  the  commander  should  frequently  turn 
about  to  observe  the  general  appearance  of  the  landscape  and 
note  particular  objects,  in  order  that  he  may  not  lose  his  way 
even  if  compelled  to  make  a  hasty  retreat.  It  may  be  well  in 
some  cases  to  mark  the  route  by  blazing  the  trees,  fastening 
wisps  of  straw  to  posts,  or  marking  the  path  by  dropping 
small  stones;  but  such  methods  are  open  to  the  objections 
that  ihey  take  time  and  might  betray  the  trail  of  the  patrol 
to  the  enemy.* 

It  is  advisable  for  a  patrol  to  return  by  a  different  route 
from  the  one  followed  on  advance,  if  it  be  practicable  for  it 
to  do  so,  as  it  thus  extends  its  reconnaissance  and  lessens  the 
danger  of  being  cut  off;  but  a  small  patrol  rarely  goes  more 
than  three-quarters  of  a  mile  beyond  the  force  which  sends  it 
out,  and  in  this  limited  distance  it  does  not  often  have  a  choice 
of  more  than  one  road. 


*These  methods  have,  however,  the  sanction  of  such  good  authorities 
as'Shaw  and  the  "Guide  Manuel  du  Chef  de  Patrouille." 


g6  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

Generally,  the  patrol  should  avoid  moving  on  great  roads 
and  entering  villages  and  inhabited  places.  But  this  does 
not  mean  that  observation  of  great  roads  is  to  be  neglected. 
On  the  contrary,  they  are  the  very  ones  that  should  be  most 
carefully  watched ;  for  they  are  the  routes  that  must  be  followed 
by  any  bodies  of  the  enemy  whose  movements  are  really  worth 
reporting.  The  patrol,  while  moving  across  fields  and  along 
such  objects  as  have  been  already  mentioned,  should  endeavor 
to  keep  a  constant  watch  on  the  great  roads.  Inhabited  places 
should  be  turned  and  carefully  observed,  but  should  not  ordi- 
narily be  entered  by  a  small  patrol.  At  night,  or  in  a  fog  or 
snow-storm,  the  patrol  must  of  necessity  move  on  the  great 
roads,  in  order  to  avoid  losing  its  way,  unless  it  is  moving  over 
ground  with  which  it  is  perfectly  familiar. 

The  patrol  should  not  halt  to  rest  before  its  return,  unless 
circumstances  render  it  imperatively  necessary  to  do  so.  In 
such  case  it  should  rest  in  concealment  in  some  place  which 
offers  advantages  for  defense,  and  from  which  a  retreat  can 
be  easily  effected.  In  the  case  of  a  small  patrol,  the  latter  con- 
sideration is  the  more  important.  The  position  chosen  should 
not  be  near  any  habitation.  During  the  day  it  should  be  on 
high  ground,  from  which  an  extensive  view  may  be  obtained; 
at  night  it  should  be  on  low  ground,  so  as  to  bring  approaching 
people  into  view  on  the  sky-line. 

If  another  patrol  of  the  same  army,  or  any  other  friendly 
force,  is  met,  the  patrol  commander  should  exchange  informa- 
tion with  it,  and  inform  himself  of  its  strength,  its  destina- 
tion, and  the  name  of  its  commander,  in  order  that  he  may 
report  the  same  on  his  return.  Friendly  patrols  should  rec- 
ognize each  other  without  noise;  but  at  night,  the  one  that 
first  discovers  the  other  must  challenge  and  demand  the  parole 
and  countersign. 

Encountering  the  Enemy. — The  patrol  should  exercise  the 
utmost  vigilance  from  the  moment  of  its  departure;  but,  un- 
less it  has  received  orders  to  return  immediately  upon  dis- 
covering hostile  troops,  its  real  work  begins  when  it  touches 


ENCOUNTERING   THE   ENEMY.  97 

upon  the  enemy.  If  a  small  hostile  patrol  is  discovered,  it  is 
generally  better  to  remain  in  concealment  than  to  attack; 
for  the  noise  of  combat  might  cause  enough  mischief  to  more 
than  counterbalance  all  that  could  be  gained  by  defeating 
the  hostile  patrol,  even  if  prisoners  were  captured.  If  the 
patrol  is  discovered  by  the  hostile  patrol,  and  finds  itself 
unable  to  escape  without  fighting,  it  should  attack  boldly, 
and  should  endeavor  to  take  prisoners. 

When  a  hostile  patrol  has  penetrated  so  far  as  to  make 
it  probable  that  it  has  gained  important  information,  an 
attempt  should  be  made  to  ambuscade  and  capture  it.  If 
surprised,  a  patrol  should  fight  resolutely,  unless  the  enemy 
be  in  such  force  as  to  make  resistance  hopeless.  In  the  latter 
case,  or  if  defeated  in  any  case,  the  patrol  should  disperse, 
each  man  making  his  way  back  to  the  rendezvous  designated 
beforehand.  It  should  then,  after  uniting,  continue  its  recon- 
naissance, sending  one  back  to  the  command  with  a  report. 
It  should  be  an  invariable  rule  not  to  quit  the  reconnaissance 
until  some  result  has  been  obtained.  If  the  enemy  is  near  at 
hand  and  in  force,  the  patrol  must  open  fire,  and  keep  up  a 
lively  fusillade  in  retreat,  as  the  only  means  of  giving  prompt 
warning  of  impending  danger. 

If,  notwithstanding  its  prudence,  the  patrol  falls  into  an 
ambuscade,  it  should  boldly  attack;  for  courage  and  coolness 
may  wrest  success  from  the  most  adverse  circumstances.  If 
a  sentinel  or  patrol  of  the  enemy  is  suddenly  encountered  in 
the  dark,  no  answer  should  be  made  to  his  challenge,  but  the 
patrol  should  remain  halted  and  silent.  The  enemy  may 
think  himself  mistaken  and  pay  no  further  attention.* 

*The  following  remarkable  instance  is  mentioned  by  Dufour:  "At 
the  siege  of  Luxembourg,  Vauban,  wishing  to  ascertain,  by  personal  obser- 
vation, the  real  condition  of  affairs,  as  was  his  custom,  advanced  under  the 
escort  of  a  few  grenadiers,  \vho  were  left  in  rear  lying  upon  the  ground.  He 
was  crossing  the  glacis  alone,  under  cover  of  the  twilight  darkness,  when 
he  was  discovered.  He  beckoned  with  his  hand  to  the  sentinels  not  to  fire, 
and  contnued  to  advance  instead  of  retiring.  The  enemy  took  him  for 
one  of  themselves,  and  Vauban,  having  seen  what  he  wished,  retired  slowly, 
and  was  saved  bv  his  admirable  coolness." 


98  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

If  the  challenge  is  repeated,  the  patrol  should  sneak  away 
as  quickly  as  possible,  unless  it  has  orders  to  capture  prisoners, 
in  which  case  a  sudden  rush  upon  the  sentinel  might  enable 
the  patrol  to  overpower  him  and  carry  him  off  before  he  could 
receive  assistance.  If  some  members  of  the  patrol  can  speak 
the  language  of  the  sentinel,  they  may  succeed  in  completely 
allaying  his  suspicions  with  a  plausible  answer  to  his  challenge.* 

Inhabitants. — Whenever  the  approach  of  people  is  sig- 
nalled, the  patrol  remains  concealed  in  observation.  If  they 
prove  to  be  civilians  coming  from  the  direction  of  the  enemy, 
they  should  be  questioned  carefully,  as  they  may  sometimes 
give  valuable  information.  They  should  be  asked  whether 
they  have  seen  any  of  the  enemy's  soldiers;  where  they  were, 
what  they  were  doing;  whether  they  were  infantry,  cavalry, 
or  artillery;  whether  they  were  regular  troops  or  militia; 
what  kind  of  uniforms  they  wore;  whether  the  horses  and 
men  were  in  good  condition,  or  seemed  to  be  worn  out  and 
fatigued;  how  the  troops  of  the  enemy  behaved  themselves; 
how  the  road  leading  to  the  enemy  is  situated,  and  its  condi- 
tion; whether  the  enemy  has  scouting  parties  out;  whether 
he  seems  to  be  vigilant;  whether  he  has  taken  any  guides 
from  the  village,  etc.  Ignorance  is  more  likely  to  be  encoun- 
tered than  untruthfulness,  and  even  information  given  sin- 
cerely will  probably  be  more  on  less  inaccurate.  Military 
terms  should  be  avoided  when  questioning  country  people. 
It  is  best  to  ask  them  when  the  enemy's  troops  began  arriv- 
ing, when  they  all  got  in,  etc.,  and  thus  get  data  from  which 
to  compute  the  enemy's  strength;  for  the  estimates  of  coun- 
try people  as  to  the  numbers  of  a  military  force  are  almost 

*When,  in  the  retreat  from  Moscow,  Eugene  was  executing  his  peril- 
ous march  across  Milaradowitch's  front,  under  cover  of  the  darkness,  the 
moon  suddenly  emerged  from  a  heavy  cloud,  and  at  the  same  moment  a 
Russian  sentinel  challenged.  A  Polish  officer  with  the  French  ran  up  to 
the  sentinel,  and  coolly  said  to  him,  in  Russian,  in  a  low  tone :  "Be  silent 
don't  you  see  that  we  belong  to  the  corps  of  Ouwaroff,  and  that  we  are 
going  on  a  secret  expedition?"  The  sentinel,  thus  assured,  kept  quiet. 
(Segur.) 


INHABITANTS.  99 

sure  to  be  worthless.  In  a  report,  dated  Gettysburg,  June  30, 
1863,  General  Buford  says: 

"I  entered  this  place  to-day  at  11  a.  m.  Found  everybody 
in  a  terrible  state  of  excitement  on  account  of  the  enemy's 
advance  upon  this  place.  He  had  approached  to  within  half 
a  mile  of  the  town  when  the  head  of  my  column  entered.  His 
force  was  terribly  exaggerated  by  reasonable  and  truthful  but 
inexperienced  men." 

Rumors  among  the  inhabitants  of  important  movements 
by  the  enemy  should  not  be  discarded  as  worthless  because 
of  their  seeming  improbability,  but  should  be  investigated 
with  care.  When,  in  1859,  Napoleon  III.  was  following  the 
Austrians  in  their  retreat  to  the  Mincio,  a  French  officer  on 
reconnaissance  was  informed  by  an  old  peasant  woman  that 
the  enemy  was  advancing.  Her  story  was  ridiculed,  as  the 
Austrians  had  been  retreating  for  a  number  of  days,  and  it 
was  known  that  they  had  withdrawn  across  the  river.  Nev- 
ertheless, the  apparently  absurd  report  was  strictly  true,  for 
the  Austrians  had  retraced  their  steps,  and  the  two  armies 
met  the  next  day  in  the  great  battle  of  Solferino. 

News  travels  by  word  of  mouth  with  incredible  rapidity; 
and  though  it  is  always  more  or  less  distorted,  and  may,  in- 
deed, be  grossly  exaggerated,  it  generally  has  a  kernel  of 
truth  which  is  well  worth  seeking.  Von  der  Goltz  is  author- 
ity for  the  statement  that  the  country  people  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Metz  had  news  of  the  march  of  MacMahon  to  the  re- 
lief of  Bazaine  at  a  time  when  the  movement  was  still  in  em- 
bryo, and  days  before  the  great  battles  around  Sedan  had  been 
fought.*     "Something,"  says  the  same  author,  "can  alwa3^s 

*It  is  well  known  that  among  the  North  American  Indians  news  is 
carried  by  word  of  mouth  with  great  rapidity.  In  1876  the  first  news  of 
Custer's  defeat  was  received  at  the  headquarters  of  the  Department  of 
Dakota,  St.  Paul,  Minn.,  ten  days  after  the  battle,  this  news  having  come 
overland  to  the  mouth  of  the  Big  Horn  River,  thence  by  steamer  down  the 
Yellowstone  and  Missouri  rivers  to  Bismarck,  from  which  point  it  was  sent 
by  telegraph.  The  day  before  the  receipt  of  this  news  at  Department 
Headquarters,  Lieutenant  John  B.  Rodman,  the  adjutant  of  the  20th 
Infantry,  stationed  at  Fort  Snelling,  near  St.  Paul,  was  informed  of  the 
battle  by  '^'aumadaka-Wanich,  an  old  Mendota  Indian,  who  stated  that 


lOO  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

be  learned ;  and  it  is  by  no  means  necessary  that  the  country- 
scouring  patrols  should  succeed  in  finding  traitors  to  give  im- 
portant information.  Each  person,  when  asked,  will,  in  order 
to  put  an  end  to  the  cross-questioning  that  is  annoying  him, 
prefer  to  say  only  what  appears  to  him  to  be  unimportant. 
But  from  a  hundred  unimportant  things  one  important  piece 
of  news  may  be  composed." 

Questions  formulating  a  statement  to  which  the  person 
questioned  may  answer  yes  or  no  should  be  avoided.  The 
questions  should  be  such  as  to  draw  out  a  narrative  from  the 
person  interrogated.  It  should  always  be  borne  in  mind  that 
the  questions  asked  may  be  repeated  to  the  enemy,  and  the 
questioner  must,  therefore,  be  careful  so  to  frame  them  that 
they  will  not  give  a  key  to  his  designs.  When  several  per- 
sons are  questioned,  they  should  be  examined  separately. 

The  matter  of  questioning  civilians,  employing  guides, 
and  examining  prisoners,  is  more  applicable  to  cavalry  than 
infantry  patrols,  and  to  strong  rather  than  small  ones.  This 
seems,  however,  to  be  the  most  convenient  place  to  consider 
these  subjects,  and,  in  fact,  they  are  applicable  to  all  patrols. 

People  going  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy  should  be  halted, 
and  never  allowed  to  proceed  unless  they  have  undoubtedly 
genuine  passes  from  proper  authority.  If  they  are  contuma- 
cious, they  must  be  threatened,  -and  sometimes  roughly  han- 
dled. It  may  be  necessary  in  some  cases  to  tie  them  to  trees 
or  posts,  or  even  to  gag  them  or  threaten  them  with  death  if 
they  cry  out;  but  it  should  be  an  invariable  rule  never  to 
resort  to  harsh  measures  when  gentler  means  will  secure  the 
same  end. 

Guides. — If  it  be  necessary  to  take  a  guide  from  among 
the  people  of  the  country,  he  should  be  kindly  treated,  but 
warned  that  he  will  pay  with  his  life  the  penalty  of  treachery. 
The  degree  of  intelligence  and  education  possessed  by  the 

all  the  soldiers  had  been  killed.     Within  nine  days  the  news  of  the  battle 
had  been  conveyed  by  the  Indians,  by  word  of  mouth,  from  the  Little  Big 
Horn  River  to  the  Mississippi,  a  distance  of  more  than  700  miles,  measured 
i  n  an  air-line. 


GUIDES,  lOI 

guide  will  decide  the  measures  proper  to  employ  with  him; 
but  he  must  always  be  carefully  guarded,  and  must  not  be  dis- 
charged until  there  is  no  longer  danger  of  his  betraying  the 
patrol.  No  one  but  the  commander  should  communicate 
with  the  guides,  and  the  soldiers  should  not,  under  any  cir- 
cumstances, be  allowed  either  to  chaff  or  threaten  them. 
Drovers,  peddlers,  livery-stable  employees,  and  country  doc- 
tors will  generally  be  the  best  guides.  If  a  man  can  be  found 
who  has  served  as  a  guide  to  the  enemy,  so  much  the  better. 
Man}^  people,  in  order  to  escape  service  as  guides,  will  declare 
that  they  know  nothing  about  the  country.  If  they  appear  to 
be  intelligent,  it  is  best  to  take  them  along  in  spite  of  their 
pretended  ignorance,  if  better  guides  are  not  manifestly  avail- 
able, and  keep  them  until  their  want  of  knowledge  seems  to  be 
more  than  sham. 

For  the  guide's  own  protection,  even  when  he  is  serving 
willingly,  it  may  often  be  advisable  to  keep  him  conspicuously 
under  guard,  so  that  he  may  appear  to  his  countrymen  to  be 
acting  under  compulsion.  In  several  instances  in  the  war  in 
the  Philippines,  natives  acting  willingly  as  guides  requested 
to  be  tied  and  led  with  a  rope,  as  a  visible  proof  to  their  people 
that  their  service  was  not  voluntary. 

If  the  guide  wilfully  leads  the  command  into  an  ambus- 
cade or  into  any  imminent  peril,  or  causes  the  failure  of  an 
expedition  by  intentionally  conducting  a  column  into  a  wrong 
road,  it  is  lawful,  not  only  under  the  universally  recognized 
customs  of  war,  but  under  orders  officially  promulgated  for 
the  government  of  the  armies  of  the  United  States,*  to  put 
him  to  death;  not  only  as  a  punishment  for  his  offense,  but 
as  a  warning  to  other  guides  who  may  be  treacherously  in- 
cHned.  The  safety  of  an  army  must  not  be  jeopardized  by  mis- 
placed considerations  of  mercy  to  a  treacherous  enemy;  but 
the  guilt  of  the  guide  should  be  clearly  proved,  or  be  unmis- 

*See  G.  O.  No.  loo,  A.  G.  O.,  1863,  which  was  issued,  without  modifi- 
cation, for  the  government  of  the  armies  of  the  United  States  during  the 
Spanish-American  War,  and  which  still  remains  in  force . 
8 


I02  SECURITY    AND   INFORMATION. 

takably  evident,  before  subjecting  him  to  the  extreme  pen- 
alty for  his  offense.  When  time  permits,  and  the  size  of  the 
command  and  the  authority  of  the  commanding  officer  ren- 
der such  a  proceeding  practicable,  the  culprit  should  be  tried 
by  a  military  commission.  When,  however,  the  command  is 
too  small  to  admit  of  such  a  proceeding,  or  the  urgency  of 
the  case  renders  immediate  action  necessary,  the  responsible 
officer  should,  at  the  very  first  opportunity,  submit  a  written 
report  to  his  immediate  superior,  setting  forth  the  facts,  and 
supported  by  the  affidavits  of  soldiers  cognizant  of  the  cir- 
cumstances attending  the  crime  and  punishment  of  the  guide. 

Reconnaissance  of  Different  Kinds  of  Ground. — The  man- 
ner of  reconnoitering  different  kinds  of  ground  depends  mainly 
upon  the  circumstances  of  each  individual  case,  and  no  rigid 
rule  can  be  prescribed.  There  are,  however,  certain  general 
methods  of  reconnoitering  various  places,  which  may  be  given 
as  the  result  of  centuries  of  warfare,  and  which  are,  in  some 
respects,  common  to  the  armies  of  the  most  enlightened  nations 
and  the  warriors  of  savage  tribes.*  The  following  suggestions 
are  offered ;  but  the  student  must  bear  in  mind  that  each  case 
presents  its  own  problem,  to  be  solved  according  to  its  own 
circumstances. 

Whenever  possible,  the  men  composing  the  patrol  should 
keep  under  cover.  If  there  is  a"  bank  or  cover  of  any  kind 
parallel  to  the  line  of  march,  they  will  keep  it  between  them 
and  the  supposed  position  of  the  enemy.  If  the  different 
features  affording  cover  lie  perpendicular  to  the  line  of  march, 
the  patrol  will  halt  a  moment  behind  each,  peer  cautiously 
about,  and  then  pass  rapidly  to  the  next,  the  men  moving  one 
at  a  time,  stooping  and  running.  No  country  is  so  open  that 
small  folds  of  ground  affording  some  degree  of  concealment 
can  not  be  found. 

Cross-Roads. — When  the  patrol  comes  to  a  cross-road,  two 
men  should  be  sent  along  it  on  each  flank  until  they  come  to 

*For  remarks  upon  the  methods  of  scouting  in  use  among  the  Indians, 
see  Chapter  IX. 


CROSS-ROADS.  105 

the  first  turn,  the  patrol  halting.  If  the  men  see  nothing  sus- 
picious, they  return,  and  the  patrol  pushes  on.  If  anything 
suspicious  is  seen,  one  man  rushes  back  quickly  to  the  patrol, 
while  the  other  remains  in  observation.  If  the  patrol  is  very 
small,  two  men  should  be  sent  first  to  one  side  and  then  to  the 
other,  in  preference  to  sending  a  single  man  in  each  direction. 

Heights. — If  the  patrol  is  large  enough  to  admit  of  detach- 
ing them,  one  or  two  men  climb  the  slope  on  either  flank, 
keeping  in  sight  of  the  patrol  if  possible.  In  any  case,  one 
man  moves  cautiously  up  the  hill,  followed  by  the  others  in 
single  file  at  such  a  distance  that  each  can  keep  his  predecessor 
in  view. 

Defiles. — If  time  permits,  the  heights  on  either  side  should 
be  reconnoitered  by  flankers  before  the  patrol  enters  the  defile. 
If  the  heights  are  inaccessible,  or  time  is  urgent,  the  patrol 
pushes  through,  in  single  file,  at  double  time,  the  distance  be- 
ing the  same  as  in  ascending  a  hill.  The  same  method  should 
be  adopted  in  reconnoitering  a  railroad  cut  or  sunken  road. 

Bridges  or  Fords. — The  front  of  the  patrol  is  contracted 
so  as  to  bring  all  the  men  to  the  passage.  The  patrol  then 
crosses  rapidly,  and  takes  up  a  proper  formation.  A  bridge 
is  first  examined,  to  see  that  it  is  safe  and  has  not  been  tam- 
pered with  by  the  enemy. 

Woods. — The  patrol  enters  in  skirmishing  order,  the  inter- 
vals being  as  great  as  may  be  consistent  with  mutual  obser- 
vation and  support  on  the  part  of  the  members  of  the  patrol. 
On  arriving  at  the  farther  edge  of  the  wood,  the  patrol  should 
remain  concealed  and  carefully  look  about  before  passing  out 
to  the  open  ground.  When  there  is  such  a  growth  of  under- 
brush as  to  make  this  method  impracticable,  a  road  through 
the  wood  must  be  reconnoitered  as  in  the  case  of  a  defile, 
though  not  usually  at  double  time.  If  in  this  case  a  cross- 
road is  found  in  the  wood,  the  patrol  must  be  assembled  and 
the  lateral  road  reconnoitered  (see  "Cross-roads")  before 
passing  beyond  it. 


r04  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

Inclosures  (Gardens,  Parks,  Cemeteries). — The  leading  pa- 
trollers  first  examine  the  exterior,  to  make  sure  that  the  ene- 
my is  not  concealed  behind  one  of  the  faces  of  the  inclosure. 
They  then  proceed  to  examine  the  interior.  Great  care  should 
be  taken  in  reconnoitering  and  entering  an  inclosure,  as  an 
imprudent  patrol  might  find  it  a  veritable  trap. 

Houses. — When  a  house  or  farm-building  is  approached 
by  a  patrol,  it  is  first  carefully  reconnoitered  from  a  distance, 
and  if  nothing  suspicious  is  seen,  it  is  then  approached  by 
two  men,  the  rest  of  the  party  remaining  concealed  in  ob- 
servation. If  the  patrol  is  large  enough  to  admit  of  it,  four 
men  approach  the  house,  so  as  to  examine  the  front  and  back 
entrances  simultaneously.  Only  one  man  enters  the  door, 
the  other  remaining  outside  to  give  the  alarm,  should  a  party 
of  the  enemy  be  concealed  in  the  house.  The  patrol  should 
not  remain  in  the  vicinity  of  the  house  any  longer  than  neces- 
sary, as  information  relative  to  its  numbers  and  movements 
might  be  given  to  the  enemy,  if  a  hostile  party  should  subse- 
quently visit  the  place. 

Villages. — If  the  village  is  seen  to  be  in  possession  of  the 
enemy,  the  patrol  must  be  content  with  reconnoitering  it 
from  the  outside.  If  the  presence  of  the  enemy  is  not  appar- 
ent, the  patrol  should  enter  the  village,  being  disposed  in  any 
way  conforming  to  the  general  rule.  A  formation  suitable 
in  many  cases  would  be  in  single  file  at  proper  distances  for 
observation  and  support,  each  man  being  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  street  from  his  predecessor.  The  patrol  should 
push  through  the  village  as  rapidly  as  possible;  and  when  it 
has  reached  .the  opposite  side,  two  of  the  party  might  be  de- 
tached, if  expedient,  to  re-enter  the  village  to  seek  further 
information,  the  rest  of  the  patrol  remaining  in  some  position 
affording  good  observation  and  secure  retreat. 

If  the  patrol  is  strong  enough,  it  should  seize  the  post- 
office,  telegraph  office,  and  railroad  station,  and  secure  all 
important  papers  that  may  be  there.  If  the  patrol  is  part  of 
an  advance  guard,  it  should  seize  the  mayor  and  postmaster 


VIIvLAGES,  105 

of  the  place,  and  turn  them  over  to  the  commander  of  the  van- 
guard with  the  papers  seized.  It  must  not  be  supposed  that 
only  the  official  papers  are  of  value.  Information  of  great 
importance  is  sometimes  obtained  from  private  letters  from 
officers  or  soldiers.  Though  the  writer  may  give  merely  what 
he  deems  items  of  friendly  gossip,  and  though  he  may  have 
but  slight  knowledge  of  the  military  operations,  his  corre- 
spondence may  convey  valuable  news  in  regard  to  the  bodies 
of  troops  with  the  army,  what  commands  have  arrived,  what 
troops  have  departed,  and  the  direction  that  they  have  taken. 
Above  all,  it  is  likely  to  convey  a  fairly  accurate  idea  of  the 
morale  of  the  army.  On  Lee's  retreat  from  Richmond,  the 
capture  of  a  letter  written  to  a  Southern  lady  by  her  son,  who 
was  an  officer  in  the  retreating  army,  gave  Sheridan  proof  of 
the  despondency  of  the  Confederates  and  their  belief  that 
their  army  was  ruined.* 

It  is  sometimes  advisable  to  guard  against  the  use  of  decoy 
letters.  In  several  instances  in  the  Philippines  the  insurg- 
ents made  a  cunning  use  of  such  letters  and  documents,  which 
were  left,  apparently  abandoned,  in  a  deserted  cuartel,  to  which 
our  troops  were  led  by  a  guide  in  collusion  with  the  rebels. 
These  papers  gave  indications  of  the  location  of  the  enemy  at 
certain  other  cuartels,  the  troops  being  thus  led  on  a  fruitless 
"hike"  over  difficult  trails,  in  fierce  tropical  heat  or  deluging 
rains ;  the  object  of  the  enemy  being  to  wear  out  oiu:  soldiers 
with  fatigue  and  exposure. 

At  night  a  village  must  be  even  more  cautiously  approached 
by  a  small  patrol  than  by  day.  The  patrol  should  glide  through 
back  alleys,  across  gardens,  etc.,  rather  than  move  along  the 
main  street.  If  a  light  is  seen  in  a  window,  two  of  the  men 
should  approach,  look  in,  and  listen.  If  there  are  no  signs  of 
the  enemy,  they  should  knock  and  make  inquiry.  If  no  light 
is  seen,  and  it  seems  imprudent  to  rouse  any  of  the  people, 

♦Sheridan's  "Memoirs,"  Vol.  II.,  page  178. 


I06  SECURITY   AND    INFORMATION. 

the  patrol  must  watch  and  capture  one  of  the  inhabitants, 
and  get  from  him  such  information  as  he  may  possess.* 

The  best  time  for  a  patrol  to  approach  a  village  is  at  early- 
dawn,  when  it  is  light  enough  to  see,  but  before  the  inhabit- 
ants are  up. 

Cities  and  Towns. — It  is  dangerous  in  the  extreme  for  a 
small  patrol  to  enter  a  village,  unless  it  is  certain  that  it  is  not 
occupied  by  the  enemy ;  for  the  men  could  be  easily  shot  down 
by  a  fire  from  windows,  cellarways,  etc.,  or  entrapped  and 
captured.  As  a  rule,  cities  and  large  towns  should  not  be 
entered  by  a  small  patrol,  but  should  be  merely  watched  from 
the  outside. 

Reconnaissance  of  Enemy  in  Position. — The  patrol  endeav- 
ors to  ascertain  the  direction  and  extent  of  the  line  of  obser- 
vation, how  its  flanks  are  supported,  the  positions  of  the  senti- 
nels, their  number,  the  number  of  pickets,  the  places  where 
the  line  may  be  penetrated  with  the  least  risk  of  discovery, 
the  strength  of  hostile  patrols,  and  the  routes  taken  by  them. 
It  is  also  of  great  importance  to  ascertain  whether  good  roads 
extend  laterally  behind  the  enemy's  pickets,  as  such  roads 
could  be  used  by  a  force  sent  out  to  capture  them.  If  the 
enemy's  line  of  sentinels  is  penetrated,  the  patrol  may,  per- 
haps, approach  near  enough  to  the  picket  to  overhear  the 
countersign  and  parole;  but  it  must  be  certain  that  the  ad- 
vantage to  be  gained  is  worth  the  risk,  as  the  patrol  will  be 
in  great  danger  of  capture.  If  a  point  can  be  found  on  the 
flank  of  the  enemy's  position  from  which  a  view  of  his  dis- 
positions in  rear  of  the  line  of  sentinels  can  be  obtained,  the 
commander  of  the  patrol  endeavors  to  gain  such  point,  and, 
concealing  his  patrol  near  at  hand,  makes  careful  observation. 
The  best  time  for  such  observation  is  at  daybreak,  and  the 
selected  point  should  be  gained  before  dawn,  so  as  to  enable 
the  patrol  to  observe  the  relieving  of  the  outpost.  The  longer 
the  patrol  remains,  the  more  it  will  see,  but  the  greater  will 

*Von  Mirus. 


RKCONNAISSANCE   OF*  ENEMY  IN   POSITION.  I07 

be  its  danger  of  being  discovered.  The  patrol  commander 
should  have  sufficient  courage  to  remain  long  enough  to  gain 
valuable  information,  and  sufficient  prudence  to  withdraw  in 
time  to  escape  capture. 

If  any  important  movements  are  observed,  such  as  the 
withdrawing  of  the  sentinels,  the  changing  of  their  positions, 
preparations  for  advance  or  retreat,  etc.,  the  patrol  com- 
mander sends  a  man  back  at  once  with  a  report  of  what  has 
been  seen. 

When  an  attack  upon  the  enemy  is  contemplated,  the  re- 
connaissance of  the  hostile  position  becomes  a  matter  of  the 
utmost  importance,  and  the  patrols  charged  with  this  duty 
are  usually  under  the  command  of  officers.  Vauban,  at 
Luxembourg,  and  Frederick  the  Great,  at  Pfaffendorf,  fur- 
nish examples  of  the  reconnaissance  of  a  hostile  position  by 
a  commander  in  person.  In  a  similar  manner,  on  the  night 
before  the  battle  of  El  Caney,  General  Chaffee,  then  a  brig- 
ade commander,  personally  reconnoitered  the  Spanish  lines, 
going  with  a  small  escort  near  the  hostile  outposts,  and  noise- 
lessly penetrating  in  person  so  close  to  the  enemy's  position 
that  he  could  not  only  see  their  sentinels,  but  locate  their 
pickets;  the  knowledge  thus  gained  enabling  him  to  make, 
with  confidence,  his  preparations  for  the  assault  the  next 
morning. 

Reconnaissance  of  Enemy  on  the  March. — If  the  enemy  is 
on  the  march,  the  patrol  should  conceal  itself  close  to  the 
hostile  column,  but  far  enough  away  to  escape  discovery  by 
the  enemy's  flankers.  Conspicuous  places  should  be  avoided, 
even  if  at  some  distance  from  the  column,  as  they  would  prob- 
ably be  carefully  searched.  The  best  place  is  a  ditch  or  wal- 
low, which  will  conceal  the  patrol  and  not  be  visible  even  at 
a  short  distance.  The  patrol  carefully  observes  the  progress 
of  the  column,  noting  its  breadth  of  front,  its  rate  of  march, 
and  the  time  it  takes  to  pass  a  given  point.  A  given  point  is 
passed  in  one  minute  by  about  200  infantry  in  column  of 
fours;  by  about  150  cavalry  in  fours  at  a  walk,  or,  if  in  rear 


108  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

of  the  infantry,  by  about  loo;  by  about  260  cavalry  in  fours 
at  a  trot,  and  by  about  4  guns  if  in  rear  of  infantry.  If  the 
whole  column  can  be  seen,  and  its  length  can  be  ascertained 
by  the  known]  distance  between  any  two  points  which  it 
passes,  its  strength  can  at  once  be  estimated  by  allowing  i 
yard  for  every  two  infantry  soldiers,  i  3'ard  for  each  cavalry 
soldier,  and  20  yards  for  each  gun  or  caisson.  An  allowance 
of  from  one-fourth  to  one-half  must  be  made  for  opening  out, 
depending  upon  the  state  of  the  roads  and  weather  and  the 
discipline  of  the  troops  composing  the  column.  Reports  will 
be  sent  in,  from  time  to  time,  by  the  commander  of  the 
patrol,  who  will  not  hesitate,  if  necessary,  to  send  back  his 
last  man  with  a  report. 

Signs  and  Trails. — The  patrol  must  carefully  watch  for  all 
signs  and  trails  of  the  enemy,  as  information  of  the  greatest 
value  is  thus  sometimes  obtained.  The  different  indications 
to  be  looked  for  are  almost  innumerable.  The  following  are 
among  the  most  important : 

If  boats  in  great  numbers  are  seen  assembled  on  the  bank 
of  a  stream,  it  is  an  indication  of  preparation  to  cross.  If 
they  are  found  burned,  it  is  an  indication  of  retreat.  If  im- 
portant bridges  are  found  broken,  it  is  a  sign  of  a  long  retreat. 
If,  at  some  distance  above  the  point  where  we  are  preparing 
to  throw  a  bridge,  large  boats  heavily  laden  with  stone  are 
found,  it  is  an  evidence  of  the  enemy's  intention  to  destroy 
the  bridge  and  oppose  the  crossing. 

If  at  night  the  flames  of  the  enemy's  camp-fires  disap- 
pear and  reappear,  something"  is  moving  between  the  observ- 
er and  the  fires.  If  smoke  as  well  as  flame  is  visible,  the  fires 
are  very  near.  If  the  fires  are  very  numerous  and  lighted 
successively,  and  if  soon  after  being  lighted  they  go  out,  it  is 
probable  that  the  enemy  is  preparing  a  retreat  and  trying  to 
deceive  us.  If  the  fires  burn  very  brightly  and  clearly  at  a 
late  hour,  the  enemy  has  probably  gone,  and  has  left  a  de- 
tachment to  keep  the  fires  burning.  If,  at  an  unusual  time, 
much  smoke  is  seen  ascending  from  the  enemy's  camp,  it  is 


SIGNS   AND   TRAILS.  IO9 

probable  that  he  is  engaged  in  cooking  preparatory  to  mov- 
ing off. 

The  rumbling  of  vehicles,  cracking  of  whips,  neighing  of 
horses,  braying  of  mules,  and  barking  of  dogs  often  indicate 
the  arrival  or  departure  of  troops.  The  braying  of  mules  is 
an  almost  infallible  indication  of  arrival  instead  of  depart- 
ure. If  the  noise  remains  in  the  same  place,  and  new  fires 
are  lighted,  it  is  probable  that  reinforcements  have  arrived. 
If  the  noise  grows  more  indistinct,  troops  are  probably  with 
drawing.  If,  added  to  this,  the  fires  appear  to  be  dying  out, 
and  the  enem}^  seems  to  redouble  the  vigilance  of  his  outposts, 
the  indications  of  retreat  are  very  strong. 

The  whistling  of  locomotives  within  the  enemy's  lines 
should  be  carefully  noted.  One  long  whistle  generally  de- 
notes arrival,  and  two  short  ones,  departure.  If  after  the 
arrival  of  a  railroad  train  hurrahing  is  heard,  it  is  probable 
that  reinforcements,  a  commander  of  high  rank  or  great  pop- 
ularity, or  much-needed  supplies  have  come  in.  Hurrahing 
is  generally  an  indication  that  the  troops  are  in  good  morale. 
The  indications  furnished  by  the  whistling  of  locomotives 
and  the  hurrahing  of  troops  may,  however,  easily  be  a  ruse, 
and  corroborative  or  contradictory  indications  should  be  care- 
fully sought.  The  noise  of  heavy  explosions  is  generally  an 
indication  of  the  destruction  of  supplies  by  the  enemy,  pre- 
paratory to  retreat.  If,  in  addition  to  such  explosions,  large 
fires  are  seen,  the  indications  of  retreat  amount  almost  to  a 
certainty. 

The  noise  made  by  a  strong  column  on  the  march  is  dis- 
tinct and  continuous;  that  of  a  small  body,  feeble  and  inter- 
rupted. The  distance  at  which  the  noise  of  marching  can  be 
heard  depends  upon  the  natinre  of  the  ground  marched  over, 
the  direction  of  the  wind,  and  the  presence  or  absence  of  other 
sounds.  On  a  calm  night,  a  company  of  infantry,  marching  at 
route  step  on  a  hard  road,  can  be  heard  at  a  distance  of  500 
or  600  yards ;  a  troop  of  cavalry  at  a  walk,  600  or  700  yards ; 


no  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

a  troop  of  cavalry  at  a   trot  or  gallop,  artillery,  and  heavy 
wagons,  900  or  1,000  yards. 

The  dust  raised  by  the  march  of  a  column  furnishes  an 
indication  not  only  of  the  direction  of  the  march,  but  the 
strength  and  composition  of  the  column.  When  infantry  is 
marching,  the  dust  is  low  and  thick.  With  cavalry,  the  dust 
is  higher;  and  as  this  arm  moves  rapidly,  the  upper  part  of 
the  cloud  is  thinner  and  disappears  more  quickly  than  in  the 
case  of  infantry.  The  clouds  of  dust  raised  by  artillery  and 
wagons  are  unequal  in  height  and  disconnected.  Hence,  by 
noting  the  length  of  a  line  of  dust  and  the  intervals  in  it,  the 
strength  and  composition  of  the  column  may  be  estimated. 
The  effect  of  the  wind  in  dissipating  the  dust  must,  however, 
be  taken  into  consideration. 

If  the  reflection  from  the  weapons  of  marching  troops  is 
very  brilliant,  it  is  probable  that  the  troops  are  marching  to- 
wards the  observer;  otherwise,  it  is  presumable  that  they  are 
marching  in  the  other  direction.  If  the  rays  of  light  slant 
from  left  to  right  downwards,  the  troops  are  marching  to  the 
observer's  right;  if  the  rays  slant  from  right  to  left  downwards, 
the  column  is  marching  to  the  observer's  left. 

A  man  with  good  vision  should  be  able,  on  a  clear  day,  to 
distinguish  objects  on  the  sky-line  as  follows : 

At  a  distance  of  9  to  12  miles,  church  spires  and  towers. 

At  a  distance  of  5  to  7  miles,  windmills. 

At  a  distance  of  2  to  2^  miles,  chimneys  of  light  color. 

At  a  distance  of  2,000  yards,  trunks  of  large  trees. 

At  a  distance  of  1,000  yards,  single  posts. 

At  500  yards  the  panes  of  glass  may  be  distinguished 
in  a  window. 
Troops  are  visible  at  2,000  yards,  at  which  distance  a 
mounted  man  looks  like  a  mere  speck ;  at  1,200  yards  infant- 
ry can  be  distinguished  from  cavalry;  at  1,000  yards  a  line  of 
men  looks  like  a  broad  belt ;  at  600  yards  the  files  of  a  squad 
can  be  counted,  and  at  400  yards  the  movements  of  the  arms 
and  legs  can  be  plainly  seen. 


SIGNS   AND   TRAILS.  Ill 

The  larger,  brighter,  or  better  lighted  an  object  is,  the 
nearer  it  seems.  An  object  seems  nearer  when  it  has  a  dark 
background  than  when  it  has  a  light  one,  and  closer  to  the 
obser^^er  when  the  air  is  clear  than  when  it  is  raining,  snow- 
ing, foggy,  or  the  atmosphere  is  filled  with  smoke.  An  ob- 
ject looks  farther  off  when  the  observer  is  facing  the  sun  than 
when  he  has  his  back  to  it.  A  smooth  expanse  of  snow,  grain- 
fields,  or  water  makes  distances  seem  shorter  than  they  really 
are. 

Optical  illusions  are  not  uncommon,  and  must  be  guarded 
against. 

The  trail  of  the  enemy  furnishes  excellent  means  of  gaining 
information  about  the  direction,  strength,  and  composition 
of  his  column,  and  sometimes  even  of  the  object  of  his  march. 
If  the  ground  is  evenly  trodden,  the  column  was  composed  of 
infantry  alone.  If  there  are  many  prints  of  horse-shoes,  the 
column  also  contained  cavalr3^  If  the  wheel-tracks  are  deep 
and  wide,  artillery  was  in  the  column.  Each  arm  was  more 
numerous  in  proportion  to  the  number  and  plainness  of  its 
indications.  If  the  trail  is  fresh,  the  column  has  recently 
passed.  If  the  trail  is  narrow,  the  troops  felt  secure,  as  they 
were  marching  in  column  of  route;  if  broad,  they  expected  an 
action,  as  they  were  marching  in  column  of  platoons  or  com- 
panies, ready  to  deploy.  If  the  fields  on  each  side  of  the  road 
are  cut  up  with  many  tracks,  the  cavalry  marched  on  the  flanks 
of  the  column,  and  the  enemy  was  pushing  on  with  his  troops 
well  in  hand  for  action.  A  retreating  army  makes  a  broad 
trail  across  fields,  especially  before  the  rear  guard  is  formed 
and  the  retreat  is  regularly  organized. 

Indications  of  a  camp  or  bivouac  are  found  mainly  in 
the  remains  of  camp-fires.  These  will  show,  by  their  degree 
of  freshness,  ^^'hether  much  or  little  time  has  elapsed  since 
the  enemy  quitted  the  place,  and  the  quantity  of  cinders  will 
give  an  indication  of  the  length  of  time  he  occupied  it.  They 
will  also  furnish  a  means  of  estimating  his  force  approxi- 
mately, the  nature  of  the  weather  and  the  supph^  of  fuel  being 


112  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

considered.  In  cold  weather  an  allowance  of  ten  men  to  each 
fire  will  give  a  rough  estimate  of  the  strength  of  the  force; 
while  in  warm  weather  the  fires  are  generally  limited  to  the 
requirements  of  cooking,  and  rarely  exceed  one  to  each  com- 
pany. Other  valuable  indications  in  regard  to  the  length  of 
time  the  position  was  occupied  and  the  time  when  it  was  aban- 
doned may  be  found  in  the  evidences  of  care  or  haste  in  the 
construction  of  huts  or  shelters,  and  in  the  freshness  of  straw, 
grain,  dung,  or  the  entrails  of  slaughtered  animals. 

Abandoned  clothing,  equipments,  or  harness  will  give  a 
clue  to  the  arms  and  regiments  composing  a  retreating  force. 
Dead  horses  lying  about,  broken  weapons,  discarded  knap- 
sacks, abandoned  and  broken-down  wagons,  etc.,  are  indica- 
tions of  its  fatigue  and  demoralization.  Bloody  bandages 
lying  about,  and  many  fresh  graves,  are  evidences  that  the 
enemy  is  heavily  burdened  with  wounded  or  sick.  Graves 
which  seem  to  have  been  made  with  much  care  are  probably 
those  of  officers  of  rank.  A  head-board  at  a  new  grave  may 
sometimes  give  valuable  information. 

The  manner  and  bearing  of  the  inhabitants  in  a  hostile 
country  should  be  carefully  noted.  If  they  are  gloomy  and 
anxious,  it  is  an  indication  of  a  want  of  confidence  in  their 
cause,  or  that  their  troops  are  distant.  If  they  are  excited 
and  insolent,  it  is  an  indication  that  their  army  is  strong  and 
near,  and  that  they  anticipate  success.  If  they  are  friendly 
and  pleasant  in  their  demeanor,  it  is  probable  that  the  war  is 
not  popular,  and  that  the  government  lacks  cordial  support. 

Reports. — Reports  should  be  sent  in  whenever  anything 
of  importance  is  seen,  or  anything  happens  which  should  be 
known  by  the  officer  who  sent  out  the  patrol.  Trivial  mat- 
ters should  not  be  reported;  but  if  there  is  a  doubt  as  to  the 
importance  of  something  seen  or  heard,  a  report  should  be 
made;  for  it  is  better  to  report  an  insignificant  matter  than 
to  let  one  of  great  moment  go  unheeded. 

Reports  may  be  either  verbal  or  written.  If  a  verbal  re- 
port is  sent  in,  it  should  be  intrusted  to  an  intelligent  man, 


REPORTS. 


113 


and  he  should  be  required  to  repeat  it  before  starting,  so  as 
to  be  sure  that  he  understands  it.  The  man  who  carries  the 
report  should,  if  possible,  himself  deliver  it  to  the  officer  for 
whom  it  is  intended.  If  the  country  is  dangerous  and  care- 
fully watched  by  the  enemy,  the  same  report  should  be  sent 
in  by  several  men,  each  taking  a  different  route.  In  this  case 
a  verbal  report  is  better  than  a  written  one,  as  the  enemy  can 


Sending 
Detachment 


Location 


Kbceived, 


Day 


Mo. 


Hes.  Min. 

a.  m.  or  p.  m. 


To 


Detachment  No.  Report  No. 

Received  Hr.  Min.  M 190 

(Name) 

(Rank) 


not  get  possesion  of  it  by  capturing  the  bearer,  and  the  report 
of  each  man  will  be  a  check  upon  the  accuracy  of  the  others. 
The  indispensable  qualities  of  a  written  report  are  scru- 
pulous accuracy  as  to  facts,  simplicity,  clearness  of  diction, 
legibility  of  handwriting,  and  correct  spelling  of  proper  names. 
Surmises  should  never  be  given  as  facts,  and  the  person  mak- 
ing the  report  should  carefully  separate  what  he  himself  knows 


114  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

from  what  has  been  told  him  by  others.  Brevity  is  desirable, 
but  not  at  the  price  of  obscurity;  a  report  should  not  be  ex- 
pressed ambiguously  in  ten  words  when  it  can  be  stated  clearly 
in  twenty.  When  the  spelling  of  proper  names  does  not  cor- 
respond with  their  pronunciation  by  the  people  of  the  country, 
their  phonetic  spelling  should  also  be  given  in  parentheses. 
Thus:  "The  enemy  is  reported  in  force  at  Saguache  (Si- 
wash),  and  we  have  seen  small  hostile  parties  on  the  Cebollo 
(Savoya)."*  Foreign  or  peculiar  proper  names  should  be  writ- 
ten in  detached  letters  or  "printed";  thus,  Tuguegarao, 
Guinay  angan. 

A  convenient  form  of  report  (reduced  to  one-fourth  size) 
is  given  on  page  113. 

If  practicable,  the  commander  of  the  patrol  should  be 
furnished  with  a  pad  of  printed  order  blanks  similar  to  this 
model.  The  receipt  should  be  signed,  torn  off,  and  given  to 
the  bearer  of  the  report  as  his  voucher  for  its  delivery.  A 
report,  either  written  or  verbal,  should  invariably  be  made 
whenever  the  patrol  returns. 

Strong  Infantry  Patrols. 

The  foregoing  principles  are  nearly  all  quite  as  applicable 
to  strong  patrols  as  to  small  ones — some  of  them  more  so. 
The  limits  of  the  strength  of  a  strong  patrol  have  already 
been  given.  The  strength  of  a  strong  patrol  should  always: 
be  proportionate  to  the  object  to  be  effected  by  it,  and  gen- 
erally to  the  distance  it  is  to  go.  It  should  neither  be  so 
weak  as  to  be  obliged  to  retire  before  small  parties  of  the  en- 
emy, nor  so  strong  as  to  attract  attention.  The  object  for 
which  the  patrol  is  sent  out  should  be  distinctly  specified, 
and  the  commander  should  be  provided  with  a  good  map,  by 
means  of  which  he  may  select  his  route.  But  if  he  chooses 
his  route  by  map,  it  is  none  the  less  imperative  that  he  pay 

*These  names  will  be  recognized  by  officers  who  have  served  in  south- 
western Colorado. 


PLATE  X. 


Fig.  I. 


PATROLS. 


f^B-3. 

« 


4  <»  «. 

3  men.  .A,men\  .  Smen. 

Distances  and  intervals  vary  from ' 
ZS  to  100 yards  according  to  circumstansea. 


F/g.4: 


i 

6  men 


Fig.  5. 

ng.€. 

** 

4 

** 

A 

4 

i 

4 

4 

7men 

Smen 

n$.a. 


Fig.  9 


H4 

tZrpen  IS  meri 

These  normal  formations  are  not  tobetaken 
as  Invariable  guides,  but  merely  as  models 
requiring  more  or  less  variation  accordirtg  to  '* 
circumstances.  It  is  very  rarely  that  a  normal  \ 
formation  can  be  used  without  considerable  change. 


IS  men  marching  along  road 
nrilh  passage  on  the  flanks. 


C^DMand 


STRONG  INFANTRY  PATROLS.  II5 

careful  attention  to  the  various  features  of  the  ground  (not 
always  clearly  indicated  by  the  best  maps),  with  a  view  to 
utilizing  them  in  approaching  the  enemy,  in  avoiding  him,  in 
retreating,  or  in  defense. 

The  larger  the  patrol,  the  less  secret  are  its  movements, 
and  the  more  nearly  does  its  formation  correspond  to  that  of 
a  column  on  the  march,  or  a  line  deplo3^ed  for  action,  as  the 
case  may  be.  As  a  rule,  at  least  half  the  strength  of  the  pa- 
trol should  be  in  the  main  body;  but  its  point,  flanking,  and 
rear  groups  each  constitute  a  small  patrol,  and  are  each  guided 
by  the  principles  already  laid  down  for  the  conduct  of  a  small 
patrol,  modified  by  their  dependence  on  the  main  body.  A 
strong  patrol  may  extend  its  reconnaissance  farther  than  a 
small  one ;  being  careful,  however,  not  to  go  so  far  as  to  incur 
unnecessary  risk  of  being  cut  off  by  the  enemy.  It  is  gen- 
erally practicable  for  it  to  return  by  a  different  route  than 
the  one  b)^  which  it  advances ;  as  the  extent  of  its  operations  is 
usually  such  as  to  give  a  choice  of  several  roads. 

Some  typical  formations  of  a  strong  patrol  are  given  in 
the  last  three  figures  on  Plate  X.  F'igures  7  and  8  explain 
themselves.  In  Figure  9  the  men  detached  to  reconnoiter  and 
guard  the  bridge  would  ordinarily  be  sent  out  from  the  point, 
their  places  being  taken,  at  double  time,  by  men  from  the 
main  body  of  the  patrol.  The  patrol  moves  slowly,  or  halts 
if  necessary,  while  the  bridge  is  being  reconnoitered.  After 
the  patrol  has  passed  on,  the  detachment  follows  as  rear  group, 
the  former  rear  group  closing  up  to  the  main  body  of  the  pa- 
trol at  double  time.  The  detachment  may  in  some  cases  be 
left  to  guard  the  bridge.* 

Expeditionary  Patrols. — These  are  generally  strong  patrols, 
although  in  some  cases  the  object  in  view  may  be  better  at- 
tained by  small  ones.  The  object  of  an  expeditionary  patrol 
is  always  a  special  one,  and  the  operations  of  a  force  of  this 

*This  explanation  of  Fig.  9  must  not  be  understood  as  a  rule;  it  is 
merely  a  suggestion  as  to  the  method  which  might  be  adopted. 


Il6  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

kind  generally  differ  from  a  special  reconnaissance  only  in  the 
size  of  the  force  employed. 

If  the  object  in  view  is  the  capture  of  a  sentinel,  the  patrol 
should  ordinarily  be  a  small  one.  A  sentinel  is  chosen  whose 
post  can  apparently  be  easily  approached,  who  appears  to  be 
isolated,  and  who,  as  far  as  can  be  judged,  is  not  in  plain  sight 
of  his  picket.  The  patrol  cautiously  steals  up  close  to  the  sen- 
tinel's post,  being  extended  as  circumstances  ma}'  require, 
and,  upon  a  pre-arranged  signal,  rushes  forward,  and  endeav- 
ors to  surround  the  sentinel  and  seize  him  before  he  can  fire. 
Even  if  he  fires,  the  patrol  can  probably  run  him  off  before 
he  can  receive  assistance,  if  he  has  been  surprised. 

If  the  object  is  the  capture  of  a  patrol,  the  expeditionary 
force  should  be  a  large  patrol.  It  must  prepare  an  ambus- 
cade, or  take  up  a  position  such  that  it  can  surround  the  en- 
emy's patrol,  or  at  least  cut  off  its  retreat.  If  the  opposing 
patrol  is  equal  or  superior  in  numbers,  the  attack  must  be  a 
surprise,  must  be  audaciously  pushed,  and  the  surviving  mem- 
bers of  the  enemy's  party  must  be  hurried  away  before  they 
can  be  succored  by  their  friends. 

In  all  cases  when  a  large  patrol  is  charged  with  the  capt- 
ure of  prisoners,  its  commander  must  seek  a  place  of  obser- 
vation for  himself  and  a  place  of  concealment  for  his  men; 
the  two  places  being  either .  coincident  or  near  each  other. 
He  then  waits  until  one  or  a  small  party  of  the  enemy  draw 
far  enough  away  from  their  camp  or  column  to  be  beyond  the 
reach  of  prompt  assistance,  and  waylays  or  gives  chase  to 
them.  In  these  expeditions  the  prime  object  is  to  bring  in 
the  prisoners,  and  harsh  measures  to  hasten  their  march  are 
excusable. 

Prisoners  are  a  most  valuable  source  of  information.  In 
his  description  of  the  battle  of  The  Wilderness,  General  Hum- 
phreys says  that  an  examination  of  prisoners  during  the  night 
of  May  5,  1864,  drew  from  them  the  statement  that  Long- 
street  was  expected  to  be  up  in  the  morning  to  attack  the  Fed- 
eral left,  and  that  his  force  was  about  12,000  men.     Hancock 


EXPEDITIONARY   PATROLS.  II7 

was  thus  enabled  to  prepare  to  receive  the  attack  which  Long- 
street  made  the  following  morning.* 

"Napoleon  often  complains,  in  his  'Correspondence,'  of 
the  lack  of  accurate  news  of  the  enemy  because  of  the  ab- 
sence of  prisoners.  He  frequently  enjoins  the  cavalry  corps, 
and  notably  Murat,  to  neglect  no  means  of  capturing  them. 
This  shows  the  extreme  importance  which  he  attached  to  in- 
formation obtained  from  prisoners.  The  most  favorable  mo- 
ment for  questioning  prisoners  is  when  they  have  just  been 
captured.  They  are  then  agitated  and  have  not  sufficient 
self-control  to  deceive. 

"The  longer  the  questioning  is  postponed,  the  more  eva- 
sive and  studied  will  their  answers  become.  Their  answers 
at  the  place  of  capture  may  to  a  certain  extent  be  verified. 
Such  is  not  the  case  after  the  lapse  of  some  time  and  in  an- 
other place.  The  prisoners  are  questioned  at  once  by  one  of 
the  officers  of  the  detachment  which  captures  them.  Their 
replies  are  written  down  and  transmitted  with  the  prisoners 
to  the  Department  of  Intelligence,  where  they  are  questioned 
more  at  length. "f 

Prisoners  have  very  different  values.  It  is  more  desira- 
ble to  capture  an  officer  than  an  enlisted  man;  an  officer  of 
high  rank  rather  than  a  subaltern;  a  staff  officer  rather  than 
a  line  officer.  In  brief,  the  object  should  be  to  capture  those 
who  are  likely  to  possess  the  most  extended  information.  It 
is  to  be  remarked,  however,  that  those  who  possess  the  most 
complete  information  will  generally  be  the  ones  most  skillful 
in  concealing  it.  If  enlisted  men  are  captured,  they  should 
be  questioned  in  regard  to  their  regiments,  brigades,  and  divis- 
ions ;  the  length  of  time  they  have  been  in  the  position ;  wheth- 
er their  rations  are  satisfactory;  whether  certain  commanders 
are  popular  and  have  the  confidence  of  their  men;  whether 
there  are  many  men  on  sick  report ;  what  news  has  lately  been 
received  in  camp,  and  what  the  rumors  are — in  brief,  all  ques- 

*"The  Virginia  Campaign  of  '64  and  '65,"  page  37. 
fLewal,  "Tactique  des  Renseignements,"  Tome  I.,  page  88. 


Il8  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

tions  calculated  to  elicit  information  in  regard  to  the  enemy's 
position,  movements,  and  morale.  If  tact  be  exercised  in 
questioning,  much  information  may  be  gained;  for  the  pris- 
oner will  probably  consider  the  questions  as  prompted  merely 
by  natural  curiosity. 

When  the  object  is  the  destruction  of  roads,  railroads,  or 
telegraphs,  the  expeditionary''  patrol  should  generally  be  a 
large  one;  but  in  some  cases  a  small  patrol  may  answer  the 
purpose  better,  as  it  can  move  to  its  destination  more  secretly, 
and  the  use  of  high  explosives  gives  it  a  great  destructive 
power.  In  any  case,  the  patrol  should  endeavor  to  reach  its 
objective  unseen,  and  part  should  be  on  the  alert  watching 
the  enemy  while  the  rest  of  the  men  are  engaged  in  the  work 
of  destruction.* 

A  patrol  must  be  sent  out  to  gain  information  by  "tap- 
ping" a  telegraph  line.  In  this  case,  a  telegraph  operator, 
using  a  small  pocket  instrument,  taps  the  line  and  learns  the 
messages  passing  over  it.  The  rest  of  the  men,  carefully  con- 
cealed, look  out  for  the  enemy.  An  expeditionary  patrol  for 
the  purpose  of  tapping  a  telegraph  line  is  generally  a  cavalry 
patrol,  sent  out  from  the  cavalry  screen  or  from  a  raiding 
column.  In  addition  to  learning  the  enemy's  movements,  the 
operator  can  often  give  him  false  information — order  him  to 
concentrate  on  wrong  points,  -and  work  mischief  to  him 
generally. 

Harassing  Patrols. — These  patrols  are  generally  strong; 
for,  their  object  being  not  to  seek  information,  but  to  annoy 
the  enem}^,  they  must  be  prepared  to  fight.  In  some  cases, 
however,  better  results  may  be  obtained  by  reducing  the  size 
and  increasing  the  number  of  the  patrols.  When  an  army 
halts  in  a  position  to  await  reinforcements,  or  because  of  the 
irresolution  of  its  chief,  the  opposing  commander  (even  if  his 
army  be  inferior  in  numbers)  may  often  raise  the  morale  of 
his  own  troops,  and  impair  the  courage  and  efhciency  of  those 

*For  the  method  of  destroying  railroads,  telegraphs,  bridges,  etc.,  see 
Beach's  "  Manual  of  Military  Field  Engineering." 


HARASSING  PATROIvS.  II9 

of  his  adversary,  by  causing  frequent  alarms,  destroying  the 
enemy's  rest;  compelHng  the  hostile  outposts  repeatedly  to 
rush  to  arms,  and  exciting  their  sentinels  to  such  a  degree 
that  they  fancy  a  foe  in  every  shadow,  and  imagine  a  hostile 
attack  in  every  rustling  leaf.  The  method  of  operating  with 
a  harassing  patrol  will  depend  upon  circumstances,  but  in 
every  case  the  attack  should  be  of  the  nature  of  a  surprise. 
If  the  patrol  is  small,  the  enemy's  sentinels  should  be  shot 
down  or  captured  in  a  nois}^  rush.  If  the  patrol  is  large,  the 
attack  should  be  made  upon  the  enemy's  pickets;  the  object 
being  the  creation  of  alarm  and  the  infliction  of  loss  rather 
than  the  capture  of  prisoners.  If  many  small  harassing  pa- 
trols are  employed,  strong  patrols  should  be  sent  out,  from 
time  to  time,  to  make  vigorous  attacks  on  the  pickets;  as 
the  enemy  would  otherwise  find  it  sufficient  merely  to  redouble 
the  vigilance  of  his  sentinels  and  patrol  to  the  front.  The 
method  of  attack  should  be  continually  changed,  and  the 
point  selected,  the  size  of  the  assailing  force,  and  the  hour  of 
attack  should  all  be  variable. 

Jackson's  defense  of  New  Orleans  furnishes  an  illustra- 
tion of  the  effective  use  that  may  be  made  of  harassing  pa- 
trols. Between  the  night  battle  of  December  23,  18 14,  and 
Pakenham's  defeat  sixteen  days  later,  the  British  were  in- 
cessantly annoyed  by  small  parties  of  Americans. 

"The  plain  between  the  two  hostile  camps  was  alive  day 
and  night  with  small  parties  of  foot  and  horse,  wandering  to 
and  fro  in  pursuit  of  adventure,  on  the  trail  of  reconnoiterers, 
stragglers,  and  outpost  sentinels.  After  a  while  there  grew 
up  a  regular  science  in  the  conduct  of  these  modes  of  vexing, 
annoying,  and  weakening  the  enemy.  It  was  as  follows:  A 
small  number  of  each  corps,  being  permitted  to  leave  the  lines, 
would  start  from  their  position,  and  all  converge  to  a  central 
point  in  front  of  the  hnes.  Here  they  would,  when  all  col- 
lected, make  quite  a  formidable  body  of  men,  and  would  pro- 
ceed to  attack  the  nearest  British  outpost,  or  advance  in  ex- 
tended lines,  so  as  to  create  alarm  in  the  enemy's  camp,  and 


I20  SECURITY   AND    INFORMATION. 

subject  them  to  the  vexation  of  being  beaten  to  arms,  in  the 
midst  of  which  the  scouting  party  would  be  unusually  unlucky 
if  it  did  not  succeed  in  'bagging'  one  or  two  of  the  enemy's 
advance  sentinels.  In  such  incessant  scouting  parties  and 
volunteer  operations  a  majority  of  Jackson's  command  were 
■engaged  during  the  greater  part  of  the  night.  So  daring  were 
these  attacks  that  on  more  than  one  occasion  the  six-pounders 
were  advanced  from  the  lines  and  drawn  within  cannon-shot 
of  the  outposts,  when  they  would  be  discharged  at  the  senti- 
nels or  any  living  object,  generally  with  some  effect,  and  always 
with  great  terror  to  the  British  camp,  causing  a  general  appre- 
hension that  the  Americans  were  advancing  to  attack  them 
in  full  force."* 

Flank  Patrols. — These  are  always  strong  patrols,  and  usu- 
ally operate  on  roads  parallel  to  the  line  of  march  of  the  main 
body.  They  reconnoiter  defiles,  farms,  woods,  etc.,  at  some 
distance  from  the  flanks  of  the  main  column.  They  usually 
consist  of  from  ten  to  twenty  men  (but  may  contain  the  max- 
imum strength  of  a  patrol),  and  are  generally  detached  for 
a  specific  reconnaissance,  with  orders  to  rejoin  the  main  body 
at  a  designated  rendezvous,  when  the  object  of  the  reconnais- 
sance has  been  gained.  The  patrol  should  be  guided  by  the 
general  principles  already  laid  down  for  patrols,  and  should 
avail  itself  of  ever>'  practicable  opportunity  of  communicating 
with  the  main  column. 

Flanking  patrols  of  the  maximum  strength  are  often  de- 
tached from  a  marching  column  to  reconnoiter  and  guard 
roads  Crossing  the  line  of  march  during  the  passage  of  the 
main  body.  They  are  sometimes  called  covering  patrols.  The 
forces  employed  on  this  duty  are,  however,  generally  larger 


*This  description  is  condensed  from  Walker's  account,  quoted  in  Par- 
ton's  "Life  of  Andrew  Jackson." 


FIvANK   PATROLS.  121 

than  patrols,  and  are  covering  detachments  charged  with  the 
duties  of  a  containing  force. 


The  Advance  Guard  Passing  Through  a  Town. 

Having  discussed  the  details  of  patrolling,  we  may  now 
consider  the  manner  in  which  the  advance  guard  would  pass 
through  a  town. 

On  approaching  the  village  or  town,  the  advance  guard 
halts,  and  the  advance  party  moves  forward  to  reconnoiter; 
the  point,  well  in  advance,  acting  as  already  prescribed  for  a 
small  patrol.  If  the  enemy's  presence  is  suspected,  the  vil- 
lage must  be  turned  by  a  portion  of  the  advance  party  or 
support,  and  entered  simultaneously  by  the  front  and  flank. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  all  seems  well,  the  point  signals  to  the 
rear  and  advances  up  the  principal  street,  the  advance  party 
following  at  a  suitable  distance,  its  flankers  working  up  the 
side  streets,  always  keeping  up  communication  with  the  ad- 
vance party  and  with  the  flank  patrols — if  there  be  any.  The 
support  follows  at  a  suitable  distance,  the  reserve  remaining 
at  the  edge  of  the  village  until  the  patrols  have  gone  through. 
If  the  point  discovers  that  the  village  is  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  it  falls  back  quickly  and  quietly  to  the  advance  party, 
whose  commander  immediately  sends  information  to  the  rear. 
The  support  at  once  comes  up,  and  the  commander  of  the  sup- 
port, in  the  case  of  a  large  advance  guard,  or  of  the  advance 
guard,  in  the  case  of  a  small  one,  makes  dispositions  for  a 
reconnaissance  of  the  village,  with  a  view  to  ascertaining  the 
most  practicable  point  for  forcing  it. 

A  village  is  approached  at  night  in  the  same  manner  as 
by  day,  with  the  exception  that  the  distances  and  intervals 
between  the  different  parts  of  the  advance  guard  are  less. 

A  strong  patrol  reconnoiters  and  enters  a  village  in  the 
same  manner  as  the  advance  guard  of  a  larger  force. 

In  considering  the  details  relative  to  the  reconnaissance 
and  attack  of  villages,  most  writers  on  minor  tactics  have  in 


122  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

view  the  conditions  presented  by  European  villages,  whose 
streets  are  generally  narrow  and  crooked,  and  whose  houses 
(usually  built  of  stone  or  brick)  are  well  adapted  to  defense. 
The  broad  streets  of  American  villages,  and  the  inflammable 
material  of  which  their  houses  are  mostly  constructed,  make 
them  much  more  difficult  to  defend  than  European  villages, 
and  an  advance  guard  might,  consequently,  enter  them  with 
less  risk. 

By  way  of  illustration  of  the  manner  of  reconnoitering 
and  entering  a  town,  let  us  suppose  that  an  advance  guard 
is  approaching  Franklin,  Tennessee,  from  the  south,  on  the 
Columbia  Pike .     ( See  Plate  XI . ) 

The  advance  guard  halts  from  a  half  to  a  quarter  of  a  mile 
from  the  town,  and  two  patrols  are  detached  from  the  sup- 
port to  the  right  and  left  respectively.  The  advance  par- 
ty continues  its  march  to  the  edge  of  the  town,  where  it 
halts,  the  point  continuing  to  advance.  The  point,  moving 
up  Main  street  to  Indigo  Street,  signals  that  all  seems  well, 
and  the  advance  party  follows  it  up  Main  street,  the  flankers 
advancing  along  Church  street  and  Bridge  street.  The  right 
patrol  from  the  support  reconnoiters  the  railroad  cut,  and 
proceeds  along  the  railroad.  The  left  patrol  reconnoiters  the 
valley  of  the  brook  west  of  the  town,  and  advances  along 
North  Margin  street.  The  advance  guard  takes  up  its  march, 
the  reserve  halting  at  the  edge  of  the  town.  The  patrols  com- 
municate as  they  pass  Indigo,  Main,  Cameron,  and  East  Mar- 
gin streets.  If  any  one  of  the  patrols  fails  to  be  seen,  the 
others  halt  until  communication  is  established,  the  advance 
being  as  expeditious  as  possible.  On  passing  through  the 
town,  the  advance  party  seizes  the  bridge,  which  is  first  re- 
connoitered  by  the  point.  The  right  patrol  crosses  the  rail- 
road bridge,  where  it  halts  and  rejoins  the  support  on  the 
arrival  of  the  latter  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Harpeth.  The 
left  patrol  crosses  the  bridge  in  rear  of  the  advance  party  and 
rejoins  the  support.  The  reserve  passes  through  the  town 
as  soon  as  it  receives  signal  that  the  patrols  are  all  through. 


PLATE    XI. 


'  FRANKLIN, 

TENI^. 


ADVANCE   GUARD   PASSING   THROUGH   A   TOWN.  1 23 

The  hills  on  the  north  bank  are  occupied  promptly,  as  they 
command  the  town  and  the  passage  of  the  Harpeth. 

Cavalry  Patrols. 

The  principles  governing  the  action  of  infantry  patrols 
are,  in  the  main,  equally  applicable  to  patrols  composed  of 
cavalr}^;  but  there  are  some  points  of  difference  which  must 
be  considered. 

Owing  to  the  greater  mobility  of  cavalry,  the  distances 
and  intervals  separating  the  scouts  from  each  other,  and  from 
the  main  body  of  the  patrol,  are  greater  than  in  infantry. 
In  very  open  country  the  cavalry  scouts  may  sometimes  be 
as  far  as  i,ooo  yards  apart.  Another  essential  difference  in 
the  conduct  of  infantry  and  cavalry  patrols,  depending  also 
upon  the  superior  mobility  of  the  latter,  is  the  detaching  of 
scouts  from  strong  cavalry  patrols.  These  scouts  are  not  merely 
detached  after  the  manner  of  the  flankers,  or  even  the  flank 
patrols,  of  an  advance  guard;  but  work  quite  independently, 
joining  the  main  body  of  the  patrol  at  fixed  rendezvous,  or 
maintaining  connection  with  it  by  occasionally  sending  in  re- 
ports to  its  commander.  These  detached  scouts  usually  work 
in  pairs,  one  man  being  in  command,  and  may  be  sent  as  far 
as  five  or  six  miles  from  the  main  body  of  the  patrol.  Each 
scout  shotdd  understand  what  he  is  to  look  for,  and  how  and 
where  he  is  to  make  his  report. 

InteUigent  and  well-mounted  soldiers  should  be  selected 
for  patrol  duty.  Before  starting  out,  the  patrol  is  carefully 
inspected  by  its  commander,  who,  in  addition  to  seeing  that 
his  men  are  in  proper  condition  and  properly  equipped  and 
supplied,  assures  himself  that  his  horses  are  in  good  condi- 
tion and  well  shod.  The  same  precautions  in  regard  to  arms 
and  accouterments  are  taken  as  in  the  case  of  an  infantry 
patrol. 

As  in  the  case  of  infantry,  no  rules  for  the  formation  of 
the  patrol  can  be  positively  prescribed,  except  the  general 
and  important  one,  that  the  patrol  must  always  be  so  formed 


124  SECURITY   AND   INF^ORMATION. 

as  to  facilitate  the  gaining  of  information,  and  insure,  if 
possible,  the  escape  of  at  least  one  man  if  the  patrol  should 
be  cut  off.  It  may  be  said,  however,  that  every  patrol,  how- 
ever small,  should,  if  possible,  have  a  scout  detached  as  ad- 
vance guard,  and  another  as  rear  guard.  When  the  size  of 
the  patrol  permits,  flankers  should  also  be  thrown  out.  All 
the  men  of  a  small  patrol,  and  the  point,  flankers,  and  rear 
guard  of  a  strong  one,  should  have  their  carbines  loaded  and 
advanced,  or  the  pistol  at  the  position  of  "raise"  or  "lower." 
The  distances  and  intervals  between  different  parts  of  a  pa- 
trol depend  upon  circumstances.  They  should  not  be  so  great 
that  the  commander  could  not  easily  convey  his  commands 
by  voice  or  signal,  and  would  rarely  exceed  loo  yards  except 
in  open  country.  At  night,  the  flankers  and  detached  scouts 
should  always  be  drawn  in,  unless  their  communication  with 
the  main  body  of  the  patrol  is  perfectly  secured. 

The  signals  for  a  cavalry  patrol  are  the  same  as  in  the  case 
of  the  infantry  (substituting  carbine  for  rifle),  with  the  excep- 
tion that  in  the  signal  "Enemy  in  sight"  the  carbine  is  held 
up  in  one  hand  by  the  small  of  the  stock,  and  to  ask  for  rein- 
forcements the  arm  is  extended  horizontally,  holding  the  piece 
vertically,  and  given  a  circular  motion  several  times. 

On  open  ground  the  following  signals  may  sometimes  be 
found  useful : 

Enemy  in  sight:  Move  in  a  circle  at  a  walk,  and  halt: 
to  the  right,  if  the  hostile  troops  are  cavalry;  to  the  left,  if 
they  are  infantry.  For  a  mixed  force,  describe  a  figure  eight. 
This  movement  may  be  repeated  as  often  as  necessary,  but 
the  halt  should  always  be  distinct. 

Enemy  advancing:  Same  as  above,  except  that  the  cir- 
cling is  continuous  and  at  a  trot.  If  the  enemy  is  advancing 
rapidly  or  in  heavy  force,  make  the  signal  at  a  gallop. 

As  the  movements  of  the  scout,  while  making  these  sig- 
nals, would  probably  be  seen  by  the  enemy,  they  should  be 
used  only  when  the  signals  with  the  carbine  might,  owing  to 
distance,  be  misunderstood. 


CAVALRY  PATROLS.  1 25 

At  night,  a  patrol  must  rely  mainly  upon  its  sense  of  hear- 
ing. Strict  silence  should  be  maintained,  and  smoking  should 
be  prohibited.  Each  scout  should  watch  his  horse  for  indi- 
cations of  danger,  not  only  at  night,  but  at  all  times;  and  if 
the  animal  pricks  up  its  ears  attentively  or  snorts  excitedly, 
the  warning  should  never  be  neglected,  but  the  cause  should 
be  investigated. 

Though  exercising  the  utmost  vigilance,  and  endeavor- 
ing to  avoid  being  discovered,  a  cavalry  patrol  must  move 
along  turnpikes  and  good  roads.  To  do  otherwise  would  be 
to  follow  by-paths  and  traverse  difficult  ground,  where  the 
horses  would  often  have  to  be  led.  The  mobility  which  gives 
a  cavalry  patrol  its  special  value  would  thus  be  lost,  and  the 
patrol  would  not  be  worth  as  much  as  one  composed  of  in- 
fantry; for  the  horses  would  become  a  mere  burden.  The 
patrol  should,  however,  always  move  upon  soft  ground  or 
sward  at  the  side  of  the  road,  if  it  be  practicable  to  do  so,  and 
should  always  move  with  the  least  possible  noise.  De  Brack 
says  that,  in  the  campaign  in  Portugal,  the  French  cavalry 
patrols,  having  to  march  on  rocky  and  resounding  roads, 
wrapped  the  hoofs  of  their  horses  with  sheepskin,  tied  around 
the  pastern,  with  the  wool  inside;  and  that  they  thus  ap- 
proached very  close  to  the  English  vedettes  without  being 
heard.  Riistow  recommends  this  measure  to  cavalry  patrols 
under  similar  circumstances.  This  incident  does  not,  how- 
ever, seem  to  be  of  an)'-  value  further  than  illustrating  the 
ingenuity  which  patrols  are  called  upon  to  exercise. 

The  patrol  commander  should  carefully  select  his  route 
before  starting  out,  and  should  adhere  to  it  unless  driven 
away  by  force.  He  should  clearly  indicate  the  places  of  ren- 
dezvous, and  explain  to  the  scouts,  as  far  as  practicable,  how 
to  reach  them.  "Nothing,"  says  Shaw,  "can  be  more  discon- 
certing to  the  commander  of  a  patrol  than  to  miss  his  scouts 
at  the  time  or  place  at  which  they  should  come  in.  He  does 
not  know  whether  they  have  lost  their  way,  or  whether  they 
have  fallen  into  hostile  hands,  and  his  further  action  is  often 


J  26  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

dependent  upon  their  reports,  which  he  does  not  receive.  The 
position  also  of  the  scouts  who  have  lost  their  way,  or  who 
have  not  hit  ofif  their  party  at  the  place  of  rendezvous,  is  one 
of  difficulty.  In  the  attempt  to  find  their  commander,  they 
constantly  wander  about  in  an  aimless  manner  and  end  by 
losing  themselves  altogether." 

The  general  manner  of  reconnoitering  different  kinds  of 
ground  is  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  infantry  patrols;  but 
the  following  details  should  be  noted:  Scouts  should  peep 
around  every  corner  or  turn  in  the  road  before  riding  on.  If 
they  come  to  an  object  too  extensive  to  be  reconnoitered 
without  assistance,  they  must  signal  for  reinforcements,  or 
one  must  ride  back  and  report  to  the  patrol  commander, 
while  the  others  remain  in  observation.  If  obstacles  are  en- 
countered on  the  road,  such  as  barricades  or  felled  trees,  the 
patrol  must,  if  possible,  move  round  them  and  continue  its 
reconnaissance.  If  the  patrol  can  remove  the  obstacle,  it 
does  so;  otherwise,  or  if  a  bridge  is  broken,  word  must  be 
sent  back,  if  a  column  is  following. 

In  ascending  a  hill,  a  scout  should  not  ride  quite  to  the 
top;  but,  unless  time  is  urgent,  should  halt  at  a  short  dis- 
tance from  the  crest  and  then  advance  with  caution.  It  may 
often  be  well  for  two  scouts  to  approach  the  crest  together, 
one  of  them  dismounting  and  reconnoitering  the  crest  on  foot 
while  the  other  holds  his  horse. 

A  cavalry  patrol  or  advance  guard  approaches  a  town 
or  village  in  practically  the  same  manner  as  corresponding 
bodies  of  infantry.  A  city  or  large  town  should  ordinarily 
be  avoided  by  a  reconnoitering  party;  but  after  a  victory,, 
when  the  enemy  is  demoralized,  more  may  be  dared  than 
would  otherwise  be  possible.  After  the  battle  of  Worth, 
Nancy,  a  city  of  50,000  inhabitants,  was  entered  by  six  Uhlans; 
and  twenty-six  others,  who  followed  later,  occupied  the  rail- 
road station  and  tore  up  a  portion  of  the  track.  The  whole 
squadron  (150  men)  then  assembled  and  marched  through 
the  citv. 


CAVALRY   PATROLS.  1 27 

As  a  rule,  a  patrol  should  not  halt  at  inhabited  places, 
taverns,  etc.,  or  enter  an  enclosure.  If  it  is  necessary  to  halt 
to  feed  or  water  the  horses,  some  secluded  place  should  be  se- 
lected, which  could  be  guarded  by  sentinels  in  concealed  posi- 
tions. A  neglect  of  this  precaution  has  more  than  once  been 
the  cause  of  disaster.  In  1846,  Captain  Thornton,  reconnoi- 
tering  with  a  troop  of  dragoons,  imprudently  entered  a  corral 
with  his  command.     The  result  is  thus  described  by  Ripley : 

"Hardly  had  the  rearmost  files  entered  when  the  alarm 
was  given.  The  squadron  was  in  confusion;  but  Thornton, 
taking  the  lead,  dashed  at  once  at  the  only  opening  of  the 
inclosure.  That  was  already  shut  and  defended  by  a  large 
body  of  Mexicans,  and  the  passage  was  impracticable.  In 
searching  for  a  passage  to  the  right,  the  dragoons  encoun- 
tered a  galling  fire,  which  increased  the  confusion,  and  Thorn- 
ton's horse  falling  wounded  upon  his  rider,  the  whole  party 
gave  back  to  the  center  of  the  corral.  Captain  Hardee,  who 
succeeded  to  the  command,  rallied  the  men,  and,  after  a  vain 
endeavor  to  find  an  opening,  surrendered.  In  this  affair  Lieu- 
tenant Mason  had  been  killed,  and  16  non-commissioned  oflli- 
cers  and  men  had  fallen  dead  or  wounded."* 

A  similar  occurrence  at  Pont-a-Mousson,  on  the  night  of  the 
1 2  th- 1 3th  of  August,  1870,  is  thus  described  by  Borbstaedt: 

"The  detachment,  consisting  of  60  dragoons  and  hussars, 
was  received  by  the  inhabitants  in  the  most  friendly  man- 
ner: so  that  the  soldiers  for  the  most  part  dismounted  and 
put  their  horses  into  stables,  while  the  commandant,  accom- 
panied by  a  few  men,  rode  out  to  reconnoiter.  All  of  a  sud- 
den, two  squadrons  of  Chasseurs  d'Afrique  and  Spahis,  most 
probably  sent  for  by  the  inhabitants  from  Metz,  dashed  into 
the  town,  surprised  the  dragoons  and  hussars  in  the  stables, 
and  took  the  greater  part  prisoners,  the  townspeople  now 
turning  on  the  Germans,  and  giving  their  ready  assistance  to 
the  French  cavalry,  "f 

*"The  War  with  Mexico,"  Vol.  I.,  page  107. 

t"  History  of  the  Franco-German  War,"  page  357. 


128  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION, 

As  a  rule,  patrols  do  not  fight,  except  to  escape  capture; 
but  when  there  is  a  line  of  patrols  whose  front  is  covered 
with  detached  scouts,  each  scout  and  each  patrol  may  be 
charged  with  a  certain  amount  of  resistance,  in  order  to  gain 
time  for  the  bodies  in  rear.  This  will  be  considered  more  at 
length  in  the  next  chapter. 

Connecting  Patrols. — These  patrols  are  always  composed 
of  cavalry.  The  patrols  keep  in  the  intervals  between  the 
different  bodies,  and  detach  scouts  to  the  front  and  flanks. 
The  scouts  to  the  front  watch  the  enemy;  those  on  the  flanks 
observe  all  movements  and  changes  of  position  of  the  body 
of  troops  nearest  them,  with  which  they  keep  in  constant 
communication.  The  commander  of  the  patrol  keeps  the 
body  of  troops  on  either  flank  informed  of  the  movements  of 
the  other.  If  the  army  is  moving  on  parallel  roads,  in  a  close 
country,  the  connecting  patrols  must  be  detached  from  the 
cavalry  at  the  head  of  each  column.  In  this  case  they  com- 
municate at  each  lateral  road,  and  each  column  is  thus  kept 
informed  of  the  progress  of  its  neighbor,  and  of  the  condition 
of  affairs  along  the  entire  front.  If  the  army  is  marching  on 
parallel  roads  in  a  sufficiently  open  country,  a  chain  of  patrols 
extends  along  its  front,  thus  linking,  as  it  were,  the  different 
columns.     Connecting  patrols  are  always  strong. 

Pursuing  Patrols. — These  are  always  composed  of  cavalry, 
and  may  be  either  small  or  strong.  They  keep  on  the  trail 
of  the  enemy,  do  not  lose  contact  with  him,  and  keep  their 
own  army  fully  informed  of  his  movements.  They  should 
have  definite  orders  as  to  the  distance  to  which  they  are  to 
pursue,  and  the  matter  which  it  may  be  specially  desirable  to 
report.  For  instance,  the  pursuing  patrols  the  day  after  the 
battle  of  L-igny  doubtless  had  special  instructions  to  report 
everything  that  would  indicate  whether  the  Prussians  were 
retreating  upon  Namur  or  upon  Wavre.  Pursuing  patrols 
must  not  be  confounded  with  a  pursuing  force  following 
headlong  upon  the  heels  of  a  routed  army  to  complete  the 
destruction  of  battle.     They  merely  follow,  watch,  and  hang 


PURSUING   PATROIvS.  1 29 

on  an  army  that  is  retreating  without  demoralization,  in  order 
that  touch  with  it  may  not  be  lost.  To  gain  and  transmit 
information  are  the  objects  of  a  pursuing  patrol,  and  the  capt- 
ure of  prisoners,  or  the  picking  up  of  stragglers,  must  be  sought 
only  with  a  view  to  gaining  information. 

Cyclist  Patrols. 

On  good  roads  and  favorable  terrain,  cyclist  patrols  can 
generally  operate  more  effectively  than  patrols  composed  of 
either  infantry  or  cavalry.  Though  they  can  not  move  so 
stealthily  as  infantry,  they  can  move  with  much  greater 
rapidity.  They  have  an  advantage  over  cavalry  patrols  in- 
asmuch as  their  movements  are  practically  noiseless,  raise 
very  little  dust,  and  cannot  be  betrayed  by  the  clatter  of 
hoofs  and  the  neighing  of  horses.  Should  it  be  necessary  to 
leave  the  road  and  operate  on  rough  and  unfavorable  ground, 
the  patrol  should  conceal  its  bicycles  in  ditches  or  behind 
bushes,  and  proceed  on  foot.  In  this  case  the  wheels  are  at 
least  safer  than  the  horses  of  a  mounted  patrol  operating  in 
a  similar  manner.  For  patrolling  duty,  the  bicycles  should 
have  solid  tires,  and  should  be  bronzed  and  devoid  of  all  glit- 
ter. The  formation  and  conduct  of  a  cyclist  patrol  are  prac- 
tically the  same  as  those  of  one  composed  of  cavalry. 

Balloon  Rjeconnaissanck. 

For  more  than  a  century,  balloons  have  been  used  at 
various  times  in  military  reconnaissance.  In  fact,  they  were 
first  employed  for  this  purpose  only  eleven  years  after  the 
first  ascent  of  a  human  being  in  a  balloon;  the  information 
gained  by  the  French  in  a  balloon  reconnaissance  at  the  bat- 
tle of  Fleurus  (1794)  having,  it  is  said,  contributed  greatly 
to  their  victory.  A  balloon  corps  accompanied  Napoleon's 
expedition  to  Egypt,  and  balloons  were  used  by  the  French 
in  the  Itahan  War  of  1859,  by  the  French  in  1870-71,  and  by 

the  United  States  Army  in  the  War  of  Secession  and  in  the 
— 10 — 


T30  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

Cuban  campaign  of  1898.  From  various  causes,  but  little  of 
importance  seems  generally  to  have  been  accomplished  in 
balloon  reconnaissances;  but  the  great  improvement  made 
in  aerial  navigation  in  recent  years  leads  to  a  general  belief 
that  greater  results  will  follow  this  method  of  reconnoitering 
in  future. 

The  three  kinds  of  balloons  used  in  reconnaissance  are 
free,  captive,  and  dirigible  balloons;  the  nature  of  each  being 
expressed  by  its  name.  Free  balloons  are  rarely  used,  as  the 
impracticability  of  controlling  their  movements  renders  the 
gaining  of  information  uncertain  and  its  transmission  prob- 
lematical. Such  balloons  might  indeed  pass  over  the  enemy 
in  an  extended  theater  of  operations,  and  land  in  friendly 
territory,  whence  information  could  be  sent  back  by  tele- 
graph or  by  means  of  carrier  pigeons.  But  the  issue  of  such 
reconnaissances  is  too  doubtful  to  make  them  of  much  prac- 
tical use. 

The  principal  reliance  in  aerial  reconnaissance  is  on  the 
captive  balloon.  Its  usual  elevation  is  about  1,000  yards,  at 
which  height  the  different  arms  of  the  service  can  be  distin- 
guished with  a  field-glass  at  a  distance  of  nine  miles,  or,  in  very 
clear  weather,  after  a  rain,  at  fifteen  miles.  The  balloon  can, 
however,  easily  ascend  as  high  as  2,000  yards,  from  which 
height  the  field  of  view  is  greatly  extended. 

The  balloon  train  consists  of  one  search-light  and  two 
balloon  sections.  Each  balloon  section  consists  of  four  wag- 
ons, one  having  the  drum  on  which  the  anchor  rope  for  rais- 
ing and  lowering  the  balloon  is  wound,  this  drum  being  driven 
by  a  gasoline  engine.  It  also  contains  a  space  for  storing  the 
balloon  when  deflated,  and  its  basket.  The  other  three  wag- 
ons in  the  section  contain  tubes  of  compressed  hydrogen 
gas.  The  search-light  section  is  composed  of  a  generator 
truck,  on  which  is  mounted  an  engine  and  dynamo  for  gen- 
erating the  cmrent,  while  the  search-light  truck  contains 
the  search-light  itself  and  a  drum  of  connecting  cable.  The 
balloon  can  be  inflated  in  less  than  half  an  hour  by  means 


BALLOON   RECONNAISSANCE.  I3I 

of  the  compressed  hydrogen  contained  in  the  tubes.  The 
ballcH^n  can  also  be  used  to  suspend  the  vertical  wire  used  in 
wireless  telegraphy.  As  a  matter  of  safety,  there  should  be 
at  least  two  anchoring  cables  to  the  balloon. 

That  the  balloon  reconnaissance  may  be  of  any  value,  it 
is  necessary  that  the  reports  should  be  clear  and  intelligent, 
and  that  they  should  be  promptly  transmitted.  The  first 
requisite  can  be  secured  only  by  having  the  reconnaissance 
made  by  a  well-qualified  professional  soldier,  not  by  a  mere 
aeronaut.  The  second  is  gained  either  by  passing  the  mes- 
sages down  to  the  ground  in  rings  which  slip  over  the  anchor- 
ing cables;  by  telegraphing  them  directly  from  the  car  of 
the  balloon;  by  means  of  signal  flags;  or  by  the  use  of  the 
telephone.  A  photographic  apparatus  should  also  be  a  part 
of  the  equipment  of  the  balloon,  by  means  of  which  correct 
representations  of  the  topography  of  the  enemy's  position 
may  be  obtained. 

The  danger  to  be  apprehended  from  the  fire  of  the  enemy 
upon  the  balloon  is  not  great.  On  the  Steinfeld,  an  artillery 
proving-ground  near  Wiener-Neustadt,  in  Austria,  in  1902, 
some  practical  tests  were  made  of  the  efficacy  of  artillery  fire 
against  balloons.  A  captive  balloon,  3  meters  in  diameter, 
was  sent  up  at  an  elevation  of  2,500  meters,  and  at  a  hor- 
izontal distance  of  4,000  paces  from  the  firing-point.  These 
distances  were,  at  first,  unknown  by  the  artillerymen,  who 
fired  twenty-two  service  shells  at  the  balloon  without  hitting 
it;  the  shots  all  being  too  low.  The  gunners  were  then  given 
the  horizontal  and  vertical  distances  of  the  balloon,  and  the 
firing  was  resumed.  The  balloon  remained  untouched  until 
the  sixty-foturth  shot,  which  punctured  it,  and  it  began  slowly 
to  descend.  The  firing  was  conducted  by  a  well-trained  de- 
tachment of  fortress  artillery.  It  may  be  said  that  above 
1,650  yards  the  balloon  is  practically  safe  from  hostile  fire; 
and,  if  struck  by  a  projectile  at  a  lower  distance,  the  descent 
will  generally  be  sufl&ciently  gradual  to  be  harmless. 


132  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

In  balloon  reconnaissance  it  is,  of  course,  impossible  to 
obser\^e  the  general  principle  of  "seeing  without  being  seen." 
Indeed,  so  able  a  military  writer  as  Dragomiroff  condemns 
the  use  of  the  balloon  in  reconnaissance,  because  it  betrays 
the  presence  and  approximate  location  of  the  troops  using 
it.  This  view  would  seem  to  be  well  sustained  by  the  unfor- 
tunate use  of  a  balloon  with  the  advancing  troops  at  the  bat- 
tle of  San  Juan,  July  i,  1898,  when,  for  the  first  time  in  mil- 
itary history,  a  balloon  was  seen  practically  upon  the  skir- 
mish-line, marking  the  position  of  the  troops,  and  drawing 
upon  them  a  heavy  fire,  from  which  they  suffered  severely.* 
It  is  not  likely,  however,  that  this  extraordinary  use  of  a  bal- 
loon will  ever  be  repeated,  and  the  objection  urged  by  Drag- 
omiroff can  not  be  regarded  as  a  serious  one;  for  balloons, 
with  their  somewhat  cumbersome  train,  will  not  ordinarily 
be  used  by  any  but  large  commands,  whose  presence  can  not 
be  concealed,  and  whose  position  can  not  be  betrayed  to  any 
hurtful  degree  by  the  location  of  one  or  two  balloons  properly 
used.  On  the  other  hand,  the  sight  of  a  balloon  in  the  air 
causes  an  uneasy  feeling  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  who  is 
thus  made  aware  that  he  is  being  watched,  and  compels  a 
degree  of  anxiety  on  his  part  that  more  than  outweighs  the 
disadvantage  of  any  information  that  he  may  gain  from  the 
situation   of   the   balloon,  f     When   the   balloon   is    provided 

*See  official  reports  of  Major-General  J.  Ford  Kent,  U.  S.  V.,  Briga- 
dier-General Samuel  S.  Sumner,  U.  S.  V.,  and  Colonel  Leonard  Wood, 
1st  U.  S.  Vol.  Cavalry,  relative  to  the  battle  of  San  Juan. 

fin  this  connection,  the  remarks  of  General  E.  P.  Alexander,  of  the 
Confederate  army,  are  interesting.  In  his  paper  on  ' '  Artillery  Fighting  at 
Gettysburg"  he  says:  "I  was  particularly  cautioned  in  moving  the  artil- 
lery, to  keep  it  out  of  sight  of  the  signal  station  upon  Round  Top."  And 
he  adds  in  a  foot-note:  "This  suggests  the  remark  that  I  have  never 
understood  why  the  enemy  abandoned  the  use  of  military  balloons  early  in 
1863,  after  having  used  them  extensively  up  to  that  time.  Even  if  the 
observers  never  saw  anything,  they  would  have  been  worth  all  they  cost 
for  the  annoyance  and  delays  they  caused  us  in  trying  to  keep  our  move- 
ments out  of  their  sight.  That  wretched  little  signal  station  upon  Round 
Top  that  day  caused  one  of  our  divisions  to  lose  over  two  hours,  and  prob- 
ably delayed  our  assault  nearly  that  long  During  that  time  a  Federal 
corps  arrived  and  became  an  important  factor  in  the  action  which  fol- 
lowed."—  "Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,"  Vol.  III.,  page  358. 


BALLOON  REICONNAISSANCE.  133 

with  an  electric  search-light,  and  the  reconnaissance  is  con- 
ducted at  night,  this  annoyance  and  uneasiness  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy  will  be  greatly  increased. 

The  perfection  of  the  dirigible  balloon  will  vastly  enhance 
the  value  of  balloon  reconnaissances,  and  will  doubtless,  at 
the  same  time,  present  a  new  danger.  It  is  claimed  that 
Germany,  France,  and  England  each  possess  at  present  dir- 
igible balloons  that  can  be  easily  moved  in  any  direction. 
The  field  of  reconnaissance  will  thus  be  greatly  enlarged; 
but  if  the  easy  navigation  of  the  air  becomes  practicable, 
the  armed  opposition  of  balloon  to  balloon  will  introduce  a 
new  element  which  it  has  not  heretofore  been  necessary  to 
consider. 

Reconnaissances  with  captive  balloons  will  not  usually 
be  made  from  any  position  more  advanced  than  the  reserve 
of  the  outpost.  A  more  advanced  position  would  place  the 
balloon  train  in  some  jeopardy,  and  would  not  increase  the 
field  of  view  sufiiciently  to  justify  the  increased  danger. 

While  the  value  of  balloon  reconnaissance  is  still  some- 
what problematical,  this  method  of  gaining  information  of 
the  enemy  presents  so  many  possibilities  that  it  cannot  be 
safely  ignored. 


CHAPTER  V. 


The  Cavalry  Screen. 


The  cavalry  is  the  eye  with  which  the  army  sees.  The  activity  of  this 
arm  can  best  ascertain  with  clearness  the  measm-es  and  intentions  of  the 
enemy. — Von  der  Goltz. 

The  employment  of  the  cavalry  as  a  reconnoitering  screen 
in  advance  of  the  army  was  habitual  in  the  wars  of  the  Con- 
sulate and  First  Empire,  though,  mifortunately,  the  details 
of  the  manner  in  which  the  French  Cavalry  performed  the 
duty  of  screening  and  reconnoitering  have  not  been  preserved. 
We  know  only  that  (excepting  the  campaign  of  1813,  in  which 
the  cavalry,  destroyed  in  Russia,  had  not  been  re-created) 
the  movements  of  Napoleon's  armies  were  always  covered  by 
a  screen  of  cavalry  pushed  forward  to  a  considerable  dis- 
tance. Davoust's  famous  flank  march  from  Ratisbon  to  Abens- 
berg  was  screened  by  cavalry;  and  in  the  Russian  campaign 
Murat's  cavalry  covered  the  front  of  the  French  army,  being 
sometimes  fifty  miles  in  advance  of  it.  The  campaigns  of 
1806  and  1 8 14  firrnish  brilliant  examples  of  the  use  of  a  cav- 
alry screen  by  Napoleon;  and  the  conduct  of  Katzler's  con- 
tact squadrons,  and  the  extended  use  of  covering  detachments 
of  Cossacks,  show  that  the  Allies  had  learned  the  lesson  of 
screening  and  reconnoitering  from  their  gieat  opponent. 

In  the  long  period  of  peace  from  Waterloo  to  the  Crimea 
(scarcely  broken  by  the  insignificant  hostilities  of  1823,  1832, 
and  1849)  the  principles  of  war  as  demonstrated  by  the  great- 
est of  military  leaders  were  forgotten  or  neglected  in  a  mass 
of  theoretical  tactical  details;  and  in  the  Crimean  and  Italian 
wars  the  commanders,  as  a  rule,  were  ignorant  of  everything 
that  took  place  beyond  their  chain  of  sentinels.     In  the  War 

134 


THE   CAVALRY   SCREEN.  135 

of  Secession  the  art  of  screening  and  reconnoitering  was  re- 
vived by  the  American  cavalry,  and  brought  to  a  high  state 
of  development,  notably  by  Sheridan  and  Stuart.  In  1866 
the  Prussians  began  to  evolve  from  their  own  experience 
principles  already  demonstrated  in  America,  but  ignored  in 
Europe;  and  in  1870-71  the  results  obtained  by  the  German 
cavalry  screen  were  so  striking  as  to  command  the  attention 
of  the  military  world. 

The  cavalry  screen  may  be  said  to  constitute  the  strate- 
gic advance  guard  of  the  army;  each  column  in  rear  furnish- 
ing Avhat  may  be  termed  its  own  tactical  advance  guard.  The 
screening  may  be  performed  either  by  the  corps  cavalry  or 
the  cavalry  divisions.*  In  the  former  case  the  head  of  each 
division  or  corps  is  covered  by  its  own  cavalry:  in  the  latter, 
the  cavalry  divisions  cover  the  front  of  the  entire  army.  In 
our  service  it  is  probable  that,  following  our  own  traditions, 
the  corps  cavalry  would  be  reduced  to  a  minimum,  and  that 
the  cavalry  divisions,  united  into  a  cavalry  corps,  would  be 
intrusted  with  the  duty  of  screening  the  front  of  the  en- 
tire army.  During  the  Peninsula  campaign,  Cooke's  cavalry 
screened  the  advance  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the 
Chickahominy,  and  masked  its  flank  march  to  the  James 
River.  Stoneman  performed  a  like  service  for  Hooker  in  the 
masterly  movement  which  preceded  the  battle  of  Chancel- 
lorsville;  and  had  the  cavalry  not  been  detached  on  a  boot- 
less raid,  the  surprise  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  by  Stonewall 
Jackson   would   have   been   impossible.     In   the   Gettysburg 

*The  coriDs  cavalry  is  the  force  attached  to  the  army  corps ;  generally 
in  the  proportion  of  400  to  600  sabers  to  each  infantry  division.  The  cav- 
alry' divisions  are  bodies  under  the  command  of  cavalry  generals,  subject 
only  to  the  orders  of  the  commander  of  the  army,  or  the  chief  of  cavalry 
if  there  be  one.  In  the  German  army  the  cavalry  attached  to  the  army 
corps  is  termed  "divisional  cavalry,"  a  part  being  assigned  permanently 
to  each  infantry  division.  The  term  "divisional  cavalry"  was  formerly 
applied  to  the  cavalry  attached  to  an  army  corps  in  our  service  (see  Cav- 
alry Drill  Regulations  of  1891,  paragraph  972),  but  the  designation  has 
since  been  changed  to  the  more  appropriate  term  "corps  cavalry."  The 
French  have,  in  this  respect,  an  organization  similar  to  our  own,  the  cav- 
alry being  assigned  to  the  army  corps  instead  of  being  attached  to  the 
divisions. 


136  SECURITY   AND    INFORMATION. 

campaign  the  screening  and  reconnoitering  duty  was  excel- 
lently performed  by  Pleasonton's  cavalry  corps. 

In  the  Wilderness  and  Appomattox  campaigns  this  du- 
ty was  similarly  performed  by  Sheridan's  cavalry;  and  in 
the  Red  River  campaign  the  Union  cavalry  so  completely 
screened  the  movements  of  the  rest  of  the  army  that  Taylor, 
a  few  hours  before  the  battle  of  Sabine  Cross-Roads,  report- 
ed to  Kirby  Smith  that  no  advance  had  been  made  in  his 
front,  except  by  cavalry.  In  these  campaigns  no  divisional 
cavalry  existed.  If  a  division  were  acting  independently,  it 
would,  of  course,  be  necessary  to  attach  some  cavalry  to  it; 
in  which  case  the  operations  of  the  cavalry  detachment  would 
be  regulated  by  the  general  principles  that  govern  the  conduct 
of  a  screen  in  front  of  an  army. 

Distance  of  the  Screen  from  the  Army. — The  distance  of  the 
cavalry  screen  from  the  main  army  will  depend  upon  many 
considerations,  chief  of  which  are  the  distance  and  charac- 
ter of  the  enemy.  If  the  enemy  is  at  a  distance,  or  if  his 
cavalry  is  cowed  and  demoralized,  the  screen  may  safely  be 
pushed  much  farther  to  the  front  than  when  he  is  nearer 
and  his  cavalry  is  bold  and  enterprising.  In  1870-71  the 
German  cavalry  "overflowed  the  country  miles,  and  even  sev- 
eral marches,  ahead  of  the  main  body  of  the  infantry."*  The 
screen  was  rarely  less  than  fifteen  or  twenty  miles  in  front  of 
the  army,  and  during  the  march  from  the  battle-field  of  Sedan 
to  Paris  it  was  always  several  marches  ahead.  In  the  Gettys- 
burg campaign,  however,  where  the  enemy  was  enterprising, 
aggressive,  and  confident,  Buford's  screening  cavalry  was  hab- 
itually less  than  ten  miles  in  advance  of  the  army.  The  cav- 
alry screen  should  be,  as  a  rule,  at  least  one  march  in  advance 
of  the  main  force;  but  as  it  betrays,  to  a  certain  extent,  the 
presence  of  troops  behind  it,  it  may  sometimes  be  advisable 
to  draw  it  in  close  to  the  main  body  with  a  view  to  deceiving 
the  enemy.  In  18 14  Napoleon  directed  Marmont  to  execute 
this  device  for  the  purpose  of  misleading  the  Allies. 

*Hohenlohe. 


DISTANCE   OF  THE   SCREEN   FROM  THE   ARMY.  1 37 

It  is,  therefore,  impossible  to  prescribe  definite  rules  for 
the  distance  of  the  screen  from  the  army.  While  the  armies 
are  concentrating,  the  cavalry  may  generally  be  pushed  far 
ahead  of  the  army,  patrols  being  extensively  and  vigorously 
used;  but  when  the  armies  begin  their  advance,  the  distance  is 
usually  reduced  to  not  more  than  fifteen  or  twenty  miles,  di- 
minishing after  contact  to  five  or  six  miles,  and  finally  disap- 
pearing altogether  when  tactical  operations  begin.  In  general 
terms,  it  may  be  stated  that  contact  with  the  enemy  is  the 
first  consideration,  and  that  this  will  largely  and  generally 
influence  the  distance  of  the  screen  from  the  forces  in  rear. 

Frontage  of  the  Screen. — The  object  of  the  cavalry  screen 
is  two-fold:  namely,  (i)  To  gain  information  of  the  enemy, 
and  (2)  To  prevent  him  from  gaining  information  of  one's 
own  army.  The  methods  necessary  to  gain  these  two  objects 
necessarily  conflict.  To  reconnoiter,  the  greatest  dispersion 
of  front  is  desirable ;  but  if  the  screen  be  too  widely  extended, 
it  will  be  everyTvhere  weak,  its  concentration  will  be  diffi- 
cult, and  the  enemy  will  be  able  easily  to  rupture  it.  The 
front  covered  by  the  advanced  cavalry  will,  therefore,  de- 
pend upon  circumstances;  such  as  the  nature  of  the  country 
(open  or  intersected) ;  the  number  of  roads  parallel  to  the 
advance  (as  affecting  the  prompt  transmission  of  intelligence 
to  the  rear) ;  and  the  number  of  lateral  roads  (as  facilitating 
the  concentration  of  the  screening  troops).  Above  all  is  the 
consideration  of  rapid  concentration. 

In  the  advance  from  the  Saar  to  the  Moselle  the  front 
of  the  German  screen  averaged  from  five  to  six  miles  to  a  reg- 
iment ;*  a  division  of  six  regiments  covering  a  front  of  thirty 
miles,  and  a  force  of  ten  regiments  reconnoitering  on  a  front 
of  sixty  miles.  The  screen  was  thus  very  weak  at  all  points ; 
and  its  success  was  mainly  due  to  the  weakness  and  ineffi- 
ciency of  the  French  cavalr3^  Trench  is  of  the  opinion  that 
a  cavalry  division  (3,600  sabers)  should,  in  open  country, 
cover  a  front  of  twenty  to  twenty-five  miles,  when  there  is 

*A  German  cavalry  regiment  numbers  600  sabers. 


138  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

no  reason  to  apprehend  the  close  proximity  of  large  bodies 
of  the  enemy ;  and  that  in  a  close  country,  where  the  scouting 
parties  would  have  to  work  much  nearer  to  each  other,  the 
front  should  be  reduced  to  two-tliirds  or  half  of  that  distance. 
Bonie  takes  from  eleven  to  twelve  and  one-half  miles  for  the 
front  of  a  division.  While  emphasizing  the  statement  that  no 
fixed  width  of  front  can  be  prescribed,  it  may  be  assumed 
that  the  front  covered  by  an  American  brigade  in  screening 
and  reconnoitering  would  average  ten  or  twelve  miles.* 

Certain  bodies  of  the  enemy  will  generally  be  assigned 
as  the  objective  of  the  brigade ;  or,  when  still  at  a  distance 
from  the  opposing  army,  a  certain  zone  of  country  will  be 
assigned  to  it ;  and  the  front  to  be  covered  by  the  brigade 
will  thus  be  incidentally  determined.  To  form  an  efficient 
screen,  there  should  be  about  a  brigade  of  cavalry  for  each 
army  corps  in  the  force  covered. 

Formation  of  the  Screen. — The  main  body  of  the  cavalry 
employed  in  screening  duty  should  be  kept  concentrated 
and  well  in  hand.  It  is  a  mistake  to  fritter  away  the  force 
in  small  groups  which  could  not  concentrate  in  time  for  fight- 
ing, however  much  such  a  plan  might  facilitate  reconnaissance. 
The  strength  of  the  detachments  should  be  adjusted  to  the 
nature  of  their  duty ;  and  it  may  be  stated,  in  general  terms, 
that  the  small  patrols  are  charged  with  the  service  of  informa- 
tion ;  and  the  larger  bodies,  with  that  of  security. 

It  must  be  frankly  stated  that  the  question  of  the  proper 
formation  and  employment  of  the  cavalry  screen  has  not  yet 
emerged  from  the  realms  of  theory.  The  best  European 
writers  on  the  subject  base  their  ideas  upon  the  experience 
of  a  single  war,  in  which  the  successful  cavalry  was  not  re- 
sisted by  a  worthy  opponent;  and  these  ideas  may,  more- 
over, be  said  to  be  based  upon  the  results  rather  than  upon 
the  methods  of  the  Franco-German  conflict;    for  there  was  no 


*A  cavalry  brigade  in  the  U.  S.  Army  consists  of  three  regiments,  and 
would  accordingly  have  a  war  strength  of  3,600  sabers — exactly  the 
strength  of  a  German  division. 


FORMATION   OF   THE   SCREEN.  1 39 

uniformity  in  the  screening  and  reconnoitering  methods  of 
the  Germans  in  1870-71.  The  student  must,  therefore,  re- 
gard the  following  typical  formations  as  suggestions,  and 
not  as  authoritative  prescriptions.  In  any  case,  the  com- 
mander must  make  his  dispositions  in  accordance  with  circum- 
stances rather  than  diagrams;  and  in  almost  every  case,  some 
modification  of  the  typical  formations  will  he  rendered  necessary 
by  the  nature  of  the  country,  the  direction  of  the  roads,  or  the 
character,  proxiinity,  or  strength  of  the  enemy. 

If  the  brigade  is  operating  in  an  open  country,  one  regi- 
ment constitutes  the  reserve,  and  is  preceded  by  a  squadron 
of  each  of  the  other  regiments  at  a  distance  of  about  two 
and  a  half  miles.  These  squadrons,  constituting  the  supports, 
are  separated  by  an  interval  of  not  more  than  six  miles,  the 
reserve  being  situated  centrall}''  in  their  rear.  About  two 
and  a  half  miles  farther  to  the  front  is  the  second  squadron 
of  each  advanced  regiment,  either  in  one  column,  or  in  two 
columns  of  two  troops  each.  These  may  be  termed  the  inter- 
mediate squadrons.  They  are  separated  by  about  the  same 
interval  as  the  squadrons  composing  the  supports.  About 
two  and  a  half  miles  farther  to  the  front,  the  remaining  squad- 
ron of  each  regiment  is  distributed  along  the  front  in  contact 
troops,  which  are  preceded  at  suitable  distaiices  by  patrols, 
detailed  either  from  the  contact  troops,  the  intermediate 
squadrons,  or  the  supports.  When  necessary,  these  patrols 
detach  scouts  still  farther  to  the  front.     (See  Plate  XII.) 

Wlien  the  enemy  is  at  a  distance  or  lacking  in  aggres- 
siveness, the  intermediate  squadrons  may  be  placed  in  the 
contact-line;  thus  extending  the  front  at  a  time  when  "in- 
formation" is  to  be  considered  more  than  "security."  If  the 
enemy  is  close  and  enterprising,  the  intermediate  squadrons 
may  be  merged  with  the  supports,  the  front  being  contracted 
and  distances  diminished,  owing  to  the  paramount  import- 
ance of  "security." 

The  intervals  between  the  contact  troops  are  such  as 
to  admit  of  covering  the  front  assigned  to  the  brigade.     In 


I40  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

a  close  country,  the  number  of  contact  bodies  and  the  inter- 
vals between  them  depend  upon  the  number  of  available 
roads  within  the  front  occupied.  On  some  roads  there  might 
be  one  troop;  on  others,  two  or  three;  or  the  whole  squad- 
ron might  have  to  march  on  a  single  road.  As  a  rule,  a  greater 
number  of  columns  would  be  requisite  in  a  close  country  than 
in  an  open  one.  Each  of  the  contact  troops,  each  inter- 
mediate squadron,  and  each  support,  as  well  as  the  reserve, 
has  its  own  advance  guard,  and  keeps  in  constant  commu- 
nication with  the  bodies  on  its  right,  left,  front,  or  rear.  The 
major  commanding  the  contact  troops  of  each  regiment  may 
accompany  any  troop,  but  is  habitually  with  the  second. 
The  colonel  of  an  advanced  regiment  is  habitually  with  the 
support,  but  may  accompany  any  one  of  his  squadrons.  The 
brigade  commander  is  habitually  with  the  reserve,  but  goes 
wherever  his  presence  seems  necessary.  If  the  reconnaissance 
is  likely  to  lead  to  a  battle,  it  may  be  well  for  him  to  be  with 
the  contact-line. 

A  battery  of  horse  artillery  should  be  attached  to  the 
brigade,  and  should  habitually  accompany  the  reserve,  march- 
ing in  rear  of  the  leading  squadron.* 

The  battery  should  not,  in  any  case,  be  placed  so  far  to 
the  front  that  the  leading  troops  could  nojt  maneuver  or  fall 
back  without  exposing  it  to  capture.  If  the  cavalry  is  pur- 
suing the  enemy,  the  battery  should  be  with  one  of  the  lead- 
ing regiments;  but  guns  should  not  be  detached  from  the 
battery  except  in  unusual  emergencies — for  instance,  in  the 
case  of  a  village  held  by  a  hostile  but  undisciplined  popu- 
lation, upon  whom  the  moral  effect  of  a  few  shells  would  be 
great.     If  a  considerable  cavalry  fight  is  expected,  the  bat- 

*As  the  American  cavalry  brigade  is  equal  in  numerical  strength  to  a 
French,  German,  or  Austrian  cavalry  division,  it  would  seem,  at  first,  that 
it  should  have  a  number  of  horse  batteries  equal  to  those  of  the  Continental 
cavalry  division.  The  condition  of  our  roads,  and  the  general  nature  of 
the  terrain  in  any  of  our  probable  theaters  of  operations,  are  not,  however, 
favorable  to  the  extended  use  of  artillery;  and  the  Cavalry  Drill  Regula- 
tions (paragraph  753)  are  undoubtedly  right  in  assigning  only  one  battery 
to  the  cavalry  brigade. 


PLATE   XII. 

CAVALRY  SCREEN  CONSISTING  OF   1    BRIGADE   OF  S  REGIMENTS. 


Patrols 


If'         «V 


Patrols 


ContactTroops^ii^'    '''i'''    ^'^^'    ^' ^^'    t^'i 


ff     «f''      ^,i    ,  A' .   ,  V.   ,  4 

yh    AiA     Ai/»    f'Af"     f'Al'     i'A' 


A 


ht Squadron     7^  Cavalry  ,       Ut  Squadron    9th  Cavalry 

1! 

A  SI  * 

is    Jl   /f  1  /*    JCj   »*» 

Intermediate  Squadrons  V^ ^    a- miles      J^ 

2nd  Sqd'n  7th  Cav  I  end  Stjdn  9th  Cav. 


Supports  yj* ' 


/*  _[■    A 


4-   miles    r| 

ji  3rrf  Sqdn    3th  Cav. 


1st  Squadron 


Reserve,  5th  Cavalry 


]j/l  2ncf  Squadron 


J 


3rcl  Squadron 


The  normal  formation  is  nor  to  be  taken 
as  an  Invariable  guide  but  merely  as  a  model 
requiring  more  or  less  variation  according  to 
circumstances.  It  is  very  rarely  that  a  normal 
formation  can  be  used  without  considerable  change. 


FORMATION   OP   THE   SCREEN.  141 

tery  should  always  be  with  the  reserve.  If  a  force  of  infantry 
in  wagons  accompanies  the  brigade,  it  forms  part  of  the  reserve. 

When  the  brigade  is  marching  on  two  parallel  roads, 
the  reserve  follows  the  regiment  that  seems  most  likely  to 
need  assistance.  If  the  extent  of  front  is  too  great  to  admit 
of  the  reserve  moving  promptly  to  the  assistance  of  either 
wing,  the  unsupported  wing  must  be  given  great  independ- 
ence, and,  if  necessary,  must  adopt  a  separate  line  of  retreat. 

When  the  brigade  is  forced  to  march  in  a  single  column, 
the  contact  troops,  the  intermediate  squadron,  and  the  sup- 
port are  all  furnished  by  the  leading  regiment.  A  strong 
patrol  should  be  pushed  out  well  to  the  front,  and  a  troop 
should  be  detached  to  a  considerable  distance  to  either  flank. 
These  distances  cannot  be  definitely  prescribed:  they  should 
be  great  enough  to  give  the  column  warning  in  time  to  pre- 
pare for  action,  but  not  so  great  as  to  expose  the  detachments 
to  imminent  danger  of  being  cut  off  by  an  enterprising  enemy. 
The  immediate  front  should  be  covered  by  two  contact  troops. 

When  the  ground  permits,  and  no  serious  engagement  is 
expected  within  the  next  twenty-four  hours,  all  three  regi- 
ments may  march  on  the  same  front,  the  brigade  thus  having 
twelve  contact  troops  and  no  reserve.  This  formation  is  de- 
sirable whenever  it  can  be  adopted,  as  it  promotes  celerity 
of  movement,  facilitates  foraging,  and  increases  the  front  of 
reconnaissance.  This  formation  may  be  adopted  even  when 
the  several  columns  are  a  short  day's  march  from  each  other; 
as  the  concentration  on  the  center  column  could  then  be  easily 
effected  within  twenty-four  hours. 

The  duty  of  contact  troops  being  very  arduous,  they  must 
be  relieved  as  often  as  practicable. 

A  rear  guard  is  always  provided  from  the  reserve.  It 
generally  consists  of  two  troops,  and  is  charged  not  only  with 
the  arrest  of  stragglers  and  the  preservation  of  order,  but  also 
with  keeping  a  careful  watch  for  all  suspicious  indications  in 
the  rear.  If  clouds  of  dust  are  seen,  the  cause  must  be  inves- 
tigated; and  villages  and  prominent  points  must  be  watched 


142  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

after  the  column  has  passed,  to  see  that  no  signals  are  given 
out  to  the  enemy. 

The  topography  of  most  of  the  States  of  the  Mississippi 
Valley,  with  their  absolutely  parallel  roads  a  mile  apart,  and 
with  lateral  communication  at  every  mile,  would  probably 
lend  itself  admirably  to  the  typical  formations  suggested 
above;  but  in  many  of  the  more  wooded  and  broken  regions 
of  the  United  States  and  Canada,  where  the  roads  are  fewer 
and  less  regular,  the  following  formation,  based  upon  the 
experience  of  the  War  of  Secession,  would  doubtless  be  much 
better.*  The  brigade,  if  practicable,  operates  on  nqt  more 
than  two  roads,  about  five  miles  apart;  a  regiment  and  two 
squadrons  on  one  road,  and  a  regiment  and  one  squadron 
on  the  other.  (See  Plate  XIII.)  Each  body  detaches  a 
squadron  about  two  miles  to  the  front.  In  advance  of  these, 
patrols,  pushed  out  to  suitable  distances,  cover  the  entire 
front,  maintaining  communication  with  the  center,  and  form- 
ing a  line  of  patrols  extending  about  three  miles  beyond  the 
roads  used  by  the  brigade.  This  gives  a  line  of  patrols  about 
eleven  miles  long,  sixteen  patrols  being  employed — eight  from 
each  advanced  squadron.  The  advanced  squadron  on  each 
road  may  either  be  held  together  or  broken  up  into  supports 

*"In  the  Shenandoah  Valley  the  roads  leading  in  the  direction  of  the 
enemy  were  generally  not  more  numerous  than  two,  each  of  which  was 
important  enough  to  occupy  with  a  brigade,  or  oftener  with  a  division,  of 
cavalry.  The  enormous  distances  to  which  the  German  cavalry  was  sent 
apply  to  conditions  that  would  not  exist  in  the  presence  of  an  enterpris- 
ing and  efficient  opposing  cavalry." — General  Wesley  Merritt,  U.  S.  A.,  in 
response  to  inqidries  by  the  author  on  this  subject. 

"It  remains  yet  to  be  proved  by  the  contact  of  equal  foes,  whether 
the  immense  spread  of  the  German  cavalry  in  1870,  radiating  in  decreasing 
subdivisions  from  a  common  center,  can  be  maintained,  to  its  full  extent, 
in  the  presence  of  an  equally  active  cavalry  foe.  It  is  more  likely  that  to 
obtain  the  information  which  in  '70  was  brought  in  by  small  groups  of 
horsemen,  fearlessly  riding  over  the  country  at  a  great  distance  from  their 
regiments,  it  will  be  found  necessary  to  hold  them  somewhat  more  in  hand 
and  push  forward  on  every  avenue  of  approach  to  the  enemy  a  self-support- 
ing body  of  cavalry  of  considerable  size,  trained  to  fight  under  all  condi- 
tions. So  it  is  that  the  careful  study  of  the  expeditions  of  cavalry  against 
cavalry,  so  fruitful  of  good  results  in  1863,  '64,  and  '65,  is  of  the  first  im- 
portance to  us  as  students  of  cavalry  progress." — General  J .  B.  Bahcock, 
U.S.  A ..  in  Journal  of  the  United  States  Cavalry  Association. 


PLATE  Xm. 


CAVALRY  SCREEN  CONSISTING  OF  1  BRIGADE  ON  TWO  ROADS. 


Sc/uadron  8'''Cavalry  *  flf 


i-o/^ 


^v     \      *     1  III       >  '  ,'' 

***  ^^  Squadron  8*^  Cavalry 


f^Cavatry 
and 
One  Squadron 
l*«/   I      <^  B^Cav. 


CH.OufarfJ. 


11- 


FORMATION   OF  THIS   SCREEN.  143 

for  the  patrols,  as  circumstances  may  require.  In  some 
cases  each  patrol  may  even  be  supported  by  a  half-troop. 
Each  flank  of  the  line  is  strongly  supported  by  nearly  half 
of  the  brigade;  and  any  small  force  of  the  enemy  penetrat- 
ing the  center  of  the  line  would  be  caught  between  the  two 
columns.  No  road  practicable  for  a  large  force  should  be 
between  the  columns,  unless  timel}^  information  and  speedy 
concentration  were  so  sure  as  to  leave  no  danger  of  a  large 
hostile  force  separating  the  two  parts  of  the  brigade. 

If  parallel  roads  do  not  exist  at  suitable  distances,  the 
force  must  be  held  in  a  single  column  in  rear  of  the  center 
of  the  line  of  patrols,  two  squadrons,  if  necessary,  being  de- 
tached to  the  front.  In  fact,  whatever  alterations  circum- 
stances may  demand  in  any  of  the  foregoing  dispositions,  the 
main  body  of  the  brigade  should,  in  any  case,  be  on,  or  near, 
the  principal  route  by  which  the  enemy  may  advance,  and 
must  be  as  concentrated  as  possible.  Lateral  roads  must 
be  reconnoitered,  and,  if  necessary,  occupied  by  covering 
patrols. 

Patrols. — Scouting  patrols  are  sent  out  in  advance  of 
the  contact  troops  to  such  distances  as  circumstances  may 
require.  They  are  either  small  patrols  or  officers'  patrols; 
the  latter  being  always  under  the  command  of  an  officer,  and 
generally  varying  in  strength  from  two  to  ten  men — some- 
times consisting  of  one  or  two  officers  alone.  Larger  de- 
tachments may  be  necessary  for  particular  objects;  but,  as 
a  rule,  the  patrols  should  be  small,  as  they  would  otherwise 
be  too  conspicuous,  and  would  lack  the  mobility  essential 
to  the  proper  performance  of  their  duties.  As  a  general  rule 
for  the  size  of  a  detachment,  it  may  be  said  that  if  it  is  to 
fight,  it  can  not  be  too  strong;  if  it  is  merely  to  observe,  it 
can  not  be  too  weak.  If,  however,  in  the  latter  case,  it  is 
likely  to  encounter  similar  parties  of  the  enemy,  it  should  be 
strong  enough  to  hold  its  own  against  a  hostile  patrol  of  five 
or  six  men,  such  as  is  most  frequently  met. 


144  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

The  scouting  patrols  are  taken  generally  from  the  con- 
tact troops,  though  the)^  may  be  taken  also  from  the  in- 
termediate squadrons,  or  even  from  the  supports,  when  ex- 
tensive reconnaissance  is  necessary.  The  number  of  these 
patrols  will  depend  entirely  upon  circumstances;  but  they 
would  rarely  exceed  two  to  each  contact  troop.  In  Bonie's 
system  these  patrols  are  termed  "points,"  each  consisting  of 
an  officer,  a  corporal,  and  six  men.  The  point  may  be  di- 
vided into  two  equal  groups,  the  officer  retaining  immediate 
command  of  one  and  assigning  the  corporal  to  the  command 
of  the  other.  As  a  formation  suited  to  secure  the  escape  of 
at  least  one  man,  in  case  the  patrol  should  meet  with  dis- 
aster, he  suggests  the  following:  the  officer  with  the  first 
group,  preceded  at  some  distance  by  a  trooper;  the  corporal 
with  the  second  group,  followed  correspondingly  by  another 
trooper,  the  distance  from  the  leading  to  the  rear  trooper 
being  about  a  third  of  a  mile. 

A  patrol  rarely  goes  more  than  six  miles  from  the  con- 
tact troops,  and  detached  scouts  do  not  often  go  more  than 
the  same  distance  from  the  patrol;  but  they  may  be  called 
upon  to  make  very  long  and  exhausting  rides,  and  the  men 
and  horses  should,  therefore,  be  carefully  chosen.  Each  pa- 
trol should  keep  informed  of  the  positions  of  the  patrols  on 
its  flanks,  and  of  its  own  squadron.  Each  troop  and  squad- 
ron should  always  have  similar  knowledge  of  the  positions 
of  corresponding  bodies  and  the  reserve,  and  each  squadron 
and  troop  commander  should  know  where  to  send  his  reports 
and  where  to  establish  connecting  posts,  if  such  posts  are 
to  be  used. 

The  patrols  explore  not  only  to  the  front,  but  on  the  flanks 
of  the  brigade;  the  flanking  patrols  being  generally  taken 
from  the  reserve,  on  account  of  the  heavy  demands  made  on 
the  advanced  squadrons  for  other  patrols. 

The  patrols  should  be  given  great  freedom  of  action.  It 
is  their  duty  to  gain  and  keep  contact  with  the  enemy,  and 
in   their   movements   everything   should   be   subordinated   to 


PATROLS.  ^  145 

the  one  object  of  gaming  information.  They  make  no  at- 
tempt to  provide  for  the  security  of  the  troops  in  rear  (ex- 
cept indirectly  by  furnishing  timely  information) ;  do  not 
think  of  fighting,  except  to  escape  capture;  and  if  compelled 
to  retreat,  they  choose  such  a  line  as  to  them  seems  best, 
regardless  of  the  troops  in  rear.  Neighboring  patrols  com- 
municate their  discoveries  to  each  other,  and,  if  they  do 
not  fall  back  upon  the  contact  squadrons,  join  for  the  night, 
when  practicable,  in  order  to  economize  vedettes,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  have  the  increased  strength  that  comes  from  in- 
creased numbers. 

If  the  scouting  patrols  are  driven  away  by  the  enemy, 
they  return  as  quickly  as  possible  and  continue  their  recon- 
naissance. "They  may,"  says  Bonie,  "best  be  compared  to 
flies,  which  one  keeps  constantly  trying  to  drive  away,  but 
without  effect,  as  they  again  and  again  return  with  an  ener- 
vating persistence."  The  conduct  of  the  German  scouts  in 
1870  is  thus  described  by  the  same  author:  "At  noon,  on 
the  8th  of  August,  we  received  orders  to  saddle  and  mount, 
because  the  enemy's  cavalry  was  in  view.  Some  scouts  were 
mistaken  for  the  head  of  numerous  columns.  We  then  re- 
tired. From  that  moment  until  we  reached  Luneville,  their 
scouts  watched  us  incessantly.  Linked  to  their  army  by 
horsemen,  they  gave  an  exact  account  of  our  positions,  of  our 
halts,  of  our  movements;  and  as  they  watched  us  from  some 
little  distance,  incessantly  appearing  and  disappearing,  they 
spread  uneasiness." 

These  scouts,  by  their  mere  presence,  appearing  and  dis- 
appearing, manifestly  watching,  invariably  eluding  pursuit, 
and  returning  to  their  impudent  intrusion,  produced  upon 
the  French  much  of  the  annoyance  caused  by  harassing  pa- 
trols.    Hohenlohe  says : 

"It  is  necessary  to  have  seen  it,  as  I  did  the  day  before 
the  battle  of  Beaumont,  before  one  can  realize  how  our  cav- 
alry swarmed  round  the  enemy's  columns  on  the  march,  just 
as  bees  swarm  out  of  their  hives  against  an  intruder.     I  saw 


146  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

one  corps,  which,  as  it  marched  by  me  during  many  hours,  I 
reckoned  at  forty  battahons,  continually  annoyed  and  de- 
layed by  our  troublesome  Uhlans.  Sometimes  whole  com- 
panies broke  out  in  anger  from  the  column  of  march  and 
fired  volleys  at  single  patrols,  who  then  quickly  fell  bacK 
and,  as  far  as  possible,  avoided  loss.  The  result  of  all  this 
was  indescribable  fatigue  for  the  enemy's  infantry.  They 
reached  the  end  of  their  march  as  night  fell,  utterly  tired  out, 
and  neglected,  from  very  weariness,  the  most  ordinary  pre- 
cautions as  to  outposts  around  their  miserable  bivouacs, 
while  our  infantry,  quite  near  them,  but  without  their  knowl- 
edge, was  comfortably  housed  in  villages." 

As  a  rule,  officers'  patrols  are  detailed  for  each  of  the 
main  routes  and  the  flanks,  the  intervening  country  and 
lesser  roads  being  intrusted  to  small  patrols  under  non-com- 
missioned officers.  If  detached  from  a  contact  troop,  the 
officer's  patrol  will  have  for  its  duty  part  of  the  general  re- 
connoitering  duty  of  the  troop;  if  detailed  otherwise,  the 
patrol  will  probably  be  intrusted  with  a  special  mission — 
such  as  to  open  communication  with  some  portion  of  ,the 
command  which  is  not  in  contact  with  the  brigade;  to  ascer- 
tain whether  the  enemy  is  present  in  a  certain  village;  or  to 
reconnoiter  a  distant  village  or  defile.  Officers'  patrols  thus 
sent  out  may  go  very  much  farther  than  the  ordinary  scout- 
ing patrols,  depending  while  gone  entirety  upon  their  own 
resources.  Officers  are  sometimes  detached  singly  to  watch 
the  enemy  or  particular  points,  rejoining  when  their  object 
is  accomplished  or  they  are  driven  in  by  the  enemy.  A  pa- 
trol sent  out  on  a  special  mission  should  return  the  moment 
its  object  is  accomplished,  without  undertaking  other  ob- 
jects on  its  own  responsibility.  Care  shcjuld  be  taken  that 
neither  too  many  missions  nor  too  great  an  exten,t  of  ground 
be  assigned  to  a  single  patrol. 

Having  in  view  the  possibility  of  falling  into  the  hands 
of  the  enemy,  the  officers  should  not  have  on  their  persons 
any  papers  that  could  give  information  to  the  enemy.     They 


PATROLS.  147 

should  commit  their  orders  to  memory,  and  then  destroy  the 
printed  or  written  copy.* 

Owing  to  the  superior  celerity  and  efficiency  of  officers' 
patrols,  they  are  especially  valuable  in  seizing  postoffices, 
telegraph  stations,  etc.  In  entering  a  village  or  town  in  the 
enemy's  country,  the  greatest  safety  is  found  in  the  sudden 
appearance  and  prompt  disappearance  of  the  party.  The 
patrol  should  quickly  gain  the  desired  information,  or  seize 
the  persons  or  documents  constituting  its  object,  and  should 
disappear  before  the  inhabitants  recover  from  their  aston- 
ishment sufficiently  to  appreciate  how  small,  or  how  isolated, 
the  party  is. 

The  general  rules  for  the  conduct  of  the  scouting  patrols 
have  already  been  considered  in  the  subject  of  reconnais- 
sance; and  but  little  remains  to  be  said  about  them.  While 
independence  of  action  must  be  given  to  these  patrols;  while 
no  attempt  must  be  made  to  rally  them  every  night  on  the 
advance  guards  of  the  contact  troops;  they  will,  as  a  rule, 
if  driven  back,  rally  upon  the  troops  immediately  in  their 
rear.  Indeed,  it  is  impossible  to  get  good  scouting  service 
unless  the  patrols  are  supported  by  a  sufficient  force  to  in- 
sure some  degree  of  protection  from  the  assaults  of  the  en- 
emy's cavalry.  In  the  retreat  from  Spicheren,  General  de 
Cissey  ordered  a  regiment  of  cavalry  to  drive  away  the  Ger- 
man patrols,  which  were  pertinaciously  hanging  upon  the 
rear  of  the  French.  A  squadron  quickly  drove  back  the 
patrols,  but  coming  upon  the  squadrons  in  rear,  it  was  de- 
feated and  driven  back  with  loss,  and  the  annoying  scouts 
were  again  seen  hovering  around  the  retreating  army. 

*This  rule  might  sometimes  be  profitably  adopted  by  officers  when 
not  on  duty  with  patrols.  General  J.  G.  Walker,  formerly  of  the  Confed- 
erate army,  in  speaking  of  Lee's  "Special  Orders,  No.  191,"  a  copy  of 
which  accidentally  fell  into  McClellan's  hands,  says:  "On  receiving  my 
copy  of  the  order  I  was  so  impressed  with  the  disastrous  consequence  which 
might  result  from  its  loss  that  I  pinned  it  securely  in  an  inside  pocket.  In 
speaking  with  General  Longstreet  on  this  subject  afterward,  he  remarked 
that  the  same  thought  had  occurred  to  him,  and  that,  as  an  absolutely 
sure  precaution,  he  memorized  the  order  and  then  'chewed  it  up.'  " — 
"Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,"  Vol.  II.,  page  607. 


148  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

In  this  case  the  French  attacking  force  was  too  small; 
and,  in  general,  it  may  be  said  that  the  only  way  to  get  rid  of 
the  enemy's  annoying  scouts,  when  they  are  properly  sup- 
ported, is  by  inflicting  a  heavy  defeat  upon  his  cavalry.  When 
(some  days  after  his  victory  at  Fisher's  Hill)  Sheridan  with- 
drew down  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  he  was  followed  by  Early, 
whose  parties  of  cavalry,  as  soon  as  they  gained  contact, 
hung  upon  the  Union  army  much  after  the  manner  of  the 
Prussian  patrols  described  above.  Sheridan,  "resenting  this 
boldness  of  an  army  so  lately  routed,"  halted  the  next  day, 
and  launched  his  entire  cavalry  force  against  that  of  the  en- 
emy. A  spirited  engagement  of  two  hours'  duration  (knov/n 
as  the  battle  of  Tom's  Brook)  resulted  in  the  complete  de- 
feat of  the  Confederate  cavalry,  Lomax  being  driven  in  flight 
nearly  thirty  miles  by  Merritt,  while  Rosser  was  routed  by 
Custer.  So  thoroughly  was  the  Confederate  cavalry  used  up 
that  nothing  further  was  seen  of  Early's  contact  parties. 

The  movements  of  the  scouting  patrols  will  depend  on  those 
of  the  enemy;  for  they  must  never  lose  contact  with  him, 
unless  ordered  to  do  so.  The  contact  troops  must  always  be 
ready,  if  possible,  to  lend  prompt  support  to  the  patrols; 
and  we  thus  have  the  movements  of  the  leading  squadrons 
entirely  contingent  upon  those  of  the  enemy.  The  patrols 
on  the  flanks  of  the  brigade  must  endeavor  to  work  round 
the  flanks  of  the  enemy;  and  for  this  purpose  they  and  the 
supporting  contact  troops  must  be  given  considerable  inde- 
pendence of  action,  both  in  advancing  and  in  falling  back. 

Separation  of  the  Duties  of  Security  and  Information. — The 
duties  of  security  and  those  of  information  thus  come  into 
direct  conflict.  The  cavalry  screen  acts  as  the  advanced  out- 
post of  the  army,  and  the  contact  troops  constitute  the  out- 
post for  the  main  body  of  the  cavalry  thus  employed.  Now,  an 
outpost  must  not  be  pushed  so  far  in  advance  of  the  main  body 
as  to  be  beyond  prompt  support;  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
scouting  parties  and  contact  troops  must  touch  upon  the  en- 
emy in  order  to  get  information.     It  follows,  then,  that  when 


SEPARATION   OF   SECURITY  AND   INFORMATION.  149 

the  opposing  armies  are  at  a  distance  of  several  days'  march 
from  each  other,  the  duties  of  security  must  be  separated  from 
those  of  information;  and  this  is  usually  effected  by  intrust- 
ing the  latter  duties  to  detached  patrols.  During  the  first 
concentration  of  the  armies  on  the  theater  of  operations, 
tliese  detached  patrols  are  generally  small  officers'  patrols; 
celerity  of  movement  and  intelligence  in  reconnoitering  being 
here  even  more  necessary  than  usual,  as  (the  regular  cavalry 
screen  not  having  yet  been  formed)  the  patrols  are  without 
support. 

Transmission  of  Intelligence. — All  information  gained  by 
the  cavalry  screen  is  promptly  transmitted  to  the  headquar- 
ters of  the  commander-in-chief.  In  case  the  screening  force 
consists  of  corps  cavalry,  the  reports  are  made  to  the  corps 
commander.  The  commander  of  the  screen  keeps  up  con- 
stant communication  with  the  commanders  of  the  advance 
guards  of  the  column  in  his  rear,  and  keeps  them  posted  in 
regard  to  matters  in  their  front  which  they  should  know. 
Staff  officers  from  the  headquarters  of  the  army,  or  of  the 
army  corps  immediately  in  rear,  are  frequently  sent  with  the 
screening  force,  moving  with  the  most  important  detachments. 
Thus,  in  the  operations  just  preceding  the  battle  of  Mars-la- 
Tom",  the  chief  of  staff  of  the  Xth  Corps  accompanied  the  5th 
Cavalry  Division.  Many  similar  instances  occurring  in  the 
same  war  might  be  cited. 

Contact  and  Fighting. — On  gaining  contact  with  the  ene- 
my, concentration  is  the  first  consideration;  for  fighting  will 
now  be  necessary,  either  to  break  his  screen  or  to  preserve 
om-  own,  and  victory  should  rest  with  that  cavalry  which  is 
in  the  best  formation  for  combat.  The  cavalry  should  be 
concentrated  on  two  or  more  parallel  roads,  in  supporting 
distance,  ignoring  the  enemy's  scouts  and  patrols,  and  push- 
ing through  to  his  reserves.*  If  the  enemy  has  been  more 
intent  upon  "information"  than  "security,"  and  has  his  force 

*Tliis  was  Sheridan's  plan  of  action  at  the  battle  of  Tom's  Brook. 


I50  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

disseminated,  his  reserves  will  be  crushed,  and  the  rest  of 
his  screen,  finding  a  concentrated  body  of  hostile  cavaliy  in 
its  rear,  will  collapse  and  seek  safety  in  a  rapid  retreat  by  the 
flanks.  If  the  enemy  has  his  force  concentrated,  our  cav- 
alry must  also  be  concentrated  to  avoid  ruin.  The  follow- 
ing may,  therefore,  be  given  as  an  invariable  rule :  From  the 
outset  spare  no  means  of  gaining  information;  but  on  touch- 
ing the  enemy,  shape  everything  to  the  end  of  being  ready  to 
fight.  The  best  way  to  screen  an  army  is  by  defeating  the  op- 
posing cavalry. 

If  the  patrols  perform  their  duty  properl)^  the  presence 
of  large  forces  of  the  enemy  should  be  known  in  time  for  the 
necessary  orders  for  concentration  to  be  given;  but  if  the 
contact  troops  find  themselves  in  the  presence  of  large  hos- 
tile bodies,  advancing  or  deplo^^ed  for  battle,  they  fall  back 
upon  the  supports,*  even  though  no  orders  to  that  effect  have 
been  given.  Unless  the  contact  troops  are  themselves  sur- 
prised (which  is  absolutely  without  excuse),  they  fall  back 
slowly;  and  when  they  have  joined  the  supports,  the  united 
force  falls  back  upon  the  reserve,  or  the  latter  is  moved  up 
to  reinforce  the  former.  If  there  is  no  special  reserve,  the 
threatened  troop  or  squadron  closes  in  upon  a  neighboring 
one,  warning  it  quickly  beforehand. 

The  concentration  effected,  the  action  of  the  cavalry  de- 
pends upon  circumstances.  If  the  enemy's  cavalry  covers 
his  front,  it  should  be  vigorously  attacked.  If  the  hostile 
screening  force  has  been  driven  awaj^  from,  or  has  volun- 
tarily uncovered,  the  front  of  its  army,  our  cavalry  should 
remain  in  observation  of  the  enemy's  front  only  until  our 
army  is  ready  for  battle,  when  it  should  withdraw  to  one  or 
both  flanks  of  the  corps  or  army,  taking  up  a  position  to 
check  the  attempts  of  the  enemy  to  attack  or  reconnoiter. 
During  the  movements  to  the  flanks,  and  in  all  movements 


*It  is  presumed  that  at  this  stage  the  intermediate  squadrons  are 
merged  with  the  supports. 


CONTACT  AND   FIGHTING.  151 

of  concentration,  unceasing  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy  is 
kept  up  b}^  officers'  patrols. 

In  an  attempt  to  break  through  our  screen,  the  enemy 
(especially  if  accompanied  by  artillery)  must  generally  ad- 
vance on  one  of  the  main  roads  perpendicular  to  its  front — 
a  road  upon  which  our  cavalry  should  itself  be  advancing. 
Good  cavalry,  under  an  efficient  leader,  should  never  be  sur- 
prised by  such  a  movement;  for  if  provision  for  mutual  sup- 
port by  the  different  bodies  has  been  made  beforehand,  if 
communication  has  been  maintained  and  scouting  has  not 
been  neglected,  the  enemy's  movements  should  be  quickly 
perceived  and  promptly  met.  If,  however,  the  cavalry  is 
driven  in  by  the  enemy,  the  direction  of  its  retreat  will  gener- 
ally depend  upon  the  seeming  designs  of  the  enemy  and  the 
direction  of  his  advance.  The  retiring  cavalry  may  find  it 
expedient  to  draw  the  enemy  after  it  in  a  false  direction,  in 
order  to  obtain  favorable  conditions  for  its  own  army.  But, 
in  order  to  act  judiciously  in  such  cases,  a  correct  apprecia- 
tion of  the  state  of  affairs  and  a  sound  judgment  as  to  what 
will  be  advantageous  are  necessary.* 

The  cavalry  screen  may  sometimes  find  it  necessary  to 
act  as  a  veritable  advance  guard,  and  fight  a  delaying  action 
to  hold  an  advantageous  position  and  cover  the  deployment 
of  the  army;  just  as  Buford  held  the  position  at  Gettysburg 
untn  the  arrival  and  deployment  of  the  First  Corps,  keeping 
in  check  with  his  two  small  cavalry  brigades  Heth's  Confed- 
erate infantry  division.  In  such  a  case  the  chief  reliance 
should  be  placed  on  dismounted  fire-action,  and  the  cavalry 
should  not  hesitate  to  resort  to  the  intrenching  tool. 

In  combating  the  opposing  cavalry  screen,  the  judgment 
of  the  commander  must  decide  whether  shock  or  dismounted 
action  should  be  used.  This  question  will  largely  depend 
upon  the  nature  of  the  ground  and  the  action  of  the  opposing 
force.  It  may  be  said  that  where  suddenness  of  action  is 
desirable,    shock   action   should   be   used   whenever  possible; 

*Von  Schmidt. 


152  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

and  the  penetrating  force  should,  therefore,  be  partial  to  the 
employment  of  the  saber  or  revolver.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  resisting  force  should  incline  to  the  use  of  the  carbine, 
unless  it  has  been  able  to  concentrate  as  rapidly  as  its  oppo- 
nent, and  thus  has  reason  to  expect  favorable  results  from  a 
counter-charge.  Cavalry  must  always  be  ready  for  effective 
fire-action ;  for  it  may  find  its  progress  opposed  by  infantry  or 
partisan  troops  sheltered  in  villages  or  behind  breastworks.* 

When  the  enemy  is  defeated,  the  cavalry  resumes  its 
place  in  advance  of  the  other  troops.  Its  mode  of  action 
then  can  not  be  better  described  than  in  the  words  of  Bo- 
guslawski : 

"Immediately  after  these  actions  [Spicheren,  Weissen- 
burg,  and  Worth],  the  cavalry  divisions  again  led  the  way. 
Their  mission  was,  above  all,  to  pursue  and  keep  in  contact 
with  the  enemy.  They  threw  forward  strong  detachments, 
which  everywhere  forced  the  enemy  back  and  sought  to  dis- 
cover the  direction  of  his  march  or  his  new  position.  If  they 
found  their  way  clear  before  them,  they  sent  on  officers'  pa- 
trols, with  orders  to  push  forward  at  any  risk  until  they  came 
upon  the  foe.  These  parties  were  dispatched  in  all  directions, 
and  performed  their  duties  generally  with  equal  ability  and 
determination.  It  is  they  who  spread  the  fear  of  les  Prus- 
siens  many  miles  in  front  of  the  army  corps'  advance  guards; 
to  them  cities  like  Nancy  opened  their  gates  without  an  at- 
tempt at  resistance;  and  if  here  and  there  a  cavalry  patrol 
some  days'  march  in  advance  of  the  division  was  dispersed 
or  cut  off,  one  or  two  horsemen  generally  made  their  way  back 
to  give  intelligence,  which  was  what  was  wanted." 

It  is  not  often,  however,  that  the  cavalry,  even  of  a  vic- 
torious army,  can  have  its  own  way  so  completely.  It  is  only 
when  the  cavalry  has  beaten  its  opponent  into  a  sense  of 

*It  seems  incredible  to  American  cavalrymen  that  in  December,  1870, 
a  German  cavalry  brigade  was  stopped  at  the  village  of  Vibray  by  twelve 
riflemen.  The  lesson  taught  by  this  humihating  check  was  not  lost  on  the 
Germans ;  and  the  arms  and  training  of  their  cavalry  are  now  such  that  a 
repetition  of  such  an  occurrence  would  be  impossible. 


CONTACT  AND   I^IGHTING.  1 53 

hopeless  inferiority  that  such  audacious  reconnaissance  can 
be  successfully  carried  out. 

Protecting  the  Infantry. — The  work  of  the  infantry  is 
greatly  lightened  when  a  cavalry  screen  in  advance  performs 
its  duty  efficiently  and  has  gained  the  upper  hand  of  the  op- 
posing cavalry.  In  1870-71  the  German  infantry  was  not 
disturbed  by  any  apprehensions  in  regard  to  the  enemy,  but 
marched  and  rested  in  security,  knowing  that  the  country  was 
reconnoitered  so  far  ahead  that  the  cavalry  could  give  warn- 
ing of  the  enemy's  advance  a  full  day  before  the  attack  could 
be  made.  During  the  entire  war,  the  German  infantry  was 
not  once  alarmed  by  the  enemy,  and  its  marches  were  made 
as  easily  as  in  "autumn  maneuvers." 

Seizing  Important  Points. — In  addition  to  screening  the 
movements  of  its  own  army  and  discovering  those  of  the 
enemy,  the  advance  cavalry  is  often  required  to  seize  passes, 
heights,  or  bridges,  the  possession  of  which  is  important,  and 
which  must  be  gained  quickly,  and  held  until  the  main  army 
can  arrive.  In  this  operation,  celerity  of  movement  and  fight- 
ing power  are  prime  considerations. 

In  1863  Rosecrans  moved  against  the  Confederate  army, 
which  occupied  the  line  from  Wartrace,  through  Shelbyville, 
along  Duck  River.  His  plan  was  to  menace  Bragg's  left, 
and  then  turn  his  right  by  way  of  Hoover's  Gap  and  Man- 
chester. Thomas'  corps,  which  constituted  the  center,  moved 
out  on  the  Manchester  road,  covered  by  Wilder'^  brigade  of 
mounted  infantry.  A  Confederate  corps  under  Hardee  was 
in  cantonments  about  three  miles  back  of  Hoover's  Gap,  and 
it  was  the  intention  of  that  commander,  as  soon  as  he  should 
hear  of  an  advance  of  the  United  States  forces,  to  push  for- 
ward and  hold  the  gap  at  its  northern  entrance,  where  the 
ground  was  favorable  for  defense,  but  unsuited  to  camping. 
Striking  the  Confederate  outposts  on  the  hither  side  of  the 
gap.  Wilder  pressed  them  so  vigorously  as  to  drive  them 
through  at  a  run.  He  then  took  up  a  position  at  the  south- 
ern outlet  of  the  gap,  where  he  had  the  same  defensive  advan- 


154  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

tages  that  the  enemy  would  have  had  at  the  northern  end. 
Attacked  here  by  greatly  superior  numbers,  he  held  his  ground 
until  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  enabled  him  definitely  to 
repulse  the  enemy.  Thus  with  a  loss  of  less  than  loo  men 
was  secured  a  position  which  General  Thomas  expected  to 
gain  only  at  the  cost  of  many  lives. 

Foraging. — Another  mission  of  the  advanced  cavalry  is 
to  furnish  and  cover  foraging  parties.  The  cavalry  screen 
generally  moves  over  an  untouched  country,  and  can  thus 
easily  supply  itself:  moreover,  considerations  of  mobility  de- 
mand that  its  train  should  be  light,  if  it  can  not  dispense 
with  a  train  altogether.  The  contact  troops  should  not  be 
accompanied  by  wagons  of  any  description,  but  should  carry 
the  necessary  rations  and  forage  either  on  their  own  horses 
or  on  requisitioned  animals;  and,  to  the  greatest  possible 
degree,  the  supplies  needed  by  them  should  be  obtained  by 
"foraging  liberally  on  the  country." 

The  train  of  the  brigade,  limited  to  the  barest  requirements, 
and  preferably  composed  of  pack-mules,  marches  with  the 
reserve.  Special  foraging  parties  are  detailed  from  the  inter- 
mediate squadrons  or  the  supports.  These  parties,  acting 
under  the  orders  of  the  commander-in-chief,  and  under  the 
general  supervision  of  a  commissary  officer,  generally  oper- 
ate on  a  line  with,  or  in  rear  of,  "the  supports,  and  incident- 
ally cover  the  front  and  flanks  of  the  reserve  to  such  distances 
as  may  be  expedient.  The  supplies  gathered  in  excess  of 
the  needs  of  the  cavalry  are  collected  at  convenient  points 
for  the  use  of  the  troops  in  rear. 

Connecting  Posts. 

Without  means  for  its  speedy  transmission  to  the  rear, 
the  information  gained  by  the  cavalry  screen  would  be  of  but 
little  value.  Scouts  ride  back  to  their  patrols  with  informa- 
tion, and  the  latter  constantly  transmit  intelligence  to  the 
contact  troops,  who,  in  turn,  maintain  communication  with 


CONNECTING   POSTS.  1 55 

the  intermediate  squadrons,  the  supports,  and  each  other,  by- 
means  of  communicating  patrols  or  single  scouts.  Commu- 
nication back  to  the  reserve  is  also  generally  effected  by 
means  of  patrols  or  single  scouts;  but  between  the  reserve 
and  the  main  body  of  the  army,  and  sometimes  between  the 
reserve  and  the  supports,  it  should  be  maintained  by  means 
of  connecting  posts. 

Connecting  posts  are  generally  about  five  miles  apart; 
but  their  immber  will  depend  largely  on  the  niunber  of  well- 
marked  points  on  the  route;  such  as  cross-roads,  taverns, 
etc.  Each  post  should  ordinarily  consist  of  one  non-commis- 
sioned officer  and  six  men.  This  would  admit  of  two  men 
being  sent  in  each  direction  without  denuding  the  post.  One 
officer  should  have  charge  of  four  posts. 

In  a  dangerous  country,  or  when  the  number  of  men 
available  for  the  duty  is  limited,  the  connecting  posts  may 
be  larger  and  farther  apart;  often  consisting  of  a  half -troop 
under  a  lieutenant.  If  the  country  is  very  dangerous,  the 
post  should  be  concealed  in  a  position  selected  with  a  view 
to  defense  and  retreat,  men  being  detached  on  the  road  to 
keep  watch  for  couriers. 

Two  horses  and  men  should  be  kept  ready  for  immedi- 
ate departure,  and  a  sentinel  must  be  constantly  on  the  alert 
at  the  post.  When  an  orderly  arrives,  he  gives  his  dispatches 
to  the  commander  of  the  post,  who  receipts  to  him  for  the 
same,  and  sends  them  forward  by  a  fresh  courier.  The  time 
of  arrival  and  departure  should  be  noted  on  the  envelope  con- 
taining the  dispatches.  When  a  dispatch  is  delayed  or  lost, 
the  officer  sending  it  must  be  notified  at  once.  The  orderly 
bringing  the  dispatch  will,  ordinarily,  rest  for  a  time  at  the 
post;  remaining,  except  in  case  of  emergency,  until  the  ar- 
rival of  a  courier  from  the  opposite  direction,  in  order  that 
he  may  carry  dispatches  back  with  him,  if  any  are  brought 
in.  On  leaving  a  post  the  orderly  is  given  careful  instruc- 
tions as  to  the  road  he  is  to  follow  and  the  pace  at  which  he 
is  to  go;  the  rate  of  travel  being  noted  on  the  envelope  con- 


156 


SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 


taining  the  dispatches.  The  orderly  must  always  carry  the 
dispatch  on  his  person,  so  that  it  may  not  be  lost  in  case  of 
any  accident  befalling  his  horse.  To  prevent  the  dispatch 
from  becoming  illegible  from  wet,  it  should  be  enclosed  in 
two  envelopes. 

A  convenient  form  of  envelope,  reduced  to  one-fourth 
size,  is  represented  below.  The  form  of  report  given  on 
page  113  could  be  used  without  the  appended  receipt,  the 
envelope  being  duly  signed  and  returned  to  the  bearer  as  a 
voucher  for  the  delivery  of  the  message. 


To 


DEPARTURE 
RATE  OF  SPEED 


ARRIVAL 


This  envelope  will  be  returned  to  bearer. 


A  register  should  be  kept  at  each  connecting  post,  and 
frequently  inspected  by  the  superintending  officer.  It  should 
show  the  time  of  arrival  of  each  courier,  whence  he  came, 
whither  he  went,  the  time  of  his  departure,  from  whom  his 
dispatches  came,  and  to  whom  they  were  addressed.  Other 
remarks  might  be  added  when  necessary. 

If  the  posts  are  moving,  the  general  rules  for  their  con- 
duct are  the  same  as  when  they  are  stationary.  Each  com- 
mander who  may  have  occasion  to  make  use  of  a  post  should 
be  kept  informed  where  it  is  to  be  found;  for  instance,  "Till 
noon,  at  Beverly;  till  6  p.  m.,  at  Bee  Creek;  till  midnight,  at 
Platte  City." 

When  a  force  is  stationary  or  moving  directly  upon  a 
fixed  objective,  connecting  posts  should  be  practicable;  but 
otherwise  it  is  not  always  possible  to  establish  them.     The 


CONNECTING   POSTS.  157 

routes  of  the  contact  troops  being  entirel3^  and  that  of  the 
whole  brigade  largely,  dependent  upon  the  movements  of  the 
enemy,  it  is  not  al\va5^s  possible  to  know  where  the  chain  of 
connecting  posts  is  to  begin  or  end.  It  must  also  be  prac- 
ticable to  relieve  the  posts  and  rally  them  upon  their  respect- 
ive troops,  and  they  must  not  be  exposed  to  great  danger 
of  capture  by  the  enemy.  Failing  these  conditions,  connect- 
ing posts  cannot  be  considered,  and  dispatches  must  be  sent 
through  by  patrols  or  on  the  responsibility  of  a  single  mes- 
senger. Connecting  posts  will  generally  be  found  practicable 
from  the  reserve  of  the  cavalry  brigade  back  to  the  rear;  but 
to  the  front  of  the  reserve,  towards  the  contact  troops,  they 
will  generally  be  out  of  the  question.  At  any  rate,  the  contact 
troops  must  not  establish  them,  as  these  troops  will  have 
enough  to  do  in  watching  the  enemy.  The  bodies  in  rear 
must  be  held  responsible  for  preser\dng  communication  with 
the  contact  troops. 

A  Regiment  as  a  Screening  Force. 

When  a  single  regiment  of  cavalry  is  required  to  screen 
the  front  of  a  considerable  force,  its  frontage  is  necessarily 
such  that  it  can  have  but  slight  power  of  resistance.  Its 
duty  is  limited  almost  entirely  to  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy, 
and  it  can  contribute  but  little  to  the  security  of  the  force  in 
rear,  except  by  keeping  it  informed  of  the  condition  of  affairs 
in  front.  It  is  out  of  the  question  to  give  it  sufficient  power 
of  resistance  for  advance  guard  duties  by  adding  infantry 
to  it,  as  its  mobilty — its  most  valuable  characteristic — would 
thus  be  destroyed.  In  some  cases,  however,  infantry  in  wag- 
ons might  take  the  place  of  the  reserve. 

The  reserve  of  the  regiment  (one  squadron)  may  be  from 
five  to  ten  miles  in  advance  of  the  force  which  it  covers.  The 
other  squadrons  are  pushed  forward  and  to  the  flanks  about 
two  and  a  half  miles,  each  sending  forward  two  contact  troops 
and  retaining  two  troops  in  support.     The  distance  between 

12 — 


158  SECURITY  AND   INFORMATION. 

the  contact  troops  and  the  supports  is  about  two  and  one- 
half  miles. 

The  following  alternative  formation  was  devised  by  Gen- 
eral Guy  V.  Henry,  U.  S.  A.,  to  use  when  it  is  desirable  to 
keep  a  strong  reserve  well  in  hand:  The  reserve,  consisting 
of  six  troops,  is  preceded  by  the  rest  of  the  regiment  in  col- 
umns of  two  troops  each;  the  distance  from  the  reserve  and 
the  intervals  between  the  columns  being  each  generally  about 
two  and  a  half  miles,  but  varying  as  circumstances  require. 
In  each  column  each  of  the  two  troops  in  turn  throws  patrols 
to  the  front,  which  send  forward  detached  scouts  as  may  be 
necessary;  each  column  covering  its  own  front.  The  general 
principles  regulating  the  screening  and  reconnoitering  duties 
of  a  regiment  are  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  a  brigade. 

:  CONClvUSIONS. 

The  general  rules  for  the  conduct  of  the  cavalry  screen 
may  be  summarized  as  follows: 

1.  Explore  the  coimtry  well  to  the  front  with  small  pa- 
trols, which  must  not  lose  contact  with  the  enem}'-. 

2.  Keep  the  supporting  bodies  well  in  hand,  so  as  to  be 
able  to  concentrate  rapidly. 

3.  Always  maintain  a  reserve  when  near  the  enemy. 

4.  Keep  up  constant  communication  between  all  parts 
of  the  screen  and  with  the  troops  in  rear. 

jl^  5.  Always  form  and  maneuver  the  screen  with  a  view  to 
beating  the  opposing  cavalry.  This  is  the  paramount  con- 
sideration ."I:; 


CHAPTER  VI. 


Rear  Guards. 


Retreats  of  great  generals,  and  of  armies  inured  to  war,  have  always 
resembled  the  retreat  of  a  wounded  lion,  and  such  is,  undoubtedly,  also 
the  best  theory. — Clauseivitz. 

When  an  army  has  been  engaged  in  a  stubborn  battle, 
its  defeat  invariably  causes,  to  a  greater  or  less  degree,  a 
disruption  of  its  organization  and  a  shattering  of  its  dis- 
cipline. Different  battalions,  regiments,  and  brigades  are 
mingled  together;  the  artillery  is  separated  from  its  ammu- 
nition; baggage  wagons  are  mixed  up  with  the  retreating 
forces;  confusion  takes  the  place  of  order,  and  subordina- 
tion is  lost  in  the  instinct  of  self-preservation.  If  the  army, 
while  in  this  condition,  be  vigorously  pursued  by  intact  forces 
of  the  enemy,  the  disaster  of  battle  will  be  completed  by  the 
havoc  of  pursuit,  and  the  results  of  the  action  will  be  decisive. 

But  such  pursuits  as  those  which  followed  the  battles 
of  Jena  and  Waterloo  are  rarely  practicable.  In  the  former, 
the  large  body  of  comparatively  fresh  troops  at  the  disposal 
of  Napoleon,  and  in  the  latter,  the  late  arrival  of  the  Prus- 
sians on  the  battle-field,  made  possible  a  prompt  and  vigor- 
ous pursuit.  As  a  rule,  however,  victorious  armies  are  too 
much  exhausted  to  pursue  immediately  with  energy;  and 
recent  wars  are  peculiarly  barren  in  instances  of  vigorous 
pursuit  of  a  defeated  enemy.  General  Johnston  declares 
that  his  raw  troops  at  Bull  Run  were  as  much  demoralized 
by  victory  as  their  undisciplined  opponents  were  by  defeat. 
At  Gettysburg  a  fierce  struggle  of  three  days  left  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  in  poor  condition  to  follow  promptly  its 
retreating  antagonist.  At  Koniggratz  the  Prussians  were 
thrown  into  such  confusion  by  the  concentric  nature  of  their 

159 


l6o  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

attack  and  the  intermingling  of  their  armies,  that  they  were 
unable  to  resume  their  advance  for  nearly  twenty-four  hours, 
and  were  for  three  days  completely  in  the  dark  as  to  the  di- 
rection of  the  Austrian  retreat.  At  Gravel otte  the  victori- 
ous Germans  remained  immovable  for  an  entire  day. 

Whatever  may  be  the  extent  of  the  confusion  and  de- 
moralization attending  their  defeat,  good  troops  need  only 
to  shake  themselves  loose  from  the  enemy,  and  have  a  brief 
respite  from  molestation,  to  recover  from  their  confusion 
and  regain  their  morale.  The  protection  needed  for  these 
ends  is  furnished  by  a  rear  guard. 

Ditty  of  a  Rear  Guard. — The  duty  of  a  rear  guard  can  not 
begin  until  the  battle  has  ended.  On  the  field  itself  the  with- 
drawal is  covered  by  the  artillery  and  cavalry,  especially 
the  latter  when  the  ground  favors  its  action;  and  it  is  only 
when  the  first  halt  is  effected  that  the  rear  guard  can  be 
organized  and  a  regular  retreat  begun.  In  thus  protecting 
the  army  by  a  fraction  of  itself,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  enemy  must  change  from  order  of  battle  to  order  of  march 
to  pursue,  and  that  he  can  at  first  bring  only  the  heads  of  his 
columns  against  the  rear  of  the  retreating  force. 

The  rear  guard  must  be  organized  as  soon  as  possible, 
even  at  the  expense  of  a  delay  comparatively  near  the  enemy  ; 
for  to  trust  to  speed  entirely  in"  escaping  would  be  to  make 
such  long  and  continued  forced  marches  as  to  ruin  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  array  and  disintegrate  it  by  straggling. 

The  rear  guard  must  profit  to  the  utmost  by  the  defens- 
ive features  of  the  ground,  and  at  every  opportunity  take  up 
a  strong  defensive  position.  The  enemy  will  then  have  but 
two  courses  of  action  open  to  his  choice:  either  to  attack 
with  the  heads  of  his  columns,  or  to  deploy  for  action.  In 
the  former,  his  advanced  troops  should  be  easily  repulsed, 
as  Murat's  cavalry,  attacking  with  "thoughtless  ardor,"  was 
invariably  beaten  back  by  the  hostile  rear  guards  in  the  Rus- 


REAR    GUARDS.  l6l 

sian  retreat  to  Moscow;*  in  the  latter,  the  enemy  will  be 
compelled  to  lose  time  in  deploying,  while  the  rear  guard 
(which  should  wait  until  the  enemy's  dispositions  for  attack 
are  about  completed)  should  quickl}^  pl<>3''  and  disappear  from 
his  front,  only  to  repeat  the  operation  at  the  next  favorable 
ground.  In  the  meantime,  the  enemy,  unable  to  advance 
quickly  in  deployed  lines,  again  loses  time  in  changing  to  a 
marching  formation,  and  the  main  body  of  the  retreating 
army  steadil}^  continues  on  its  way  without  halting.  The 
duty  of  the  rear  guard  is  thus  epitomized  by  Napoleon:  "The 
art  of  a  general  of  a  rear  guard  is,  without  compromising 
himself,  to  check  the  enemy,  to  delay  him,  and  to  oblige  him 
to  consume  three  or  four  hours  in  going  a  league. "| 

Ney's  method  of  handling  the  rear  guard  in  the  retreat 
from  Moscow  may  be  taken  as  a  typical  example.  Count 
Segur  thus  describes  it:  "Every  day,  at  five  o'clock  in  the 
evening,  he  took  his  position,  stopped  the  Russians,  allowed 
his  soldiers  to  eat  and  take  some  rest,  and  resumed  his  march 
at  ten  o'clock.  During  the  whole  of  the  night  he  pushed  the 
mass  of  the  stragglers  before  him,  by  dint  of  cries,  of  en- 
treaties, and  of  blows.  At  daybreak,  which  was  about  sc/en 
o'clock,  he  halted,  again  took  position,  and  rested  under  arms 
and  on  guard  until  ten  o'clock;  the  enemy  then  usually  made 
his  appearance,  and  he  was  compelled  to  fight  until  the  even- 
ing, gaining  as  much  ground  to  the  rear  as  possible." 

Strength  of  the  Rear  Guard. — The  strength  of  the  rear 
guard  depends  upon  the  nature  of  the  country,  and  the 
strength  and  character  of  the  pursuing  force.  In  a  broken 
country,  full  of  good  defensive  positions,  it  would  be  less 
than  in  an  open  country;  and  it  would  be  greater  when  the 
pursuit  was  vigorously  pushed  in  force  than  when  it  was  fee- 
bly conducted   by  small   parties.     As  a   rule,  it  corresponds 

*For  Davoust's  strictures  on  Murat's  method  of  combating  the  Rus- 
sian rear  guard,  see  Segur's  "History  of  the  Expedition  to  Russia,"  Book 
VII.,  Chapter  II. 

f'Maximes  de  Guerre." 


l62  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

to  the  Strength  of  an  advance  guard  on  a  forward  march; 
and  would,  consequently,  vary  from  one-eighth  to  one-third 
of  the  entire  force — generally  consisting  of  about  one-sixth. 
Care  and  good  judgment  are  necessary  in  determining  the 
strength  of  the  rear  guard.  If  it  were  too  large,  too  many 
troops  would  be  kept  upon  a  peculiarly  trying  duty,  and  the 
object  of  the  command,  to  withdraw  quickly  as  many  men 
as  possible  to  a  place  of  safety,  would  be  thwarted.  If  it 
were  too  small,  it  would  be  continually  driven  in  upon  the 
main  body,  to  which  it  would  communicate  alarm  and  confu- 
sion; and  the  latter  might  even  be  compelled  to  halt  and 
fight  for  the  protection  of  the  rear  guard. 

Morale. — Everything  should  be  done  to  raise  the  morale 
of  the  rear  guard.  The  best  troops  should  be  selected ;  gener- 
ally, those  which  have  suffered  least  in  the  battle,  or  which 
have  gained  therein  some  local  success.  At  the  battle  of 
Bull  Run,  Sykes'  battalion  of  regulars,  which  alone  remained 
undemoralized,  was  selected  to  cover  the  retreat;  Blenker's 
division,  which  had  not  been  engaged  at  all,  being  after- 
wards detailed  as  a  rear  guard.  After  the  battle  of  Nash- 
ville, Forrest's  cavalry  corps,  which  had  been  detached  at 
the  time  of  the  battle,  was  hurried  back  to  act  as  a  rear  guard 
for  Hood's  army. 

It  rarely  happens  that  an  army  is  defeated  on  every  part 
of  the  field,  and  troops,  finding  everything  prospering  in 
their  front,  are  often  perplexed  and  indignant  at  an  order  to 
withdraw,  the  necessity  for  which  they  do  not  understand. 
These  are  the  troops  to  select  for  the  rear  guard;  and  their 
morale  should  be  still  further  raised,  if  practicable,  by  occa- 
sional ambuscades  or  offensive  returns  against  the  enemy, 
whenever  an  opportunity  of  taking  him  at  a  disavantage 
occurs. 

Offensive  Returns. — ^The  offensive  returns  should  not,  how- 
ever, be  pushed  far;  for  their  result,  at  best,  can  only  be  a 
moral  one,  and  the  distance  between  the  main  body  and  the 
rear  guard  must  not  be  dangerously  increased. 


OFFENSIVE  RETURNS.  1 63 

Offensive  returns  on  the  part  of  the  rear  guard  may  be 
necessary  for  its  relief  when  closel}'^  pressed  by  the  enemy  at 
a  bridge,  defile,  or  ford.  At  Smolensk  the  bridge  os^er  the 
Dnieper  was  choked  with  a  mob  of  stragglers,  and  the  French 
rear  guard,  being  at  the  same  time  closely  pushed  by  the 
Russians,  found  itself  in  danger  of  being  thrust  into  the  river. 
Ney  accordingly  ordered  De  Fezensac  to  attack  the  enemy 
with  his  regiment.  The  attack  was  made  in  a  spirited  manner; 
the  Russians  were  thrust  back,  and  the  rear  guard  filed  across 
the  bridge,  which  it  immediately  destroyed. 

A  similar  incident  at  Boonsboro,  Md.,  in  1862,  is  worth 
noting,  especially  on  account  of  the  ingenious  and  successful 
tactics  employed.  Fitzhugh  l^ee's  cavalry  brigade  was  cov- 
ering the  retreat  of  D.  H.  Hill  from  South  Mountain.  The 
pressure  upon  Lee's  rear  was  so  heavy,  as  he  was  passing 
through  Boonsboro,  that  it  became  necessary  to  make  an 
offensive  return  with  one  regiment,  in  order  to  cover  the 
withdrawal  of  the  others. 

The  attack  was  made  by  the  9th  Virginia  Cavalry  (Col. 
W.  H.  F.  Lee),  which,  owing  to  the  narrowness  of  the  street, 
charged  in  column  of  fours  with  a  considerable  interval  be- 
tween the  squadrons.  As  one  squadron,  broken  by  the  col- 
lision, retired  to  form  again  in  rear  of  the  regiment,  the  next 
squadron  took  up  the  charge,  thus  giving  the  Union  column 
a  succession  of  shocks.  The  9th  Virginia  was  finally  pushed 
back  through  Boonsboro  with  considerable  loss;  but  not  until 
it  had  gained  time  for  the  rest  of  the  brigade  to  take  up  a  posi- 
tion west  of  the  town.* 

Commander  of  the  Rear  Guard. — The  commander  of  the 
rear  guard  should  be  a  man  of  resolution  and  fertility  of  re- 
source. He  should  be  as  prudent  as  a  man  can  be  without 
being  timid,  and  as  brave  as  a  man  can  be  without  being 
rash.  He  should  constantly  present  a  bold  front  to  the  ene- 
my, and  should  ever  be  ready  to  fight,  even  to  the  extent  of 
sacrificing  himself  and  his  entire  command  if  necessary;  but 

*See  McClellan's  "Campaigns  of  Stuart's  Cavalry,"  page  125. 


164  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

he  should  remember  that  the  great  duty  of  the  rear  guard  is 
to  gain  time,  and  he  should  know  when  to  withdraw.  He 
should  be  able  to  distinguish  the  enemy's  preparations  for 
a  serious  attack  from  insignificant  demonstrations,  and  he 
should  never  allow  the  enemy  to  force  him  into  a  fight  con- 
trary to  his  own  interests  and  intentions.  He  should  never  ex- 
pect assistance,  and  should  feel  disgraced  if  the  main  body 
should  be  obliged  to  suspend  its  retreat  to  come  to  his  aid. 

Distance  from  the  Alain  Body. — As  the  main  body  seeks 
to  withdraw  from  the  enemy  as  rapidly  as  possible,  while  the 
rear  guard  endeavors  to  delay  him  and  watch  his  movements, 
it  is  clear  that  the  distance  between  the  two  bodies  can  not  be 
definitely  prescribed.  In  general  terms  it  may  be  said  to  be 
usually  about  the  same  as  that  of  the  advance  guard  from 
the  main  body  on  advance.  If  the  distance  were  too  great, 
the  rear  guard  would  be  in  danger  of  being  cut  off;  if  the  dis- 
tance were  too  small,  the  main  body  would  be  subject  to  con- 
stant alarms,  and  each  reverse  of  the  rear  guard  would  quickly 
affect  the  main  body,  whose  retreat  would  be  continually  har- 
assed by  the  enemy.  In  marching  at  night,  the  rear  guard 
draws  near  the  column,  especially  if  the  night  is  dark,  the 
enemy  near,  and  the  inhabitants  inimical. 

Formation  and  Composition  of  the  Rear  Guard. — The  for- 
mation of  the  rear  guard  is  that  of- an  advance  guard  reversed. 
Nearest  the  main  body  is  the  reserve,  after  which  follow  the 
support  and  the  rear  party,  the  extreme  rear  being  composed 
of  a  point.  The  distances  between  the  various  bodies  com- 
posing the  rear  guard  are  the  same  as  those  between  the  cor- 
responding bodies  of  the  advance  guard.  Flankers  are  thrown 
out  as  in  the  case  of  an  advance  guard,  but  they  are  more 
numerous,  and  the  line  joining  them  is  a  more  pronounced 
curve,  for  the  reason  that  flank  attacks  are  more  to  be  feared 
than  in  the  case  of  an  advance  guard,  and  the  flanks  must, 
therefore,  be  more  carefully  covered.  In  an  advance,  an 
attempt  against  a  flank  of  the  advance  guard  might  easily 
result  in  the  assailing  troops  being  themselves  struck  in  flank 


FORMATION   AND   COMPOSITION    OF  REAR  GUARD.  1 65 

bv  troops  from  the  main  body;  but  in  a  retrograde  movement 
the  main  body  is  moving  away  from,  instead  of  towards,  the 
covering  detachment,  and  thus  a  flank  attack  upon  the  rear 
guard  must  be  met  by  the  rear  guard  itself,  or  else  the  main 
body  must  halt  and  march  back  to  its  assistance.  According 
to  circumstances,  a  portion  or  the  M^hole  of  the  rear  guard 
will  march  in  readiness  for  action. 

The  composition  of  a  rear  guard  is  practically  the  same 
as  that  of  an  advance  guard.  It  is  generally  composed  of  all 
three  arms ;  but  if  there  are  enough  cavalry  and .  horse  ar- 
tillery to  admit  of  the  rear  guard  being  composed  exclusively 
of  those  arms,  it  would  be  best,  except  in  a  very  close  and 
rugged  country,  to  leave  the  infantry  with  the  main  body. 
There  should  be  as  many  guns  with  the  rear  guard  as  can  be 
effectively  used  and  freely  maneuvered.  The  effective  use  of 
artillery  may  obviate  the  necessity  of  deploying  the  other 
arms  of  the  rear  guard,  the  deployment  of  the  enemy  at  a 
distance  being  compelled  by  the  fire  of  the  guns.  The  fire  of 
the  artillery  at  short  range  should  be  as  rapid  as  is  compati- 
ble with  its  cool  and  intelligent  action:  when  the  rear  guard 
is  pressed  by  the  enemy,  it  is  necessary  to  fire  as  many  shots 
as  possible,  and  still  more  necessary  that  each  one  should 
count.  If  it  becomes  necessary  to  abandon  the  guns,  the 
equipments  and  breech-blocks  should  be  carried  away,  and, 
if  practicable,  one  wheel  should  be  removed  from  each  and 
run  to  the  rear,  so  that  if  the  pieces  are  recaptured  they  can 
be  at  once  used.  If  there  seems  to  be  no  hope  of  recovering 
the  lost  pieces,  the  guns  should  be  burst  and  the  caissons 
blown  up;  or,  at  least,  the  breech-blocks  should  be  broken 
off,  damaged,  or  thrown  into  a  stream  or  well.  The  danger 
of  losing  a  few  guns  must  never  be  made  an  excuse  for  a 
premature  withdrawal.  If  the  guns,  by  remaining  until  the 
last  moment,  exact  a  heavy  price  in  blood  from  the  enemy, 
and  contribute  largely  towards  checking  pursuit,  they  are 
profitably  sold,  and  their  loss  is  an  honor. 


1 66  SECURITY   AND   IXFORMATIOX. 

The  cavalry  of  the  rear  guard  can  charge  bodies  of  the 
enemy  that  have  been  thrown  into  confusion  by  the  ardor  of 
pursuit,  or  by  the  fire  of  the  artillery;  but  its  chief  reliance 
should  be  in  dismounted  fire-action.  It  can  take  up  almost 
any  position  that  the  infantry  can,  and  thus  compel  the  de- 
plo\-ment  and  retardation  of  the  enem)^,  while  its  superior 
mobility  enables  it  rapidly  to  diminish  the  distance  between 
the  main  body  and  the  rear  guard,  always  dangerously  in- 
creased by  a  stubborn  stand  of  the  latter.  Good  cavalry  of 
the  American  type  is  the  life  of  a  rear  guard.  A  rear  guard 
entirely  without  cavalry,  except  in  a  region  where  that  arm 
can  not  be  used,  is  at  an  enormous  disadvantage,  unless  the 
enemy  is  also  without  mounted  troops.  In  the  retreat  from 
Mosco\r,  the  destruction  of  Napoleon's  cavalrs'  by  cold  and 
starv^ation  left  the  French  rear  guard  exposed  to  the  attacks 
of  the  Cossacks,  who,  though  unable  to  break  a  single  square 
of  infantn,',  annoyed  it  incessantly,  and  cannonaded  it  with 
small  guns  brought  up  on  sleds. 

WTien  a  rear  guard  is  composed  of  all  arms,  the  infantry 
should  be  with  the  reser\"e,  and  the  cavalry  with  the  support 
and  rear  party.  If  the  cavalr}^  is  not  in  sufficient  strength 
for  the  entire  support,  the  deficiency  must,  of  coiurse,  be 
made  up  from  the  infantry.  The  artillery  should  be  with 
the  reser\'e;  but  horse  artiller\^  may  sometimes  accompany 
the  support.  The  engineers  should  be  at  the  rear  of  the  re- 
serve or  at  the  head  of  the  support.  Machine  guns  may  be 
used  with  effect  by  the  rear  guard,  being  always  used  de- 
fensively.    They  should  generally  be  with  the  support. 

The  rear  guard  should,  if  possible,  be  entirely  free  from 
impedimenta,  in  order  that,  if  separated  from  the  main  body 
by  a  considerable  distance,  it  may  close  up  b}"  forced  marches. 
If  its  baggage  can  not  be  sent  forward  to  the  main  column,  all 
that  is  not  absolutely  necessary  should  be  destroyed,  if  the 
pursuit  is  vigorous,  and  the  remainder  kept  with  the  reserv-e. 

Plates  XIV.  and  XV.  show  typical  formations  of  a  rear 
guard.     It  will  be  observed  that  the  rear  guard  is  merely  a 


PLATE    XIV. 


COMPANY   OF    INFANTRY    AS    REAR  GUARD. 


MAIN  BODY 


This  normal  formation  h  not  to  be  talcen 
as  an  invariable  guide,  but  merely  as  a  model 
requiring  more  or  less  variation  according  to 
circumstances.   It  is  very  rarely  that  a  norma} 
formation  can  be  used  without  considerable  change. 


t  Platoon 


Reserve 


4 


1  Section    ^  _■)■.  ^  Support 


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i  Section      I      Rear  Party 

«  4i- ..         • 

Potnt 


PLATE    XV. 


TROOP    OF     CAVALRY     AS    REAR    GUARD. 


777/5  normal  formation  is  not  to  be  taken 
as  an  invariable ^uide.  but  merely  as  a  model 
requiring  more  or  less  variation  according  to 
circumstances.  It  is  very  rarely  that  a  normal 
formation  can  t>e  used  without  corKiderable  chanje. 


4  S 


.^^ 


y 


/t//»//V  SODY 


Reserve 


,'» 


4i 


da  Support 


.600^' 


rdS 


i* 


[i 30Oy</s ^ 300yds    -ijt 

'  ^  Rear   ^  Party  * 


FORMATION  AND   COMPOSITION   OF  REAR  GUARD.  1 67 

reversed  advance  guard  with  more  flankers.  Thus,  in  the 
case  of  a  company  of  infantry  (Plate  XIV.),  flankers  are 
thrown  out  from  the  reserve.  In  the  case  of  a  troop  of  cav- 
alry (Plate  XV.),  the  reserve  throws  out  a  double  patrol  on 
each  flank,  similar  to  the  one  thrown  out  from  the  support 
in  the  case  of  an  advance  guard,  the  larger  patrols  being 
on  the  more  dangerous  flank.  The  support  sends  out  flank- 
ing groups  which  march  at  a  distance  of  about  600  yards 
from  the  line  of  march  of  the  column.  Ordinarily,  a  line 
passing  through  the  point  and  flankers  of  an  advance  guard 
forms  a  semicircle:  a  similar  line  in  the  case  of  a  rear  guard 
forms  about  two- thirds  of  an  ellipse.  These  typical  forma- 
tions are,  of  course,  merely  suggestive:  they  must  he  modified  to 
suit  the  circumstances  of  each  case.  Rear  guards  composed  of 
larger  bodies  are  similarly  formed.  In  an  open  country  the 
reserve  may  sometimes  be  advantageously  formed  in  two 
parallel  columns. 

Withdrawal  from  Action. — ^The  manner  of  withdrawing  a 
rear  guard  from  action  will  depend  entirely  upon  circum- 
stances. As  a  rule,  only  a  portion  should  withdraw  at  a 
time,  taking  up,  if  necessary,  a  new  position,  to  cover  the 
withdrawal  of  the  rest.  The  guns  especially  must  not  all 
withdraw  at  once,  as  the  total  cessation  of  artillery  fire  would 
betray  the  movement.  Whether  the  withdrawal  should  be 
by  alternate  battalions,  or  whether  it  should  begin  at  the 
center  or  at  a  flank,  would  depend  upon  the  direction  and 
progress  of  the  attack  and  the  topography  of  the  field.  Gen- 
erally, the  infantry  and  a  portion  of  the  guns  withdraw  first; 
and  when  they  are  again  in  position  or  en  route,  they  are 
followed  by  the  remaining  guns  and  the  cavalry.  The  with- 
drawal should  never  be  a  difficult  matter  if  it  has  not  been 
delayed  too  long. 

Co-inmunication  between  the  Several  Parts  of  the  Rear  Guard 
and  with  the  Main  Body. — Uninterrupted  communication  must 
be  maintained  between  the  several  parts  of  the  rear  guard 
and  the  main  body.     The  road  should  be  carefully  marked, 


l68  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

SO  that  the  rear  guard  may  not  lose  its  way.  The  trail 
of  a  retreating  force  is  usually  only  too  plain;  but  it  is  well 
to  leave  a  patrol  at  cross-roads,  etc.,  with  orders  to  rejoin  the 
main  body  as  soon  as  the  proper  road  has  been  taken  by  the 
rear  guard.  Similar  precautions  must,  when  necessary,  be 
taken  by  the  reserv^e  to  insure  the  proper  direction  being 
taken  by  the  support. 

Protection  of  Flanks. — Patrolling  must  be  carried  on  with 
vigilance  and  energy,  especially  on  the  flanks.  The  enemy, 
finding  a  firm  front  opposed  to  all  his  direct  attacks,  will  un- 
doubtedly attempt  to  cut  in  on  the  flanks,  where,  in  fact, 
always  lie  his  most  promising  hopes  of  success;  for  if  he  can 
cause  the  rear  guard  to  form  front  to  a  flank,  any  assault 
by  which  it  can  be  pushed  off  the  road  will  uncover  the  rear 
of  the  main  body,  and  will  be  only  less  disastrous  to  the  re- 
treating army  than  the  destruction  of  the  rear  guard  itself. 
Prompt  notification  of  attempts  against  the  flanks  should  be 
given  by  the  patrols  (who  are  often  warned  of  them  by  a 
diminution  of  the  enemy's  forces  following  in  rear),  and  the 
rear  guard  should  then  endeavor  with  celerity  to  slip  past  the 
menaced  point;  failing  in  this,  it  should  form  a  strong  front 
towards  the  attacking  force. 

Conduct  of  the  Rear  Guard. — If  the  two  armies  are  of  ap- 
proximately equal  strength,  the  rear  guard  will  be  about 
as  strong  as  the  advance  guard  of  the  force  pursuing  it,  and 
the  advantage  of  a  good  defensive  position  should  give  it  a 
superiority  over  the  latter.  But  this  superiority  will  be 
only  temporary  at  best;  for  the  advance  gxiard  is  receiving 
constant  accessions  of  strength  from  the  rear,  while  the  dis- 
tance between  the  rear  guard  and  the  main  body  of  the  re- 
treating force  is  constantly  increasing.  Hence,  the  longer  the 
rear  guard  remains  in  its  position,  the  greater  will  be  the  odds 
against  it.  If  it  does  not  remain  long  enough,  the  enemy's 
advance  will  not  be  seriously  delayed;  while  if  it  remains 
too  long,  it  will  suffer  heavily  in  the  engagement.  In  Mas- 
sena's  retreat  from  Portugal,  Ney  made  the  one  error  of  his 


CONDUCT   OP   THE   REAR   GUARD.  169 

brilliant  rear-guard  operations,  by  remaining  too  long  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Ceira,  which  mistake  cost  him  500  men, 
though  he  succeeded  in  withdrawing  the  greater  part  of  his 
force  across  the  stream  and  blowing  up  the  bridge. 

The  pursuing  army  will  always  be  in  more  or  less  doubt 
as  to  the  strength  of  the  force  which  it  finds  barring  its  way, 
and  it  must  act  with  prudence,  or  run  the  risk  of  a  serious 
and  costly  repulse.  At  Redinha,  Ney,  with  a  rear  guard  of 
about  5,000  men,  made  such  skillful  dispositions  as  to  compel 
Wellington  to  deploy  40,000  men,  and  incur  a  delay  of  sev- 
eral hours.  The  morale  of  the  retreating  force  is  also  a  mat- 
ter of  uncertainty  to  the  pursuers,  and  this  consideration 
also  forbids  rash  action.  Sir  John  Moore  at  Coruiia  and 
McClellan  at  Malvern  Hill  each  turned  and  gave  his  pursuer 
a  knock-down  blow  at  the  termination  of  a  retreat. 

The  rear  guard  has  an  advantage  over  the  pursuing  force 
in  not  being  obliged  to  reconnoiter  the  ground  over  which 
it  has  to  march.  All  necessary  information  as  to  the  roads 
is  furnished  from  the  front,  and  a  well-qualified  staff  officer 
with  the  main  body  should  select  defensive  positions  for  the 
rear  guard,  and  furnish  its  commander  with  a  description 
(and,  if  possible,  a  topographical  sketch)  of  the  same.  The 
positions  would  be  ridges,  sunken  roads,  villages,  woods, 
bridges,  or  defiles. 

The  rear  guard  must  not  be  tempted  by  the  great  natu- 
ral strength  of  a  position  to  occupy  it  at  the  expense  of  being 
separated  at  too  great  a  distance  from  the  main  body,  nor  to 
hold  it  so  long  as  to  become  compromised  in  a  regular  en- 
gagement. The  amount  of  resistance  to  be  made  by  the  rear 
guard  w^ill  depend  upon  the  judgment  of  its  commander,  or 
on  the  orders  of  the  commander-in-chief.  At  very  important 
positions,  the  latter  should  join  the  rear  guard,  if  necessary, 
superintending  its  formation  for  resistance,  or  even  conduct- 
ing its  action.  Sir  John  Moore,  on  his  famous  retreat,  per- 
sonally directed  the  movements  of  the  rear  guard.  This 
is  generally  neither  practicable  nor  desirable;  but  the  com- 


I70  SECURITY   AND    INFORMATION. 

mander-in-chief  should  always  know  what  his  rear  guard  is 
about,  and  whether  it  is  judiciously  handled.  He  should, 
above  all,  see  that  it  is  never  forced  to  fight  superior  num- 
bers of  the  enemy  at  too  great  a  distance  from  succor.  It  is 
best,  however,  never  to  interfere  with  the  commander  of  the 
rear  guard,  if  he  understands  his  business  and  performs  his 
part  properly.  The  nature  of  his  duty  requires  that  he  should 
have  even  greater  independence  of  action  than  the  commander 
of  an  advance  guard. 

The  Intennediate  Body. — The  advance  guard  of  the  pur- 
suing force,  its  strength  constantly  increasing,  can  act  boldly 
to  the  flank;  and  the  rear  guard  is  in  danger  of  being  inter- 
cepted, and  finding  a  force  of  the  enemy  barring  its  way  at 
some  one  of  the  positions  selected  for  its  own  defensive  stand. 
This  danger  increases  with  the  stubbornness  of  the  stand  made 
by  the  rear  guard.  In  view  of  these  considerations,  Riistow 
recommends  an  important  difference  in  the  composition  of 
advance  guards  and  rear  guards,  by  giving  to  the  latter  an 
intermediate  body,  which  should  march  midway  between  the 
reserve  of  the  rear  guard  and  the  main  body.  It  would  thus 
be  in  a  position  to  hold  important  points  until  the  arrival  of 
the  reserve,  which  points  it  might  even  have  time  to  fortify, 
while  preparing  at  the  same  time  for  the  destruction  of  the 
passages  at  the  selected  positions."  This  intermediate  body 
should  have  artillery,  especially  if  the  country  is  open  and 
the  enemy's  forces  are  able  to  make  turning  movements  with 
celerity.  Riistow  recommends  further,  when  the  enemy 
shows  a  particular  tendency  to  execute  flank  movements, 
with  the  intention  of  separating  and  cutting  off  the  differ- 
ent detachments,  and  the  country  is  such  as  to  favor  his 
movements,  that  the  principal  column  leave  a  detachment 
to  hold  an  important  position  until  the  arrival  of  the  inter- 
mediate body.  Under  some  circumstances,  the  detachments 
recommended  by  Riistow  might  be  imperativeh^  necessary; 
but  the  system  is  open  to  the  objection  that  the  detachments, 
unless  composed  of  cavalry,   would  be  unable  to  rejoin  the 


THE  INTERMEDIATE   BODY.  171 

main  .body,  which  would  thus  be  constantly  reinforcing  the 
rear  guard.  If  composed  of  cavalry,  they  might,  perhaps, 
better  be  with  the  rear  guard  in  the  first  place,  and  be  sent 
forward  to  hold  the  positions  in  question.  They  would  thus 
at  least  be  continuall}^  and  definitely  under  the  orders  of  the 
rear  guard  commander. 

Contact  with  the  Enemy  to  be  Preserved. — Contact  with 
the  pursuing  force  should  not  be  lost,  but  its  movements 
should  be  continually  watched;  otherwise  the  army  might 
be  fl^'ing  from  a  mere  phantom,*  or  it  might  be  deceived  as 
to  the  objective  point  of  the  enemy's  attack.  The  enemy 
might  continue  the  pursuit  with  a  small  force  on  the  main 
route,  and  move  the  bulk  of  his  army  on  a  parallel  road, 
whence,  after  making  unobstructed  progress  to  the  front,  he 
might  move  in  to  cut  off  the  rear  guard  or  assail  it  in  flank. 
In  Napoleon's  retreat  from  Moscow,  Miloradowitch,  with  a 
Russian  advance  guard  of  25,000  men,  moving  on  a  road  par- 
allel to  the  French  retreat,  cut  in  between  the  main  body 
and  rear  guard  at  Wiasma,  and  would  have  wrought  irre- 
trievable disaster  to  the  retreating  army  if  he  had  been  prop- 
erly supported  by  the  main  body  of  the  Russians. 

A  similar  movement  was  more  effectively  executed  against 
Lee  in  his  retreat  to  Appomattox  Court-House.  Pursuing 
on  a  parallel  road,  Sheridan,  with  the  cavalry  corps,  cut  in 
on  the  Confederate  line  of  retreat  at  Sailor's  Creek,  interpos- 
ing between  the  main  body  and  the  rear  guard.  Holding  the 
latter  in  check  until  he  was  reinforced  by  the  Sixth  Corps,  he 
compelled  its  surrender,  capturing  five  general  officers  and 
all  that  remained  of  Ewell's  corps,  t 

*History  presents  a  number  of  instances  of  armies  turning  their  backs 
upon  each  other  in  mutual  flight.  Thus  Napoleon  and  Kutusoff  both  re- 
tired from  Malo-Jaroslawitz ;  the  troops  of  Braddock  and  Beaujeu  both 
fled  from  the  Monongahela,  and  the  Federals  and  Confederates  both  re- 
treated from  Big  Bethel. 

fGordon's  corps  originally  formed  the  rear  guard  of  Lee's  army;  but 
Gordon  having  been  defeated  by  Humphreys  and  deflected  to  the  right 
in  retreat,  Ewell's  corps  was  left  as  the  real  rear  guard  of  the  retreating 
army. 

13 


172  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

If  the  pursuit  seems  to  slacken  or  cease,  contact  must  be 
maintained  by  strong  patrols,  each  patrol  generally  consist- 
ing of  a  platoon  under  command  of  an  officer.  Small  pa- 
trols could  not  drive  back  any  but  the  most  insignificant 
forces  of  the  enemy,  and  could  not,  therefore,  learn  whether 
the  pursuit  were  conducted  by  a  large  force  or  merely  by 
small  parties.  The  patrols  should  be  given  great  liberty  of 
action,  and,  after  having  been  informed  of  the  route  to  be 
taken  by  the  main  body  in  retreat,  and  given  such  general 
orders  as  may  be  necessary,  they  should  be  left  quite  inde- 
pendent of  the  rear  guard.  It  will  often  be  necessary  to  act 
vigorously  on  the  offensive  with  the  cavalry,  in  order  to  as- 
certain the  nature  of  the  pursuit.  If  the  enemy's  advanced 
troops,  when  repulsed,  fall  back  upon  larger  bodies  in  rear, 
the  enemy  is  evidently  pursuing  in  force;  if,  on  the  contrary, 
they  are  driven  back  in  rapid  flight,  and  are  not  supported, 
the  enem^"-  either  is  not  attempting  a  serious  pursuit,  or  is 
moving  on  a  parallel  road. 

Defiles. — Defiles  offer  the  greatest  opportunities  to  an  en- 
ergetic pursuer  and  to  an  able  rear  guard  commander.  To 
the  former  they  afford  a  chance  of  cutting  off  the  rear  guard 
by  interposing  a  force  at  the  entrance  of  the  defile.  To  the 
latter  they  afford  a  double  opportunity  of  administering  a 
check  to  the  enemy,  who  is  compelled  to  narrow  his  front. 
In  defending  a  defile,  the  main  body  leaves  a  detachment  to 
hold  the  heights  on  each  side  until  relieved  by  the  infantr}^ 
of  the  rear  guard.  The  artillery  is  generally  stationed  at  the 
entrance  of  the  defile,  and  the  cavalry  in  the  best  position  for 
dismounted  fire- action — always  at  that  part  of  the  line  which 
is  to  withdraw  last.  As  soon  as  the  enemy  has  not  only  de- 
ployed for  attack,  but  is  well  committed  to  the  assault,  the 
artillery  fires  its  parting  round  of  shrapnel,  and  withdraws 
rapidly  through  the  defile,  followed  by  the  infantry.  The 
cavalry  covers  the  withdrawal  of  the  other  arms,  mounting 
at  the  last  moment,  and  retreating  rapidly  through  the  de- 
file,  its  retreat   being  protected,   if  practicable,   by  infantry 


DEFlIvES.  173 

skirmishers  lining  the  crest  on  either  side  of  the  interior  of 
the  defile. 

The  outlet  of  the  defile  always  affords  a  better  position 
for  opposing  the  enemy  than  the  entrance;  for  in  making  a 
stand  wdth  a  defile  at  its  back  the  rear  guard  runs  the  risk, 
in  case  its  flank  is  turned,  of  being  cut  off  altogether.  In 
making  a  stand  at  the  farther  side,  the  artillery  is  posted  so 
as  to  rake  the  defile;  and  the  infantry,  so  as  to  bring  a  con- 
verging fire  on  its  outlet,  detachments  of  infantry  also  hold- 
ing the  crest;  while  the  cavalry  is  stationed  so  as  to  be  able 
to  charge  the  enemy  in  flank  as  he  emerges  from  the  defile. 
Enough  of  the  enemy  should  be  allowed  to  pass  to  enable  the 
assault  upon  him  to  be  more  than  a  mere  stroke  at  the  head 
of  his  column;  but  the  mistake  of  allowing  too  many  to  pass 
would  be  a  fatal  blunder.  Here  the  judgment  of  the  rear 
guard  commander  must  come  into  play,  and  no  rule  or  sug- 
gestion can  aid  him.  The  enemy  having  been  severely  han- 
dled and  thrown  back  into  the  defile,  the  rear  guard  withdraws 
without  delay. 

If  practicable,  the  position  at  the  entrance  of  the  defile 
should  be  convex  towards  the  enemy,  so  as  to  admit  of  ready 
withdrawal  by  the  flanks.  At  the  outlet,  the  position  should, 
on  the  other  hand,  be  concave,  so  as  to  bring  a  converging 
fire  upon  the  enemy. 

Negative  Measures. — ^The  measures  taken  by  the  rear 
guard  to  delay  the  enemy  may  be  classed  as  positive  and 
negative;  the  former  relating  to  the  delays  caused  by  actual 
or  threatened  combat,  and  the  latter  including  all  measures 
to  impede  his  progress  by  blocking  his  path,  destroying  bridges, 
etc.  The  positive  measures  have  already  been  considered: 
the  negative  meastues  are  diverse  in  their  nature,  and  afford 
a  wide  field  for  ingenuity.  Bridges  may  be  burned,  blown 
up,  or  torn  down.  In  the  first  case,  if  time  permits,  the  tim- 
bers should  be  coated  with  tar,  or  saturated  with  coal  oil,  by 
troops  from  the  main  body  or  the  reserve,  and  fired  by  the 
last  men  of  the  rear  detachment  who  cross;  in  the  second 


174  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

case,  the  charge  should  be  similarly  placed  and  exploded; 
and  in  the  third  case,  the  planks  should  be  loosened  by  troops 
in  advance,  and  thrown  into  the  river  by  the  rear  point.  In 
all  cases,  the  preparation  for  destruction  should  be  made  by 
the  main  body  or  reserve,  and  the  consummation  should  be 
the  work  of  the  last  men  who  cross.  Loaded  shells  placed 
under  the  heaps  of  combustibles  would,  by  bursting  at  inter- 
vals, prevent  the  enemy  from  approaching  to  extinguish 
the  flames. 

Fords  can  be  obstructed  by  planting  therein  pointed 
stakes,  broken  bottles,  or  harrows,  plows,  and  scythes,  so 
arranged  that  the  sharp  sides  and  points  are  uppermost.  An- 
other expedient  is  to  throw  in  trees  with  the  branches  to- 
wards the  enemy  and  weighted  down  with  stones  in  sacks. 
In  addition  to  these  measures,  the  banks  may  be  scarped, 
and  an  epaulement  with  artillery  established  on  the  side 
opposite  the  enemy.  Boats  should  be  taken  to  the  far  side 
and  either  burnt  or  sunk.  Roads  can  be  obstructed  by  fell- 
ing trees  across  them,  or  blowing  up  the  road-bed;  and  gate- 
ways and  passages  can  be  blocked  with  heavily  laden  carts 
dovetailed  together,  one  wheel  being  removed  from  each. 

Villages  may  be  fortified  in  some  cases,  but  generally 
it  will  be  more  expedient  to  burn  them,  and  thus  place  a 
barricade  of  fire,  so  to  speak,-  between  the  rear  guard  and 
the  enemy;  but  this  measure  will,  manifestly,  be  of  value 
only  when  the  enemy  is  following  close  upon  the  heels  of  the 
rear  guard.  Thus  Ney  burned  Redinha  and  Condeixa  in  the 
face  of  Wellington,  delaying  him  in  each  case.  The  com- 
mander-in-chief should  give  general  instructions  as  to  the 
extent  to  which  bridges,  villages,  etc.,  are  to  be  destroyed, 
and  no  wanton  or  unnecessary  destruction  should  ever  be 
permitted. 

Other  expedients  will  suggest  themselves  to  a  good  com- 
mander. Of  Johnston's  retreat  to  Jackson,  Miss.,  in  1863, 
General  Sherman,  in  his  "Memoirs,"  says:  "On  the  8th 
[July],  all  our  troops  reached  the  neighborhood  of  Clinton, 


NEGATIVE   MEASURES.  1 75 

the  weather  fearfully  hot,  and  water  scarce.  Jolinstoii  had 
marched  rapidly,  and  in  retreating  had  caused  cattle,  hogs, 
and  sheep  to  be  driven  into  the  ponds  of  water,  and  there  shot 
down;  so  that  we  had  to  haul  their  dead  and  stinking  car- 
casses out  to  use  the  water."  Any  means  of  producing  suf- 
fering and  inconvenience  to  the  pursuers,  such  as  to  cause 
them  to  delay,  should  be  resorted  to  by  the  rear  guard,  stop- 
ping only  at  such  measures  as  are  condemned  by  the  laws 
of  war. 

But  these  negative  measures  are,  after  all,  merely  helps, 
and  the  safety  of  the  retreating  force  must  depend  upon  the 
resolute  action  of  the  rear  guard  itself.  When  it  is  essential 
that  the  army  should  put  distance  between  itself  and  the 
enemy,  the  rear  guard  must  make  use  of  every  good  defensive 
position  to  delay  the  pursuers;  but  no  halt  should  be  made 
for  fighting  when  the  necessity  of  checking  the  enemy  and 
gaining  time  is  not  imperative. 

Sick  and  Wounded. — The  rear  guard  should  collect  all 
stragglers  and  compel  them  to  move  on,  and  it  should  not 
allow  the  sick  or  wounded  to  be  left  behind,  unless  they 
prove  a  dangerous  encumbrance.  When  necessary,  transport- 
ation must  be  requisitioned  for  the  sick  and  wounded,  and 
they  should,  if  practicable,  be  sent  forward  to  the  main  col- 
umn every  night.  When  it  is  found  necessary  to  abandon 
them,  they  should  be  formally  transferred  to  the  authori- 
ties of  some  village  or  town,  and  one  or  more  medical  officers, 
with  a  liberal  supply  of  medical  stores  and  money,  should  be 
left  with  them.  With  the  exception  of  such  medical  sup- 
plies, no  stores  of  any  description  that  could  be  of  value  to 
the  enemy  should  be  left  behind;  what  can  not  be  carried 
along  must  be  destroyed. 

Halts. — When  the  rear  guard  halts,  it  chooses  a  good 
defensive  position,  and  establishes  its  outposts  towards  the 
enemy.  It  is  desirable  that  the  position  should  not  only  be 
strong,  but  that  it  should  command  an  extended  view.  On 
halting  for  the  night,  the  rear  guard  should,  when  practica- 


176  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

ble,  be  relieved  by  other  troops.  The  new  guard  should  be 
halted  at  a  suitable  distance  from  the  point  selected  for  the 
camp  or  bivouac  of  the  main  body,  and  established  as  an  out- 
post. When  it  is  passed  by  the  old  rear  guard,  the  former 
assumes  its  duties,  and  the  latter  joins  the  main  column.  In 
the  case  of  either  an  advance  guard  or  a  rear  guard,  the  dis- 
tance of  the  outpost  from  the  main  body  will  depend  mainly 
upon  the  time  required  for  the  troops  to  turn  out  and  form 
at  the  designated  rendezvous;*  in  the  latter  case,  however, 
the  time  required  for  the  longest  column  to  march  out  in 
resuming  the  retreat  must  be  added,  no  allowance  being 
made  for  time  gained  by  the  resistance  of  the  rear  guard. 
The  distance  of  the  outpost  from  the  main  body  will,  there- 
fore, be  greater  in  the  case  of  a  rear  guard  than  in  the  case  of 
an  advance  guard. 

Retreahng  by  Parallel  Roads. — When  an  army  is  retreat- 
ing by  several  parallel  roads,  each  column  will  have  its  own 
rear  guard,  each  rear  guard  having  its  own  chief,  and  all  be- 
ing united,  when  practicable,  under  the  command  of  one 
common  superior.  Connection  should  be  maintained  be- 
tween the  several  columns,  and  between  the  different  rear 
guards,  by  connecting  groups  or  patrols.  If  retreating  by  a 
single  route  to  which  several  other  roads  are  near  and  par- 
allel, it  may  sometimes  be  advisable  to  place  a  secondary 
rear  guard  on  each.  This  would  practically  amount  to  a 
subdivision  of  the  rear  guard,  which  should,  consequently, 
be  of  a  greater  strength  proportionately  to  the  main  body 
than  would  otherwise  be  the  case.  The  necessity  for  these 
secondary  rear  guards  would  be  greatest  when  there  were 
many  lateral  roads  joining  the  parallel  routes,  and  such  roads, 
conversely,  would  be  necessary  in  order  that  a  secondary 
rear  guard  might  not  be  left  entirely  without  support.  Gen- 
erally, vigilant  scouting  to  the  flanks  will  obviate  the  neces- 
sity of  secondary  rear  guards. 

*Provided,  of  course,  that  the  distance  is  not  determined  by  consider- 
ations of  artillery  fire. 


WHEN  LINE  OF  REtREAT  IS  CHANGED.  I77 

When  Line  of  Retreat  is  Changed. — When  the  line  of  re- 
treat is  changed,  it  may  sometimes  be  advantageous  to  leave! 
the  rear  guard  on  the  old  route  for  the  purpose  of  deceiving 
the  enemy.  Artillery  should  then  accompany  the  rear  guard, 
not  only  to  add  to  its  defensive  power,  but  to  give  it  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  force  of  respectable  size.  A  small  rear  guard 
should  follow  the  main  body  in  the  new  direction. 

Rear  Guard  in  Retrograde  Movement  Which  is  Not  a  Re- 
treat.— It  is  not  only  in  a  retreat  that  a  rear  guard  becomes 
necessary  for  the  purpose  of  holding  the  enemy  in  check.  A 
retrograde  movement  may  be  designedly  made  for  the  purpose 
of  leading  the  enemy  into  a  theater  where  the  conditions 
will  be  more  favorable  for  the  retiring  army;  or  a  move- 
ment may  be  undertaken  against  one  of  the  enemy's  arm- 
ies in  such  a  way  as  to  expose  the  rear  to  another.  Thus, 
n  Wilkinson's  march  against  Montreal,  in  1813,  a  rear  guard 
was  necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  American  army  from 
the  attacks  of  the  British  from  Kingston,  though  the  enemy 
was  sought  in  the  opposite  quarter.  In  the  first  case,  the 
rear  guard  would  be  conducted  in  the  manner  already  de- 
scribed. In  the  latter  (unusual)  case,  the  advance  and  rear 
guards  would  be  of  equal  importance.  In  the  latter  case,  in 
fact,  it  would  be  better  to  leave  a  containing  force  to  hold 
one  of  the  hostile  armies  in  check  while  proceeding  against 
the  other. 

Rear  Guard  as  a  Delaying  Force  When  the  Main  Body  is 
Awaiting  Battle  in  a  Defensive  Position. — When  an  army  has 
taken  up  a  defensive  position  which  is  the  objective  of  the 
enemy's  operations,  it  is  generally  advisable  to  retard,  an- 
noy, and  damage  the  advancing  force  before  it  can  reach  the 
scene  of  the  decisive  encounter;  and  this  is  especially  the 
case  when  it  is  necessary  to  gain  time  to  complete  the  de- 
fenses of  the  occupied  position.  In  such  a  case  the  retarding 
force  is,  in  all  respects,  essentially  the  same  as  a  rear  guard. 
The  action  of  the  American  troops  in  the  operations  pre- 
ceding the  battle  of  New  Orleans  exemplifies  the  duties  of 


178  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

a  rear  guard  in  covering  a  defensive  position.  A  vigorous 
night  attack  upon  the  British  camp,  the  darkness  largely 
neutralizing  in  the  confused  combat  the  superior  discipline 
of  the  invading  army,  and  enabling  the  Americans  to  with- 
draw safely,  not  only  inflicted  a  severe  loss  upon  the  enemy, 
but  impressed  him  profoundly  as  to  the  courage  and  enter- 
prise of  the  army  in  his  front,  and  very  erroneously  in  regard 
to  its  numbers.  This  action,  followed  by  an  incessant  use 
of  harassing  patrols,*  caused  the  British  to  delay  for  rein- 
forcements, impaired  their  morale,  caused  them  to  advance 
with  caution,  and  gave  Jackson  time  to  occujay  and  strength- 
en a  defensive  position  from  which  Pakenham's  army  finally 
recoiled  in  bloody  defeat. 

A  similar  line  of  action  might,  doubtless,  have  been  adopted 
by  Linares,  in  1898.  "The  defense  made  by  the  Spaniards 
was  characterized  by  courage  rather  than  skill.  Taking  their 
posts  in  front  of  Santiago,  they  waited  in  a  purely  passive 
manner  for  the  American  attack.  There  were  many  places 
on  the  road  from  Siboney  to  Santiago  where  a  small  force, 
acting  as  a  rear  guard,  could  have  seriously  delayed  our  ad- 
vance, and  could  have  caused  us  to  pay  dearly  for  the  ground 
gained ;  but  no  such  attempts  were  made.  Knowing  the  coun- 
try thoroughly,  it  would  have  been  possible  for  the  Span- 
iards to  send  out  at  night  a  number  of  harassing  patrols  to 
alarm  our  camps,  to  cause  confusion,  and  to  give  to  our  men 
the  impression  that  they  had  in  front  of  them  an  alert  and 
active  enemy,  "f 

Rear  Guard  in  a  Friendly  Country. — In  a  movement  in  a 
friendly  country,  the  duties  of  the  rear  guard  are  much  less 
difficult  and  onerous  than  in  a  hostile  one.  In  the  former 
the  rear  guard  easily  finds  subsistence;  guides  are  obtained 
without  difficulty;  the  inhabitants  aid  in  obstructing  or  de- 
stroying roads  and  passages ;  they  assist  in  enterprises  against 
the  enemy;  and  they  remove  all  supplies  upon  his  approach. 

*See  page  118  ante. 

fOfi&cial  report  by  the  author  on  the  mihtary  operations  in  Cuba. 


REAR    GUARD   IN    A   HOSTILE    COUNTRY.  1 79 

In  a  Hostile  Cotmtry. — In  a  hostile  country,  however,  for- 
aging is  difficult  for  the  rear  guard,  as  it  must  pass  over  a 
country  already  exhausted  by  the  main  column ;  and  the  in- 
habitants, far  from  rendering  assistance  to  the  rear  guard, 
are  ever  ready  to  turn  against  it,  and  are  quite  sure  to  throw 
all  manner  of  annoying  obstacles  in  its  way. 

The  Rear  Guard  in  a  Forward  March. 

The  rear  guard  should  never  begin  its  march  until  all 
the  baggage  has  moved  off.  The  provost-marshal  and  pro- 
vost guard  generally  march  with  the  rear  guard,  which  takes 
charge  of  all  prisoners  arrested  by  them.  No  duty  is  more 
disagreeable  than  that  of  a  rear  guard  in  a  forward  march. 
Wolseley  says  of  it : 

"It  is  sheer  hard  work,  without  any  excitement  or  glory. 
Under  the  most  fortunate  circumstances  the  men  composing 
such  a  rear  guard  can  not  expect  to  be  in  camp  for  some  hours 
after  the  main  body.  It  is  most  fatiguing  to  march  in  the 
dusty  wake  of  an  army,  but  it  is  on  such  occasions  that  offi- 
cers show  their  true  mettle;  any  man  can  be  cheerful  and  zeal- 
ous with  an  advance  guard,  or  even  with  a  rear  guard  dur- 
ing a  retreat,  but  it  is  only  those  who  have  the  keenest  pro- 
fessional feelings  who  can  throw  all  their  energies  into  every 
little  duty,  irrespective  of  its  being  agreeable  or  otherwise."* 

If  marching  in  a  hostile  country,  the  rear  guard  is  charged 
with  the  protection  of  the  baggage  from  the  forays  of  guer- 
rillas, and  if  the  country  is  suited  to  partisan  warfare,  and 
the  enemy's  raiding  parties  are  enterprising,  its  duty  greatly 
increases  in  importance.  It  should  carefully  watch  the  flanks 
of  the  baggage  train  with  patrols,  of  a  number  and  size  suited 
to  the  danger  to  be  apprehended,  and  should  be  ready  to  repel 
attacks  on  the  flanks  as  well  as  on  the  rear  of  the  train. 


♦"Soldiers'  Pocket  Book,"  page  346. 


CHAPTER  VII. 


Spies. 


Too  much  attention  cannot  be  given  to  spies  and  guides.  Monte- 
cuculi  says  that  they  are  as  necessary  to  a  general  as  the  eyes  are  to  the 
head. — Marshal  Saxe. 

Although  the  method  of  gaining  information  from  spies^ 
deserters,  prisoners,  newspapers,  etc.,  does  not  strictly  be- 
long to  the  domain  of  tactics,  it  seems  too  important  a  sub- 
ject to  be  omitted  from  consideration  in  this  work.  The 
questioning  of  deserters  and  prisoners  has  already  been  con- 
sidered in  the  chapter  on  "Reconnaissance";  the  other  meth- 
ods require  additional  notice. 

Two  Classes  of  Spies. — Spies  may  be  primarily  divided  into 
two  classes:  military  and  civilian.  The  first  class  consists 
of  officers  or  soldiers  who,  from  patriotism  or  a  sense  of 
military  duty,  assume  a  disguise,  and  penetrate  the  enemy's 
lines  to  gain  information.  They  are  often  men  of  the  most 
exalted  character  and  distinguished  courage,  and  deserve  a 
better  fame,  and  a  better  fate  if  captured,  than  that  usually 
accorded  to  spies.  To  this  class  belong  Captain  Hale  and 
Major  Andre;  and  the  War  of  Secession  adds  to  the  list  two 
names  more  illustrious  and  more  successful.  General  Nathan- 
iel Lyon  visited  in  disguise  the  Confederate  camp  near  St. 
Louis  the  day  before  he  attacked  and  captured  it;  and  Colo- 
nel Turner  Ashby,  in  the  guise  of  a  country  horse  doctor,  vis- 
ited the  Union  camp  at  Chambersburg,  in  1861,  and  returned 
safely  with  a  great  deal  of  valuable  information.  Shortly 
after  the  outbreak  of  the  Spanish- American  war,  in  1898, 
Lieutenant  Henry  H.  Whitney,  Fourth  Artillery,  shipping  as 
a  common  sailor  on  a  British  tramp  steamer  at  St.  Thomas,. 

180 


Two   CLASSES   OF   SPIES.  l8l 

Danish  West  Indies,  landed  at  Ponce,  Porto  Rico;  and  while 
the  vessel  was  lying  at  the  various  southern  ports  of  the 
island,  explored  the  interior,  gaining  much  information,  which 
was  of  great  value  in  the  subsequent  campaign  in  that  theater. 

The  second  class  consists  of  men  who  often  deserve  all 
the  obloquy  so  freely  cast  upon  spies  in  general;  though  in- 
stances are  not  lacking  of  civilian  spies  actuated  solely  by 
motives  of  disinterested  patriotism.  But  whatever  may  be 
their  motives  or  individual  characteristics,  spies  are  indis- 
pensably necessary  to  a  general;  and,  other  things  equal, 
that  commander  will  be  victorious  who  has  the  best  secret 
service. 

The  services  of  spies  are  most  valuable  during  the  con- 
centration of  armies  on  the  theater  of  operations,  and  dur- 
ing the  investment  of  fortified  places.  During  active  opera- 
tions, the  information  brought  by  them,  however  accurate  it 
may  be,  generally  arrives  too  late  to  be  of  much  value. 

The  Selection  of  Spies. — Spies  should  be  carefully  selected 
from  people  whose  occupations  are  such  as  to  enable  them 
to  enter  the  enemy's  lines  without  exciting  suspicion;  such 
as  peddlers,  drivers  of  public  vehicles,  strolling  players,  etc. 
Women  are  often  the  best  of  spies;  but  their  means  of  gain- 
ing information  is  generally  in  direct  proportion  to  their  lack 
of  character,  and  accordingly  proportionate  to  their  lack  of 
credibility.*  A  marked  expression  of  distrust  on  the  part 
of  his  employers  may  sometimes  protect  a  spy  from  the  ene- 
my's suspicion.  In  1863,  General  Hurlbut  expelled  a  man 
from  Memphis  for  uttering  disloyal  and  threatening  senti- 
ments. The  fact  of  his  expulsion  under  the  circumstances 
recommended  him  to  the  favorable  consideration  of  John- 
ston, to  whom  he  offered  his  services  as  a  spy.     The  expul- 

*"Les  femmes  galantes  et  surtout  les  fiUes  publiques  servent  beau- 
coup  dans  I'espionnage,  quand  elles  offrent  quelques  garanties  de  fidelite. 
Le  general  von  Decker  dit  a  ce  sujet :  Si  le  partisan  sait  acquerir  de  1' in- 
fluence sur  les  femmes,  il  se  gardera  de  negliger  ce  moyen;  c'est  a  ce  sexe 
qu'il  devra  ses  renseignements  les  plus  certains.  Un  secret  qui  ne  peut  se 
savoir  ni  par  les  femmes  ni  par  les  hommes  d'eglise,  ne  se  revelera  probable- 
ment  jamais." — Lewal,  "Tactiqiie  des  Renseignements,"  Tome  I.,  page  105. 


1 82  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

sion  had  been  a  mere  ruse;  and,  some  months  later,  the  man 
brought  to  Grant  an  important  message  from  Johnston  to 
Pemberton,  which  placed  the  Union  commander  in  possession 
of  his  opponent's  plans. 

A  spy  should  be  intelligent,  conscientious,  and  faithful 
— qualities  hard  to  find  in  a  man  whose  very  occupation 
bespeaks  habitual  deceit  and  a  want  of  principle — and  in 
proportion  to  his  possession  of  these  characteristics  will  he 
be  valuable.  The  motives  which  induce  him  to  play  the 
part  of  a  spy  should  be  ascertained.  Men  banished  from 
their  country,  smarting  under  a  sense  of  injustice,  exasper- 
ated by  ill-treatment,  embittered  by  jealousy,  or  influenced, 
in  short,  by  any  strong  passion  calculated  to  incite  a  spirit  of 
hatred  and  revenge  against  the  enemy,  are  almost  certain 
to  be  faithful  and  energetic  spies.  Spies  should  always, 
when  practicable,  be  tested  with  unimportant  missions  be- 
fore being  entrusted  with  matters  of  great  moment.  It  is  a 
good  plan  to  require  them  at  first  to  report  upon  matters 
that  are  already  known,  as  a  means  of  testing  their  relia- 
bility and  accuracy.  The  services  of  a  spy  permanently  at- 
tached to  a  command  are  likely  to  be  much  more  valuable 
than  those  of  one  who  is  employed  only  for  the  single  occa- 
sion, and  whose  efforts  are  not  stimulated  by  a  hope  of  profit- 
able employment  in  the  future. 

Compulsory  Espionage. — It  is  clear  that  the  only  trust- 
worthy spies  are,  as  a  rule,  those  who  serve  voluntarily;  nev- 
ertheless it  is  sometimes  necessary  to  force  men  to  act  as  spies 
for  a  particular  object  and  on  a  single  occasion.  Bugeaud 
thus  describes  the  system  of  which  he  himself  made  use  in 
Spain,  but  which  certainly  should  not  be  copied  unless  cir- 
cumstances were  so  extraordinary  as  to  justify  its  brutality: 

"Wlien  spies  are  lacking  to  procure  news  of  the  enemy, 
to  carry  letters  to  a  distance  through  the  hostile  lines,  or  to 
gather  information  by  visiting  places  occupied  by  the  foe, 
rich  countrymen  should  be  taken  from  the  villages  passed 
through,  and  having  been  given  a  certain  mission,  they  should 


COMPULSORY  ESPIONAGE.  1 83 

be  threatened  with  the  burning  of  their  houses  and  captiv- 
ity of  their  wives  and  children  if  they  fail  to  execute  their 
charge  faithfully.  This  is  a  good  method  of  giving  false 
information  to  the  enemy.  To  this  end,  the  messenger  is 
given  letters  containing  the  misleading  statements,  addressed 
to  the  commandant  of  some  place,  or  the  chief  of  some  body 
of  troops  supposed  to  have  arrived  at  some  point  which  is 
still  occupied  by  the  enemy.  The  countryman  goes  thither; 
he  is  captured;  his  letters  are  read,  and  the  ruse  rarely  fails. 
Well-to-do  countrymen  are  better  adapted  to  playing  this 
part  than  men  of  a  higher  class,  because  they  value  more 
their  little  possessions,  are  more  hardened  to  fatigue,  and 
patriotism  is  a  sentiment  less  developed  in  them  than  in  the 
superior  classes.  Moreover,  they  awaken  less  suspicion.  If 
inhabitants  are  not  to  be  seen,  as  often  happened  in  Spain, 
it  will  be  necessary  to  drive  along  the  cattle  that  are  found. 
Their  owners  will  not  fail  to  come  to  claim  their  animals, 
and  they  can  be  compelled  to  ransom  them  by  service  as 
spies;  being  warned  that  their  herds  will  be  restored  to  them 
only  when  the  information  brought  in  is  verified.  With  the 
same  object  in  view,  hostages  may  be  captured  during  the 
night  in  a  town  or  city  near  the  enemy." 

A  fine  instance  of  compulsory  espionage  occurred  in  1777, 
when  Arnold  was  moving  to  the  relief  of  Fort  Stanwix,  which 
was  besieged  by  a  large  force  of  British  and  Indians.  Fear- 
ing that  the  fort  might  be  compelled  to  surrender  before  he 
could  relieve  it,  he  made  a  skillful  use  of  a  Tory  spy,  who 
had  been  captured,  tried,  and  condemned  to  death.  This  man 
was  promised  a  full  pardon  on  the  condition  that  he  would 
go  to  the  British  camp  with  false  news  of  the  defeat  of  Bur- 
gojme  and  an  exaggerated  report  of  the  strength  of  the  col- 
umn moving  to  the  relief  of  the  fort.  The  brother  of  the  spy 
was  held  as  a  hostage  for  his  fidelity.  The  man  being  known 
by  the  British  as  one  of  their  own  spies,  his  story  was  readily 
believed,  the  Indians  deserted  in  a  body,  the  British  hastily 


1 84  SECURITY    AND   INFORMATION. 

retreated,  and  Arnold  was  enabled  to  retrace  his  steps  and 
rejoin  the  army  confronting  Burgoyne. 

Double  Spies. — The  fidelity  of  a  spy  depending  entirely 
upon  his  individual  interests,  he  must,  even  if  apparently 
devotedly  faithful,  be  regarded  with  suspicion.  His  safest 
and  most  profitable  r61e  is  that  of  a  "double  spy";  that  is, 
one  who  is  engaged  in  carrying  true  information  to  both 
armies.  For  fear  that  a  spy  may  be  playing  this  double 
part,  he  should  always  be  halted  at  the  outposts,  or  even  be 
met  at  a  designated  place  beyond  them.  It  is  a  good  rule 
to  go  to  meet  the  spy,  instead  of  having  him  come  in  to  re- 
port. This  rule,  which  is  practicable  whenever  the  time  of 
the  spy's  return  can  be  foretold,  subserves  another  good  end; 
for  there  are  often  men  who  are  willing  to  act  as  spies,  but 
who  are  afraid  or  ashamed  to  be  known  as  such,  even  among 
friendly  people.  Such  men  would  willingly  render  their  re- 
ports at  some  isolated  rendezvous,  while  they  would  dread  to 
be  seen  entering  the  camp. 

Double  spies  are  often  of  great  value.  Prince  de  Ligne 
even  declares  that  they  are  the  best.  But  he  adds  that  it  is 
necessary  to  deceive  them  in  order  that  we  may  not  be  de- 
ceived by  them,  and  to  make  a  false  movement  in  order  to 
test  them.  It  can  then  be  seen  whether,  after  allowing  the 
spy  to  learn  of  the  movement,  -the  enemy  is  informed  of  It. 
If  he  is,  the  spy  should  not  be  hanged,  but  should  be  confined 
and  compelled  to  send  false  news  to  the  enemy.  False  infor- 
mation should  be  communicated  to  a  spy  only  by  an  author- 
ized officer  having  full  knowledge  of  the  true  plans  and  con- 
ditions. Any  uninstructed  officer  taking  it  upon  himself  to 
disseminate  false  news  might  unwittingly  give  true  informa- 
tion, and  cause  incalculable  mischief. 

The  Conduct  of  the  Service  of  Espionage. — Nothing  intrust- 
ed to  a  spy  should  be  put  in  writing,  unless  it  be  false  informa- 
tion intrusted  to  a  double  spy.  All  other  messages  should 
be  either  verbal  or  expressed  in  cipher.  The  messages  should 
be  closely  written  on  fine  paper  and  inclosed  in  a  small  quill, 


CONDUCT   OF   the;   SERVICE   OE   ESPIONAGE.  1 85 

■which  could  be  concealed  in  the  hair  or  beard,  or  enclosed 
in  a  hollow  bullet,  which  could  be  fired  away  if  capture  seemed 
unavoidable.  A  still  better  plan,  perhaps,  would  be  to  write 
the  message  in  lemon  juice  on  the  margin  of  some  book,  such 
as  a  Testament  or  prayer-book,  which  the  spy  might  carry 
without  exciting  suspicion.  Exposing  the  leaf  to  heat,  or 
passing  a  hot  iron  over  it,  would  then  bring  out  the  writing. 
The  dispatches  carried  by  Campbell  (one  of  Sheridan's  spies) 
were  closely  written  on  tissue  paper,  rolled  up  in  tin  foil,  and 
concealed  in  a  quid  of  tobacco  in  his  mouth. 

A  spy  should  never  be  allowed  to  see  that  he  is  mis- 
trusted; but  should  be  led  to  believe  that  particular  confi- 
dence is  reposed  in  him,  and  that  his  services  are  regarded 
as  especially  valuable.  At  the  same  time,  other  spies  should 
be  employed  to  cover  the  same  ground,  and  their  reports 
should  be  carefully  compared.  The  same  rendezvous  should 
not  be  assigned  to  different  spies  on  their  return,  as  they 
would  thus  become  acquainted  with  each  other,  and  might 
conspire  to  bring  in  false  news,  or  one  might  be  betrayed  to 
the  enemy  by  another.  In  rare  cases  it  may,  however,  be 
practicable  to  employ  spies  in  pairs.  In  Tennessee,  Sheri- 
dan employed  the  three  brothers  Card  as  spies;  two  of  the 
men  working  together,  while  the  third  remained  at  head- 
quarters, available  for  duty  in  case  of  mishap  to  the  others, 
or  in  case  Sheridan  wished  to  communicate  with  them. 

When  a  spy  leaves  the  post,  camp,  or  bivouac,  he  should 
be  escorted  beyond  the  outposts  by  an  officer  or  non-commis- 
sioned officer,  who  should  give  only  such  information  about 
him  as  may  be  necessary  to  insure  his  safe  exit.  When  a  spy 
comes  in,  he  should  be  halted  by  the  sentinel,  and  conducted 
to  the  nearest  picket,  where  he  should  be  retained  under 
charge  of  the  picket  sentinel  while  awaiting  the  orders  of 
the  officer  for  whom  he  inquires.  While  at  the  picket,  the 
sentinel  should  see  that  he  communicates  with  nobody.  A 
spy  should  always,  if  practicable,  be  assigned  to  the  same 
officer,  mutual  acquaintance  being  essential  to  complete  mu- 


1 86  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

tual  understanding.  A  good  spy  often  acquires  a  feeling 
of  friendship  and  devotion  for  a  chief  who  always  sends  him 
out,  who  always  receives  his  reports,  and  (above  all)  who 
always  rewards  him,  A  spy  must  always  be  well  paid.  He 
is  usually  working  for  money,  and  for  money  alone.  A  badly 
paid  spy  will  generally  strike  a  bargain,  sooner  or  later,  with 
the  enemy.  Communication  with  a  spy  should  never  be 
made  through  an  interpreter,  if  it  can  be  avoided.  His  in- 
formation may  be  misinterpreted,  and  he  will  fear  misrep- 
resentation. Liberal  pay  and  kindness  should  chiefly  char- 
acterize the  treatment  of  spies,  though  they  should  be  treated 
with  firmness  and  held  to  the  faithful  performance  of  their 
duties.  Threats  should  never  be  used.  If  the  spy  is  of- 
fended, he  can  easily  leave,  or  pehaps  turn  traitor.  If  his 
conduct  has  been  so  suspicious  as  to  warrant  a  threat,  it  has 
been  bad  enough  to  justify  his  arrest. 

A  spy's  abilities  should  always  be  considered,  and  too 
much  should  not  be  required  of  him.  If  charged  with  ascer- 
taining too  many  things,  he  will  probably  bring  back  a  con- 
fused report.  Unless  he  be  an  exceptionally  able  man,  he 
should  be  directed  to  ascertain  only  certain  definite  things. 
It  is,  consequently,  necessary  to  employ  many  spies,  and  to 
assign  to  each  a  particular  mission,  giving  them  only  such 
•things  in  common  to  report  upon  as  may  enable  them  to  act 
as  a  check  upon  each  other.  The  question  to  which  the 
spies  are  to  find  answers  will  depend  upon  circumstances. 
The  following  ones,  of  general  application,  should  always  be 
kept  in  view:  j^- ; 

1.  Where  are  the  headquarters? 

2.  At  what  places  are  the  different  generals?     What  are 
their  names,  and  what  is  the  character  of  each  ? 

3.  What  are  the  numbers  and  strength  of  the  corps  in 
each  position,  and  how  many  guns  with  each  ? 

4.  Is  the  enemy  concentrating  or  dividing  his  forces? 

5.  What  are  the  measures  taken  for  subsistence  and 
transport? 


CONDUCT  OF  THE   SERVICE   OF   ESPIONAGE-  1 87 

6.  How  are  the  enemy's  troops  clothed,  fed,  and  paid? 
What  is  the  state  of  their  morale?  How  large  is  their  sick- 
report?  What  is  the  mortality  among  them?  What  are  the 
prevailing  diseases  ? 

7.  Is  the  enemy  moving?  If  so,  the  entire  army,  by 
corps,  or  by  detachments  ? 

8.  Is  he  awaiting  reinforcements?  Whence  are  they 
coming?  What  kind  of  troops  are  they?  When  are  they 
expected  ? 

9.  Is  he  fortifying?     If  so,  on  what  points? 

When  the  army  is  engaged  in  active  operations,  it  may 
be  a  difl5cult  matter  for  a  spy  to  find  the  officer  or  the  head- 
quarters to  which  he  should  report;  and  it  may  not  be  easy 
for  him  to  establish  his  identity  as  a  bona-fide  spy,  when  he 
arrives  at  the  outposts  or  meets  an  advance  guard,  unless 
some  general  device  has  been  adopted  beforehand.  In  1870-71 
each  German  spy  wore  a  small  medal,  similar  to  a  religious 
medal,  around  his  neck,  under  his  clothes.  Wolseley  sug- 
gests that  each  spy  should  carry  "a  coin  of  a  certain  date,  a 
Bible  of  a  certain  edition,  a  Testament  with  the  3d  or  7th 
leaf  torn  out,"  etc.,  etc. 

Stationary  Spies. — Spies  sometimes  remain  in  a  certain 
locality,  and  send  information,  often  through  the  ordinary 
channels  of  communication,  in  regard  to  the  enemy's  move- 
ments and  preparations.  These  communications,  either  tel- 
egraphic or  by  letter,  may  often  be  couched  in  commercial 
language,  and  sent  to  persons  in  a  neutral  country,  by  whom 
they  are  transmitted  to  the  officials  for  whom  they  are  in- 
tended. There  can  be  no  doubt  that  during  the  Spanish- 
American  War,  spies  in  the  United  States  cabled  disguised 
messages  to  neutral  European  countries,  whence  they  were 
transmitted  through  Spain  to  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico. 

Spies  can,  with  a  small  pocket  instrument,  tap  the  tele- 
graph wires  and  gain  valuable  information  by  means  of  the 
messages  passing.  This  information  can  then  be  forwarded 
to  the  army  by  means  of  mobile  spies,  or  under  disguise  through 


1 88  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

neutral  territory.  Officers  or  trusted  agents  should  always 
be  posted  in  a  neutral  country  for  the  purpose  of  .transmit- 
ting promptly  to  the  headquarters  of  the  army  such  news  of 
importance  as  they  may  there  learn. 

Guarding  Against  Hostile  Spies. — Thus  far  we  have  con- 
sidered only  the  employment  of  spies  against  the  enemy.  We 
must  now  consider  the  measures  necessary  to  guard  against 
espionage  on  his  part.  The  mischief  that  may  follow  care- 
lessness in  this  respect  is  well  shown  by  I^ewal  in  the  follow- 
ing incident : 

"A  stranger  presented  himself,  giving  false,  but  spe- 
cious, news  of  the  Germans.  He  was  listened  to;  he  gained 
the  confidence  of  the  French;  he  went  without  hindrance  to 
the  center  of  the  army,  even  to  headquarters.  He  saw  all 
there  was  to  be  seen,  and  returned  to  the  enemy  under  pre- 
text of  going  in  search  of  further  news.  He  never  returned. 
At  daybreak  the  enemy,  well  informed  by  him  of  our  posi- 
tions, attacked.  A  great  reverse  for  us  followed.  It  was  a 
case  of  a  German  spy  whom  nobody  had  suspected."      * 

When  the  presence  of  the  enemy's  spies  is  suspected,  the 
soldiers  should  be  warned  against  intimate  association  with 
the  inhabitants,  and  should  be  instructed  not  to  answer  any 
questions  relative  to  the  army  or  its  movements  asked  them 
by  strangers.  Strangers  caught  giving  liquor  to  the  sol- 
diers should  be  at  once  arrested  and  subjected  to  a  rigid 
examination. 

Vigilance  at  the  outposts  will  do  much  to  keep  spies 
away;  but  the  necessity  of  allowing  inhabitants  to  pass  often 
gives  admission  to  spies.  When  Napoleon  was  bivouacked 
on  the  Danube,  opposite  Essling,  some  Jews  came  into  the 
French  bivouac  ostensibly  to  bargain  for  the  hides  of  the  ani- 
mals slaughtered  for  the  subsistence  of  the  troops.  It  after- 
wards transpired  that  they  were  spies  of  the  Archduke  Charles. 
People  on  such  alleged  mercantile  errands  must  be  carefully 
watched,  as  well  as  persons  on  supposed  religious  missions. 
Beggars,    peddlers,    itinerant   preachers,    and   strange   women 


GUARDING    AGAINST   HOSTILE    SPIES.  1 89 

should  be  objects  of  suspicion,  and  should  not  be  allowed  to 
approach  the  camp  or  bivouac  or  to  remain  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  troops. 

A  spy  may  often  be  detected  by  his  obsequious  polite- 
ness, by  his  having  plenty  of  money  with  him,  by  his  liber- 
ality in  "treating"  the  soldiers,  by  his  extreme  care  to  ob- 
serve all  the  regulations  of  the  camp,  by  his  presence  every- 
where where  military  movements  are  taking  place,  by  his 
manner  of  looking  and  listening  while  trying  to  seem  not  to 
do  so,  by  his  assumed  air  of  extreme  frankness,  and  by  his 
promptness  in  producing  papers  to  establish  his  innocent 
and  worthy  character. 

When  a  spy  is  captured,  he  should  be  carefully  searched, 
his  clothes  ripped  apart,  the  soles  and  heels  of  his  shoes  cut 
open,  and  his  buttons  examined.  If  he  is  suspected  of  hav- 
ing about  him  papers  which  are  not  discovered  in  the  search, 
his  clothing  should  be  burned.  His  hair,  beard,  and  mouth 
should  be  searched;  and  if  he  is  armed  when  captured,  his 
cartridges  and  revolver  should  be  carefully  examined.  If  he 
is  suspected  of  having  swallowed  a  dispatch,  he  should  be 
given  an  emetic. 

A  captured  spy  is  usually  put  to  death  by  hanging;  but 
even  if  taken  clearly  in  the  act,  he  can  not,  without  violation 
of  the  laws  of  war,  be  executed  without  a  preliminary  trial.* 
The  severe  punishment  habitually  inflicted  upon  captured 
spies  is  necessary  to  protect  an  army  from  the  operations  of 
foes  whom  it  is  difficult  to  detect,  and  upon  whom  the  sever- 
ity of  the  punishment  rather  than  its  probability  must  act  as 
a  deterrent.  The  offense  of  a  spy  lies  essentially  in  his  dis- 
guise; and  an  enemy  found  in  his  proper  uniform  within  the 
lines  of  the  army,  even  though  engaged  in  observing  stealthily 
the  movements  and  condition  of  the  troops,  is  entitled  to 
all  the  rights  of  a  prisoner  of  war.     A  spy's  offense  ends  with 

*Rules  concerning  the  Laws  and  Usages  of  War  on  Land,  as  agreed 
upon  by  the  International  Peace  Conference  at  The  Hague. 


igo  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

his  return  to  his  army,  and  if  subsequently  captured,  he  is  not 
liable  for  his  previous  acts  of  espionage. 

The  Secret  Service. — The  management  of  the  secret  service 
of  an  army  requires  a  profound  insight  into  human  nature, 
and  an  ability  to  estimate  at  once  the  military  worth  of  the 
information  brought  in.  The  chief  of  the  secret  service  should 
be  a  peculiar  combination  of  detective  and  general;  it  is  not 
suflScient  that  he  should  be  a  detective  alone.  The  chief  of 
McClellan's  secret  service  was  a  well-known  and  skillful  de- 
tective; yet  that  general  seemed  to  be,  to  an  unusual  degree, 
the  victim  of  misinformation  in  regard  to  the  movements, 
and  especially  the  numbers,  of  the  opposing  army.  The  Reg- 
ulations for  Troops  in  Campaign  now  prescribe  that  the  pro- 
vost-marshal-general shall  superintend  the  secret  service. 

Newspapers. 

In  time  of  war  much  attention  should  be  given,  at  the 
headquarters  of  an  army,  to  the  newspapers  of  the  enemy 
and  to  those  of  neutral  countries;  for  much  valuable  infor- 
mation may  thus  be  obtained.  It  is  said  that,  in  1796,  Mo- 
reau  first  received  intelligence  of  the  reverses  of  Jourdan 
from  the  columns  of  a  German  newspaper;  and  it  is  known 
that  in  the  Franco- German  war,  when  MacMahon  attempted 
his  disastrous  march  to  the  relief  of  Bazaine,  the  first  news 
of  this  important  movement  came  to  Von  Moltke  through 
the  French  and  English  newspapers. 

With  the  increasing  means  of  gathering  and  transmit- 
ting news,  and  with  the  constantly  growing  popular  de- 
mand for  late  and  complete  information,  the  trouble  created 
in  military  operations  by  the  mischievous  energy  of  news- 
paper reporters  will,  more  than  ever,  justify  the  characteriza- 
tion of  such  correspondents  as  "the  plague  of  modem  arm- 
ies." Such  is  the  power  of  the  press  in  the  United  States 
that  an  attempt  to  banish  newspaper  correspondents  from 
an  American  army  would  probably  do  more  harm  than  good; 


NEWSPAPERS.  191 

but  it  does  not  seem  impracticable  to  place  restrictions  upon 
the  unavoidable  evil,  and  even,  in  some  cases,  to  turn  it  to 
practical  use.  No  correspondent  should  be  allowed  to  ac- 
company the  army  unless  provided  with  a  license  signed  by 
the  Secretary  of  War,  on  which  should  be  an  agreement, 
signed  by  the  correspondent  and  the  managing  editor  of  his 
paper,  not  to  violate  any  orders  relative  to  correspondence 
that  might,  from  time  to  time,  be  issued  by  the  commander 
of  the  army. 

An  officer  should  be  detailed  as  press  censor.  He  should 
exercise  a  general  supervision  over  all  the  accredited  corre- 
spondents, and  should  satisfy  himself  as  to  the  propriety  of 
all  newspaper  dispatches  before  allowing  them  to  be  sent. 
Any  correspondent  known  to  be  discreet,  subordinate,  and 
trustworthy  should  be  freely  given  all  news  of  proper  na- 
ture at  headquarters ;  but  mischievous  ones  should  be  prompt- 
ly deprived  of  their  licenses,  and  otherwise  punished  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  and  degree  of  their  oJEfense. 

It  is  impossible  to  prescribe  hard-and-fast  rules  for  the 
government  of  the  newspaper  reporters  accompanying  an 
army;  but  regulations  of  some  kind  must  be  adopted  to  hold 
in  check  the  mischievous  gossip  of  those  correspondents  who 
would  unhesitatingly  imperil  the  safety  of  the  army  for  the 
purpose  of  getting  ahead  of  their  rival  reporters  with  some 
item  of  news.  ' '  Complete  and  unfettered  freedom  of  the  press 
is  incompatible  with  a  state  of  war."* 

It  is  not  merely  the  metropolitan  newspapers  that  work 
the  mischief,  but  the  petty  local  press  as  well. 

"Of  coxurse,"  says  Von  der  Goltz,  "even  the  best-informed 
paper  will  neither  be  able  nor  willing  to  make  known  the 
position  of  its  party  in  all  its  entirety.  But,  even  here,  what 
is  worth  knowing  is  composed  of  many  petty  details.  Other 
flashes  of  light  have  often  so  far  lit  up  the  picture  of  the  ene- 
my's doings  that  only  a  breath  of  wind  is  still  wanting  to 
rend  assunder  the  thin  enshrouding  veil  of  mist.     The  pres- 

*Bronsart  von  Schellendorf . 


192  SECURITY   AND    INFORMATION. 

ence  of  a  high  commander  is  mentioned,  a  letter  published, 
in  which  the  writer  mentions  a  division  of  troops  and  its 
station,  or  narrates  a  deed  of  arms,  exactly  describing  all 
the  circumstances,  the  regiments,  and  commanders.  Each 
detail  by  itself  is  perfectly  unprejudicial,  but  may  yet  serve 
as  a  valuable  link  of  a  chain  that  at  last  leads  to  its  aim. 
*  *  *  Xhe  national  press  can  not  in  war-time  be  suffi- 
ciently warned  to  caution.  The  demand  for  news  must  be 
decidedly  suppressed  in  its  disastrous  effects,  much  as,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  must,  in  consideration  of  the  feeling  of  the 
country,  be  treated  with  regard.  It  would  be  better  to  trust 
reliable  persons  with  the  spreading  of  news  that  is  worth 
knowing  to  the  country,  than,  by  attempting  to  close  all 
sources  of  communication,  to  incite  unqualified  and  unrelia- 
ble persons  to  independent  action." 

It  may  sometimes  be  practicable  to  lead  the  enemy  into 
error  by  giving  the  newspaper  correspondents  incorrect  in- 
formation. This  misinformation  will  do  no  harm  to  the  read- 
ing public  at  home,  and  it  may  produce  great  results  in  the 
field.  This  ruse  must  not,  however,  be  too  frequently  at- 
tempted, as  the  correspondents,  who  are  invariably  men  of 
alert  intelligence,  would  cease  to  fall  into  the  trap,  and  might 
feel  justified  in  smothering  the  official  news  in  a  mass  of  sen- 
sational conjecture,  which  they  -might  succeed  in  smuggling 
past  the  press  censor. 

When  a  newspaper  has  incurred  the  displeasure  of  the 
commander  by  the  nature  of  its  correspondence,  the  punish- 
ment should,  except  where  the  fault  manifestly  lies  with  the 
editorial  management,  fall  upon  the  correspondent  individ- 
ually, and  not  upon  the  newspaper.  Instead  of  denying  the 
paper  the  privilege  of  having  a  correspondent  with  the  army, 
it  should  be  notified  that  it  could  retain  that  privilege  only 
by  sending  a  new  man  in  place  of  the  offending  reporter,  who 
should  be  expelled  from  the  army,  or  otherwise  punished 
according  to  the  nature  of  his  offense.  But  the  problem  of 
dealing  with  correspondents  is  a  difficult  one,  and  it  must  be 


NEWSPAPERS.  193 

solved  by  the  commander  according  to  the  circumstances  of 
each  case.  The  chief  objects  to  be  considered  in  regard  to 
the  newspapers  in  war  are,  to  derive  the  greatest  possible 
benefit  from  the  indiscretions  of  the  correspondents  with  the 
enemy's  armies,  and  to  prevent  similar  indiscreet  publica- 
tions by  the  reporters  with  our  own.* 

*For  illustrations  of  the  annoyance  caused  by  newspaper  correspond- 
ents in  the  War  of  Secession,  see  "  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War," 
Vol.  I.,  page  141;  Sherman's  "Memoirs,"  Vol.  I.,  page  232  et  seq.;  and 
Grant's  "Memoirs,"  Vol.  II.,  page  143  ei  seq. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


Orientation  and  Map-Rkading. 


The  conduct  of  patrols,  reconnaissances,  partisan  corps,  and  in  general 
all  the  operations  of  war,  require  that  military  men  of  all  grades  should 
understand  orientation,  and  be  familiar  with  map-reading. — Von  Witzleben. 

Orientation  is  the  art  of  determining  the  points  of  the 
compass  at  any  place  where  the  observer  may  be. 
It  is  effected : 

1 .  By  means  of  the  magnetic  compass ; 

2 .  By  observing  the  sun ; 

3.  By  observing  the  moon; 

4.  By  observing  the  North  Star ; 

5.  By  means  of  maps ;  and 

6.  By  means  of  indications. 

Orientation  by  Means  of  the  Compass  scarcely  needs  expla- 
nation. It  is  well  known  that  the  needle  points  north.  Fac- 
ing, then,  towards  the  north,  a  right  face,  left  face,  or  about 
face  will  cause  the  observer  to  face  towards  the  east,  west,  or 
south.  Care  should  be  taken  that  the  needle  is  not  affected 
by  the  proximity  of  weapons,  or  other  objects  of  iron.  For 
ordinary  purposes  of  orientation,  the  variation  of  the  compass 
may  be  neglected.  All  the  ordinary  methods  of  orientation 
are,  in  fact,  the  rough  expedients  of  the  practical  soldier, 
and  not  the  scientific  calculations  of  the  astronomer. 

Orientation  by  Observing  the  Sun  can  give  only  an  approxi- 
mation to  correct  results.  Roughly  speaking,  the  sun  is  in 
the  east  at  6  o'clock  in  the  morning,  in  the  south  at  noon,  and 
in  the  west  at  6  o'clock  in  the  evening.  This  method  of 
orientation  requires  that  the  hour  be  known.  If  the  observer 
is  without  a  watch,  the  time  of  day  can  be  judged  approxi- 

194 


ORIENTATION   BY   OBSERVING   THE   SUN.  195 

mately  by  the  height  of  the  sun  in  the  heavens.  To  judge 
correctly  requires  practice;  no  rules  can  be  given.  If  the  ob- 
serv^er  knows  approximately  the  time  of  sunrise,  and  knows 
the  distance  traveled  since  that  hour,  this  distance  divided 
by  the  usual  rate  of  march  will  give  the  hours  marched,  and 
consequenth^  the  time  of  day. 

The  sun  passes  over  an  arc  of  15  degrees  in  an  hour.  At 
II  o'clock  the  shadow  cast  by  a  vertical  stake  will  be  west 
of  the  meridian,  and  will  make  an  angle  of  15  degrees  with 
it.  If  then  a  line  be  drawn  to  the  eastward  of  the  shadow 
and  at  right  angles  with  it,  a  division  of  this  angle  into  three 
equal  parts  will  enable  the  observer  to  lay  off  an  angle  of  15 
degrees  east  of  the  shadow,  which  will  give  the  meridian 
line.  At  10:30  o'clock  the  right  angle  should  be  bisected. 
At  10  o'clock  an  angle  of  30  degrees  should  be  taken,  and  so 
on.  In  the  afternoon  the  meridian  line  should  be  drawn  cor- 
respondingly to  the  westward  of  the  shadow.  But  all  at- 
tempts at  orientation  by  observing  the  sun  are  scarcely  more 
than  guesses,  unless  a  timepiece  of  some  sort  is  at  hand. 

When  the  sun  is  shining,  a  watch  answers  the  purposes 
of  orientation  as  well  as  a  compass.  While  the  sun  is  pass- 
ing over  180  degrees  (from  east  to  west),  the  hour  hand  of  the 
watch  passes  over  360  degrees  .(from  6  o'clock  to  6  o'clock). 
Consequently,  the  angular  movement  of  the  sun  in  an  hour 
corresponds  to  the  angular  movement  of  the  hour  hand  in 
half  an  hour.  If,  then,  holding  the  watch  horizontal,  we 
point  the  hour  hand  in  the  direction  of  the  sun,  a  line  from 
the  pivot  of  the  hands  to  the  point  midway  between  the  hour 
hand  and  XII  will  point  to  the  south.  To  illustrate:  Sup- 
pose that  it  is  9  o'clock  in  the  morning.  Following  the  rule 
given  above,  we  find  the  south  as  indicated  in  Figure  i ,  Plate 
XVI. 

Orientation  by  Observing  the  Moon  is  more  difficult  and 
not  very  reliable;  it  depends  upon  the  quarter  in  which  the 
moon  happens  to  be. 


196  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

The  full  moon  is  in  the  east  at  6  o'clock  in  the  evening, 
in  the  south  at  midnight,  and  in  the  west  at  6  o'clock  in  the 
morning. 

The  moon  in  the  first  quarter  is  in  the  south  at  6  o'clock 
in  the  evening,  and  in  the  west  at  midnight. 

The  moon  in  the  last  quarter  is  in  the  east  at  midnight, 
and  in  the  south  at  6  o  'clock  in  the  morning. 

These  indications,  except  the  first,  may  vary  an  hour  or 
so  earlier  or  later. 

The  moon  in  the  first  quarter  has  the  concavity  to  the 
left.     In  the  last  quarter  the  concavity  is  to  the  right. 

Orientation  by  Observing  the  North  Star  is  one  of  the  easi- 
est methods.  In  whatever  position  the  constellation  of  the 
Great  Bear,  or  the  Dipper,  may  be,  the  line  joining  the  "point- 
ers" will,  if  prolonged  to  about  six  times  its  length,  pass 
nearly  through  the  North  Star,  which  can  be  readily  recog- 
nized by  its  brilliancy.     (See  Fig.  2,  Plate  XVI.) 

Orientation  by  Map  is  altogether  the  most  satisfactory. 
The  north  is  generally  at  the  top  of  the  map ;  if  not,  it  is  in- 
dicated by  the  direction  of  an  arrow  or  similar  symbol.  Hav- 
ing a  map,  and  being  on  the  ground  represented  by  it,  all  that 
is  necessary  is  to  place  any  line  on  the  map  in  the  same  direc- 
tion as  a  corresponding  line  on  the  ground,  and  the  map  will 
give  the  direction  of  the  points"  of  the  compass.  Any  line 
may  be  chosen,  such  as  a  portion  of  a  road  or  railroad,  or  a 
line  joining  two  prominent  landmarks. 

Orientation  by  Indications. — If  compass  and  maps  are 
lacking  in  cloudy  weather,  or  at  night,  the  points  of  the  com- 
pass may  be  found  by  various  indications.  In  the  Northern 
Hemisphere  the  moss  on  stones  and  trees  is  found  thickest 
on  the  northwest  or  north  side.  Walls  are  damper  on  the 
north  than  on  the  south  side.  The  bark  of  trees  is  most 
deeply  wrinkled  on  the  north  side.  In  stumps  of  trees  it  will 
be  observed  that  the  rings  of  annual  growth  are  wider  on  the 
south  than  on  the  north  side.     Vines  are  trained  on  the  south 


ORIENTATION   BY   INDICATIONS.  1 97 

side  of  walls.  Headstones  in  cemeteries  are  generally  at  the 
west  end  of  graves.  Weather-vanes  are  often  marked  with 
the  points  of  the  compass. 

Map-Reading. 

Quick  and  accurate  map-reading  can  be  acquired  only 
by  practice.  This  practice  can  be  obtained  by  going  to  the 
ground  represented,  and  orienting  one's  self  with  the  map. 
Pacing  the  distance  from  one  object  to  another,  the  result 
should  be  compared  with  the  distance  between  the  same  ob- 
jects as  indicated  on  the  map.  At  each  cross-road  or  fence 
delineated  on  the  map,  the  angle  made  with  the  road  should 
be  estimated  or  measured,  and  compared  with  the  angle  rep- 
resented. The  actual  appearance  of  all  hills  or  natural  feat- 
ures should  be  compared  with  the  cartographic  represen- 
tation, and  this  practice  continued  until  an  examination  of 
a  topographical  map  gives  to  the  mind  a  clear  conception 
of  the  actual  appearance  of  the  ground  represented.  The 
best  way  to  learn  to  read  a  map  is  to  learn  to  make  one; 
which  knowledge  can  be  acquired  by  the  study  of  military 
topography. 

To  ascertain  the  distance  between  any  two  points  on  the 
map,  take  the  distance  as  indicated  by  a  pair  of  dividers,  and 
apply  it  to  the  scale  given  on  the  map.  If  the  distance  is  too 
great  to  be  measured  with  a  single  span  of  the  dividers,  or 
greater  than  the  length  of  the  given  scale,  draw  a  straight 
line  in  pencil  on  the  margin  of  the  map,  or  on  any  convenient 
paper,  and  lay  off  the  distance  thereon.  Then  adjust  the 
dividers  to  any  suitable  portion  of  the  scale  (say  i,ooo  yards) 
and  see  how  many  times  the  adjusted  span  is  contained  in  the 
space  marked  off.  If  there  is  a  remainder,  apply  it  to  the 
scale.  The  quotient  multiplied  by  the  number  of  yards  rep- 
resented by  the  span,  plus  the  number  represented  by  the 
remainder,  will  indicate  the  distance  measured. 


198  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

The  distances  measured  along  roads  are  rarely  on  a  straight 
line.  The  best  method  of  measuring  such  distances  is  as 
follows : 

Let  it  be  required  to  find  the  exact  distance  from  the 
point  B  to  the  point  A  on  the  map,  measured  along  the  road 
B  C  D  E  J  A.  (See  Fig.  3,  Plate  XVI.)  Placing  one  foot  of  the 
dividers  at  B  and  the  other  at  C,  we  get  the  distance  between 
these  two  points.  Without  changing  the  opening  of  the  di- 
viders, we  leave  one  foot  at  C,  and  swing  the  other  around  on 
the  prolongation  of  the  line  D  C,  where  it  falls  at  some  point  F. 
Extending  the  other  foot  of  the  dividers  to  the  point  D,  we 
find  F  D  =  B  C+C  D.  Swinging  the  foot  at  F  arotmd  in  pro- 
longation of  E  D,  and  extending  the  foot  at  D  to  E,  we  find 
G  E  =  B  C+C  D+D  E.  In  a  shnilar  manner  we  find  H  J  = 
B  C+C  D+D  E+E  J;  andfinally,  A  I  =  B  C+C  D+D  E+E  J 
+J  A.  Applying  the  distance  A  I  to  the  scale  on  the  map, 
we  have  the  distance  by  road  from  B  to  A. 


PLATE   XVI. 


Q.- 


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CHAPTER  IX. 


Indian  Scouting. 


It  must  be  emphatically  asserted  that  there  does  not  exist,  never 
has  existed,  and  never,  except  by  pedants,  of  whom  the  most  careful 
students  of  war  are  more  impatient  than  other  soldiers,  has  there  ever 
been  supposed  to  exist,  "an  art  of  war"  which  was  something  other  than 
the  resultant  of  accumulated  military  experience. — Maurice. 

As  contributing  to  a  demonstration  of  the  fact  that  sound 
theories  of  war  are  simply  the  accumulations  of  experience, 
it  is  interesting  to  note  the  essential  points  in  common  pos- 
sessed by  the  scouting  methods  of  European  armies  and 
those  of  the  Indians,  who,  far  from  knowing  anything  about 
European  warfare,  are  ignorant  of  the  existence  of  Europe 
itself.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  consider  the  methods  of  the 
Apaches  and  the  Sioux. 

Unlike  the  other  Indian  tribes,  the  Apaches  are  essen- 
tially foot-soldiers.  They  often  use  great  numbers  of  horses 
on  their  raids,  but  they  never  fight  mounted,  their  horses  be- 
ing used  merely  as  a  means  of  transportation  from  one  point 
to  another.  As  warriors,  they  are  formidable  only  when  afoot, 
and  as  scouts  they  are  seen  at  their  best  when  acting  as  small 
infantry  patrols. 

During  the  wars  of  the  past  decade  in  Arizona,  the 
ordinary  methods  of  an  Apache  company  in  the  field  against 
hostile  Indians  were  about  as  follows:  The  scouts  were  up 
and  on  the  alert  before  the  earliest  signs  of  dawn;  and,  hav- 
ing received  their  instructions  as  to  the  next  camping-place, 
and  especially  in  regard  to  "ranches"  inhabited  by  white  men 
(by  whom  they  were  likely  to  be  fired  upon,  if  they  approached 
unaccompanied  by  troops),  they  started  out  from  camp, 
spreading  out  like  a  fan,  in  groups  of  three,  and  pushing  on 

199 


200  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

SO  far  ahead  of  the  troops  that  the  latter  rarely  saw  them 
until  camp  was  reached,  or  the  trail  became  so  hot  that  word 
was  sent  back  to  the  column.  The  patrols  reconnoitered  the 
country  in  the  most  thorough  manner  for  about  five  miles 
on  each  side  of  the  trail,  and  absolutely  nothing  escaped  their 
notice;  tracks,  broken  branches,  upturned  stones,  ashes  of 
camp-fires,  horse-dung — in  short,  every  thing,  being  com- 
mented on,  and,  if  deemed  important,  reported  to  the  com- 
mander of  the  column  by  one  of  the  party.  If  less  than  three 
men  remained  of  a  party,  it  always  united  with  another,  an 
Apache  dreading  to  be  alone. 

As  soon  as  camp  was  made  (generally  about  i  o'clock 
p.  M.),  the  scouts,  without  instructions  being  given,  encircled 
the  camp  with  an  outpost  line,  which  nothing  could  approach 
without  being  seen.  As  soon  as  it  became  dark,  everyone 
came  in  and  went  to  bed,  the  horses  were  turned  out  un- 
der soldiers  for  night-herding,  and  the  camp  slept  securely, 
because  it  is  a  cardinal  principle  with  the  Apaches  never 
to  attack  at  night.  This  peculiarity  of  the  Apaches  is  by 
some  attributed  to  the  extremely  rough  country  covered 
with  cactus  and  prickly  pear;  by  others,  to  superstition. 
Whatever  the  cause,  it  seems  to  be  an  invariable  rule.  The 
earliest  gray  of  dawn  always  found  the  outposts  reestablished, 
the  herd  in  (or  the  guards  about  it  quadrupled),  and  the  men 
under  arms. 

The  methods  of  these  scouts  were  in  all  respects  essen- 
tially the  same  as  those  of  the  hostile  Indians  to  whom  they 
were  opposed. 

The  Apaches  show  a  surprising  skill  in  the  selection  of 
positions  and  in  the  measures  taken  for  defense.  An  oJBficer 
of  experience  says: 

"In  the  field  against  Victorio  for  two  years,  I  never  saw 
one  of  his  camps  that  did  not  astonish  me  with  the  splendid 
means  of  defense  against  any  opponent  coming  in  any  direc- 
tion, and  the  absolute  impossibility  of  sudden  surprise  guar- 
anteed by  his  arrangement  of  outposts.     *     *     *     *     jn  his 


INDIAN    SCOUTING.  20I 

own  country  the  Apache  is  the  ideal  scout  for  an  infantry 
patrol,  as  he  obtains  all  information  without  being  seen,  can 
conceal  himself  on  a  bare  plain,  and  is  good  for  thirty  miles 
a  day  all  the  time." 

^Vhile  the  Apache,  habitually  operating  on  foot,  gives 
us  a  valuable  lesson  in  the  conduct  of  infantry  patrols,  the 
mounted  Indian  furnishes  a  similar  one  for  the  cavalry  recon- 
noitering  service. 

The  Sioux  is,  probably,  the  best  type  of  mounted  Indian. 
He  is  "all  eyes  and  ears,"  is  seldom  seen,  and  may,  in  fact, 
be  characterized  as  a  perfect  scout.  When  General  Crook's 
command  left  Fort  Fetterman,  in  the  campaign  of  1876,  it 
had  in  its  front  from  8,000  to  10,000  hostile  Sioux;  and  yet, 
in  a  march  of  200  miles,  not  one  of  them  was  seen,  though 
they  kept  the  command  under  constant  observation,  and 
knew  its  every  movement.  At  Tongue  River  the  camp  was 
fired  into  in  broad  daylight  by  Indians  who  had  stealthily  ap- 
proached unseen  to  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river.  Had  the 
stream  been  unfordable,  so  that  the  Indians  could  not  have 
been  dislodged,  they  would  have  made  the  camp  untenable. 

The  advance  guard  and  flankers  of  the  Sioux  are  pushed 
miles  beyond  the  main  body,  and  their  scouts  hang  upon  the 
flanks  of  the  approaching  enemy.  The  scout  gains  some  high 
point,  where,  lying  on  his  belly  in  the  shadow  of  some  tree 
or  rock,  he  sees  everything  without  being  seen  himself;  his 
horse  meanwhile  being  either  picketed  or  grazing  with  drag- 
ging lariat  behind  the  crest  of  the  hill.  The  expedients  adopted 
for  concealment  are  many  and  ingenious.  The  scout  some- 
times crawls  towards  a  rock  on  the  crest  of  a  hill,  and  when 
near  it  draws  his  blanket,  or  a  white  cloth  or  stable  frock 
(according  to  the  color  of  the  rock),  over  his  head  and  shoul- 
ders, covering  everything  but  his  eyes,  and  then  wriggles 
himself  by  degrees  up  to  the  rock,  where  he  remains  motion- 
less imtil  he  has  minutely  scanned  all  the  country  in  sight, 
when  he  withdraws  as  stealthily  as  he  approached,  whether 
anything  has  been  discovered  or  not.     He  often  conceals  him- 

16 


202  SECURITY   AND   INFORMATION. 

self  by  holding  a  piece  of  sage-brush  in  front  of  him  while 
lying  down.  Sometimes  he  fastens  bushes  to  the  upper  part 
of  his  body,  extending  above  his  head;  then,  sitting  in  a 
"wash-out"  or  wallow,  he  is  completely  concealed,  while  his 
own  view  is  unobstructed. 

In  long-distance  reconnoitering,  the  scout  (lying  flat  on 
his  belly)  places  his  elbows  on  the  ground,  rests  his  head  on 
his  hands,  which  are  so  placed  as  to  shade  his  eyes  and  hmit 
the  front  of  vision,  and  then  fixes  his  gaze  upon  some  distant 
object,  which  he  watches  intently.  In  this  way  Bloody  Knife, 
one  of  General  Custer's  scouts,  located  Sitting  Bull's  camp 
on  the  Little  Big  Horn  at  a  distance  of  about  twelve  miles; 
discovering  first  the  smoke,  and  then  ponies  grazing  in  the 
valley. 

Buttes  and  other  prominent  points  near  the  trail  are  sought 
as  lookouts,  the  scouts  often  going  miles  to  reach  them,  un- 
less the  enemy  is  known  to  be  near.  In  almost  every  case 
the  scouts  work  in  pairs,  a  watch  being  kept  to  the  rear  as 
well  as  to  the  front.  Before  crossing  a  ridge,  the  scouts 
invariably  scan  carefully  the  valley  in  front.  They  never 
enter  any  place  without  first  reconnoitering  it ;  and  if  it  does 
not  afford  means  of  easy  escape,  they  keep  out.  If  they  come 
to  an  unfordable  stream,  they  swim  it  without  any  ado,  and 
continue  their  reconnaissance. 

The  Sioux  place  their  camp  in  hollows  and  valleys,  where 
it  is  well  concealed;  the  location  chosen  being  always  such 
that  numerous  canons  or  ravines  provide  means  of  escape. 
In  the  daytime  watch  is  kept  from  the  highest  points;  at  late 
dusk  and  early  dawn  the  scouts  are  drawn  in  so  as  to  enable 
them  to  see  an  approaching  enemy  on  the  sky-line. 

If  attacked  and  forced  to  abandon  their  village,  the  Sioux 
retreat,  by  means  of  the  ravines  or  other  avenues,  to  the 
high  ground ;  and  in  many  cases  a  neglect  on  the  part  of  the 
troops  promptly  to  occupy  surrounding  heights  has  enabled 
the  Indians  to  drive  them  out  of  the  captured  camp  by  fire 
from  commanding  positions. 


INDIAN   SCOUTING.  203 

On  the  battle-field  the  tactics  of  the  Sioux  is  simple  and 
effective.  At  the  battle  of  Rosebud,  on  being  discovered, 
they  advanced  so  rapidly  to  the  attack  that  the  troops  barely 
had  time  to  prepare  to  receive  them.  On  being  dislodged 
from  one  height,  the  Indians  retreated  rapidly,  and  made  a 
stubborn  stand  at  the  next.  They  fought  in  successive  lines, 
one  advancing  when  the  other  retreated;  and  when  they 
were  charged,  they  scattered  only  to  unite  and  fight  at  some 
point  beyond.  Their  ability  to  rally  quickly  often  enables 
them  to  inflict  a  heavy  blow  upon  troops  disordered  by  pursuit. 

In  attacking,  the  Indians  endeavor  to  surround,  or,  at 
least,  to  extend  beyond  their  enemy,  so  as  to  bring  upon  him 
a  convergent  fire;  their  tactics,  in  this  respect,  as  in  many 
others,  bearing  a  considerable  resemblance  to  the  lava  of  the 
Cossacks.  The  fact  that  their  own  line  is  thus  thin  and  eas- 
ily broken  causes  them  no  uneasiness ;  for  their  enemy's  fire 
is  divergent  and  directed  against  a  difficult  target;  and  if  the 
line  is  broken,  they  scamper  away,  quickly  rally  at  a  signal, 
and  resume  the  same  tactics  as  before.  The  chief  object  of 
their  tactics  is  to  place  themselves  in  such  a  position  as  to 
give  them  the  most  effective  fire  on  the  enemy,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  to  incur  the  least  possible  loss. 

In  order  to  mislead  the  enemy  in  regard  to  the  move- 
ments of  their  "villages,"  or  to  gain  time  for  the  escape  of 
their  famiHes  or  herds,  they  not  infrequently  uncover  the 
trail  and  mass  their  warriors  in  another  direction,  making 
just  enough  resistance  to  draw  the  pursuing  force  away  from 
the  trail  of  their  non-combatants. 

Like  the  Apaches,  the  Sioux  do  not  expect  a  night  at- 
tack. They  post  no  sentinels  after  dark,  but  are  on  the  alert 
at  the  first  sign  of  dawn.  They  do  not,  however,  have  so 
great  an  aversion  to  night  operations  as  the  Apaches;  for 
parties  of  prowlers  often  approach  camp,  to  steal  horses,  if 
the  animals  are  on  the  "picket-line,"  or  to  stampede  them,  if 
they  are  herded  or  lariated.  Night  attacks  by  the  Sioux 
are  almost  imknown;  though  a  considerable  force  of  warriors 


204  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

fired  into  the  camp  of  Baker's  battalion  of  the  Second  Cavalry 
at  Pompey's  Pillar,  on  the  Yellowstone,  in  1872. 

The  Sioux  warrior  also  resembles  the  Apache  in  his  knowl- 
edge of  the  country  and  its  topography;  in  his  expertness  in 
trailing ;  in  the  many  makeshifts  of  the  practical  warrior ;  and 
in  his  skillful  interchange  of  signals  with  distant  comrades. 

It  is  not  because  of  his  courage,  expertness  with  firearms, 
or  celerity  of  movement  that  the  Indian  is  a  formidable  foe — 
indeed,  in  the  first  two  qualities  he  is  greatly  surpassed  by 
our  troops.  He  is  formidable  because  his  thorough  knowl- 
edge of  all  the  essential  details  of  the  science  of  security  and 
information  generally  enables  him  to  give  battle  when  he 
chooses,  and  to  avoid  conflict  when  he  sees  fit.  As  a  scout  he 
is  a  model;  and  it  may  be  said  that  the  scouting  methods 
prescribed  by  the  best  European  authorities  are  valuable  in 
proportion  to  the  degree  of  their  approach  to  those  of  the 
North  American  Indian. 

It  should  be  observed  that  these  Indians  are  all  trained 
to  war,  and  that  their  methods  are  not  the  result  of  the  in- 
spiration of  the  occasion,  but  of  constant  practice,  and  of  a 
study  which  is  not  less  deep  because  it  is  unlettered.  Meth- 
ods of  scouting,  various  expedients  of  warfare,  and  even  geo- 
graphical details,  are  learned  by  one  generation  from  an- 
other; and  more  than  one  instance  has  been  known  of  an 
Indian  finding  his  way  without  difiiculty  through  a  country 
which  he  was  traversing  for  the  first  time,  because  he  had 
learned  so  thoroughly  from  others  the  relative  positions  of 
prominent  landmarks  as  to  be  in  possession  of  a  reliable  men- 
tal map.  Constant  practice  in  hunting,  stalking  game,  and 
making  long  journeys  through  wild  country  makes  the  In- 
dians expert  in  judging  distances,  reconnoitering,  utilizing 
cover,  and  husbanding  the  strength  of  themselves  and  their 
horses.  In  fact,  the  Sioux,  quite  as  well  as  the  Prussian, 
teaches  the  lesson  that  nothing  but  constant  practice  in  the 
real  or  simulated  conditions  of  war  can  properly  prepare  the 
soldier  for  the  duties  of  a  campaign. 


APPENDIX  I. 


Advance;  Guard  Drii^Iv — Infantry. 

Often  in  active  service  a  command  is  ordered  on  detached 
dut}^  from  a  point  some  distance  within  the  outposts  of  the 
army.  It  is  unnecessary  and  fatiguing  to  march  from  the 
camp  or  bivouac  with  an  advance  guard,  which  should  be 
thrown  out  only  when  the  outpost  line  is  passed.  Troops 
should,  therefore,  be  drilled  in  forming  advance  guard  from 
column  with  celerity. 

When  a  single  company  forms  the  advance  guard,  the 
first  section  constitutes  the  advance  party,  the  second  sec- 
tion the  support,  and  the  second  platoon  the  reserve.  The 
company  being  in  column  of  fours,  at  a  halt,  the  captain 
commands:  i.  Form  advance  guard,  2.  March.  At  the  first 
command,  the  first  sergeant  takes  command  of  the  first  sec- 
tion, and  the  corporal  of  the  first  four  exchanges  places  with 
his  rear-rank  man.  At  the  command  March,  the  front  rank 
of  the  first  four,  under  the  second  sergeant,  moves  to  the  front 
as  a  point.  The  rear  rank  of  the  first  and  the  front  rank  of 
the  second  four  oblique  to  the  left  and  right,  respectively,  to 
form  flanking  groups.  The  point  and  flankers  all  move  out 
at  double  time,  reducing  their  pace  to  quick  time  as  soon  as 
they  reach  their  proper  positions.  The  first  sergeant  detach- 
es two  men  from  the  rear  rank  of  the  second  four  to  march  as 
connecting  files  between  the  advance  party  and  the  support, 
puts  the  other  two  in  the  line  of  file-closers,  and  commands: 
I.  Forward,  2.  March,  the  second  command  being  given  as 
soon  as  the  point  has  gained  its  proper  distance.  When  the 
section  consists  of  only  two  fours,  the  first  sergeant  marches 
the  rear  rank  of  the  second  four  forward,  and  the  connect- 
ing files  are  furnished  by  the  support. 

20  s 


206  APPENDIX   I. 

The  first  lieutenant  (remaining  with  the  second  section) 
commands:  i.  Forward,  2.  March,  the  second  command  be- 
ing given  as  soon  as  the  support  has  its  proper  distance. 
He  then  adds:  i.  Rear  four,  2.  Right  and  left  oblique,  3.  Dou- 
ble time,  4.  March.  The  front  rank  of  the  rear  four  ob- 
liques to  the  right,  and  the  rear  rank  to  the  left,  at  double 
time,  forming  the  flankers  of  the  support,  and  taking  quick 
time  on  gaining  their  positions. 

The  captain  (remaining  with  the  second  platoon)  com- 
mands: I.  Forward,  2.  March,  the  second  command  being 
given  as  soon  as  the  reserve  has  its  proper  distance.  Should 
flankers  be  necessary  for  the  reserve,  they  are  then  sent  out, 
at  double  time,  by  the  same  commands  as  in  the  case  of  the 
support,  from  the  rear  (or  rear  and  leading)  fours.  The  en- 
tire advance  guard  marches  at  attention,  the  advance  party 
and  support  marching  on  as  broad  a  front  as  practicable, 
and  the  reserve  in  column  of  fours. 

If  the  command  is:  i.  Form  advance  guard,  2.  Double 
time,  3.  March,  the  point  and  flankers  move  out  as  already 
prescribed,  but  do  not  reduce  their  pace  upon  gaining  their 
positions.  The  advance  party,  the  support,  and  the  reserve 
move  forward  successively  at  double  time.  The  reserve  takes 
quick  time  at  the  command  of  the  captain,  and  the  other 
parts  of  the  advance  guard  then  conform  to  the  pace  of  the 
reserve. 

If  the  compan}^  is  left  in  front,  the  duties  described  above 
for  the  first  lieutenant  will  be  performed  by  the  second  lieu- 
tenant, and  the  point  will  be  commanded  by  the  third  ser- 
geant. In  either  case  the  first  sergeant  commands  the  section 
constituting  the  advance  party. 

When  the  advance  guard  consists  of  an  entire  battal- 
ion, the  first  and  second  companies  constitute  the  vanguard, 
and  the  third  and  fourth  form  the  reserve.  The  vanguard 
is  commanded  by  its  senior  captain.  The  major  commands: 
I.  Form  advance  guard,  2.  March,  the  commands  being  re- 
peated by  the  commander  of   the  vanguard.     The   point  and 


ADVANCE  GUARD  DRILL — INFANTRY.  207 

flankers  move  out  from  the  first  section  of  the  leading  com- 
pany, the  first  platoon  of  this  company  constituting  the  ad- 
vance party.  The  first  sergeant  does  not  take  command 
of  the  first  section.  As  soon  as  the  point  has  gained  its 
proper  distance,  the  lieutenant  commanding  the  first  pla- 
toon moves  it  forward.  As  soon  as  the  advance  party  has 
gained  its  proper  distance,  the  commander  of  the  vanguard 
commands:  i.  Forward,  2.  March;  immediately  adding: 
I.  Rear  fours  first  and  second  companies,  2.  Right  and  left 
obliqtie,  3.  Double  time,  4.  March.  The  fours  designated 
move  out  as  flankers  in  the  manner  already  prescribed,  those 
of  the  first  company  being  slightly  in  advance  of,  and  those 
of  the  rear  company  slightly  in  rear  of,  the  support.  If  only 
one  group  of  flankers  is  needed  on  each  flank,  they  are  formed 
by  the  rear  four  of  the  first  company.  When  the  support 
has  gained  its  proper  distance,  the  major  moves  the  reserve 
forward,  and  orders  flankers  out  from  the  reserve,  if  necessary, 
in  the  same  way  as  from  the  support. 

In  the  case  of  two  battalions  forming  the  advance  guard 
of  a  brigade,  the  major  commanding  the  first  battalion,  upon 
receiving  instructions  from  the  commander  of  the  advance 
guard,  commands:  i.  Form-  advance  guard,  2.  March.  The 
commands  are  repeated  by  the  captain  of  the  first  compa- 
ny, who  adds:  i.  Forward,  2.  March,  in  time  to  move  his 
entire  company  forward  as  advance  party  as  soon  as  the 
point  has  gained  its  proper  distance.  The  major  commands: 
I.  Forward,  2.  March,  the  second  command  being  given  the 
moment  the  advance  party  has  gained  the  proper  distance. 
The  major  then  adds:  i.  Rear  four  (such)  company  or  com- 
panies, 2.  Right  and  left  oblique,  3.  Double  time,  4.  March, 
the  flankers  being  taken  from  the  second,  foturth,  or  third  com- 
pany, or  from  all  three  in  the  order  mentioned,  according 
to  the  number  of  groups  required  on  each  flank.  When  the 
support  has   gained  the   proper  distance,   the  major  of  the 


2o8  APPENDIX   I. 

second  battalion  moves  the  reserve  forward.  The  major 
commanding  the  reserve  should  ordinarily  be  the  senior,  as 
the  commander  of  the  advance  guard  is  habitually  with  the 
reser^'^e. 

The  terrain  will  not  always  lend  itself  readily  to  the  nor- 
mal formation  of  the  advance  guard.  When  the  normal 
formation  is  impracticable,  the  commander  will  designate 
the  different  parts  of  the  advance  guard,  will  specify  the 
number  of  flankers,  etc.,  and  will  then  give  the  command: 
I.  Form  advance  guard,  2.  March,  which  will  be  executed 
according  to  the  preliminary  instructions. 

To  assemble  the  advance  guard,  the  reserve  is  halted, 
and  the  other  parts  of  the  advance  guard  at  once  halt.  The 
command  is  then  given:  i.  Assemble,  2.  March,  or  the  com- 
mander gives  the  signal  of  assembly  as  prescribed  in  the 
drill  regulations.  The  command  is  repeated  by  the  com- 
mander of  the  vanguard,  and  then  by  the  commander  of  the 
advance  party.  At  the  command  March,  the  point,  flankers, 
and  connecting  files  move  on  the  shortest  lines  to  the  body 
from  which  they  were  sent  out,  and  take  their  places  in  the 
column.  The  detached  men  having  thus  rejoined,  the  ad- 
vance party  marches  back  and  joins  the  support,  and  the 
united  bodies  then  march  back  and  join  the  reserve.  Should 
the  advance  party  or  support  not  be  in  column  of  fours,  such 
column  should  be  formed  before  its  commander  gives  the 
order  for  assembling. 

If  it  is  desired  to  assemble  on  the  advance  party,  the 
command  is:  i.  Assemble  on  the  advance  party,  2.  March. 
The  command  is  executed  as  prescribed  above,  except  that 
the  advance  party  remains  halted,  and  the  support  and  re- 
serve move  forward  and  close  upon  it. 

The  assembly  may  be  similarly  made  on  the  support 
by  the  command:    i.  Assemble  on  the  support,  2.  March. 

In  this  case  the  assembly  is  made  as  prescribed  above, 
except  that  the  advance  party  marches  back,  and  the  reserve 


ADVANCE    GUARD   DRILL — INFANTRY.  209 

moves  forward  to  join  the  support.     In  all  cases  the  assembly- 
may  be  made  either  at  quick  time  or  double  time. 

Rear  Guard  Drill. 

Upon  the  receipt  of  the  order  to  form  a  company  as  a 
rear  guard,  its  captain  halts  it,  and,  if  it  be  not  already  in 
that  formation,  forms  it  in  column  of  fours  facing  the  enemy. 
The  main  body  having  gained  the  proper  distance,  the  cap- 
tain commands :  i .  Form  rear  guard,  2 .  Second  platoon  fours 
left  about,  3.  March,  and  the  second  platoon,  under  com- 
mand of  the  captain,  at  once  moves  to  the  rear  and  follows 
the  main  body.  At  the  command,  i.  First  and  rear  fours, 
2.  Right  and  left  oblique,  3.  March,  the  designated  fours  move 
out  as  flankers  in  the  manner  prescribed  for  the  advance  guard, 
the  front  rank  to  the  right  and  the  rear  rank  to  the  left. 

When  the  reserve  has  gained  its  proper  distance,  the 
first  lieutenant  commands:  i.  Second  section,  2.  Fours  left 
about,  3.  March.  The  section  follows  the  reserve  as  a  sup- 
port, maintaining  the  proper  distance.  Flankers  are  sent  out 
from  the  rear  four  as  in  the  advance  guard. 

The  support  having  gained  its  proper  distance,  the  first 
sergeant  commands:  i.  Form  rear  party,  2.  March.  At 
the  first  command,  the  corporal  of  the  first  four  exchanges 
places  with  his  rear-rank  man,  and  at  the  command  March, 
the  rear  rank  of  the  first  four  and  the  front  rank  of  the  sec- 
ond four  face  to  the  left  and  right  respectively,  leave  the 
column  at  double  time,  and  upon  gaining  the  proper  interval 
from  the  column,  march  to  the  rear  at  quick  time.  The  front 
rank  of  the  first  four  stands  fast.  Immediately  after  giving 
the  command  for  forming  rear  party,  the  first  sergeant  com- 
mands: I.  Fours  left  about,  2.  March,  and  afterwards  de- 
taches two  men  as  connecting  files  between  the  rear  party 
and  support.  The  front  rank  of  the  first  four  assumes  the 
proper  formation  for  a  rear  point,  and  marches  to  the  rear 
as  soon  as  the  rear  party  has  gained  the  proper  distance. 


2IO  APPENDIX    I. 

Similar  modifications  will  give  suitable  commands  for 
larger  bodies  of  infantry  as  rear  guards.  In  the  cavalry,  at 
whatever  pace  the  main  body  may  be  retiring,  the  whole 
rear  guard  is  halted,  and  the  successive  fractions  then  follow 
at  the  gait  of  the  main  body. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  advance  guard,  the  terrain  will 
rarely  lend  itself  readily  to  the  normal  formation.  It  will 
accordingly  generally  be  necessary  for  the  commander  to 
designate  certain  modifications  before  giving  the  command: 
I.  Form  rear  guard,  2.  March.  The  command  will  then  be 
executed  in  accordance  with  the  preliminary  instructions. 
At  the  command:  i.  Assemble,  2.  March,  the  rear  party 
and  support  are  assembled  in  the  same  manner  as  the  ad- 
vance party  and  support  in  an  advance  guard,  and  are  marched 
forward  to  the  reserve. 

Advance  Guard  Drili, — Cavalry. 

The  troop  being  in  column  of  fours,  the  captain  com- 
mands: I.  Form  advance  gtiard,  2.  March.  At  the  first 
command,  the  commander  of  the  first  platoon  takes  com- 
mand of  the  vanguard,  and  the  guidon  sergeant  takes  posi- 
tion abreast  of  the  leading  four  of  the  reserve.  At  the  com- 
mand March,  the  first  four,  under  the  command  of  the  right 
principal  guide,  moves  forward-  at  a  trot,  constituting  the 
point.  The  second  and  third  fours  oblique  to  the  right  and 
left,  respectively,  at  a  trot,  until  they  are  about  300  yards 
from  the  line  of  march,  and  then  move  forward  until  they  are 
on  a  line  about  100  yards  in  rear  of  the  point,  increasing  their 
pace,  if  necessary,  in  moving  forward  to  their  position.  The 
right  principal  guide  is  the  commander  of  the  advance  party, 
and  regulates  the  movements  of  the  point  and  flanking  groups. 

When  the  point  has  gained  a  distance  of  600  yards,  the 
commander  of  the  vanguard  moves  the  support  forward  at 
a  walk,  and  the  advance  party  (consisting  of  the  point  and 
flanking  groups)    at  once  takes  the   same   pace.     The  com- 


advance;   guard    DRIIvL — cavalry.  211 

mander  of  the  vanguard,  as  soon  as  he  has  put  the  support 
in  motion,  detaches  two  flanking  groups  from  the  last  three 
fours.  These  patrols,  which  are  always  under  a  non-commis- 
sioned officer,  march,  one  on  each  flank,  about  half  a  mile 
from  the  column  and  slightly  in  advance  of  the  reserve.  As 
one  flank  is  generall}''  more  exposed  than  the  other,  the  pa- 
trol on  the  dangerous  flank  would  consist  of  eight  and  the 
other  of  four  men.  If  both  flanks  appear  to  be  equally  ex- 
posed, each  patrol  should  consist  of  six  men,  but  it  is  not 
otherwise  advisable  to  break  up  the  unity  of  a  four.  These 
patrols  move  to  their  positions  at  a  trot,  and  take  such  for- 
mation as  circumstances  may  require. 

When  the  support  has  advanced  about  700  yards,  the 
captain  moves  the  reserve  forward.  When  flanking  groups 
are  thrown  out  from  the  reserve,  they  should  be  taken  from 
the  rear  fours. 

If  the  command  is:  i.  Form  advance  guard,  2.  Trot, 
3.  March,  the  advance  guard  is  formed  as  above  described, 
except  that  the  point  and  flankers  move  to  their  positions 
at  a  gallop,  and  the  support  and  reserve  move  forward  at  a 
trot.  As  soon  as  the  support  moves  forward,  the  advance 
party  comes  down  to  a  trot.  The  entire  advance  guard  con- 
tinues to  move  at  a  trot  until  the  pace  of  the  reserve  is  either 
increased  or  reduced,  when  the  other  parts  at  once  conform 
thereto.  Unless  orders  be  given  to  the  contrary,  the  reserve 
always  regulates  the  pace  of  the  advance  guard. 

If  the  command  is:  i.  Form  Advance  Guard,  2.  Gallop, 
3.  March,  the  advance  guard  is  formed  as  in  the  last  case, 
except  that  the  advance  party  continues  the  gallop  and  the 
other  bodies  move  out  successively  at  the  same  pace.  The 
cavalr}'-  should  be  habitually  drilled  in  forming  advance  guard 
at  a  gallop. 

If  the  troop  is  left  in  front,  the  advance  party  is  com- 
manded by  the  left  principal  guide,  and  the  vanguard  by  the 
corresponding  platoon  commander. 


212  APPENDIX    I. 

The  above  method  of  forming  an  advance  guard  will  an- 
swer in  the  case  of  a  troop  of  60  men  or  more.  If  the  troop 
numbers  only  60  men,  it  should  be  divided  into  three  platoons. 
If  the  troop  is  small,  the  point  will  be  taken  from  the  first 
four,  and  the  flankers  of  the  advance  party  may  be  reduced 
to  two  on  each  flank,  both  taken  from  the  second  four.  The 
flanking  patrols  sent  out  from  the  support  may  be  reduced 
to  four  men  each.  When  the  troop  is  very  small,  and  (as  is 
usually  the  case)  the  country  is  such  that  these  patrols  can 
not  be  dispensed  with,  it  will  not  be  able  to  furnish  the  entire 
advance  guard,  the  whole  strength  being  required  for  the^ 
advance  party  and  support. 

An  advance  guard  consisting  of  more  than  one  troop  is 
formed  by  similar  commands  and  means. 

The  assembly  is  executed  as  in  the  case  of  infantry.  It 
may  be  made  at  a  walk,  trot,  or  gallop. 


APPENDIX  II. 


Questions. 


The  following  questions  have  been  prepared  with  a  view 
to  their  use  in  a  general  review  of  the  book.  The  number  in 
parentheses  indicates  the  page  on  which  the  answer  to  the 
question  is  to  be  found. 

1.  How  is  the  security  of  an  army  provided  for  on  the 
march?     (i6.) 

2.  How,  at  a  halt?     (i6.) 

3.  Why  are  the  two  elements  of  security  and  information 
inseparable?     (16.) 

4.  The  information  necessary  for  a  commander  is  of  what 
two  kinds?     (16.) 

5.  How  is  the  first  kind  of  information  generally  ob- 
tained?    (16.) 

6.  In  what  two  ways  is  the  second  class  of  information 
gained?     (18.) 

7.  By  whom  may  a  reconnaissance  be  effected?     (18.) 

8.  To  gain  reliable  information  of  the  enemy,  what  should 
be  done?     (19.) 

Advance  Guards. 

9.  What  would  be  the  effect  if  troops  moving  in  one 
body  should  come  suddenly  upon  the  enemy?     (20.) 

10.  How  is  a  column  of  troops  on  the  march  divided? 
(20.) 

11.  What,  in  general  terms,  are  the  objects  of  the  advance 
guard?  (20.) 

12.  What  are  the  specific  objects  of  the  advance  guard? 
(20.) 

13.  How  does  the  proportionate  strength  of  the  advance 
guard  vary?     (20.) 

213 


214  APPENDIX    II. 

14.  WTiat  is  the  danger  in  having  the  advance  guard 
too  weak?     (21.) 

15.  As  a  general  rule,  what  portion  of  the  entire  force 
is  assigned  to  the  advance  guard  and  to  the  rear  guard  on 
advance — and   what  on  a  retrograde  movement?     (21.) 

16.  \\^ence  are  the  flanking  parties  taken?     (21.) 

17.  With  a  small  force,  what  may  be  the  proportionate 
strength  of  the  advance  guard?     (21.) 

18.  WTiy  should  the  proportion  be  larger  in  the  case  of 
a  large  force?     (21.) 

19.  What  is  the  object  of  each  of  the  constituent  de- 
tachments of  the  advance  guard?     (22.) 

20.  Into  what  two  parts  is  the  advance  guard  prima- 
rily divided,  and  what  is  the  strength  of  each?     (22.) 

21.  Into  what  two  parts  is  the  vanguard  divided,  and 
what  is  their  relative  strength?     (22.) 

22.  How  are  these  proportions  varied?     (22.) 

23.  Draw  a  diagram  representing  the  formation  of  a 
company  of  infantry  as  an  advance  guard.     (Plate  I.) 

24.  Draw  a  diagram  representing  a  battalion  of  infantry 
as  an  advance  guard.     (Plate  II.) 

25.  Describe  briefly  the  formation  of  an  advance  guard 
consisting  of  two  battalions.     (24.) 

26.  What  might  resvdt  if  the  distance  of  the  advance 
guard  fromtthe  main  body  were  too  great;  and  what,  if  it 
were  too  small?     (24.) 

27.  Give  the  "rough  rule"  which  will  answer  in  most 
cases  for  determining  the  distance  of  the  advance  guard  from 
the  main  body.     (25.) 

28.  When  must  this  distance  be  decreased,  and  when 
may  it  be  increased?     (25.) 

29.  Where  does  the  commander  of  the  vanguard  march? 
(26.) 

30.  Describe  the  duties  of  the  commander  of  the  van- 
guard. (26.) 

31.  How  are  losses  in  the  advance  party  replaced?     (27.) 


ADVANCE  GUARDS.  215 

32.  In  a  command  of  considerable  size,  who  is  charged 
with  the  duties  of  selecting  a  camp  or  bivouac  for  the  main 
body?     (27.) 

33.  Where  does  the  commander  of  the  advance  guard 
march?     (27.) 

34.  Wrhat  qualities  does  the  commander  of  the  advance 
guard  need,  and  why?     (27.) 

35.  What  should  the  commander  of  the  advance  guard 
continually  consider,  and  what,  in  general,  should  he  do? 
(28.) 

36.  What  is  done  when  the  advance  guard  halts?     (28.) 

37.  How  is  information  conveyed  from  one  part  of  the 
advance  guard  to  another?     (29.) 

38.  Draw  a  diagram  representing  an  advance  guard 
consisting  of  a  troop  of  cavalry.     (Plate  III.) 

39.  Describe  the  composition  of  the  advance  party,  the 
supports,  and  the  reserve,  when  the  advance  guard  consists 
of  two  troops.     (30.) 

40.  WTiat  would  be  the  composition  of  the  advance 
party  in  a  ver)^  large  advance  guard?     (31.) 

41.  Why  are  the  distances  and  intervals  greater  in  a 
cavalry  advance  euard  than  in  one  composed  of  infantry? 

(31.) 

42.  Why  should  an  advance  guard  be  composed  of  all 
arms?     (31.) 

43.  In  the  United  States  Army,  what  arm  should,  if  in 
sufficient  numbers,  compose  the  support?     (31.) 

44.  Describe  the  use  of  artillery  with  the  advance  guard, 
and  its  position  therein  when  marching.     (32.) 

45.  Describe  the  use  and  position  of  the  engineers  with 
the  advance  guard.     (33.) 

46.  Upon  what  does  the  proportion  of  each  arm  with  the 
advance  guard  depend,  and  when  is  each  preferable?     (33.) 

47.  As  a  rule,  what  troops  perform  the  duty  of  advance 
guard,  and  when  may  it  be  desirable  to  compose  the  advance 
guard  differently?     (33.) 


2l6  APPENDIX   II. 

48.  If  the  nature  of  the  country  is  such  as  to  render  the 
use  of  flanking  groups   impracticable,    what  is  done?     (34.) 

49.  When  marching  in  an  open  country,  how  may  the 
advance  guard  be  formed?     (34.) 

50.  State  the  general  and  important  rule  in  regard  to 
the  disposition  of  the  advance  guard,  whether  on  active  ser- 
vice or  merely  at  drill.     (35.) 

51.  Describe  the  method  of  action  of  the  advance  guard 
on  meeting  the  enemy.     (35-36.) 

52.  Describe  the  order  of  march  of  a  division — advance 
guard,  main  body,  and  rear  guard.     (37-40.) 

53.  How  would  the  front  of  an  army  corps  on  the  march 
be  protected  ?     ( 40 . ) 

54.  In  the  case  of  a  flank  march  near  the  enemy,  in  what 
respects  does  the  flank  guard  resemble  an  advance  guard, 
and  how  does  it  differ  from  it?     (41.) 

55.  Describe  the  duties  of  the  advance  guard  in  a  retreat. 
(41-42.) 

Outposts. 

56.  What  are  outposts,  and  with  what  duties  are  they 
charged?     (43.) 

57.  What  effect  on  an  outpost  has  a  good  cavalry  screen 
in  its  front?     (43.) 

58.  How  may  the  duties  of  an  outpost  be  classified ?     (44.) 

59.  Into  what  four  parts  is  an  outpost  divided?     (44.) 

60.  Who  occupy  the  line  of  observation;  and  who,  the 
line  of  resistance?     (44.) 

61.  What  are  the  normal  distances  between  the  subdi- 
visions of  an  outpost  of  infantry? — of  cavalry?     (45.) 

62 .  To  what  may  the  general  plan  of  an  outpost  be  likened  ? 

(45.) 

63.  What  portion  of  the  strength  of  the  outpost  is  gen- 
erally assigned  to  the  reserve,  to  the  supports,  and  to  the 
pickets?     (45.) 


OUTPOSTS.  2l7 

64.  On  what  does  the  strength  of  a  picket  depend,  and 
what  principle  regulates  the  strength  of  each  support  ?     (45-46.) 

65.  What  two  systems  of  outposts  are  there,  and  what  are 
their  general  characteristics?     (46.) 

66.  State  the  requirements  of  a  good  outpost  position. 

(46.) 

67.  State  what  furnishes  one  of  the  best;  and  what,  one 
of  the  worst,  outpost  positions.     (46.) 

68.  What  should  be  done  when  the  outpost  is  compelled 
to  occupy  a  wood,  the  farther  edge  of  which  is  too  distant  to 
be  occupied?     (46.) 

69.  If  the  outpost  be  not  compelled  to  occupy  the  wood, 
in  this  case,  what  is  generally  advisable?     (47.) 

70.  Where  a  stream,  canal,  or  other  obstacle  having  but 
few  passages,  lies  parallel  to  the  outpost  line,  what  may  be 
done?     (47.) 

71.  What  should  generally  be  the  shape  of  the  outpost 
line?     (47.) 

72.  On  what  does  the  strength  of  the  outpost  depend? 
(47-48.) 

73.  As  a  rule,  what  is  the  maximum  strength  of  the  out- 
post in  proportion  to  the  entire  command?     (48.) 

74.  When  the  army  is  marching,  from  day  to  day,  what 
constitutes  the  outpost  at  each  halt?     (48.) 

75.  If  outposts  are  required  on  the  flanks  and  rear,  of 
what  are  they  composed?     (48.) 

76.  Draw  a  diagram  representing  an  outpost  consisting 
of  a  regiment  of  infantry.     (Plate  VI.) 

77.  Draw  a  diagram  representing  an  outpost  consisting 
of  a  squadron  of  cavalry.     (Plate  VII.) 

78.  State  how  the  outposts  for  divisions  and  brigades 
are  generally  furnished,  and  give  the  alternative  formations 
of  a  brigade  outpost.     (49.) 

79.  What  provisions  for  the  command  of  the  outpost 
are  made  in  this  case?     (49.) 

16 


2l8  APPENDIX   II. 

80.  If  two  brigades  encamp  in  the  first  line,  with  tne 
third  in  reserve,  whence  are  the  outposts  taken?     (49.) 

81.  Where  is  the  baggage  of  the  outpost  troops  kept? 

(49.) 

82.  State  when  infantry  is  preferable  to  cavalry  for  out- 
post duty,  and  the  reverse,  and  state  how  the  two  arms  may 
be  advantageously  combined.     (49-50.) 

83.  How  should  artillery  be  used  with  an  outpost?      (51- 

52.) 

84.  State  the  considerations  on  which  the  distance  of  the 
outpost  from  the  main  body  depends.     (52-53.) 

85.  What  is  the  usual  distance,  and  what  is  the  maximum 
distance?     (53.) 

86.  How  is  the  outpost  divided,  and  where  are  the  several 
headquarters?     (53.) 

87.  What  instructions  does  the  outpost  commander  re- 
ceive from  the  commander  of  the  forces,  and  what  does  he 
(the  outpost  commander)  then  do? — ^including  his  instructions 
to  his  subordinates.     (53-54.) 

;-•'.    88.     As  a  rule,   how  should  the  outpost  be  intrenched? 

(54-) 

89.     How  are  sentinels  generally  posted,   and  how  may 
the  group  system  be  used?     (55.) 
Hi  90.     State  the  requirements  'of  a  good  post  for  a  sentinel. 

(55.) 

\>:^  91.     How  far  apart  may  sentinels  and  vedettes  be? — min- 
imum and  maximum  distances.     (55.) 

92.  What  are  the  general  duties  of  a  sentinel,  and  what 
shoidd  he  clearly  understand?     (56.) 

93.  What  persons  are  allowed  to  cross  the  line  of  sen- 
tinels, and  what  is  done  with  the  others?     (56-57.) 

94.  How  are  deserters  from  the  enemy  received  at  the 
outpost?     (57.) 

95.  When  a  flag  of  truce  approaches,  how  is  the  bearer 
received  by  the  sentinel?     (57.) 


OUTPOSTS.  219 

96.  Everything  observed  by  the  sentinel  is  how  commu- 
nicated?    (58.) 

97.  What  are  the  general  rules   in  regard  to  sentinels 
firing?     (58.) 

98.  How   often   should   sentinels   be   relieved?     (58-59.) 

99.  How  are  vedettes  posted?     (59.) 

100.  How  may  vedettes  sometimes  perform  their  duty 
dismounted?     (59.) 

loi.     What  is  a  connecting  sentinel ?     (59.) 

102.  What  is  a  picket  sentinel ?     (59.) 

103.  What  is  the  object  of  an  examining   post,  and  of 
what  persons  does  it  consist?     (60.) 

104.  How  is  a  person  approaching  an  examining  post 
received?     (60.) 

105.  If  a  person  approaches  the  line  of  sentinels  at  any 
other  point  than  the  examining  post,   what  is  done?     (60.) 

106.  What  are  the  objections  to  examining  posts,   and 
when  may  such  posts  be  advantageously  used?     (60.) 

107.  What  are  detached  posts?     (61.) 

108.  What  points  may  be  advantageously  held  by  de- 
tached posts?     (61.) 

109.  How  often  are  detached  posts  relieved,  and  what 
is  required  of  the  men  composing  them?     (61.) 

no.     What  is  the  usual  strength  of  a  picket? — both  in- 
fantry and  cavalry.     (61.) 

111.  How  many  double  sentinels  or  vedettes  does  a  picket 
usually  furnish  ?     (61.) 

112.  What  regulates  the  strength  of  a  picket,  and  what 
portion  of  the  picket  is  used  in  patrolling?     (61-62.) 

113.  What  are  the  maximum  and  minimum  fronts  of  an 
infantry  picket?     (62.) 

114.  What  are  the  maximum  and  minimum  fronts  of  a 
cavalry  picket  ?     ( 6  2 . ) 

115.  Pickets  are  generally  about  how  far  apart?     (62.) 

116.  What  Une  is  the  first  consideration  in  selecting  the 
groimd  for  the  outpost?     (62.) 


220  APPENDIX    II. 

117.  What  are  the  six  requirements  of  a  perfect  picket 
post?     (63.) 

118.  If  a  picket  is  posted  in  a  defile,  what  should  be  done? 

(63.) 

119.  What  is  the  general  rule  in  regard  to  posting  a 
picket  in  a  house  or  inclosure;  and  what  exception  is  there 
to  the  rule?     (63.) 

120.  How  should  the  picket  be  situated  relatively  to  a 
junction  of  roads  leading  from  the  enemy's  position?     (63.) 

121.  When  an  impassable  obstacle  lies  along  a  portion 
of  the  front  of  the  outpost,  what  may  be  done?     (64.) 

122.  What  are  the  general  rules  concerning  fires  with 
the  picket?     (64.) 

123.  What  is  required  of  the  men  composing  the  picket? — 
both  infantry  and  cavalry.     (64.) 

124.  What  should  be  done  if  a  noise  is  heard  from  a  neigh- 
boring picket  ?     ( 64 . ) 

125.  What  do  the  supports  constitute ?     (65.) 

126.  What  regulates  the  position  of  the  supports,  and 
what  should  be  its  general  requirements?     (65.) 

127.  What  arrangements  should  the  commander  of  a 
support  make  with  a  view  to  defense?     (65.) 

128.  What  is  required  of  the  men  composing  the  sup- 
port?    (65-66.) 

129.  Describe  a  Cossack  post.     (66.) 

130.  What  are  the  disadvantages  and  advantages  of 
Cossack  posts ?     (66.) 

131.  What  does  the  reserve  constitute,  and  of  what  does 
it  generally  consist?     (68.) 

132.  What  considerations  influence  the  selection  of  its 
position?     (68.) 

133.  What  rules  obtain  in  regard  to  the  men  and  horses 
of  the  reserve ?     (68.) 

134.  When  may  the  reserve  be  dispensed  with?     (68.) 

135.  What  is  the  advantage  of  the  omission  of  the  re- 
serve, and  why  can  it  but  rarely  be  omitted?     (68.) 


OUTPOSTS.  221 

136.  What  is  the  objection  to  retaining  the  cordon  sys- 
tem at  night  ?     ( 69 . ) 

137.  What  system  is  generally  adopted,  in  its  essential 
features,  at  night;  and  on  what  is  it  based?     (69.) 

138.  Give  the  important  details  of  the  outpost  system 
at  night.     (69-70.) 

139.  In  cavalry  outposts,  where  are  the  pickets  posted 
at  night,  and  what  precautions  are  taken?     (70.) 

140.  When  the  enemy  is  close  at  hand  and  aggressive, 
what  may  sometimes  be  advisable?     (70.) 

141.  When  are  the  changes  in  the  position  of  the  out- 
post arranged  and  made?     (70.) 

T42.  What  change  is  made  in  the  positions  of  the  sen- 
tinels for  night?     (70.) 

143.  Describe  the  composition  and  duties  of  a  visiting 
patrol.     (72.) 

144.  When  are  visiting  patrols  mainly  used;  what  extent 
of  front  do  they  cover;  and  how  far  to  the  front  do  they  go? 
(72.) 

145.  What  is  the  object  of  reconnoitering  patrols?     (73.) 

146.  What  is  the  size  of  reconnoitering  patrols,  and  how 
far  do  they  go  beyond  the  line  of  sentinels?     (73.) 

147.  What  patrols  should  be  used  at  night,  and  what 
must  be  constantly  varied  in  regard  to  them?     (73.) 

148.  When  is  the  duty  of  a  reconnoitering  patrol  best 
performed?     (73.) 

149.  What  are  patrolling  posts?     (73.) 

150.  Describe  the  manner  in  which  a  patrolling  post 
performs  its  duties.     (74.) 

151.  If  the  number  of  patrolling  posts  is  such  as  to  weaken 
the  picket  materially,  what  must  be  done?     (74.) 

152.  From  what  part  of  the  outpost  are  strong  patrols 
taken,  and  how  do  they  vary  in  size?     (74.) 

153.  How  far  from  the  line  of  sentinels  may  a  strong 
patrol  advance,  and  how  may  it  sometimes  be  used?     (74-75.) 


222  APPENDIX    II. 

154.  With  what  should  the  men  detailed  for  outpost 
duty  be  supplied?     (75.) 

155.  What  should  each  officer  detailed  for  outpost  duty 
have? — each  non-commissioned  officer?     (75-76.) 

156.  Describe  the  posting  of  the  outpost,  both  infantry 
and  cavalry.     (76-77.) 

157.  After  the  picket  is  posted,  what  does  its  commander 
do?     (77-78.) 

158.  When,  at  the  close  of  the  day's  march,  the  advance 
guard  forms  the  outpost,  what  portions  of  it  constitute  the 
various  parts  of  the  outpost?     (78.) 

159.  Whenever  practicable,  what  should  be  done  to  make 
an  equitable  division  of  sentinel  duty?     (78.) 

160.  Describe  the  defense  of  an  outpost.     (79.) 

161.  If  the  enemy  is  repulsed,  by  whom,  and  to  what 
extent,  is  pursuit  made?     (79-80.) 

162.  Soon  after  the  repulse  of  the  attack,  what  should 
be  done?     (80.) 

163.  When  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  approach  is  gained 
in  time  to  admit  of  full  preparation,  how  should  he  be  received, 
and  why?     (80.) 

164.  When  should  the  pickets  be  under  arms,  and  why? 
(80.) 

165.  When  is  the  outpost  relieved,  and  why  at  this  time? 
(80.) 

166.  Describe  the  manner  of  relieving  the  outpost.  (80- 
81.) 

167.  How  often  are  outposts  relieved?     (81.) 

168.  If  the  army  is  on  the  march,  when  is  the  outpost 
relieved?     (81.) 

169.  If  the  army  is  retreating,  what  does  the  outpost 
form?     (81.) 

Reconnaissance. 

1 70.  Under  what  three  heads  may  reconnaissance  be  con- 
sidered?    (82.) 


RECONNAISSANCE.  223 

171.  By  whose  order,  and  how,  is  a  reconnaissance  in 
force  made?     (82-83.) 

172.  How  should  information  be  sought  from  the  pris- 
oners captured  ?     (83.) 

173.  What  arms  are  especially  valuable  in  a  reconnais- 
sance in  force,  and  why?     (83.) 

174.  What  are  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
making  a  reconnaissance  in  force  in  the  evening;  and  what, 
in  the  morning?     (83.) 

175.  To  what  three  serious  objections  is  a  reconnaissance 
in  force  open?     (84.) 

176.  What  is  a  special  reconnaissance?     (85-86.) 

177.  How  is  an  attempt  upon  a  hostile  picket  carried 
out?     (87.) 

178.  How  may  a  force  employed  on  a  special  reconnais- 
sance vary  in  size?     (87.) 

179.  How  are  patrols  primarily  divided,  and  how  does 
each  vary  in  size?     (88.) 

180.  Patrols  are  also  classified  as  what  kinds? — State 
briefly  the  duties  of  each.     (88-91.) 

181.  State  what  should  be  reported  by  an  exploring  pa- 
trol in  regard  to  the  following:  roads,  railroads,  bridges, 
rivers,  woods,  canals,  telegraphs,  villages,  defiles,  ponds  and 
marshes,   springs   and   rivulets,   valleys,   heights.     (88-90.) 

182.  What  arm  is  generally  best  suited  to  patrolling;. 
and  wh)''  is  the  union  of  infantry  and  cavalry  on  this  duty 
undesirable?     (91.) 

183.  What  is  the  composition  of  a  small  infantry  patrol? 
(92.) 

184.  Describe  the  preparation  and  inspection  of  a  small 
infantry  patrol,  and  describe  the  signals  used.     (92-93.) 

185.  Every  patrol  should  have  what  general   formation? 

(94.) 

186.  What  is  the  only  definite  rule  that  can  be  laid  down 
for  the  formation  of  a  patrol?     (94.) 


224  APPENDIX    II. 

187.  What  considerations  influence  the  distances  and 
intervals  between  the  members  of  a  patrol,  and  what  are 
generally  the  minimum  and  maximum  distances?     (94.) 

188.  Of  what  should  the  point  generally  consist;  how 
are  the  signals  to  and  from  the  commander  transmitted;  and 
how  is  the  patrol  assembled?     (95.) 

189.  Describe  briefly  how  the  patrol  moves,  and  how 
it  returns.     (95.) 

190.  What  should  the  patrol  do  in  regard  to  great  roads? 

(96.) 

191.  What  is  the  general  rule  in  regard  to  a  patrol  halting? 
(96.) 

192.  If  another  patrol  of  the  same  army  or  any  friendly 
force  is  met,  what  should  be  done?     (96.) 

193.  What  should  be  done  if  a  hostile  patrol  is  discovered? 

(97.) 

194.  What  should  be  done  if  the  patrol  falls  into  an  am- 
buscade, and  what  if  a  hostile  sentinel  or  patrol  is  suddenly 
encountered  in  the  dark?     (97.) 

195.  What  questions  should  be  asked  of  civilians  com- 
ing from  the  direction  of  the  enemy,  or  whose  neighborhood 
has  been  visited  by  hostile  troops?     (98.) 

196.  What  should  be  done  in  regard  to  rumors  among 
the  inhabitants  of  important  movements  by  the  enemy?     (99.) 

197.  What  should  be  done  in  regard  to  people  going  in 
the  direction  of  the  enemy?     (100.) 

198.  Give  the  general  rules  in  regard  to  the  selection 
and  treatment  of  guides .     ( 1 00- 102.) 

199.  What  is  the  extreme  penalty  for  the  ofifense  of  mis- 
guiding, and  what  should  be  done  before  punishing  a  guide? 
(101-102.) 

200.  Describe  the  manner  of  reconnoitering  cross-roads, 
heights,  defiles,  bridges,  and  fords.     (102-103.) 

201.  Describe  the  manner  of  reconnoitering  woods,  in- 
closures,  and  houses.     (103-104.) 


RECONNAISSANCE.  225 

202.  Describe  the  manner  of  reconnoitering  villages,  cit- 
ies, and  towms.     (104-106.) 

203.  If  the  patrol  is  strong  enough,  what  places  in  a  vil- 
lage or  city  should  it  seize?     (104.) 

204.  What  information  may  a  patrol  often  gain  from 
private  letters.     (105.) 

205.  Describe  the  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy  in  posi- 
tion.    (106-107.) 

206.  Describe  the  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy  on  the 
march.     (107-108.) 

207.  What  indications  are  furnished  by  boats  and  bridges 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy?     (108.) 

208.  What  indications  are  furnished  by  the  flames  and 
smoke  of  the  enemy's  camp-fires?     (108.) 

209.  WHiat  indications  may  be  noted  of  the  arrival  and 
departure  of  troops?     (109.) 

210.  What  indications  are  furnished  by  the  whistling  of 
locomotives,  the  hurrahing  of  troops,  and  the  noise  of  ex- 
plosions?    (109.) 

211.  Describe  the  noise  made  by  troops  on  the  march, 
and  the  distances  at  which  the  various  arms  can  be  heard. 
(109.) 

212.  What  indications  are  furnished  by  the  reflection 
from  the  weapons  of  marching  troops?     (no.) 

213.  State  the  distances  at  which  various  objects  should 
be  seen  on  a  clear  day,  by  a  man  with  good  vision,     (no.) 

214.  State  some  of  the  conditions  which  cause  an  object 
to  appear  farther  or  nearer  than  it  really  is.     (iii.) 

215.  What  information  may  be  gained  from  the  trail  of 
the  enemy?     (in.) 

216.  What  indications  are  furnished  by  an  abandoned 
camp  or  bivouac?     (111-112.) 

217.  What  inferences  may  be  drawn  from  the  manner 
and  bearing  of  the  inhabitants  in  a  hostile  country?     (112.) 

218.  When  should  reports  be  sent  in,  and  what  should 
be  reported  ?     (112.) 


226  APPENDIX    II. 

219.  How  should  a  verbal  report  be  sent,  and  when  are 
such  reports  better  than  written  ones?     (11 2- 113.) 

220.  What  are  the  indispensable  qualities  of  a  written 
report?     (113.) 

221.  As  a  rule,  what  is  the  general  nature  of  the  forma- 
tion of  a  strong  infantry  patrol?     (115.) 

222.  How  do  the  operations  of  an  expeditionary  patrol 
generally  differ   from    a   special    reconnaissance?     (115-116.) 

223.  In  general,  how  does  an  expeditionary  patrol  effect 
the  capture  of  a  sentinel? — of  a  patrol? — of  prisoners  gen- 
erally?    (116.) 

224.  When  is  the  most  favorable  moment  for  questioning 
prisoners,  and  why?     (117.) 

225.  What  is  the  relative  value  of  different  grades  of 
prisoners?     (117.) 

226.  If  enlisted  men  are  captured,  what  should  they  be 
questioned  about  ?     (117.) 

227.  When  the  object  is  the  destruction  of  roads,  rail- 
roads, or  telegraphs,  or  the  tapping  of  a  telegraph,  how  should 
the  expeditionary  patrol  act  ?     (118.) 

228.  When  may  harassing  patrols  be  used,  and  what 
is  their  general  method  of  operating?     (118-120.) 

229.  Describe  the  nature  and  duties  of  flank  patrols, 
(120.) 

230.  When  may  flank  patrols  be  called  covering  patrols? 
(120.) 

231.  Describe  the  manner  in  which  an  advance  guard 
passes  through  a  town.     (121-122.) 

232.  What  are  the  essential  differences  between  a  cav- 
alry and  an  infantry  patrol?     (123.) 

233.  What  cavalry  soldiers  should  be  selected  for  patrol 
duty,  and  what  is  required  in  their  inspection?     (123.) 

234.  What  general  rule  may  be  prescribed  for  the  for- 
mation of  a  cavalry  patrol,  and  how  do  the  members  of  the 
patrol  carry  their  firearms?     (123-124.) 


reconnaissance;.  227 

235.  How  do  the  signals  of  a  cavalry  patrol  differ  from 
those  of  an  infantry  patrol,  and  what  additional  signals  may 
be  used  on  open  ground?     (124.) 

236.  How  does  a  cavalry  patrol  conduct  itself  at  night? 

(125.) 

237.  Why  must  a  cavalr}'-  patrol  move  along  turnpikes 
and  good  roads,  and  what  precautions  should  it  take?     (125.) 

238.  Why  should  the  patrol  commander  adhere  to  the 
road  selected?     (125-126.) 

239.  In  what  details  of  the  reconnaissance  of  different 
kinds  of  ground  do  the  operations  of  a  cavalry  patrol  differ 
from  those  of  an  infantry  patrol?     (126.) 

240.  If  necessary  to  halt  to  feed  or  water,  what  places 
should  be  avoided,  and  what  selected?     (127.)  ■'';- 

241.  Of  what  are  connecting  patrols  always  composed, 
and  how  do  they  operate?     (128.) 

242.  Describe  the  composition  and  duties  of  pursuing 
patrols.     (128-129.) 

243.  Why  can  cyclist  patrols  operate,  on  a  favorable 
terrain,  more  effectively  than  patrols  composed  of  infantry 
or  cavalry?     (129.) 

244.  Describe  the  composition  of  a  balloon  train.     (130- 

131-) 

245.  What  is  the  usual  elevation  of  a  captive  balloon, 
and  what  can  be  observed  from  that  height?     (130.) 

246.  To  what  height  can  a  captive  balloon  easily  ascend, 
and  at  what  height  is  it  safe  from  hostile  fire?     (131.) 

247.  What  objection  has  been  urged  to  the  use  of  bal- 
loons on  reconnaissance,  why  is  this  objection  not  a  serious 
one,  and  what  is  the  compensating  advantage?     (132.) 

The  Cavalry  Screen. 

248.  What  may  the  cavalry  screen  be  said  to  constitute? 

(135.) 

249.  By  what  cavalry  may  the  screening  duty  be  per- 
formed, and  which  system  would  probably  be  adopted  in 
the  United  States  service?     (135.) 


228  APPENDIX    II. 

250.  On  what  does  the  distance  of  the  screen  from  the 
main  army  depend?     (136.) 

251.  How  does  the  distance  of  the  screen  from  the  army 
change  from  the  time  the  armies  begin  to  concentrate  mitil 
tactical  operations  begin  ?     (137.) 

252.  What  are  the  two  great  objects  of  the  cavalry  screen? 

(137-) 

253.  On  what  does  the  front  of  the  screen  depend,  and 
what  is  the  first  consideration  influencing  it?     (137.) 

254.  What  would  be  the  average  front  of  an  American 
cavalry  brigade  in  screening  and  reconnoitering?     (138.) 

255.  Draw  a  diagram  representing  an  American  cavalry 
brigade  on  screening  and  reconnoitering  duty.     (139.) 

256.  How  may  this  formation  be  varied,  if  the  enemy  is 
at  a  distance,  or  lacking  in  aggressiveness;  and  how,  if  he  is 
close  and  enterprising?     (139.) 

257.  On  what  will  the  number  of  contact  troops  and  the 
intervals  between  them  depend?     (140.) 

258.  How  much  artillery  should  be  attached  to  the  brig- 
ade, and  what  would  be  its  position  under  different  circum- 
stances?    (140.) 

259.  When  the  brigade  is  marching  on  two  parallel  roads, 
where  is  the  reserve?     (141.) 

260.  When  the  brigade  is  forced  to  march  on  a  single 
road,  what  dispositions  are  made  ?     (141.) 

261.  When  the  ground  permits,  and  no  serious  engage- 
ment is  expected  within  the  next  twenty-four  hours,  what 
formation  may  be  adopted?     (141.) 

262.  What  rear  guard  is  provided?     (141.) 

263.  Describe  the  formation  of  the  cavalry  screen,  based 
upon  the  experience  of  the  War  of  Secession.     (142-143.) 

264.  Why  should  the  patrols  sent  out  from  the  screening 
force  generally  be  small;  and  what  is  the  general  rule  for  the 
size  of  a  detachment?     (143.) 

265.  From  what  bodies  are  the  scouting  patrols  taken, 
and  about  how  many  are  usually  employed?     (144.) 


the;  cavalry  scrken.  229 

266.  Describe  Bonie's  "points."     (144.) 

267.  How  far  out  are  patrols  and  detached  scouts  sent, 
and  of  what  should  a  patrol  always  keep  informed?     (144.) 

268.  In  the  movements  of  the  patrols,  to  what  is  every- 
thing subordinated,  and  how  do  the  patrols  accordingly  act? 
(144-145.) 

269.  As  a  rule,  what  patrols  are  detailed  for  each  of  the 
main  routes,  and  the  flanks,  and  to  whom  are  the  lesser  roads 
intrusted?     (146.) 

270.  When  should  a  patrol  sent  out  on  a  special  mission 
return?     (146.) 

271.  What  precautions  should  the  members  of  a  patrol 
take  in  regard  to  papers  on  their  persons?     (146.) 

272.  For  what  duty  are  officers'  patrols  especially  val- 
uable; and  in  entering  a  village  or  town  what  should  they 
do?     (147.) 

273.  As  a  rule,  the  patrols,  if  driven  in,  will  do  what? 

(147.) 

274.  Why  must  the  duties  of  information  be  separated 
from  those  of  security  in  the  case  of  a  cavalry  screen,  and 
how  is  this  separation  usually  effected?     (148-149.) 

275.  To  whom  is  the  information  gained  by  the  cavalry 
screen  transmitted?     (149.) 

276.  On  gaining  contact  with  the  enemy,  what  is  the  first 
consideration,  and  what  should  be  done?     (149-150.) 

277.  If  the  contact  troops  find  themselves  in  the  presence 
of  large  hostile  bodies,  advancing  or  deployed  for  battle,  what 
should  be  done?     (150.) 

278.  Concentration  effected,  what  should  be  done  under 
different  circumstances?     (150.) 

279.  Why  should  good  cavalry  never  be  surprised  by  a 
serious  attempt  of  the  enemy  to  break  through  the  screen? 

(151.) 

280.  If  the  cavalry  is  driven  in  by  the  enemy,  on  what 
does  the  direction  of  its  retreat  depend?     (151.) 


230  APPENDIX    II. 

281.  How  may  the  cavalry  screen  sometimes  find  it 
necessary  to  act  as  a  veritable  advance  guard?     (151.) 

282.  In  combating  the  opposing  cavalry  screen,  when 
should  the  saber,  and  when  the  carbine,  be  used?     (151-152.) 

283.  Why  must  cavalry  always  be  ready  for  effective 
fire  action?     (152.) 

284.  What  effect  on  the  infantry  has  a  good  covering 
screen  of  cavalry?     (153.) 

285.  How  may  the  advanced  cavalry  be  used  to  seize 
important  points;  and  in  this  use,  what  are  the  prime  con- 
siderations?    (153.) 

286.  Describe  how  the  advanced  cavalry  furnishes  and 
covers  foraging  parties.     (154.) 

287.  What  determines  the  number  of  connecting  posts, 
and  of  what  does  each  generally  consist?     (154-155.) 

288.  What  changes  are  made  in  the  strength  and  lo- 
cation of  connecting  posts  in  a  dangerous  country?     (155.) 

289.  How  are  dispatches  received  at,  and  forwarded  from, 
a  connecting  post?     (155-156.) 

290.  When  will  connecting  posts  generally  be  found 
practicable,  and  what  bodies  must  never  establish  them? 
(156-157.) 

291.  Describe  the  formation  of  a  regiment  of  cavalry  as 
a  screening  force.     (157-158.) 

292.  Describe  the  alternative  formation  when  a  strong 
reserve  is  desirable.     (158.) 

293.  Give  a  summary  of  the  general  rules  for  the  conduct 
of  a  cavalry  screen.     (158.) 

Rear  Guards. 

294.  How  is  the  withdrawal  of  a  defeated  army  covered 
on  the  field  of  battle,  and  when  does  the  duty  of  the  rear  guard 
begin?     (160.) 

295.  Why  is  it  that  a  retreating  army  can  be  protected 
by  a  fraction  of  itself  ?     (160.) 


REAR   GUARDS.  23 1 

296.  Why  must  a  rear  guard  be  organized  as  soon  as 
possible?     (160.) 

297.  By  what  must  the  rear  guard  profit,  and  what  two 
courses  of  action  are  then  open  to  the  enemy's  choice  ?     ( 1 60.) 

298.  State  the  strength  of  the  rear  guard  under  vari- 
ous conditions,  and  the  objections  to  having  it  too  large  or 
too  small.     (161.) 

299.  What  troops  should  be  selected  for  the  rear  guard, 
and  what  should  be  done  to  raise  their  morale?     (162.) 

300.  When,  and  how,  should  offensive  returns  be  made? 
(162-163.) 

30 1 .  What  qualities  should  be  possessed  by  the  commander 
of  the  rear  guard,  and  (briefly)  how  should  he  conduct  its 
operations?     (163-164.) 

302.  In  general  terms,  what  is  the  distance  of  the  main 
body  from  the  rear  guard;  and  what  are  the  objections  to 
having  it  too  great  or  too  small?     (164.) 

303.  Describe  the  formation  of  the  rear  guard.     (164.) 

304.  Of  what  arms  should  the  rear  guard  be  composed? 
(165.) 

305.  How  many  guns  should  there  be  with  the  rear  guard, 
and  what  may  their  efl'ective  use  do?     (165.) 

306.  How  should  the  artillery  of  the  rear  guard  be  used, 
and  what  should  be  done  if  it  becomes  necessary  to  abandon 
the  guns?     (165.) 

307.  How  should  cavalry  be  used  with  the  rear  guard? 
(166.) 

308.  How  are  the  several  arms  arranged  in  a  rear  guard 
composed  of  all  arms?     (166.) 

309.  What  shotdd  be  done  with  the  baggage  of  the  rear 
guard?     (166.) 

310.  Draw  a  diagram  representing  a  company  of  infantry 
as  a  rear  guard.     (Plate  XIV.) 

311.  Draw  a  diagram  representing  a  troop  of  cavalry  as 
a  reai  ^aard.     (Plate  XV.) 


232  APPENDIX   II. 

312.  Describe  the  withdrawal  of  the  rear  guard  from 
action.     (167.) 

313.  What  precautions  should  be  taken  to  insure  the 
right  road  being  followed  by  the  rear  guard?     (167-168.) 

314.  Why  must  the  flanks  of  a  rear  guard  be  guarded 
with  especial  care,  and  what  provision  is  made  for  protecting 
them  from  surprise?     (168.) 

315.  If  the  two  armies  are  of  approximately  equal  strength, 
why  should  the  rear  guard  have,  at  first,  an  advantage  over 
the  opposing  advance  guard;  and  why  does  not  this  advan- 
tage continue  ?     (168.) 

316.  In  regard  to  what  is  the  pursuing  army  always  m 
doubt?     (169.) 

317.  What  advantage  has  the  rear  guard  over  the  pur- 
suing force  in  regard  to  the  ground?     (169.) 

318.  What  topographical  features  afford  good  positions 
for  the  rear  guard ;  and  on  what  will  the  amount  of  resistance 
at  each  stand  depend?     (169.) 

319.  To  what  extent  should  the  commander-in-chief 
supervise  the  operations  of  the  rear  guard?     (169-170.) 

320.  What  are  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
having  an  intermediate  body  between  the  main  body  and  the 
rearguard?     (170.) 

321.  "\ATiy  must  contact  with  the  pursuing  force  be  pre- 
served?    (171.) 

322.  If  the  pursuit  seems  to  slacken  or  cease,  how  is  con- 
tact maintained,  and  what  will  often  be  necessary  to  ascer- 
tain the  nature  of  the  pursuit?     (172.) 

323.  Why  do  defiles  offer  good  opportunities  to  an  ener- 
getic pursuer  and  to  an  able  rear- guard  commander?     (172- 

I73-) 

324.  How  may  a  defile  be  defended  at  the  entrance? 
(172.) 

325.  How  may  a  defile  be  defended  at  the  outlet?     (173.) 

326.  What  measures  of  the  rear  guard  may  be  classified 
as  positive;  and  what,  as  negative?     (173.) 


REAR   GUARDS.  233 

327.  Describe  some  of  the  most  important  negative  meas- 
ures that  may  be  taken.     ( 1 73-1 74.) 

328.  What  should  be  done  with  stragglers,  and  with 
the  sick  and  wounded,  with  the  rear  guard?     (175.) 

329.  At  each  halt,  what  is  done  by  the  rear  guard?     (175.) 

330.  How  is  the  rear  guard  relieved  when  practicable? 
(176.) 

331.  When  an  army  is  retreating  by  several  parallel  roads, 
how  are  the  rear  guards  formed  and  commanded?     (176.) 

332.  If  retreating  by  a  single  road,  when  may  secondary 
rear  guards  be  of  use  ?     (176.) 

333.  When  the  line  of  retreat  is  changed,  what  may  be 
done  with  the  rear  guard?     (177.) 

334.  How  may  a  rear  guard  be  used  in  a  retrograde  move- 
ment which  is  not  a  retreat?     (177.) 

335.  How  may  a  rear  guard  be  used  as  a  delaying  force 
when  the  main  body  is  awaiting  battle  in  a  defensive  position  ? 
(177-178.) 

336.  In  what  respects  are  the  duties  of  a  rear  guard  easier 
in  a  friendly  than  a  hostile  country?     (i 78-1.79.) 

337.  Describe  the  duties  of  the  rear  guard  in  a  forward 
march.     (179.) 

Spies. 

338.  Into  what  two  classes  may  spies  be  primarily  divided, 
and  what  may  often  be  the  characteristics  of  each  ?     (180- 181.) 

339.  When  are  the  services  of  spies  most  valuable  ?     (181.) 

340.  From  what  people  should  spies  be  selected?     (181.) 

341.  What  qualities  should  a  spy  possess,  and  how  should 
he  be  tested  if  practicable  ?     (182.) 

342.  How  may  compulsory  spies  be  used  in  certain  ex- 
traordinary cases?     (182-183.) 

343.  What  are  double  spies;  what  precautions  should  be 
taken  against  them;  how  may  they  be  punished;  and  how 
may  they  be  utilized?     (184.) 

17 


234  APPENDIX   II. 

344.  What  precautions  should  be  taken  in  regard  to 
messages  intrusted  to  a  spy?     (184-185.) 

345.  How  may  a  check  be  kept  on  one  spy  by  the  employ- 
ment of  others  ?     (185.) 

346.  How  should  a  spy  be  conducted  from  camp,  how 
should  he  be  received  when  he  comes  in,  and  how  should  he 
be  treated?     (185-186.) 

347.  State  the  questions  of  general  application  to  which 
spies  should  be  required  to  find  answers.     (186-187.) 

348.  What  measures  may  be  taken  to  establish  the  iden- 
tity of  the  spy?     (187.) 

349.  How  may  spies  remaining  in  a  certain  locality  con- 
vey information?     (187.) 

350.  When  the  presence  of  the  enemy's  spies  is  suspected, 
what  should  be  done?     (188.) 

351.  What  people  should  be  especial  objects  of  suspicion 
in[a  camp  or  bivouac?     (188-189.) 

352.  How  may  a  spy  often  be  detected?     (189.) 

353.  When  a  spy  is  captured,  how  should  he  be  searched? 
(189.) 

354.  How  is  a  captured  spy  usually  punished,  and  in 
what  does  the  offense  of  the  spy  essentially  lie?     (189.) 

355.  What  qualifications  are  requisite  for  the  management 
of  the  secret  service  of  an  army?     (190.) 

Newspapers. 

356.  Under  what  conditions  only  should  a  correspondent 
be  allowed  to  accompany  an  army?     (191.) 

357.  What  are  the  duties  of  a  press  censor?     (191.) 

358.  How  may  correspondents  sometimes  be  utilized  to 
lead  the  enemy  into  error?     (192.) 

359.  When  a  newspaper  has  incurred  the  displeasure  of 
the  commander  by  the  nature  of  its  correspondence,  upon 
whom  should  the  punishment  fall?     (192.) 


indian  scouting.  235 

Orientation  and  Map-Reading. 

360.  What  is  orientation  ?     (194.) 

361.  Describe  the  method  of  orientation  by  means  of 
the  compass .     (194.) 

362.  Describe  the  methods  of  orientation  by  means  of 
observation  of  the  sun.     (194-195.) 

363.  How  are  the  points  of  the  compass  indicated  by  the 
moon  in  the  different  quarters?     (195-196.) 

364.  Describe  how  an  observer  could  orient  himself  by 
means  of  the  North  Star.     (196.) 

365.  Describe  the  method  of  orientation  by  map.     (196.) 

366.  Describe  the  means  of  orientation  by  indications. 
(196-197.) 

367.  Describe  how  practice  in  map-reading  may  be  ob- 
tained.    (197.) 

Indian  Scouting. 

368.  Describe  the  ordinary  methods  of  an  Apache  com- 
pany in  the  field  against  hostile  Indians.     (199-200.) 

369.  How  far  out  do  the  Sioux  push  their  advance  guard 
and  flankers,  and  what  do  the  scouts  do?     (201.) 

370.  Describe  some  of  the  expedients  adopted  by  Sioux 
scouts  to  obtain  concealment.     (201-202.) 

371.  How  does  the  Sioux  scout  execute  long-distance 
reconnoitering?     (202.)  i 

372.  What  places  do  the  Indian  scouts  seek  as  look-outs, 
and  what  are  their  methods  in  regard  to  ridges,  enclosed  places, 
etc.?     (202.) 

373.  Where  do  the  Sioux  place  their  camps,  and  what  do 
they  do  if  attacked  and  driven  out?     (202.) 

374.  Describe  the  tactics  of  the  Sioux.     (203.) 

Advance  Guard  Drill. 

375.  Describe  the  commands  and  movements  by  which 
a  company  of  infantry  is  formed  as  an  advance  guard.  (205- 
206.) 


236  APPENDIX    II. 

376.  Describe  the  commands  and  movements  by  which 
a  battalion  of  infantry  is  formed  as  an  advance  guard.  (206- 
207.) 

377.  Describe  the  commands  and  movements  by  which 
two  battalions  of  infantry  are  formed  as  an  advance  guard. 
(207-208.) 

378.  Describe  the  commands  and  movements  by  which 
an  advance  guard  of  infantry  is  assembled.     (208.) 

379.  How  is  a  rear  guard  formed?     (209.) 

380.  Describe  the  commands  and  movements  by  which 
a  troop  of  cavalry  is  formed  as  an  advance  guard.     (210-212.) 

381.  How  is  an  advance  guard  of  cavalry  assembled? 
(212.) 


INDEX. 


Advance  guard,  20;  objects  of,  20;  strength  of,  20;  how  divided,  22; 
typical  formations  of,  23,  24,  29;  distance  of,  from  main  body,  24; 
of  all  arms,  31;  important  rules  for  formation  of  the,  35;  en- 
countering the  enemy,  35 ;  of  a  division,  37 ;  of  an  army  corps,  40 ; 
in  retreat,  41;  passing  through  a  town,  121;  drill  (infantry),  205; 
drill  (cavalry),  210. 

Alexander,  General  E.  P.,  quoted,  132. 

American  war  of  1775-83,  67. 

Andre,  Major,  the  spy,  180. 

Apaches,  as  scouts,  199. 

Archduke  Charles,  spies  of,  188.  ' 

Army,  taken  by  surprise,  1 5 ;  condition  of,  after  defeat,  1 59. 

Army  corps,  advance  guard  of,  40. 

Arnold,  Benedict,  makes  use  of  Tory  spy,  183. 

Artillery,  with  the  advance  guard,  32 ;  with  the  outpost,  51 ;  with  the  cav- 
ahy  screen,  140;  with  the  rear  guard,  165. 

Ash,  Captain,  gallant  exploit  of,  87. 

Ashby,  Colonel  Turner,  as  a  spy,  180. 

Atlanta  campaign,  84. 

Babcock,  General  J.  B.,  on  cavalry  screen,  142. 

Baker's  liattalion  of  Second  U.  S.  Cavalry,  204. 

Balaklava,  Turkish  posts  at,  86. 

Balloon  reconnaissance,  129. 

Banks,  General  N.  P.,  46. 

Barnes,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  reconnaissance  by,  85. 

Bates,  Major-General  John  C,  advance  of,  from  Imus  to  Das  Marinas,  34 

Beaujeu,  retires  from  the  Monongahela,  171. 

Benedict,  General,  unfortunate  outpost  position  chosen  by,  46. 

Big  Bethel,  mutual  retreat  of  combatants  from,  171. 

Blackbtum's  Ford,  action  at,  84. 

Blenker's  division  as  a  rear  guard,  162. 

Bloody  Knife,  the  scout,  202. 

Bllicher,  night  attack  of,  at  Laon,  43. 

Boguslawski,  remarks  of,  on  cavalry  screen,  44,  152. 

Bonie,  Colonel,  on  the  front  of  the  cavalry  screen,  137;  patrol  system  of 
144;  on  German  scouts,  145. 

Boonsiaoro,  rear  guard  action  at,  163. 

Braddock,  General,  retreats  from  the  Monongahela,  171. 

Bridges,  reconnaissance  of,  89,  103. 

Bronsart  von  ScheUendorf,  90;  on  the  press  during  the  war,  191. 

Buford,  General  John,  report  of,  99;  cavalry  of,  in  Gettysburg  cam- 
paign,  136,   151. 

Bugeaud,  Marshal,  outpost  system  of,  69;  on  compulsory  spies,  182. 

Bull  Run,  reconnaissance  at,  84;  retreat  from,  162. 

2M 


238  INDEX. 

Campbell,  the  spy,  1S5. 

Camping-places,  always  noted,  90. 

Canals,  reconnaissance  of,  89. 

Capron,  Captain  Allyn  K.,  advance  guard  under,  at  Las  Guasimas,  34. 

Card,  the  brothers,  spies,  185. 

Cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  51 ;  an  expensive  arm.  51 ;  advance 
guards,  composed  of,  29;  with  the  outpost,  50;  in  reconnaissance  in 
force,  83;  Fifth  U.  S.,  86;  the  arm  for  patrolling,  91;  patrols,  differ 
from  infantry,  123;  how  composed  and  how  inspected,  123;  signals 
used  by,  124;  conduct  of  patrols  at  night,  125. 

Cavalry-  screen,  composed  of,  135;  distance  of,  from  the  army,  136;  front- 
age of,  137;  formation  of,  138;  separation  of  duties  of  security  and 
information  in,  148;  transmission  of  intelligence  in,  149;  contact 
and  fighting,  149;  protecting  the  infantry,  153;  seizing  important 
points,  153;  foraging  by,  154;  connecting  posts  with,  154;  regim^ent 
as,  157;  conclusions  in  regard  to  the,  158. 

Chaffee,  General,  at  El  Caney,  107. 

Chihuahua,  Wool's  expedition  against,  17. 

Cities,  reconnaissance  of,  106. 

Clausewitz,  on  retreats,  159. 

Clery,  examples  given  by,  of  outpost  strength,  48. 

Cold  Harbor,  39. 

Colombey,  battle  of,  22. 

Commander,  the  duty  of  a,  15;  of  the  advance  guard,  27;  of  the  outpost,. 
53;   of  the  picket,  77;   of  the  vanguard,  26;   of  the  rear  guard,  163. 

Compliments,  29,  68. 

Connecting  files,  23,  30. 

Connecting  posts,  1 54. 

Connecting  sentinels,  59. 

Cooke,  General  P.  St.  G.,  135. 

Cordon  system  of  outposts,  46. 

Cossacks,  covering  detachments  of,  134;  annoy  the  French  rear  guard,  166, 

Cossack  posts,  66,  77. 

Cox,  General  J.  D.,  ingenious  disposition  of  advance  guard  by,  35. 

Crimea,  the,  unknown  to  the  Allies,  16. 

Crook,  General  Geo.,  march  of,  from  Fort  Fetterman,  201. 

Cross-roads,  recormaissance  of,  102. 

Crown  Prince  of  Prussia,  84. 

Cultivated  ground,  reconnaissance  of,  90. 

Custer,  General  Geo.  A.,  defeats  Rosser,  148;  news  of  defeat  by  the  Indians, 

99- 
CycHsts,  employment  of,  23. 
Cyclist  patrols,   129. 

Davoust's  use  of  cavalry,  134. 

De  Cissey,  General,  attacks  German  patrols,  148. 

Defensive  positions,  should  be  noted,  90. 

De  Fezensac,  at  Smolensk,  163. 

Defiles,  reconnaissance  of,  90,  103;  defense  of,  172. 

Deserters,  how  received  at  outpost,  57. 

Early,  General  J.  A.,  in  Shenandoah  Valley,  148. 
El  Caney,  battle  of,  107. 


INDEX.  239 

Enemy  in  position,  reconnaissance  of,  106;  on  the  march,  reconnaissance 

of,  107. 
Engineers  wth  advance  guard,  35. 
Eugene,  perilous  march  of,  98. 
Ewell's  corps,  capture  of,   171. 

Examining  posts,  60;  when  they  may  be  of  use,  60. 
Firing,  by  sentinels,  58. 

Fires,  ^^^th  picket,  64;  with  support,  65;  with  reserve,  68. 
Fisher's  Hill,  battle  of,  148. 
Flags  of  truce,  57,  60. 
Flank  guards,  41. 
Flanking  groups,  23. 
Fleurus,  battle  of,  129. 
Fords,  reconnaissance  of,  89,  103. 
Forey's  division,  defeats  Stadion's  corps,  84. 
Forrest's  cavalry  as  rear  guard,  162. 
Fort  on' s  surprise  at  Vionville,  43. 
Franco-German  War,  advance  guards  in,  21,  22. 
Frankhn,  Tenn.,  advance  guard  entering,   122. 
Frederick  the  Great,  15,  107. 
French  cavalry  patrols,  ingenious  expedient  of,  125. 

General  staff,  Bronsart  von  Schellendorf's  "Duties  of  the,"  18. 

Gettysburg,  ^\rmy  of  the  Potomac  at,  159. 

Giulay,  Cotmt,  84. 

Grant,  General  U.  S.,  39;   gets  possession  of  Johnston's  plans,  182. 

Grant's  Virginia  campaign,  17. 

Gravelotte,  Germans  at,  160.  I 

Guides,  employment  and  treatment  of,  100. 

Hale,  Captain,  the  spy,  180. 

Halts,  of  the  advance  guard,  28;  of  rear  guard,  175. 

Hancock,  General  W.  S.,  enabled  to  receive  Longstreet's  attack,  116. 

Hardee,  Captain,  surrenders  to  Mexicans,  127. 

Hardee,  General  W.  J.,  at  Hoover's  Gap,  153. 

Heights,  recoimaissance  of,  90,  103. 

Henry,  General  Guy  V.,  formation  of  regimental  screen  devised  by,  158. 

Heth,  General  H.,  held  in  check  by  Buford,  151. 

Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen,  Prince  Kraft  zu,  on  German  scouts,   145. 

Hooker,  General  J.,  135. 

Hoover's  Gap,  battle  of,  153. 

Horse  artillery,  in  reconnaissance  in  force,  83;  with  cavalry  screen,  140. 

Hospital  troops,  37. 

Houses,  reconnaissance  of,  104. 

Howard,  General  O.  O.,  orders  special  reconnaissance,  88, 

Humphreys,  General,  quoted,  116;  defeats  Gordon,  171. 

Hurlbut,  General,  at  Memphis,  181. 

Inclosures,  reconnaissance  of,  104. 

Indian  scouting,  199. 

Infantry  patrols,  small,  their  composition,  92 ;  preparation  and  inspection 

of,   92;    signals   used   by,    93;    formation   of,    94;    conduct   of,    95; 

encoimtering  the  enemy,  96;    meeting  inhabitants,  98;    employing 

guides,  100;  strong,  114. 


240  INDEX. 

Information,  the  indispensable  basis  of  military  plans,  16;  the  kinds  of, 
necessary  for  a  commander,  1 6 ;  lack  of,  in  Mexican  War,  1 7 ;  how 
gained,  16,  18. 

Inhabitants,  how  questioned,  98. 

Jackson,  General  Andrew,  harassing  patrols  used  at  New  Orleans  by,  119. 

Jackson,  General  "Stonewall,"  135. 

Jena,  pursuit  after  battle  of,  159. 

Johnston,  General  J.  E.,  on  condition  of  his  army,  Bull  Run,  159;  retreat 

of,  to  Jackson,  Miss.,  174. 
Jomini,  on  reconnaissance,  82. 

Katzler's  contact  squadrons,  134. 
Kenesaw  Mountain,  reconnaissance  at,  85. 
Kent,  General  J.  Ford,  note  132. 
Koniggratz,  Prussians  at,  159. 
KutusoflF,  retires  from  Malo-Jaroslawitz,  171. 

Laon,  Marmont's  neglect  at,  43. 

Las  Guasimas,  34. 

Lee,  General  Fitzhugh,  39,  163. 

Lee.  General  R.  E.,  39,  105,  147,  171. 

Lee,  Colonel  W.  H.  F.,  at  Boonsboro,  163. 

Lewal,  General,  on  German  spies,  188. 

Ligne,  Prince  de,  on  double  spies,  184. 

Linares,  General,  defense  of  Santiago  de  Cuba  by,  178. 

Line  of  observation,  by  whom  occupied,  44;  regulates  position  of  picket,  62. 

Lomax,  General,  defeated  by  Merritt,  148. 

Longstreet,  General,  attack  by,  at  The  Wilderness,   116;  precaution  of, 

in  regard  to  a  written  order,  147. 
Lyon,  General  Nathaniel,  180. 

MacArthur,  Major  A.,  Jr.,  reconnaissance  by,  85. 

McClellan,  General  G.  B.,  testimony  of,  before  Committee  on  the  Conduct 

of  the  War,  17;    obtains  Lee's  orders,   147;    at  Malvern  Hill,   169; 

secret  service  of,  190. 
McDowell,  General  I.,  84. 

MacMahon,  Marshal,  march  of,  to  the  relief  of  Bazaine,  99,  190. 
Malo-Jaroslawitz,  mutual  flight  of  combatants  from,    171. 
Map-reading,  197. 
Marmont,  Marshal,  on  marches,  20;  his  neghgence  at  Laon,  43;  in  1814, 

136. 
Mars-la-Totn,  battle  of,  25,  149. 
Mason,  Lieutenant,  killed,  127. 
Massdna's  retreat  from  Portugal,  168. 
Maurice,  Colonel  F.,  on  Art  of  War,  199. 

Merritt,  General  W.,  on  cavalry  screen,  142;  defeats  Lomax,  148. 
Milaradowitch,  cuts  in  between  main  body  and  rear  guard  of  the  French 

171. 
Military  intelligence,  bureau  of,  16. 

Monongahela,  mutual  flight  of  combatants  from  the,  171. 
Montebello,  battle  of,  84. 
Montecuculi,  on  spies,  180. 


INDEX.  241 

Monterey,  Taylor's  movement  on,  17. 

Moore,  Colonel,  75. 

Moore,  Sir  John,  at  Coruna,  169;  directs  the  movements  of  his  rear  guard, 

169. 
Moreau,  General,  receives  intelligence  of  Jourdan's  reverses,  190. 
Moscow,  French  annoyed  by  Cossacks  on  retreat  from,  166. 
Murat,  enjoined  to  capture  prisoners,  117;  screening  duty  by,  134;  beaten 

back  by  Russian  rear  guards,  160. 

Nancy,  entered  by  Uhlans,  126. 

Napoleon,  remarks  of,  33,  161;  his  army  covered  by  a  screen  of  cavalry. 

134;  directions  to  Marmont,  136;  retires  from  Malo-Jaroslawitz,  171, 
Nash\'ille,  Confederate  retreat  from,  162. 
Negative  measures  of  rear  guard,  173. 
Newspaper  correspondents,  trouble  caused  by,   190;  conditions  required 

of,  191;  how  utilized,  192;  how  punished,  192. 
Ney,  Marshal,  in  retreat  from  Moscow,  161;   at  Smolensk,  163;   mistake 

of,  at  Ceira,  168;   compels  Wellington  to  deploy  at  Redinha,  169. 

Observation,  Hne  of,  regulates  position  of  pickets,  62,  63. 

Outposts,  definition  of,  43 ;  disasters  resulting  from  neglect  of,  43 ;  duties 

of,  44;  [subdivisions  of,  44;   two  systems  of,   46;   position  of,  46; 

strength  of,  47 ;   composition  of,  48 ;   distance  of  the,  from  the  main 

body,  52;   at  night,  69;    Bugeaud's  system,  69;   patrols,  72;   posting 

the,  75;  reUe^'ing  the,  80;  defense  of  the,  79. 
Orange  Court- House,  reconnaissance  toward,  86. 
Orientation,  194;  by  compass,  194;  by  sun,  194;  by  moon,  195;  by  North 

Star,  196;  by  map,  196;  by  indications,  196. 

Paris,  German  pickets  at  siege  of,  63. 

Patrol  system  of  outposts,  46. 

Patrolling,  73;  patrolling  posts,  73. 

Patrols,  outpost,  72;  visiting,  72,  88;  reconnoitering,  72,  91;  small,  73,  92; 
strong,  73,  74,  114;  officers',  88,  146,  147;  covering,  88,  120;  con- 
necting, 91,  128;  exploring,  88;  harassing,  91,  118;  expeditionary, 
91,  115;  pursuing,  91,  128;  flank,  120;  cyclist,  129;  with  cavalry 
screen,  143. 

PfafFendorf,  battle  of,  107. 

Phihppines,  campaign  in  the,  14,  18,  34,  35,  66,  loi,  105. 

Picket,  strength  of,  61;  front  of,  62;  requirements  of  good  position  for, 
63 ;  posting  the,  76 ;  under  arms,  80. 

Picket  commander,  duties  of,  77. 

Picket  firing,  in  War  of  Secession,  58. 

Picket  sentinel,  59. 

Pierron,  General,  on  Cossack  posts,  67. 

Pleasant  Hill,  battle  of,  46. 

Pleasonton,  General  Alfred,  screening  duty  by,  136. 

Ponds  and  marshes,  reconnaissance  of,  90. 

Pont-a-Mousson,  capture  of  German  patrol  at,  127. 

Posts,  examining,  60;  detached,  61. 

Prentiss,  General,  75. 

Prisoners,  questioned,  83;  examination  of,  at  The  Wilderness,  116;  Napo- 
leon enjoins  their  capture,  117;  when  questioned,  117;  different  val- 
ues of,  117. 


242  INDEX. 

Railroads,  reconnaissance  of,  89 ;  destruction  of,  118. 

Rear  guard,  when  its  duties  begin,  1 60 ;  strength  of,  161;  morale  of  the, 
must  be  raised,  162;  offensive  returns  of,  162;  commander  of,  163; 
distance  of,  from  the  main  body,  164;  formation  and  composition  of, 
164;  withdrawal  of,  from  action,  167;  commtmication  of,  with  main 
body,  167;  protection  of  the  flanks  of,  168;  conduct  of,  168;  must 
preserve  contact  with  the  enemy,  171;  negative  measures  of,  173; 
sick  and  wounded  with,  175;  retreating  by  parallel  roads,  176;  when 
hne  of  retreat  is  changed,  177;  in  retrograde  movement  not  a  retreat, 
177;  in  a  friendly  country,  178;  in  a  hostile  country,  179;  on  a  for- 
ward march,  179. 

Reconnaissance,  how  primarily  performed,  19;  kinds  of,  82;  in  force,  82; 
special,  85. 

Report,  of  exploring  patrol,  90 ;  of  small  infantry  patrol,  112;  indispens- 
able qualities  of  a,  113;  form  of  a,  113. 

Reserve,  of  advance  guard,  23;  of  outpost,  68. 

Rivers,  reconnaissance  of,  89. 

Roads,  reconnaissance  of,  89;   destruction  of,   118;  obstruction  of,  174. 

Rodman,  Lieutenant  John  B.,  99. 

Rosebud,  battle  of,  203. 

Rosecrans,  General  W.  S.,  moves  against  Bragg,  153. 

Rosser,  General  T.  L.,  defeated  by  Custer,  148. 

Rough  Riders,  advance  guard  of,  34. 

Running  guard,  59. 

Riistow,  intermediate  body  recommended  by,  170. 

Sabine  Cross-Roads,  battle  of,  46,  136. 

Sailors'  Creek,  battle  of,  171. 

Samar,  Island  of,  conditions  in,  35. 

San  Juan,  battle  of,  132. 

Santiago  campaign,  130,  132,  178. 

Saxe,  Marshal,  on  spies,  180. 

Scouts,  cavalry,  123,  125;  Apache,  199;  Sioux,  201. 

Secret  service,  requirements  of,  190. 

Sentinels,  how  posted,  55 ;  their  duties,  56^  who  may  cross  the  line  of,  56  ; 
connecting,  59;  picket,  59. 

Shaw,  on  scouts,  125. 

Shenandoah  Valley,  roads  in,  142. 

Sheridan,  General  P.  H.,  on  condition  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  5 1 ;  gains  inf ormaton  of  the  condition  of  the  Confederate 
Army,  105;  employment  of  spies  by,  185;  screening  duty  by,  135, 
136;  defeats  Early  at  Tom's  Brook,  148,  149;  cuts  off  Confederate 
rear  guard,  171. 

Sherman,  General  W.  T.,  87;   on  Johnston's  retreat,  174. 

Shiloh,  carelessness  of  U.  S.  outposts  at,  43;   reconnaissance  before,  75. 

Signals,  use  of,  by  the  advance  guard,  29;  by  patrols,  93. 

Signs  and  trails,  108. 

Sioux,  their  camps,  202;  scouts,  201. 

Sitting  Bull's  Camp,  202. 

Smith,  General  Kirby,  136. 

Smolensk,  rear  guard  action  at,  163. 

Smyrna  Camp-Ground,  reconnaissance  at,  88. 

Solferino,  reconnaissance  before  the  battle  of,  99. 


INDEJX.  243 

Spanish-American  War,  66,  10 1,  iSo. 
Spicheren,  battle  of,  22;  retreat  from,  147. 

Spies,  military  and  civilian,  180;   compulsory,  1S2;   double,  184;  how  de- 
tected, 189;  how  searched,  189. 
Spottsylvania,  39. 

Springs  and  rivulets,  reconnaissance  of,  90. 
Stadion's  corps,  reconnaissance  by,  84. 
Staff  officer  with  the  advance  guard,  27. 
Stanley,  General  D.  S.,  special  reconnaissance  by,  88. 
Stedman,  Fort,  capture  of,  57. 
Steinfeld,  artillery  fire  against  balloons  at,  131. 
Stoneman,  General  Geo.,  135. 
Stuart,  General  J.  E.  B.,  screening  duty  by,  135. 
Stvilpnagel's  advance  guard,  25. 
Sumner,  General  S.  S.,  note,  132. 
Support,  of  advance  guard,  23,  30;  of  outpost,  65. 
Sykes'  regulars,  cover  retreat  from  Bull  Run,  162. 

Taylor,  General  R.,  report  of,  to  Kirby  Smith,  136. 

Taylor,  General  Z.,  movement  of,  on  Monterey,  17. 

Telegraphs,  reconnaissance  of,  90. 

Terrain,  influence  of  the,  on  formation  of  the  advance  guard,  34. 

Thomas,  General  G.  H.,  154. 

Thornton,  Captain,  capture  of,  127. 

Tom's  Brook,  battle  of,  148,  149. 

Torbert,  General,  39. 

Towns,  reconnaissance  of,  106. 

Trench,  Chenevix,  on  frontage  of  cavalry  screen,  137. 

Truce,  flag  of,  how  received,  57,  60. 

Tyler,  General,  reconnaissance  by,  84. 

Uhlans,  enter  Nancy,  126;  annoy  the  French  columns,  145. 

Valleys,  reconnaissance  of,  90. 

Van  Mulken,  on  outposts,  43. 

Vauban,  at  siege  of  Luxembourg,  97,  107. 

Vedettes,  how  posted,  55. 

Vibray,  German  cavalry  stopped  at,  152. 

Victorio,  skill  of,  in  selecting  positions,  200. 

Villages,  reconnaissance  of,  90,  104. 

Vionville,  Forton's  surprise  at,  43. 

Von  Decker,  on  women  as  spies,  181. 

Von  der  Goltz,  on  advance  guards,  22;  on  cavalry,  134;  on  newspapers 

in  war,  191. 
Von  Moltke,  receives  news  of  MacMahon's  march,  190. 
Von  Schmidt,  quoted,  151. 
Von  Valentini,  on  American  outpost  duty,  67. 
Von  Witzleben,  on  orientation,  194. 

Walker,  General  J.  B.,  147. 
Waterloo,  ptu-suit  after  Ijattle  of,  159. 
Wamnadaka-Wanich,  conveys  news  of  Custer's  defeat,  99. 
Weissenburg,  battle  of,  152. 


244  INDEX. 

Wellington,  compelled  to  deploy  at  Redinha,  169. 

Wheaton,  Major-General  Loyd,  advance  guard  of,  34. 

Whitney,  Lieutenant  Henry  H.,  in  Porto  Rico,  180. 

Wiasma,  battle  of,  171. 

Wilder' s  mounted  infantry  at  Hoover's  Gap,  153. 

Wilderness,  battle  of  the,  39,  116. 

Wilkinson,  General,  march  of,  against  Montreal,  177. 

Wolseley  Lord,  on  rear  guard  duty,  179;  on  spies,  187. 

Wood,  General  Leonard,  note,  132. 

Woods,  reconnaissance  of,  89,  103. 

Worth,  battle  of,  22,  84,  152. 

Wright,  General  H.  G.,  39. 


Date 

Due 

Hjnj^i 

FEfi    -q 

2000 

^ 

BOSTON  COLLEGE 


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